Dog Bites

Dog Bite Statistics
Dog Bite Statistics in Children
Why do dogs bite
What to do if you are bitten by a dog
Dog Bite Law
Elements of a Dog Bite Claim
Dogs Most Likely to Bite
Damages
Tips for Keeping Kids Safe
Frequently Asked Questions
States Dog Law
State leash laws

Dog Bites

(All facts are recent unless noted otherwise. All statistics were obtained from reliable sources such as ENA, CDC and others.)

Dog bites are often painful and life changing. The scars are often permanent and ugly. Our attorneys are use to dealing with insurance companies. Our lawyers have extensive experience dealing with insurance companies who refuse to pay. In 2006, there were approximately 65 million dogs kept as pets in the United States. Every year over 4.7 million Americans suffer from painful and often serious dog bite injuries. Most patients need competent attorneys to help them through the insurance maze. A great many of these are simple accidents which do not result in serious injury do not need a lawyer, but a growing number of cases result in long-term disability, and in some cases death. Further complicating the tragedy of dog bites is the overwhelming majority of these bites occur in children, often when they are doing nothing more than playing with the dog.

Approximately 3,000 U. S. Postal Service workers are bit annually by dogs. Every year approximately 800,000 dog bites require medical attention. 386,000 of these cases require emergency medical treatment. This is approximately 1,008 victims a day. Approximately every 40 seconds, someone in the U. S. seeks medical care because of a dog bite. Approximately 12 people die from dog bite incidents annually. Hospital expenses for dog bite related emergency visits are an estimated $102.4 million. Un-neutered dogs are more than 2.6 times more likely to bite than neutered dogs. Male dogs are 6.2 times more likely to bite than female dogs. Among purebreds, Rottweilers were most commonly involved in fatal attacks. Pit Bulls, German Shepherds, Husky types and Malamutes were common in all fatal attacks. Among crossbreds, Wolf Dog Hybrids and mixed breeds were the most commonly involved in fatal attacks. Most dog bites occur in the afternoon and evening, peaking between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. Dog bite reports increase between March and September, with a peak month of July. The majority of biting dogs (77%) belong to the victim’s family or a friend. The majority of dog biting incidents or attacks (61%) occur at home or in a familiar place. In 2003 dog bites accounted for about ¼ of all homeowner’s insurance liability claims with a total cost of $321.6 million.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, nearly 2% of the U.S. population is bitten by a dog each year. This translates to nearly 5 million dog bite victims per year, most of whom are children. In a 10-year period, the number of dogs rose by 2%, while the number of bites increased by 33%. About 1,000 dog bite victims arrive in hospital emergency rooms per day for treatment. Dog bite losses exceed $1 billion per year, with $345 million paid by homeowner insurance policies.

Studies have shown that facial injuries are most common in dog bite cases:

Dog bites result in about 44,000 facial injuries requiring a hospital visit. This is between 0.5% – 1.5% of all emergency room visits.

The lips, nose and cheeks are the areas of the face are most often damaged or injured in a dog bite to the face. 77% of all injuries resulting from dog bites were in the face. Mail carriers were the only exception to this with 97% of dog bite injuries occurring in the lower extremities.

The following chart illustrates types of injuries requiring emergency room visits in 2001. (Information was obtained from the Emergency Nurses Association.):

BODY PART INJURED	EMERGENCY ROOM INCIDENTS	PERCENT (%)
Head/Neck	83,946	22.8
Upper Trunk	5,036	1.4
Lower Trunk	14,432	3.9
Arm/Hand	166,756	45.3
Leg/Foot	94,848	25.8
Other	2,328	.6
TOTALS	368,245	100

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Dog Bite Statistics in Children:

60% of all dog bite victims are children. Dog bite injury rates are highest for children ages 5-9, especially boys. About half of all dog bite victims are children under the age of 14. The median age of children patients that were bitten is 15. Children who were seen in emergency rooms for dog bites were more likely than adults to have been bitten in the face, neck and head. 77% of dog bite injuries to children under 10 years old were facial. Severe injuries occur almost only in children under the age of 10. When a child less than the age of 4 was the victim, the family dog was the attacker 47% of the time. 90% of the time, the attack happened in the home. Dog bites rank second among other common causes of emergency room incidents. There are approximately 333,687 children a year who visit the emergency room for a dog bite.

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Why do dogs bite

There are several reasons why dogs bite people. The most common of these include: Dominance aggression: usually occurs when family members take something from the dog or disturb it while it rests, sleeps, or eats. Defensive or fear aggression: generally occurs with people who move quickly or closely when a dog is frightened. Protective/territorial aggression: can occur when unknown or unfamiliar people get too close to the owner or their property. Predatory aggression: an instinct that causes dogs to react to small, quick moving animals and sometimes children. Pain-elicited aggression: if a dog is injured, it can react violently to those who get near them, even if they mean to help. Punishment-elicited aggression: dogs remember those who cause them pain, and can react negatively to people who may cause them more pain. Redirected aggression: dogs cannot always control their instincts if they are disturbed while aggressive in another context.

There are many reasons why a dog bites. Dogs bite out of fear or to protect their territory or to establish their dominance over the person bitten. Some owners mistakenly teach their dogs that biting is an acceptable form of play behavior, and every year a number of newborn infants die when they are bitten by dogs that see them as “prey.” These reasons are not an excuse when dogs attack people; they are merely natural reasons why dogs can become aggressive. Training, discipline, socialization, gender, and breed can greatly influence whether a dog will attack someone in a given situation.

The owners of dogs causing harm to others can be held legally responsible in most states. Furthermore, victims of dog bites can sometimes collect financial restitution from the owner of the offending animal for their injuries, pain, and suffering. Attacks on people are not the only kinds of situations that merit action, as damage to livestock and other property can sometimes be recovered through the legal process. If you or someone you love was attacked by a dog, you have rights. Although the bite itself may be simple, dealing with the medical consequences and legal complications are often extremely complicated. You need to consult an experienced and dedicated dog bite attorney today in order to get the justice you deserve. Contact one today.

Dog bite attorneys are ready and available to assist you with your dog bite injury.

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What to do if you are bitten by a dog

If you are bitten or attacked by a dog, do not to panic. It is important to identify the animal that bit you, because if it is a stray and you cannot identify it, you’re facing the possibility of having to submit to treatment for rabies, which can be painful.

Immediately wash the wound thoroughly with soap and warm water. Contact your physician for additional care and advice. If you are in immediate medical distress, call an ambulance or go to the emergency room immediately. Report the bite to your local animal care and control agency. Tell the animal control official everything you know about the dog, including his owner’s name and the address where he lives. If the dog is a stray, tell the animal control official what the dog looks like, where you saw him, whether you’ve seen him before, and in which direction he went after the incident.

Try to identify the dog that bit you and see if you can get the address to the house at which the dog bite occurred. If it’s a stray, you could end up having to get rabies treatments, which is very painful. However, if the dog belongs to someone you may not have to get rabies treatment and you also may be eligible for a personal injury lawsuit claim against the owner. Get medical attention as soon as possible after being bitten and follow all physician instructions relating to your care. Get medical attention quickly because any delay in getting medical attention could affect your eligibility for a claim. You might also be ordered to stay out of the sun, use sun block, use scar reduction lotion, change bandages, report for follow up treatment, report for removal of stitches, massage the healing areas. The decision as to whether you need rabies shots must be left to your doctor. Shots are not always called for, because rabies may not be in your geographic area. Don’t be alarmed if your physician tells you that you don’t need this painful treatment. As soon as possible after you’ve received medical attention, focus on finding out as much as you can about the dog and the owner, including whether or not the owner has insurance. Take pictures of all of your injuries. Contact a dog bite lawyer for more information.

Types of insurance policies that typically cover dog bites include:

• Homeowner’s insurance
• Renter’s insurance
• Landlord’s insurance (covering the owner, occupier and/or manager of property)
• Commercial general liability insurance (covering stores and other businesses)
• Insurance covering employers (protecting employees only)
• Motor vehicle insurance

If the owner does have insurance, be sure to find out:

• The name of insurance company
• The address of the office
• Telephone number
• The policy owner’s name

Medical payments coverage
Do not do any of the following:

• Do not discuss money, payment of money, settlement, injury value or anything else involving money
• Do not set up an appointment
• Do not write a letter or a memo
• Do not permit yourself to be tape recorded
• Do not allow the victim to be photographed
• Do not discuss who is responsible
• Do not accept any money

Once you’ve contacted the insurance company, be sure to get a claim number. Have good pictures taken of your injuries on the date of the attack and at reasonable intervals afterwards. This is especially important to document the appearance of infections, bite wounds and marks on the face if you were bitten on the face, and other important visual images of the effect of the attack.

Interview witnesses (if there were any) at the location of the attack or as soon as possible after the attack. The sooner you interview witnesses the better because memories fade in time and you need the facts as fresh as possible. Be sure to take down names, addresses and phone numbers of any witnesses to the attack.

Get a qualified dog bite attorney to represent you and help you with your insurance claim if the dog owner has insurance. Remember, insurance companies are not sympathetic to your injuries. Their job is to pay as little as possible on your claim, which usually will only cover minimal medical care and not come anywhere near what you actually deserve, so it is important that you retain a lawyer to enforce your legal rights as an injured person.

If the dog owner does not have insurance or the insurance policy limits are inadequate to cover your claim, the dog owner may be personally liable for your damages. The dog owner may also be personally liable if he or she acted with actual malice and intentionally caused the injury. If the dog owner is uninsured, underinsured or acted with malice, you definitely need a dog bite attorney to help you assert your legal rights.

As a dog bite victim, you may be entitled to damages and losses, ranging from medical bills and emotional damage, to loss of the opportunity to earn income in the future because of disfigurement. Only an experienced dog bite lawyer will be able to determine if you are eligible for a lawsuit claim. State statutes of limitations do apply, and you may have little as 60 days to start your claim, although you have much longer in most states. (see our statute of limitations section) Contact a qualified dog bite lawyer today. Any delay could adversely affect your eligibility to collect monetary damages.

Some cities, counties and/or states have leash laws. It depends on where you live. Some cities and states consider particular breeds like pit bulls and rottweilers dangerous, while others only consider a dog dangerous only after it behaves in a manner that is regarded, in that particular city or county, as posing unacceptable risks. Contact a dog bite attorney to find out what your city, county and/or state considers a dangerous dog.

Landlord liability law differs from state to state. Some do not ever impose liability on the landlord. However, a landlord may be liable for injuries and bites inflicted by dogs belonging to tenants and possibly other people who bring dogs onto the landlord’s property. It all depends on your state’s laws. Contact a dog bite lawyer to find out the landlord liability laws in your state. This notice should also be sent to the resident of the property, with a copy to the local animal control department, a copy to the injured person, and a copy to the owner of the property if different from the resident.

Remedies for Dangerous Dog in the Neighborhood A dangerous dog in any neighborhood is a difficult and, often times, extremely dangerous situation. A number of potential remedies are available including:
Provide the dog owner with notice and/or a warning regarding their dangerous dog. You may consider including a copy of your state’s dog bite law as an illustration of the liability exposure that this dog creates for the owner.
Pursue a small claims court action if the dog has damaged property or inflicted a very minor injury.
File a complaint with the appropriate authorities (e.g. police, homeowners association, landlord).
Report to animal control officials.

Consider consulting with an attorney.

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Dog Bite Law

Dog bite laws vary from state to state. The location of the dog attack will determine your legal rights. In most instances, dog bite law follows a “strict liability” theory. Under these statutes, the dog owner is responsible for any damage caused by an attack from their dog. For example:

“If a dog bites a person, without provocation while the person is on public property, or lawfully on private property, including the property of the owner of the dog, the owner of the dog shall be liable for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.”

Some states, including New York, Texas Virginia and Maryland, adhere to common law principles with respect to dog bite law. In order for the owner of a dog to be liable to a person injured, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the dog was vicious or had a natural inclination or tendency to be dangerous and that the owner had knowledge thereof.

In determining the character of the dog, you may consider evidence of the general reputation of the dog, as well as evidence of any prior acts and conduct of the dog.

In determining the knowledge of the owner, you may consider evidence of the manner in which the owner maintained the dog, his knowledge of prior acts and conduct of the dog, and any previous warnings issued to others by the owner.

(“The owner of such a dog is not liable to the person injured if the injured person has knowledge of the character of the dog and wantonly excites it or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in the way of the dog.”) If this is so, then it may be necessary to establish negligence on the part of the dog owner. As a result of important differences among states, it is critical that you call an attorney to determine the best course of action to protect your legal rights. This site provides the text of many state dog bite laws.

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Elements of a Dog Bite Claim

The two key elements to prove in a strict liability dog bite claim are:

1. That the Defendant was the owner of the dog in question.
2. That a bite occurred

In some states, where common law negligence principles are applied it is necessary to establish negligence on the part of the dog owner. Although sometimes difficult, ownership can usually be established by licensing and vaccination records, as well as by the testimony of witnesses. In most dog bite cases, there is substantial physical evidence of a dog bite, allowing the second element to be established. Many people believe that “every dog is allowed one bite”. This is simply not true in strict liability states. In these states, the law is clear that good prior behavior from the dog will not exonerate the owner from responsibility.

Provocation Defense

One of the frequently asserted defenses allowed under both common law and strict liability statutes concerns the issue of provocation. It is common for an insurance company to assert that a child in some manner “provoked” the dog and is actually responsible for a resulting bite. This assertion is almost always incorrect.

Statute of Limitations

In every state, there are important time limits within which you must take action or lose your rights to make a claim for damages. These time limits vary considerably and can elapse sooner than you might expect. For example, some states allow action to be taken against a dog owner for a period of up to three years from the date of the incident. It is advisable to seek immediate legal consultation if you or a loved one has been bitten.
There are several circumstances which allow additional time for a dog bite victim to file a claim. The most common example is children under the age of 18. As a legal minor, a child bitten by a dog has until his or her 19th birthday to commence formal proceedings with the proper court. However, it is advisable to seek more immediate legal counsel.

How much would you want if someone did this to your child ! We excel in the representation of children victims and their parents. Our mission is to provide our clients with the highest quality representation to insure that the insurance company settlement or trial compensates our clients fully. Dog bites are a very serious public health problem and a traumatic event for the dog attack victim and their family. All dog bites require medical attention because of blood diseases. Dog Attacks are not Accidents! They are terrifying brutal physical assaults. Don’t sign anything with the insurance company. Insurance companies adjusters are in the business of saving the insurance money. They could care less about your child’s disfigurement or pain and suffering. They feel their only responsibility is to pay the immediate bills and hope you go away. They did not see the attack on your child. They did not see you holding your screaming bleeding child while surgeons stitched their skin. They could care less about the aftermath to the family or the disfigured child. They wont feel the as the empathetic parent watching their child struggle through the cruelty of years of rejection by adolescents peers. When you complain to them they will tell you that it was your fault for neglecting to protect your child but offer you a little money to go away. Don’t be or let your child be a victimized twice.

If your dog bites someone, don’t worry if you have homeowners or tenant insurance. Your rates cannot be raised or canceled because of a claim. Insurance rates are regulated by the State Insurance Commissioner. You pay insurance premiums every month to them so you have an iron clad contract with the insurance company. It is a good idea to contact the State Insurance Commissioner who may advise you as to your rights with your own insurance carrier. If your insurance company violates your rights by failing to respond to the claim in a reasonable time frame or unnecessarily cause you to be sued and taken into court litigation, your rights may be violated and you may have a cliam against your insurance company.

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Dogs Most Likely to Bite

The Centers for Disease Control studies dog bite incidents, including the types of dogs most likely to bite. The breeds that the CDC considers highest risk include:

• Pit bulls
• Rottweilers
• German shepherds
• Huskies
• Alaskan malamutes
• Doberman pinschers
• Chows
• Great Danes
• Saint Bernards
• Akitas

Many small dog owners overlook their dog’s behavior because they are small and/or think they cannot hurt anyone. The truth is, little dogs bite more than big dogs. There have been many cases involving dog bite attacks with smaller dogs such as the case involving a family Pomeranian dog and a 6-week old baby. While there is no clear cut list in which all dogs can be categorized by levels of their dog-bite predictability, generally speaking:

• Any dog, treated harshly or trained to attack, may bite a person. Any dog can be turned into a dangerous dog. The owner most often is responsible — not the breed, and not the dog.
• An irresponsible owner or dog handler might create a situation that places another person in danger by a dog, without the dog itself being dangerous, for example: leaving an infant alone with a dog.
• Any individual dog may be a good, loving pet, even though its breed is considered to be likely to bite. A responsible owner can win the love and respect of a dog, no matter its breed. One cannot look at an individual dog, recognize its breed, and then state whether or not it is going to attack.

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Damages

A dog bite victim may incur many different kinds of damages and losses, from medical bills and emotional damage, to loss of the opportunity to earn income in the future because of disfigurement. A victim may be entitled to recover these losses from another person and that person’s insurance company, provided that the victim presents the necessary proof, first to the insurance company and then possibly in a court of law.

Cosmetic surgery in the future will not be covered by your health insurance. Most future surgery will be considered to be “cosmetic” and therefore will not be covered by their own health insurance. The only way to get those costs paid is to bring a claim right now against the dog owner or other liable person. You should not have to pay for any of these costs out of your own pocket. Get the necessary medical report from a credible plastic surgeon. You must have this information to get an insurance company to pay for future medical treatment.

Dog bites may result in one or more of the following injuries:

• Abrasions
• Lacerations
• Punctures
• Tissue loss and avulsion
• Crush injuries
• Fractured bones
• Sprain / strain injuries
• Scars
• Infections such as rabies, cellulitis, C carnivorous infections

Victims of dog bite injuries to the face, especially children, should be examined for nerve damage and facial fractures. While the incidence of facial fractures from dog bite injuries is statistically low, physicians should not exclude the possibility of fractures resulting from dog attacks. (American Society of Plastic Surgeons, “When Dogs Attack: Report illustrates the Importance of Examining Dog Bite Victims for Facial Fractures,” Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, April 2002.) The article states:

In an overview of 16 dog bite cases, there were 27 facial fractures, with 87 percent of the cases occurring in children under the age of 16. Sixty-nine percent of the cases involved fractures of bones around the eye, the nose, or the jaw. To rule out facial fractures, the authors agree that victims should undergo a computed tomographic (CT) scan in cases with a high degree of suspicion – when large breed dogs capable of crush-type injuries are involved.

Not only can dog bite injuries lead to painful lacerations and puncture wounds, nerve damage, fractures, serious infections, disability, and deformity, but death can occur as well. Between 1989 and 1994, 109 bite-related fatalities were reported, and 57 percent were in children younger than 10 years old. Death can result from infection. For example, C canimorsus infections are very rare but can be very dangerous. They can result in fever, malaise, myalgia, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, dyspnea, confusion, headache, and skin rash. Disseminated intravascular coagulation develops in many patients.

Treatment

The physician’s first priority is to protect the victim from infection. Proper wound management is required to reduce the risk of developing wound infection, sepsis, osteomyelitis, tenosynovitis, and septic arthritis. The wound should be cleaned carefully. After cleaning it, physicians often irrigate the area with normal saline under pressure using a 19-gauge needle and large syringe. A 20-gauge angiographic catheter often is attached and introduced into puncture wounds to facilitate irrigation. Victims frequently state that this is the most painful part of treatment.

It is important to find out when and if the victim had a tetanus shot. Such a shot may be administered if required or the date of the last shot cannot be determined. The dog may be known to be rabid. If so, the victim is treated preventatively for rabies. Because dogs can develop a tremendous force when biting, x-ray studies might be necessary to determine underlying bone and joint injury. Fractured bones must be set. Nerve injuries must be repaired. Dog bites to the neck and face require special considerations. Most occur in children younger than 10 years, and severe brain injury and death are most common in this age group. Most deaths occur from hemorrhage from the great vessels of the neck.

The nose, mouth, and parotid region is a primary target area for dog bites. Depending on the type of bite, the wounds may be closed. If the damage is not extensive, the wounds may be closed with tape or sutures. High-risk wounds should not be sutured but should receive antibiotic treatment. Low-risk wounds may be sutured and do not require antibiotic treatment unless infected. High-risk wounds include all human and cat bites; hand and foot wounds; wounds surgically debrided; puncture wounds; wounds involving joints, ligaments, tendons, and bones; bites with treatment delay exceeding 12 hours; and bites in immunocompromised patients. Low-risk wounds include bites involving the extremities, face, and body. (Heavily damaged tissue may have to be debrided — cut away. Sometimes it can be reattached by grafting; other times it is replaced with skin from another area of the victim’s body. More than one type of surgery may be required:

• Plastic/reconstructive surgery
• Orthopedic surgery

Scars

Dog bite wounds that bleed will inevitably result in scars. The question is whether they will be disfiguring, disabling or painful. Some types of skin produce keloid scars (i.e., scar tissue grows out of control, frequently producing raised, disfiguring scars).
Small scars may fade away. Otherwise, scars may be improved but never removed. Treatment includes:

• Dermabrasion (i.e., sanding down the scar)
• Pressure scar modification
• Surgical excision of scar
• Make-up

Fear of dogs and the outdoors

One of the most painful effects of a dog bite can be the resulting morbid fear of dogs. A victim frequently is a dog lover; after being attacked, however, he or she no longer feels comfortable around dogs, and thereby can no longer enjoy the companionship of “man’s best friend.”

This may interfere with friendships and the quality of life. For example, a woman who lived in the countryside found that she no longer could take walks because she feared being attacked. This left her a “shut-in” for a period of months.

What the parents should watch out for

Your son or daughter’s injuries hopefully will heal without complications. However, the main things that you should be concerned with are:

• Infection. Do exactly what the doctor tells you to do. Dog bite infections are rare but can be very, very serious. Be sure to take your child to the doctor if he has a lot of pain, there is redness at the wound that is getting worse, or if you see streaks of redness heading away from the wound.
• Crush injury. The bigger, powerful dogs have tremendous crush power in their jaws. A crush injury causes scar tissue and compression of the nerves in the soft tissues — and can also break bones. If your child complains of pain even after the wound heals, then you should take her to a doctor that has done a significant amount of work with dog bite victims and is familiar with crush injuries. If you detect any kind of disability — such as favoring the hand or limb that was bitten, or weakness in it — then your child might have a permanent problem, and should be seen by the appropriate physicians.
• Scars. Wounds can result in scars. Some people scar very badly. You should not think about resolving your child’s cliam until the scars have matured to some degree. In cases where an attorney knows that there will be scars, we do not settle them until at least 9 months have passed since the date of the attack. Plastic surgeons who revise scars do not like rendering a long term prognosis about them until at least one year after the attack. When the victim is very young (i.e., under 5 years), the skin rejuvinates and therefore it is difficult to predict what the wound site will look like.
• Emotional injuries. Some children stop talking, or start wetting their beds. Some start hitting their siblings. Some cry and cling to their parents. Some do not want to go outside, or to school. Any unusual behavior may be a sign of emotional injury. This kind of trauma heals most of the time. However, your child might need the assistance of a counselor. See the next section for more information.

Emotional injuries in children

After a horrible event, a person may not feel or behave normally for a significant amount of time. He or she may feel depressed, nervous or fearful — may cry, take dangerous risks or not get along with friends and family. There are many possible symptoms and classifications of this problem. “Post traumatic stress disorder” is one such classification. A dog bite victim might suffer from post traumatic stress disorder for months after the attack. It is unfair to allow this suffering to continue without proper treatment from a mental health practitioner.

The emotional reactions of children who are the victims of, or witnesses to, dog attacks include fear, depression, withdrawal and anger. These problems can occur immediately or sometime after the tragic event. Many such children will develop post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and/or other persistent problems.

“Trauma” includes emotional as well as physical experiences and injuries. Emotional injuries are essentially a normal response to an extreme event. Emotional injury involves the creation of emotional memories, which arise through a long lasting effect on structures deep within the brain. The more direct exposure to the traumatic event, the higher the risk for emotional harm.

The “undifferentiated thinking” of children frequently leads them to derive “wrong” conclusions from traumatic events. A child, especially a very young one, attempts to read the environment in order to enhance his comfort and further survival. A traumatic event like a dog bite is often misunderstood as a statement about life in general, that it is uncertain, painful and precarious. Furthermore, such an event might be internalized as a statement about the child himself, that he is somehow “bad” and even responsible for not only his physical pain but even the emotional pain suffered by his parents as a result of the dog attack. These psychic wounds may become significant determinants of the adult personality, so that the dog attack truly affects the child victim for life.

Either being exposed to violence within the home for an extended period of time or exposure to a one-time event like an attack by a dog can cause PTSD in a child. Some scientists believe that younger children are more likely to develop the disorder than older ones. PTSD can develop at any age, including in childhood. Symptoms typically begin within 3 months of a traumatic event, although occasionally they do not begin until years later. Once PTSD occurs, the severity and duration of the illness varies. Some people recover within 6 months, while others suffer much longer.

Emotional reactions to trauma may appear immediately after the dramatic event or days and even weeks later. Rates of PTSD identified in child and adult survivors of violence and disasters vary widely. For example, estimates range from 2% after a natural disaster (tornado), 28% after an episode of terrorism (mass shooting), and 29% after a plane crash. The disorder may arise weeks or months after the traumatic event.

Children and adolescents exposed to a dramatic events frequently lose trust in adults and have fear that the event may occur again. Other reactions vary according to age:

• For children five years of age and younger, typical reactions may include a fear of being separated from the parent, crying, whimpering, screaming, immobility and/or aimless motion, trembling, frightened facial expressions and excessive clinging. Parents may also noticed children returning to behaviors exhibited at earlier ages (these are called regressive behaviors), such as thumb-sucking, bedwetting, and fear of darkness. Children in this age bracket tend to be strongly affected by the parents’ reactions to the traumatic event.
• # Children six to eleven years old may show extreme withdrawal, disruptive behavior, and/or inability to pay attention. Regressive behaviors, nightmares, sleep problems, irrational fears, inability or refusal to attend school, outbursts of anger and fighting are also common in traumatized children of this age. Also, the child may complain of stomach aches or other bodily symptoms that have no medical basis. School work often suffers. Depression, anxiety, feelings of guilt and emotional numbing or “flatness” are often present as well.
• Adolescents 12 to 17 years old may exhibit responses similar to those of adults, including flashbacks, nightmares, emotional numbing, avoidance of any reminders of the traumatic event, depression, substance abuse, problems with peers, and anti-social behavior. Also common are withdrawal and isolation, physical complaints, suicidal thoughts, school avoidance, academic decline, sleep disturbances, and confusion. The adolescent may feel extreme guilt over his or her failure to prevent injury or loss of life, and may harbor revenge fantasies that interfere with recovery from the trauma.

Some children and adolescents will have prolonged problems after a traumatic event. These potentially chronic conditions include depression and prolonged grief. Another serious and potentially long-lasting problem is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This condition is diagnosed when the following symptoms have been present for longer than one month:

• Re-experiencing the event through play or in trauma-specific nightmares or flashbacks, or distress over events that resemble or symbolize the trauma.
• # Routine avoidance of reminders of the event or a general lack of responsiveness (e.g., diminished interests or a sense of having a foreshortened future).
• Increased sleep disturbances, irritability, poor concentration, startle reaction and regressive behavior.

PTSD may resolve without treatment, but some form of therapy by a mental health professional is often required in order for healing to occur. Fortunately, it is more common for a traumatized child or adolescent to have some of the symptoms of PTSD than to develop the full-blown disorder.

People with PTSD are treated with specialized forms of psychotherapy and sometimes with medications or a combination of the two. One of the forms of psychotherapy shown to be effective is cognitive/behavioral therapy, or CBT. In CBT, the patient is taught methods of overcoming anxiety or depression and modifying undesirable behaviors such as avoidance. The therapist helps the patient examine and re-evaluate beliefs that are interfering with healing, such as the belief that the traumatic event will happen again.

Children who undergo CBT are taught to avoid “catastrophizing.” For example, they are reassured that dark clouds do not necessarily mean another hurricane, that the fact that someone is angry doesn’t necessarily mean that another shooting is imminent, etc. Play therapy and art therapy also can help younger children to remember the traumatic event safely and express their feelings about it. Other forms of psychotherapy that have been found to help persons with PTSD include group and exposure therapy. A reasonable period of time for treatment of PTSD is 6 to 12 weeks with occasional follow-up sessions, but treatment may be longer depending on a patient’s particular circumstances.

Research has shown that support from family and friends can be an important part of recovery and that involving people in group discussion very soon after a catastrophic event may reduce some of the symptoms of PTSD.

There has been a good deal of research on the use of medications for adults with PTSD, including research on the formation of emotionally charged memories and medications that may help to block the development of symptoms. Medications appear to be useful in reducing overwhelming symptoms of arousal (such as sleep disturbances and an exaggerated startle reflex), intrusive thoughts, and avoidance; reducing accompanying conditions such as depression and panic; and improving impulse control and related behavioral problems. Research is just beginning on the use of medications to treat PTSD in children and adolescents.

There is preliminary evidence that psychotherapy focused on trauma and grief, in combination with selected medications, can be effective in alleviating PTSD symptoms and accompanying depression. More medication treatment research is needed to increase our knowledge of how best to treat children who have PTSD.

Parents’ responses to a violent event or disaster strongly influence their children’s ability to recover. This is particularly true for mothers of young children. If the mother is depressed or highly anxious, she may need to get emotional support or counseling in order to be able to help her child.

PTSD is often accompanied by depression. In a group of teenage. Depression must be treated along with PTSD in these instances, and early treatment is best.

Social effects of a disfiguring injury

Without intending it, people may cause a disfigured dog bite victim to feel humiliated and discriminated against. An unmarried person may have trouble getting dates. Consider these shameful, true stories from the actual case files of attorney Kenneth Phillips:

• A prominent scientist had an ugly scar on her wrist from a dog’s teeth; she repeatedly was asked whether she had tried to slit her wrists.
• An attractive lady was bit in the face and the end of her nose was ripped away; she reported that men were less attracted to her, even after reconstructive surgeries.

In our society, good-looking people have more friends, get more invitations and are treated better than those who are disfigured. Disfigured victims are unjustly required to endure stares, painful questions and social discrimination.

Treatment for emotional and social injuries

Emotional and social injuries require treatment from a mental health practitioner such as a psychologist or psychiatrist.

• A psychologist is trained to provide therapy and usually is the best choice for a dog bite victim.
• A psychiatrist is a medical doctor who may provide therapy or medical solutions for a psychological problem. Medical solutions can include prescription drugs and surgery, for which reason they usually are not appropriate in a dog bite case.

Some victims, their friends or families believe that psychological and emotional problems do not require treatment. These people feel that a victim should “tough it out” or simply “ignore it.” It is true that inner strength can overcome many of the difficult emotions we might encounter in the ordinary course of life. However, a dog attack can result in devastating psychological and social injuries that a victim should not endure without professional guidance. Therefore do not hesitate to visit a mental health practitioner at least once for an initial evaluation.

The cost of such services is usually covered by insurance. Be sure to get your insurance agent’s advice about whom to see and how much treatment is covered.

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Tips for Keeping Kids Safe

Children are the most frequent victims or dog bites, but there are a number of precautions parents can take to keep their kids safe. Most importantly, start teaching young children, including toddlers, to be careful around pets. They should know to not hug or approach a dog from behind, touch his food bowl, pull parts of his body, stare directly into his eyes or try to kiss him on the face. Children should always ask permission from a dog’s owner before touching or petting a dog.

Another important tip is to educate kids on what to do if they are threatened by a dog. Tell them to remain calm and do not scream. Speak calmly and firmly and avoid making eye contact with the dog. Try to stay still until the dog leaves or back away slowly until the dog is out of sight. Do not turn and run away. There are several common sense methods of preventing dog bites, but sometimes there is no way to avoid an attack. If you are attacked, first try to block the attack with an object like a jacket or backpack. If you fall or are knocked to the ground, curl into a ball, protect your face by covering your head and neck, and cover your ears, as well.

How to Avoid Dog Bites
There are several ways to help reduce the risk of a bite:

• If confronted by a dog trying to sniff you, stand still, don’t try to run away. Most dogs will move away after determining that you are not a threat.
• Never interfere with a dog that is caring for it’s puppies.
• Never startle a dog, by waking it or throwing an object in it’s direction.
• Don’t disturb a dog while it is eating or drinking.
• If you feel threatened by a dog, do not run. A dog’s instinct will likely be to give chase. Stay calm. If you speak, talk in a firm voice without screaming.
• Be very mindful of your children around all dogs, including family pets. Most dog bites occur to children.
• If you think a dog may attack, remain motionless with hands at your sides. Once the dog loses interest in you, slowly back away until the dog is out of sight.
• If the dog does attack, “feed” the dog your jacket, purse, bicycle, or anything that you can put between yourself and the dog.
• If you fall or are knocked to the ground, curl into a ball with your hands over your ears and remain motionless. Do not scream or roll around.
• Despite the best preventive measures, bites can occur. If you or a child are bitten, seek emergency medical attention immediately.

How to Avoid Dog Bites to Children

Just as we teach our children to practice safety in other situations, we can teach them to be safe around dogs. The most important lessons for children to learn are not to chase or tease dogs that they know and to avoid dogs that they don’t know.
The following rules will help prevent your child from receiving a bite wound:

• Treat all dogs as potentially dangerous, unless supervised by an adult.
• Children should never be alone with a dog.
• Never approach a restrained or confined dog.
• Never approach a barking dog, even if he is wagging his tail.
• Never take a toy or food from a dog.
• Never disturb a sleeping dog.
• Never discipline a dog by hitting it.

Below I will list selected preventative steps that should be undertaken by parents, landlords, dog owners, and anyone who anticipates contact with a dog. Analysis of dog bites incidents suggests that if these selected preemptive steps are taken, either alone or in combination, the dog bite problem in this country would lessen considerably.

Recommendations for parents

Parents should instruct children not to approach and interact with dogs they do not know that well, particularly in certain circumstances such as when a dog is feeding, when a dog in in possession of a coveted object such a bone or something that it has stolen, or when a dog is resting or sleeping;

In selected circumstances, parents should instruct children not to charge a dog or place their face into the face of a dog they do not know that well. This recommendation also applies to adults;

Both children and adults should be cautious around a dog who is chained until indication is received from the dog itself (i.e. through it’s behavior) or from the owner that the dog will not bite or act aggressively;

In selected circumstances, children need to be taught to respect a dog’s personal boundaries, including the dog’s territory and “personal” space, and further children (and adults as well) need to recognize a dogs body language.

Instruct children not to tease neighborhood dogs, or for that matter any dog;

Parents should teach their children to treat dogs in a humane and caring manner. There should be zero tolerance for animal abuse;

Keep children away from a dog who they know could be aggressive, and both children and adults should avoid circumstances that might elicit aggressive responding from a dog. These circumstances have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis – situations obviously differ.

Recommendations for owners

Obtain a dog from an experienced breeder with a track record of breeding for temperament and not just physical appearance. Be wary about obtaining a dog from pet shops, puppy mills, “backyard” breeders, or obtaining a puppy whose background is mysterious (e.g. stray dog found on the street).

Spay or neuter the dog, ideally before 9 months of age;

Subject your dog to obedience and socialization training, ideally before 6 months of age. Older dogs also benefit from “refresher” obedience training under the instruction of a behaviorist or dog trainer.

Avoid chaining an aggressive dog as a means of restraint and avoid long periods of sustained confinement in one area. A caveat to this is that some dogs (depending on a dog’s temperament and behavioral history) can be confined or chained without negative consequences;

Act in a responsible manner: take your dog in for regular veterinary examinations, including blood work, to rule out medical causation for possible aggressive responding;

Recognize warning signs of aggression and seek professional help from a specialist when the first signs of aggression appear. Do not wait until the dog bites someone. Behavioral therapy should be started to reduce a dog’s tendencies to bite. Part of this therapy may include the use of drugs when necessary.

Choose a dog which you know you can physically control;

Dogs with strong predatory tendencies (e.g. killing cats) should be kept away from toddlers and children and the dog’s predatory tendencies should to be addressed with behavioral modification;

If you dog lacks a proven tract record of 100% acceptable and non-aggressive behavior around children, and to a lesser extent around adults, then keep the dog away from children (or adults) who do not know the dog that well;

Post warning signs (e.g.”Beware of Dog”) when necessary and use judgement when it comes to the need of possibly warning people that your dog could become aggressive and bite;

If you know you have a dog with aggressive tendencies, make sure the dog can’t escape from your property. Mend broken fences, install locks on gates, make sure gates close automatically and properly, instruct service people to close gates, know the whereabouts of your dog when you open a garage door, etc.

Use a muzzle when appropriate;

In selected cases, reduce the height of a dog’s canine teeth via veterinary surgical procedure;

Lodge complaints to animal control about neighborhood dogs who act aggressively;

Be wary of circumstances when a female is in heat and in the proximity of a male dog, particularly a male dog who has not been neutered. Some male dogs may become aggressive in these circumstances. The bottom line: do not let people, particularly small children, interact with a male dog or a bitch, when the male is near a bitch who is actively in heat (the duration of esterus in female dogs is relatively short: 4 – 7 days; behaviorally this can be determined via “flagging” behavior in the bitch). After the period of esterus has ended, owners do not need to be as concerned because intact males quickly lose interest in the female and become less protective.

Aggressive dogs should be relocated so that the likelihood of attack on a person is substantially reduced, or the dog should be placed in a shelter. If these options are not available, in selected cases, the dog should be destroyed.

Comply with local leash laws. Letting you dog run loose in an urban environment or residential area could be dangerous:

Your dog might approach a person and frighten that person, causing that person to fall;

Your dog, albeit non-aggressive, might approach and try to interact with a dog-aggressive-dog (possibly being walked on leash), an altercation starts, and somebody gets injured;

Your dog might run into the street in pursuit of a squirrle or cat and get hit by a car or possibly cause a traffic accident;

Your dog could pick up a disease through contact with another animal and transmit it to you or your child;

Your dog could injure a person if it accidentally collided with a person while in pursuit of some object like a cat (or another dog), or while playing with another dog.

Recommendations for landlords

Landlords should have zero tolerance for aggressive dogs residing on their property. Once a landlord becomes aware of a dog’s aggressive nature, steps need to be immediately taken to reduce the risk of injury to people living on the property or coming near the property.

Dog Bite Articles

AVMA Task Force on Canine Aggression and Human-Canine
Interactions. A community approach to dog bite prevention. JAVMA 2001; 218: 1732-1749.
CDC. Dog-Bite-Related Fatalities – United States, 1995-1996. MMWR 1997;46:463-7.
Colebourn, John. Spate of maulings a wake up call for dog owners. The Province, March 16, 2003.
Gershman KA, Sacks JJ, Wright JC. Which dogs bite? A case-control study of risk factors. Pediatrics 1994;93:913-7.
Newman, Sarah Casey. Grrr!: Authors throw the book at owners for letting dogs bite. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 26, 2000.
Sacks JJ, Kresnow M, Houston B. Dog bites: how big a problem?
Injury Prevention 1996;2:52-4.
Sacks JJ, Sinclair L, Gilchrist J, Golab GC, Lockwood R. Breeds of dogs involved in fatal human attacks in the United States between 1979 and 1998. JAVMA 2000;217:836-840.

Dog Bite Books

Ledwith, Irene. Dog Bite February, 1988. Nexus Press Margolis, Matthew & Mordecai Siegal. Grrrrrr!: The Complete Guide to Understanding and Preventing Aggressive Behavior in Dogs, March 2000
Nardi, Ken. Why Dogs Bite: How to Prevent My Dog from Becoming a Biter. February, 1998. Nardi
Wilson, Sylvia. Bite Busters; How to Deal with Dog Attacks, June 1998. Simon & Schuster Australia

Given the nature of dogs and given that dogs are embedded in our society we must accept that, like people, dogs will become aggressive and bite, and even maul and kill a person.

Annually in the United States it is generally held that approximately 4.5 million people are bitten by dogs. The majority of victims are children. Educating potential victims, particularly children, and educating owners about dog bite prevention is probably the best way to curtail the so-called “dog bite problem”. Whether the problem exists to the extent that it does has been questioned in a recent book.

Information about dog bite prevention is now widely available from many different sites on the internet. For example, from the American Veterinary Medical Association – and not surprisingly from organizations which stand to lose the most financially – State Farm Insurance and the US Postal Service.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Question: What exactly is a dog bite?

Answer:
A “dog bite” is an action by a dog in which the mouth of the dog closes around an object or person. Broken skin is not a requirement. If the dog closes its jaws on something, it “bites” that thing, or that person, whether or not the skin is damaged. Some of the most painful dog bite injuries consist of crush wounds to the soft tissues beneath the skin. For example, a victim wearing denim jeans might have a painful crush injury but no broken skin. There might be surrounding circumstances and indications that can lead to a more definite conclusion as to whether the closing of the jaws was a “bite or something else.

Question: Why do some dogs bite?

Answer: There are many reasons why a dog may bite. Dogs may bite due to fear, to protect their territory, or to establish their dominance over the person being bitten. Some dog owners mistakenly teach their dogs that biting is an acceptable form of play behavior.
Every year a number of newborn infants die when they are bitten by dogs that see them as “prey.” Because dog bites occur for many reasons, many components of responsible dog ownership-including proper socialization, supervision, humane training, sterilization, and safe confinement-are necessary to prevent dogs from biting.

Question: What are some warning signs that a dog may become violent?

Answer: A dog that is under socialized by being tied up all the time and confined to a small yard can be psychologically damaged and not know how to act if it gets out. A lot of aggression can arise out of fear. Every dog needs lots of exercise and mental stimulation.
Another sign could be a dog that is ill or old. These dogs may turn mean if they are not touched in a manner they do not like. Try to not pat or touch a dog without the owner’s consent.

Question: What can I do to lessen the chance that my dog will bite a person?

Answer:

• Get the advice of a veterinarian about the right breed of dog if you are thinking about getting a family dog
• Purchase dogs from a reliable breeder or from a shelter that evaluates its animals thoroughly
• Spay or neuter your dog, this often reduces its aggressive tendencies
• Be sure all pets are properly immunized and have up-to-date vaccinations
• Make sure to have all up-to-date information on your dog (identification tags, vaccination records, etc.)
• Seek a veterinarian’s advice quickly if your dog becomes aggressive
• Never leave babies or small children alone with a dog without adult supervision
• Teach your dog submissive behaviors, like rolling over to show its stomach
• Take your dog to obedience classes so it becomes accustomed to obeying voice commands
• Obey all leash laws, licensing laws and warning sign laws
• Make a point of rewarding your dog for good behavior
• Do not play aggressively with your dog (tug-of-war, wrestling)
• Introduce your dog to different people, other dogs and unthreatening situations
• Don’t allow your dog to roam, keep it in a fenced yard

Question: Are dog owners liable if their dogs injure another person?

Answer: In the past, a dog owner was only held liable if their dog had already bitten or shown that it was likely to bite a person. Now, most states hold the owner responsible regardless of whether the dog had previously shown a predisposition to bite a person. Liability will be assigned based on evidence presented to the court. In these cases, knowledge of the dog’s past behavior is important.

Question: Can I bring a claim if I was petting the dog before it attacked?

Answer: Generally, yes. As long as your petting would not be construed as provoking the dog. Liability is typically assigned based on evidence presented to the court. In this claims, knowledge of the dog’s past behavior is an important component.

Question: Is the dog owner covered by insurance?

Answer: The dog owner is usually covered by his/her homeowners’ insurance policy.

Question: Can a child sue his or her parents?

Answer: Yes. If an insured parent buys insurance in order to cover a stranger, then it is reasonable to assume that the parent would turn to their insurance company to protect and compensate their own family member. In some cases, the dog owner’s homeowners’ insurance policy would be in effect.

Question: Do I have to go to court?

Answer: Most cases are settled out of court. Dog bite cases rarely go to trial.

Question: What information should I collect in the event of a dog bite?

Answer: When investigating a dog bite incident it is also important to:

• Talk to neighbors
• Talk to the dog’s veterinarian
• Obtain a copy of the dog’s medical history
• Investigate the scene
• Obtain obedience school records
• Obtain Animal Control records
• Obtain police reports
• Take photographs immediately

Question: What is my dog bite case worth?

Answer: Please call our office, and someone from our team with contact you personally to answer address your the specific nature of your claim. Free of charge

Question: How do I find the law in my city, county and state?

Answer: It is time-consuming and sometimes difficult process to research dog bite laws, because there are several equally important sources of the law:

• State statutes are the primary source, but not all states have dog bite statutes.
• Most cities and counties have local dog laws that frequently are more detailed and beneficial to people injured by dogs. These local laws may include county and municipal codes.
• Every state has case law -judicial decisions from trials involving people from that state.

State Laws

Many states have enacted legislation related to dog bite injuries. In some states, the general principles of common law negligence apply to this type of injury. In common law states it is necessary to establish negligence on the part of the dog owner. In order to prove negligence, you must demonstrate the traditional element of a common law tort claim including duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury. Even in the absence of a strict liability statute, the possessor of a dog known to be vicious is liable for harm caused by the dog even if he/she has exercised utmost care to prevent it.

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State Leash Laws

Alabama Dog Law

Liability Statute For Dog Bites Occurring On Dog Owner&squo;s Property

Alabama has a statute that makes dog owners liable for damages when their dog bites or injures a person, so long as the injured person is lawfully on the dog owner’s property at the time of the injury. The statute also applies to cases where the injured person was lawfully on the dog owner’s property, but, because the dog chased the person, the injury actually occurred off the owner’s property. A person is lawfully on the owner’s property when he or she is invited there. For example, those people who the owner invites on the property, such as a friend or a repair person, are “lawfully” on the owner’s property. On the other hand, trespassers are not lawful guests of the owner. The only exception to this rule is in cases where the injured person provoked the dog and that provocation caused the dog to attack. Finally, the statute permits a dog owner to defend the case by proving that he or she had no knowledge that the dog was vicious, dangerous, or mischievous. If the owner proves lack of knowledge, damages are limited to actual expenses incurred by the injured person. Actual expenses do not include pain and suffering.

Common Law Liability for Dog Bites Occurring Outside of Owner’s Property

When a dog bite occurs off the owner’s property, the injured person’s right to recover damages is governed by negligence principles under the common law. In that case, the injured person must prove that the owner knew, or had reason to know, that the dog had a dangerous propensity. If the owner can prove that he had no knowledge of this, the owner will still be liable to pay for the actual expenses incurred by the injured person. Actual expenses do not include pain and suffering damages.

Vicious and Dangerous Dogs

When the owner of a vicious or dangerous dog carelessly manages the animal or allows it to run free, and another person, without fault on his part, is bitten or injured, the owner or the dog’s keeper at the time of the injury will be liable for damages. Under Alabama law, all dog owners are bound to take notice of the general propensities of the breed of the dog that they own, even if their dog has never displayed vicious behavior. For example, a pit bull is a breed that is unpredictable and can be vicious and dangerous. If a pit bull owner fails to exercise reasonable care to guard against and prevent injuries that should reasonably be anticipated by the breed, the dog owner will be liable for injuries caused by the dog.

Rabid Dogs

Alabama has a rabid dog statute. Under this statute, if a dog owner knows the dog has rabies, and the dog bites a person, the owner is liable to twice the damages suffered by the injured person.

Alabama Dog Bite Law

TITLE 3. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 6. LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF DOGS BITING OR INJURING PERSONS br
Code of Ala. § 3-6-1 (2003)
§ 3-6-1. Generally

If any dog shall, without provocation, bite or injure any person who is at the time at a place where he or she has a legal right to be, the owner of such dog shall be liable in damages to the person so bitten or injured, but such liability shall arise only when the person so bitten or injured is upon property owned or controlled by the owner of such dog at the time such bite or injury occurs or when such person has been immediately prior to such time on such property and has been pursued therefrom by such dog.

Notes:
CROSS REFERENCES. –Liability for vicious dog, § 3-1-3.
Liability of dog owner for injuries to livestock, § 3-1-6.
ROBERTS, CUSIMANO: TORT LAW. –12.1; 12.1, nn. 37, 50, 51, 53.
AM. JUR. 2D. –Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 96 et seq.
C.J.S. –C.J.S., Animals, § 177 et seq.

ALR. –Absolute or strict liability for dog bite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Liability for injuries caused by cat. 68 ALR4th 823.
Owner of animal, liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway. 29 ALR4th 431.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.

CASE NOTES
General comment
Liability
When applicable
Illustrative cases
Cited

GENERAL COMMENT.
Where claims against the owner of dog involved in attack on child were not involved in appeal, this section, setting out the liability of a dog owner, does not govern the disposition of the case. Gentle v. Pine Valley Apts., 631 So. 2d 928 (Ala. 1994).

LIABILITY.
Nothing in this section indicates that anyone other than the owner can be held liable pursuant to the statute. Humphries v. Rice, 600 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1992).
Wife of owner of dog which attacked another was not liable since she was not the owner, and she was not liable even though she may have been the keeper of the dog. Humphries v. Rice, 600 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1992).

WHEN APPLICABLE.
In this case the attack happened off the owner’s premises, some nine miles from the defendant’s home, so that this action is governed by the rules of common law negligence, not this section. Rucker v. Goldstein, 497 So. 2d 491 (Ala. 1986).
This section does not apply to one who is the “keeper” rather than the “owner” of the dog. Humphries v. Rice, 600 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1992).

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
This section was not applicable to an action brought by a motorcyclist and his passenger who were injured when a dog ran out into the road and collided with the motorcycle, causing it to crash, where the motorcyclist and his passenger were riding on a public highway and they had never entered the owner’s property. Williams v. Hill, 658 So. 2d 381 (Ala. 1995).

CITED IN Allen ex rel. Allen v. Whitehead, 423 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 1982); Kent v. Sims, 460 So. 2d 144 (Ala. 1984); King v. Breen, 560 So. 2d 186 (Ala. 1990); Wright v. Calvin Reid Constr. Co., 723 So. 2d 55 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).

TITLE 3. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 6. LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF DOGS BITING OR INJURING PERSONS
Code of Ala. § 3-6-4 (2003)
§ 3-6-4. Construction
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as diminishing any right or liability for injury by dog bites now existing under the laws of this state.

NOTES:
ROBERTS, CUSIMANO: TORT LAW. –12.1; 12.1, nn. 56, 57, 58.

Alaska Dog Law

Liability Statute

Alaska does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

A dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his or her dog is most often determined by general negligence principles. Therefore, if the owner failed to exercise reasonable control over the dog and the dog bites or otherwise injures a person, the owner will be liable. In some cases, an owner can be subject to strict liability, provided that the injured person proves that the owner knew, or had reason to know, that the dog had a dangerous propensity or a trait not characteristic of a dog of that kind, and that the dangerous tendency caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Alaska does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Arizona Dog Law

Liability Statute

Arizona has a strict liability dog bite statute. That means that dogs don’t get “one free bite.” The owner of a dog that bites someone in a public place or someone that is lawfully in a private place, including the dog owner’s property, is liable for damages suffered by the injured person, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness and regardless of whether the owner had knowledge of the dog’s viciousness. The only defense to these strict liability statutes is in cases where the injured person provoked the attack.

Common Law Liability

Under Arizona common law, a dog bite victim can recover for personal injuries, so long as he or she can prove that the dog owner knew, or had reason to know, of the dog’s vicious propensities at the time the bite occurred. Arizona’s strict liability statute does not replace common law liability. In other words, dog bite victims can file suit under the strict liability statute and the common law.

Arizona Dog Bite Law

TITLE 11. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
ARTICLE 6.1. HANDLING OF ANIMALS
A.R.S. § 11-1025 (2003)
§ 11-1025. Liability for dog bites

A. The owner of a dog which bites a person when the person is in or on a public place or lawfully in or on a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of its viciousness.

B. Nothing in this section or in section 11-1020 shall permit the bringing of an action for damages against any governmental agency using a dog in military or police work if the bite occurred while the dog was defending itself from a harassing or provoking act, or assisting an employee of the agency in any of the following:

1. In the apprehension or holding of a suspect where the employee has a reasonable suspicion of the suspect’s involvement in criminal activity.
2. In the investigation of a crime or possible crime.
3. In the execution of a warrant.
4. In the defense of a peace officer or another person.

C. Subsection B of this section shall not apply in any case where the victim of the bite was not a party to, nor a participant in, nor suspected to be a party to or a participant in, the act that prompted the use of the dog in the military or police work.

D. Subsection B of this section shall apply only where a governmental agency using a dog in military or police work has adopted a written policy on the necessary and appropriate use of a dog for the police or military work enumerated in subsection B of this section.

HISTORY: Last year in which legislation affected this section: 1992 ANALYSIS
In General.
Construction.
Legislative Intent.
Common Law.
Defenses.
Duty of Care.
Family Members.
Limitations.
Stolen Dogs.
Strict Liability.

IN GENERAL.
This section created a change in substantive law and was not simply a change in pleading and proof requirements. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

CONSTRUCTION.
This section, being in derogation of the common law, is subject to strict, literal construction. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).
The legislative amendment to this section, enacted in 1992, which excepts the use of police dogs from strict liability under the dog bite statute, constitutes a change in the law that applies only prospectively. Weekly v. City of Mesa, 181 Ariz. 159, 888 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1994).

LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The legislature use the conjunction “or” rather than “and,” indicative of a legislative intent that either the owner or some other person responsible for a dog may be held liable for injury or damage caused by the dog. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988).

COMMON LAW.
This section does not codify or replace common law liability. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985). It is possible to proceed simultaneously under this section and common law theories. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).
The cause of action created by this section is distinct from the common law which imposes liability on dog owners only if the owner knew or had reason to know of their animal’s vicious propensities. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).
A claim pursuant to this section is legally distinct from a common law dog bite claim. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

DEFENSES.
The only defense to liability under this section is proof that the injured party provoked the dog. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

DUTY OF CARE.
The duty imposed upon dog owners by this section is not a familial duty confined to the care of one’s own child, but rather a general duty to a large protected class. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

FAMILY MEMBERS.
Arizona’s strict liability dog bite statute did not apply when the victim was a child of and resides in the same household as the owners of the dog and was bitten at the family home. Schleier ex rel. Alter v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1989).

LIMITATIONS.
A cause of action brought pursuant to § 24-521, Arizona’s “dog bite statute,” is governed by the time limitations contained in § 12-541, subsection 3. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).

STOLEN DOGS.
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on liability against the owner of dog for injuries sustained by a dog bite victim after the dog had been stolen from the owner. Johnson v. Svidergol, 157 Ariz. 333, 757 P.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988).

STRICT LIABILITY.
This section imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries inflicted by their dog without respect to fault on the part of the owner. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).
In Arizona, dogs do not get one free bite”; owners are held strictly liable for injuries caused by their dogs’ actions and liablity is imposed without regard to an owner’s knowledge of the dog’s viciousness. Massey v. Colaric, 151 Ariz. 65, 725 P.2d 1099 (1986).

TITLE 12. COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS o:p
CHAPTER 5. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 3. PERSONAL ACTIONS

A.R.S. § 12-541 (2003)

§ 12-541. Malicious prosecution; false imprisonment; libel or slander; seduction or breach of promise of marriage; breach of employment contract; wrongful termination; liability created by statute; one year limitation

There shall be commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:

1. For malicious prosecution, or for false imprisonment, or for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander.
2. For damages for seduction or breach of promise of marriage.
3. For breach of an oral or written employment contract including contract actions based on employee handbooks or policy manuals that do not specify a time period in which to bring an action.
4. For damages for wrongful termination.
5. Upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.

HISTORY: Last year in which legislation affected this section: 1996

ANALYSIS
Accrual of Action.
Liability Created by Statute.
Libel and Slander.
– In General.
– Consent.
Statute of Limitations.
– Discovery of Defamation.
– Publication.
– Special Educational Programs.

ACCRUAL OF ACTION.
Action brought by creditors against stockholders of insolvent corporation can accrue only at the time of a judicial declaration of insolvency. Pioneer Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Rich, 179 Ariz. 462, 880 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1994).
Cable television operator’s action against cable television decoding device seller for unauthorized reception of cable service was not a bar to entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the damages caused by the seller until two months prior to filing lawsuit, when seller sold two decoders to investigator for plaintiff, notwithstanding defendant’s argument that plaintiff should have been aware of seller’s conduct because of its widespread magazine advertising of decoders for sale. Time Warner Cable v. Cable Box Wholesalers, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Ariz. 1996).
A claim of bad faith by a renter against a car rental agency accrued when judgment was entered for the renter, injured as a passenger, in her negligence claim against the driver who was an authorized additional driver. Uyleman v. D.S. Rentco, 194 Ariz. 300, 981 P.2d 1081 (Ct. App. 1999).

LIABILITY CREATED BY STATUTE.
A cause of action brought pursuant to § 24-521, Arizona’s “dog bite statute,” is governed by the time limitations contained in subsection 3 of this section. Murdock v. Balle, 144 Ariz. 136, 696 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1985).
Claim of negligent conduct arising from doing act required by the state was governed by subsection 3. Jackson v. Pima County, 159 Ariz. 331, 767 P.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1988); Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 884 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1994).
Failure to comply with the requirements of § 28-324, subsection A, does not entitle a car rental company to demand that the injured party sue them to establish the joint and several liability provided by § 28-324, subsection B, before first obtaining the judgment for damages caused by a renter’s negligence; it is only after an injured party establishes the right to receive damages that the cause of action against the car rental company accrues for the purposes of application of subsection 3 of this section. Clark v. DS Rentco, Inc., 175 Ariz. 233, 854 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1993).
Because a claim for relocation benefits is statutory in nature, such a claim is subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in paragraph 3. Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 884 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1994).
Where plaintiff filed a cause of action against an establishment for selling intoxicating beverages to a motorist who was involved in an automobile accident with plaintiff, the two-year statute of limitations in § 12-542(1) applied to plaintiff’s common law cause of action instead of the one-year limitations period in subsection (5). Andrews v. Eddie’s Place, Inc., 199 Ariz. 240, 16 P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2000).

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

–IN GENERAL.
Pure opinion is not actionable in Arizona. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

–CONSENT.
Even if the contents of the letter were republished, consent by the injured party to its publication by way of testimony at the hearing was a complete defense to the action for defamation. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
–DISCOVERY OF DEFAMATION.
The rule of discovery should be applied in those situations in which a defamation is published in a manner in which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff, such as in a confidential memorandum or a credit report. Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co., 138 Ariz. 240, 673 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1983).

–PUBLICATION.
This section bars a complaint filed more than one year after sending a letter for defamation based on the content of that letter. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1986).

The statute of limitations for libel and slander commences to run upon publication. Boatman v. Samaritan Health Servs., 168 Ariz. 207, 812 P.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1990).

–SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS.
In appeal to determine the extent to which a public school district must pay for services related to the education of a handicapped student when those services conflict with an educational program offered by the school district and when the program as offered provides a free, appropriate, public education, the appropriate statute of limitation is not the 35-day statute of limitations for reviewing agency decisions in § 12-904; the appropriate statute of limitations is the one-year period permitted for “liabilities created by statute, other than penalty or forfeiture” in this section. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994).

Arkansas Dog Law

Liability Statute

Arkansas does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In Arkansas, a person who is injured by a dog can recover damages from the dog’s owner if he or she proves that the owner’s negligence caused the injuries. The injured person may also proceed under a strict liability theory. In that case, the injured person must prove that the dog was of a vicious species or that the animal had dangerous tendencies that were known to the owner.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Arkansas does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Arkansas Dog Bite Law

TITLE 20. PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
SUBTITLE 2. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CHAPTER 19. ANIMALS
SUBCHAPTER 4. OWNERSHIP AND BREEDING OF WOLVES AND WOLF-DOG HYBRIDS

A.C.A. § 20-19-406 (2003)
§ 20-19-406. Vaccination

(a) Wolves and wolf-dog hybrids are required to be vaccinated by a licensed veterinarian against rabies with a vaccine approved for dog use, and a rabies certificate may be issued.

(b) Veterinarians must inform the owner of the wolf or wolf-dog hybrid, preferably in writing, that the vaccination is considered “off label” and that protection against rabies is not guaranteed.

(c) If a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid bites a person, the following criteria will be used by an official of the Department of Health in dealing with the animal:

(1) The decision shall consider, at least:
(A) The epidemiology and risk of rabies in the species of animal in question;
(B) Possible prior exposure to a rabies vector;
(C) Behavior of the animal at the time of the bite;
(D) Prior rabies vaccinations; and
(E) Other circumstances that may exist;

(2) In some situations, the department will consider the initiative and willingness of the individual so exposed to submit to postexposure antirabies immunization after being adequately informed of all potential risks;

(3) Upon written order by the Director of the Department of Health or a specifically designated representative, any biting animal determined to be at significant risk for the transmission of rabies shall be humanely killed and the brain tissue submitted for testing; and

(4) The department has the authority to order the quarantine of an animal determined to be a very low risk for the transmission of rabies for a thirty-day observation period as an alternate method to euthanasia and testing.
(d) Owners must be notified and given three (3) business days to provide proof to the department in their animal’s defense before the animal can be euthanized.
(e) If, in the future, the United States Department of Agriculture approves the use of rabies vaccines in wolves or wolf-dog hybrids, or both, then wolves and wolf-dog hybrids will fall under the same regulations as dogs regarding biting humans and rabies control.

HISTORY: Acts 2001, No. 1768, § 6.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this part, article, subchapter, chapter, subtitle, or title.

TITLE 20. PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
SUBTITLE 2. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CHAPTER 19. ANIMALS
SUBCHAPTER 4. OWNERSHIP AND BREEDING OF WOLVES AND WOLF-DOG HYBRIDS

A.C.A. § 20-19-407 (2003)
§ 20-19-407. Penalties

(a) If a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid bites a person or injures or destroys another animal while out of its confined area, the person responsible for the adequate confinement of the animal upon conviction shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(b) If a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid is not adequately confined or fed, the person responsible for adequate confinement or adequate feeding of the animal, or both adequate feeding and adequate confinement upon conviction shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) A person who abandons or releases a wolf or wolf-dog hybrid into the wild upon conviction shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

HISTORY: Acts 2001, No. 1768, § 7.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this part, article, subchapter, chapter, subtitle, or title.

California Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, a dog owner is liable to a person bitten by the owner’s dog, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness. The statute allows the victim to recover without having to prove any fault of the owner. California’s dog bite statute applies to dog injuries that occur in public places, as well as those that occur on private property. A dog owner can defend the suit only by proving that the victim assumed the risk of the bite.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• any dog that, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior 36-month period engages in any behavior that requires a defensive action by any person to prevent bodily injury when the person and the dog are not on the owner’s property; or
• any dog that, when unprovoked, bites a person and causes a less-than severe injury; or
• any dog that, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior 36-month period, has killed, seriously bitten, inflicted injury, or otherwise caused injury attacking a domestic animal when the animals are not on the dog owner’s property.

The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A “vicious dog” is:

• a dog that, when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner kills or inflicts a severe injury on a person. A severe injury is a physical injury that results in muscle tears or disfiguring lacerations or requires multiple sutures or corrective cosmetic surgery.
• A vicious dog also includes a dog that has previously been determined to be potentially dangerous and continues its dangerous behavior.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Potentially
Dangerous and Vicious Dogs

Owners must confine potentially dangerous and vicious dogs in an enclosure that prevents the dog from escaping, and that also prevents children from trespassing.
A dangerous dog is permitted off the owner’s property, only if it is restrained by a substantial leash, of appropriate length, and if it is under the control of a responsible adult.
Cities and counties can prohibit ownership of vicious dogs.

Liability of Owners of Potentially Dangerous and Vicious Dogs

When a potentially dangerous dog injures a person, the owner is liable under the Dog Bite Statute and also faces a fine up to $500. When a vicious dog injures a person, the owner is liable under the Dog Bite Statute and also faces a fine up to $1,000.

California Dog Bite Law

CIVIL CODE

DIVISION 4. General Provisions
PART 1. Relief
TITLE 2. Compensatory Relief
CHAPTER 2. Measure of Damages
ARTICLE 2. Damages for Wrongs
Cal Civ Code § 3342. (2003)
3342. (a) The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner within the meaning of this section when he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner.

Colorado Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, a person or personal representative of a person who suffers “serious bodily injury” or death from being bitten by a dog is entitled to bring a civil action to recover economic damages against the dog owner, regardless of the dog’s viciousness or the owner’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of the dog’s viciousness, so long as the victim (1) was lawfully on public or private property at the time of the injury; and (2) did not knowingly provoke the dog. This strict liability statute applies in cases where the injury involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function or organ, or a break or fracture.
In cases not involving a “serious bodily injury,” the victim must show that the dog owner was negligent.

The statute, however, outlines the following six circumstances where a dog owner will not be liable for a dog-bite injury:

• In cases where the injury occurred while the victim was a trespasser on public or private property;
• In cases where the injury occurred while the victim was on the dog owner’s property and the property was clearly and conspicuously marked with one or more posted signs stating, No trespassing,” or “Beware of Dog;”
• In cases where the dog was being used by a peace officer or military personnel for official duties;
• In cases where the victim knowingly provoked the dog;
• In cases where the victim was a veterinary health-care worker, dog groomer, humane agency staff person, professional dog handler, trainer, or dog show judge acting in the performance of his or her respective duties; and
• In cases where the dog is working as a hunting, herding, farm, ranch, or predatory control dog while on the property or under the control of the dog’s owner.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

• Under Colorado’s Dangerous Dog Statute, “bodily injury” means any physical injury that results in severe bruising, muscle tears, or skin lacerations that requires professional medical treatment, or any physical injury that requires corrective or cosmetic surgery.
• Under Colorado law, “serious bodily injury” means an injury that involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function or organ, or a break, fracture or second- or third-degree burn.

Dangerous Dog Owner’s Legal Responsibilities

The owner of a dangerous dog must confine the dog in an escape-proof building or enclosure. When a dangerous dog is outside of its enclosure, the law requires the owner to control the dog by using a leash. In cases where the owner has been convicted of violating the dangerous dog law on more than one occasion, the dog must be muzzled when it is outside of its building or enclosure. The dog owner must report any change in the dangerous dog’s situation, such as an address change, the dog’s escape, or its death, to the Bureau of Animal Protection.
At the owner’s expense, the dangerous dog must be permanently identified through the implantation of a microchip by a licensed veterinarian or a licensed shelter. The law requires the facility that implants the microchip to report the microchipping information to the Bureau of Animal Protection within ten days of the implantation. In addition, the owner of a dangerous dog must pay a $50 microchip licensing fee to the Bureau of Animal Protection.

Dangerous Dog Owner’s Liability

If a dangerous dog injures or kills a person or a domestic animal, or if it destroys property, the dog’s owner will face a variety of criminal punishment. The punishment depends on the severity of the injury or damage caused by the dog, as well as the number of times the owner has violated the Dangerous Dog Statute. The criminal punishment range is vast. On the high end, the owner faces a two-year prison term, as well as a fine that can be as high as $100,000.

When a dangerous dog causes personal injury, the owner will also be required to pay restitution to the victim. Restitution generally covers the victim’s out-of-pocket expenses, as well as anticipated future expenses. Under the Dangerous Dog Statute, restitution does not include pain and suffering or loss of future earnings. In order to recoup those damages, the victim can file a civil suit.

In cases where a dangerous dog injures a domestic animal, the owner will be required to pay medical expenses. In cases where the dangerous dog kills a domestic animal, the owner will be required to pay restitution in an amount equal or greater to the fair market value or replacement cost of the animal.

Finally, if a dangerous dog destroys property, the owner will be required to make restitution in an amount equal to or greater than the fair market value or replacement cost of the property, plus any costs the victim incurs in replacing the property.

COLORADO DOG BITE LAW

TITLE 18. CRIMINAL CODEbr
ARTICLE 9. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE, ORDER, AND DECENCY
PART 2. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
C.R.S. 18-9-204.5 (2002)
18-9-204.5. Unlawful ownership of dangerous dog

(1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that dangerous dogs are a serious and widespread threat to the safety and welfare of citizens throughout the state because of the number and serious nature of attacks by such dogs.

(2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Bodily injury” means any physical injury that results in severe bruising, muscle tears, or skin lacerations requiring professional medical treatment or any physical injury that requires corrective or cosmetic surgery.
(b) “Dangerous dog” means any dog that:
(I) Has inflicted bodily or serious bodily injury upon or has caused the death of a person or domestic animal; or
(II) Has demonstrated tendencies that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the dog may inflict injury upon or cause the death of any person or domestic animal; or
(III) Has engaged in or been trained for animal fighting as described and prohibited in section 18-9-204.
(c) “Dog” means any domesticated animal related to the fox, wolf, coyote, or jackal.
(d) “Domestic animal” means any dog, cat, or livestock.
(e) “Owner” or “owns” means any person, firm, corporation, or organization owning, possessing, harboring, keeping, having financial or property interest in, or having control or custody of a domestic animal, as the term is defined in paragraph (d) of this subsection (2), including a dangerous dog as the term is defined in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2).
(f) “Serious bodily injury” has the same meaning as such term is defined in section 18-1-901 (3) (p).

(3) (a) A person commits ownership of a dangerous dog if such person owns, possesses, harbors, keeps, has a financial or property interest in, or has custody or control over a dangerous dog.
(b) Any owner who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) whose dog inflicts bodily injury upon any person commits a class 3 misdemeanor. Any owner involved in a second or subsequent violation under this paragraph (b) commits a class 2 misdemeanor.
(c) Any owner who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) whose dog inflicts serious bodily injury to a person commits a class 1 misdemeanor. Any owner involved in a second or subsequent violation under this paragraph (c) commits a class 6 felony.
(d) Any owner who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) whose dog causes the death of a person commits a class 5 felony.
(e)(I) Any owner who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) whose dog injures or destroys any domestic animal commits a class 3 misdemeanor.
(II) Any owner involved in a second or subsequent violation under this paragraph (e) commits a class 2 misdemeanor. The minimum fine specified in section 18-1.3-501 for a class 2 misdemeanor shall be mandatory.
(III) (A) The court shall order the convicted owner and any owner who enters into a deferred judgment or deferred prosecution to make restitution to the injured or dead domestic animal’s owner pursuant to applicable provisions of title 16, C.R.S., governing restitution.
(B) Restitution shall be equal to the greater of the fair market value or the replacement cost of the domestic animal on the date, but before the time, the animal was injured or destroyed plus any reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred in treating the animal and any actual costs incurred in replacing the injured or destroyed animal.
(C) Any owner whose dog destroys property shall make restitution to the owner of such property in an amount equal to the greater of the fair market value or the replacement cost of such property before its destruction plus any actual costs incurred in replacing such property. (e.5) The court shall order any owner of a dangerous dog who has been convicted of a violation of this section to confine such dangerous dog in a building or enclosure designed to be escape-proof and, whenever such dog is outside of such building or enclosure, keep the dog under such owner’s control by use of a leash. In addition, if the conviction is for a second or subsequent offense, such dangerous dog shall also be muzzled whenever it is outside of the building or enclosure.
(f) In addition to any other penalty set forth in this subsection (3), upon an owner’s entry of a guilty plea or the return of a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury or a deferred judgment or deferred prosecution for a violation that results in bodily injury, serious bodily injury, or death to a person, the court, pursuant to applicable provisions of title 16, C.R.S., governing restitution, shall order the defendant to make restitution in accordance with said provisions.
(g) In addition to the penalties set forth in paragraphs (b) to (e) of this subsection (3), upon an owner’s entry of a guilty plea or the return of a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury or a deferred judgment or deferred prosecution for a violation that results in serious bodily injury to a person or death to a person or domestic animal or for a second or subsequent violation of said paragraph (b) or (e) resulting in a conviction or a deferred judgment or a deferred prosecution involving the same dog of the same owner, the court may order that the dangerous dog be immediately confiscated and placed in a public animal shelter and shall order that, upon exhaustion of any right an owner has to appeal a conviction based on a violation of this subsection (3), the owner’s dangerous dog be destroyed by lethal injection administered by a licensed veterinarian.
(h) (I) An affirmative defense to the violation of this subsection (3) shall be: (A) That, at the time of the attack by the dangerous dog which causes injury to or the death of a domestic animal, the domestic animal was at large, was an estray, and entered upon the property of the owner and the attack began, but did not necessarily end, upon such property;
(B) That, at the time of the attack by the dangerous dog which causes injury to or the death of a domestic animal, said animal was biting or otherwise attacking the dangerous dog or its owner;
(C) That, at the time of the attack by the dangerous dog which causes injury to or the death of a person, the victim of the attack was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense, other than a petty offense, against the dog’s owner, and the attack did not occur on the owner’s property;
(D) That, at the time of the attack by the dangerous dog which causes injury to or the death of a person, the victim of the attack was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense, other than a petty offense, against a person on the owner’s property or the property itself and the attack began, but did not necessarily end, upon such property; or
(E) That the person who was the victim of the attack by the dangerous dog tormented, provoked, abused, or inflicted injury upon the dog in such an extreme manner which resulted in the attack.
(II) The affirmative defenses set forth in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (h) shall not apply to any dog that has engaged in or been trained for animal fighting as said term is described in section 18-9-204.

(4) Upon taking an owner into custody for an alleged violation of this section or the issuing of a summons and complaint to the owner, pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure and part 1 of article 4 of title 16, C.R.S., the owner’s dangerous dog shall be taken into custody and placed in a public animal shelter, at the owner’s expense, pending final disposition of the charge against the owner. In addition, in the event the court, pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure and part 1 of article 4 of title 16, C.R.S., sets bail for an owner’s release from custody pending final disposition, the court shall require, as a condition of bond, that the owner’s dangerous dog be placed at the owner’s expense in a public animal shelter, licensed boarding facility, or veterinarian’s clinic of the owner’s choosing, pending final disposition of the alleged violation of this section. The owner shall be liable for the total cost of board and care for a dog placed pursuant to this subsection (4).

(5) (a) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a municipality from adopting any rule or law for the control of dangerous dogs.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate a county’s authority under part 1 of article 15 of title 30, C.R.S., to adopt dog control and licensing resolutions and to impose the penalties set forth in section 30-15-102, C.R.S.

(6) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the following:
(a) To any dog that is used by a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of peace officer duties;
(b) To any dog that inflicts bodily or serious bodily injury to any veterinary health care worker, dog groomer, humane agency personnel, professional dog handler, trainer, or dog show judge each acting in the performance of his or her respective duties; or
(c) To any dog that inflicts injury upon or causes the death of a domestic animal while the dog was working as a hunting dog, herding dog, or predator control dog on the property of or under the control of the dog’s owner and the injury or death was to a domestic animal naturally associated with the work of such dog.

HISTORY: Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 413, § 1, effective July 1.L. 99: (2)(a) amended, p. 797, § 10, effective July 1; (3)(e) amended and (3)(e.5) added, p. 274, § 1, effective July 1.L. 2002: (3)(e)(II) amended, p. 1517, § 206, effective October 1. Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3)(e)(II), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

Connecticut Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under Connecticut’s Dog Bite Statute, a dog’s owner or keeper at the time of the injury is liable for damages if the injured person proves:

• that the injury was caused by the dog
• that at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was not committing a trespass or other tort, or was not teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog; and
• that the defendant is the owner or was the keeper of the dog.

Under this statute, if a person was under seven years old at the time of the injury, the law automatically presumes that the child was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog. In that case, the burden of proof is on the defendant.

Under Connecticut’s Dog Bite Statute, persons injured by dogs can recover economic damages, as well as pain and suffering damages.

Connecticut Dog Bite Law

TITLE 22. AGRICULTURE. DOMESTIC ANIMALSbr
CHAPTER 435 DOGS AND OTHER COMPANION ANIMALS. KENNELS AND PET SHOPS
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357 (2003)

§ 22-357. Damage to person or property.
If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, was under seven years of age at the time the damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action.

HISTORY: (1949 Rev., S. 3404; 1953, S. 1842d; 1969, P.A. 439, S. 1.)

NOTES:
1969 act added provision re actions brought on behalf of minors.
Title Notes:
*See Sec. 19a-341 re “right to farm”.
Chapter Notes:
*Cited. 36 Conn. Supp. 156, 158.
Administrator as “owner”. 74 C 85. Necessity of counting on statute. 77 Conn. 570. That person injured provoked dog as a defense under former statute. 81 Conn. 321. Action is one in tort. 86 Conn. 710. Cited. 102 Conn. 480. Statute held constitutional; elements of damage. 105 Conn. 89. Scope of exception. 106 Conn. 202. Negligence in operation of automobile not a “tort” within exception. 107 Conn. 626. Owner of dog held liable where dog jumped in front of automobile causing it to swerve into ditch and overturn. Id. Cited. 91 Conn. 492. Complaint should negative the existence of circumstances which would bring plaintiff within the exception. 117 Conn. 107. Defendant who pleaded an affirmation of the exception assumed burden of proof thereof. Id., 103. “Trespass or tort” construed. Id., 310. Conduct not within the exceptions, although it might be held contributorily negligent, is not a defense under the statute. Id. Cited. 119 Conn. 648. Wife, co-owner, liable with husband who thrust dog toward plaintiff’s face. 129 Conn. 210. “Trespass or tort” means more than mere entry; statute bars recovery where plaintiff is committing or intends to commit an injurious act. 133 Conn. 509: 140 Conn. 358. See note to Sec. 22-327. Plaintiff may recover where menacing attitude of dog frightened him and caused him to fall. 138 Conn. 718. Friendly playing with a dog is not “teasing, tormenting or abusing.” 142 Conn. 516. A plaintiff must bring himself clearly within the provisions because it creates a cause of action that did not exist at common law. 142 Conn. 719. Phrase “trespass or other tort” interpreted. 148 Conn. 125. That the plaintiff was on a public highway did not eliminate the possibility that she was committing a trespass within the meaning of the statute. Id. Plaintiff restrained dog with a leash from attacking another dog and from leaving the premises of its master, all in accordance with the wishes of its master; held that this did not come within the exceptions from liability under this statute. 148 Conn. 557. History of statute reviewed. Id. Cited. 221 Conn. 14-21, 23, 26. Cited. 231 Conn. 920. Doctrine of parental immunity bars action by unemancipated minor against parent alleging strict liability pursuant to statute; doctrine of parental immunity discussed. 234 Conn. 259-262, 264, 266, 267, 270, 271. Cited. 235 Conn. 360, 389; see also 40 Conn. App. 219 et seq. Cited. 241 Conn. 319. Cited. 7 Conn. App. 19-22. Cited. 9 Conn. App. 495-497. Action under section barred by parental immunity doctrine. 34 Conn. App. 866-868, 870. Cited. 42 Conn. App. 239. Absent specific language in Sec. 52-557n modifying common law rule of governmental immunity for claims of strict liability, section should not be so construed. 58 Conn. App. 702.
Owner and keeper of dog liable in the alternative and not jointly. 5 Conn. Supp. 150. Trespass does not include technical or casual trespass. Id., 426; 18 Conn. Supp. 156. Controlled by three year tort statute of limitations. 14 Conn. Supp. 428. Assumption of risk has no place in an action brought under this section. But plaintiff must prove either that her own conduct was not such as would naturally incite the dog to retaliation or that it was, under the circumstances, justified. 22 Conn. Supp. 332. Cited. 25 Conn. Supp. 341. When a cause of action arises in a child for personal injuries under this section, an independent cause of action arises in his parent for consequential damages as a result of the injury. 26 Conn. Supp. 274, 275. But parent’s right may be barred by conduct of his own which in whole or in part caused the damage. Id. Applicable statute of limitation is section 52-577. 26 Conn. Supp. 294, 296. Statute of limitation under the dog bite law is three years. 29 Conn. Supp. 71. Cited. 29 Conn. Supp. 72. Owners of premises where dog was kept considered “keepers” and held to be liable. 36 Conn. Supp. 156, 157.
Where plaintiff alleged, in her complaint, negligence and scienter on the part of the dog’s owners, held that, notwithstanding plaintiff’s claim of defendants’ statutory liability, the action was one in negligence at common law and not under this statute. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539. History discussed. Id., 541, 542. Petting of dog does not constitute teasing, tormenting or abusing dog. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 694.

TITLE 52. CIVIL ACTIONS

CHAPTER 901 DAMAGES, COSTS AND FEES

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-240 (2003)
§ 52-240. Effect of damages on costs.

(a) In any action founded on tort tried in the Superior Court, if the damages found do not exceed fifty dollars, the plaintiff shall recover no more costs than damages, subject to the provisions of this section.

(b) If the title to property, or a right-of-way, or to the use of water, is in question, or if the damages were reduced so as not to exceed fifty dollars by reason of an act of the defendant pending the action, the plaintiff shall recover full costs. (c) Judgment for nominal damages upon a hearing after a default or a demurrer overruled shall entitle the party in whose favor damages are given to the full taxable costs of the action.

HISTORY: (1949 Rev., S. 7985; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 117; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 53; P.A. 74-183, S. 89, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 135, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 127.)

NOTES:
See Sec. 47-41 re consideration of notice as disturbance of right.
Title Notes:
*Cited. 176 Conn. 401, 407-409. Cited. 199 Conn. 496, 507, 513.
Cited. 4 Conn. App. 339, 344, 347.
Cited. 35 Conn. Supp. 609, 614, 615; 36 Conn. Supp. 47, 51.
Chapter Notes:
*See notes to Secs. 52-257, 52-265.
Cited. 235 Conn. 1, 40.
In statutory proceedings, if there is no provision of law or rule governing taxation of costs, costs may be awarded in court’s discretion. 21 Conn. Supp. 331.
The title or right must be so brought in question that the record may show that it was decided. 18 Conn. 394; 1 R. 525; 52 Conn. 255; 54 Conn. 57, 58. If brought up under a plea and notice, it may be sufficient. 21 Conn. 80. Trespass qu. cl. fr. 21 Conn. 80; 25 Conn. 249. Case for diversion of water. 36 Conn. 151. Payment, pending suit. 19 Conn. 529; 39 Conn. 462. Return of property, pending suit. 1 R. 136. Retrospective law. 30 Conn. 326. Applied where count in tort beyond jurisdiction of court was added to count in tort and verdict was rendered for one dollar damages; 79 Conn. 305; and to action on statute for killing registered dog; 80 Conn. 435; or for bite of dog. 86 Conn. 710. Though charter of city gives its court same powers as justices of the peace, this section applies. 80 Conn. 437. Amendment of 1907 held to apply to pending case. 81 Conn. 216. “Default” and “demurrer overruled” have different meanings. 63 Conn. 266. Nominal damages. 119 Conn. 496. Cited. 218 Conn. 309, 318.
Tort defined. 7 Conn. Supp. 521.

Delaware Dog Law

Liability Statute

In Delaware, a dog owner is liable in damages for injury or death caused by the owner’s dog, unless the victim was committing or attempted to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the owner’s property at the time of the injury, or unless the victim was attempting to commit a crime against any person, or unless the victim was teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog at the time of the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Delaware does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute that addresses an owner’s liability for injuries a dog may inflict on a person. Delaware does, however, have a statute that sets forth certain legal duties of dangerous dog owners. Under this statute, after Delaware officials declare a dog to be dangerous, the owner must

• maintain liability insurance of at least $100,000 to cover any damage or injury caused by the dog;
• confine the dog when it’s on the owner’s property;
• properly muzzle and restrain the dog when it’s off the owner’s property
• display a sign warning that a dangerous dog is on the premises. The sign must be visible and legible from the roadway or 100 feet, whichever is less
• Spay or neuter the dog
• immediately notify the local animal control agency when the dog is loose or unconfined, when it attacks a person or another domestic animal, when the owner moves, and when the dog dies.

Violations of this statute carry penalties ranging from $50 to $2,000.

Florida Dog Law

Liability Statute

In Florida, dog owners are liable for any injury their dog inflicts on a person. The owner of a dog that bites a person in a public place, or bites a person while lawfully in a private place, including the owner’s property, is liable for damages, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness and regardless of the owner’s knowledge of viciousness. If, however, the victim’s negligence contributed to the biting incident, the owner’s liability will be reduced by the percentage that the victim’s negligence contributed to the bite. This statute also contains another exception. If at the time of the injury, the owner displayed in a prominent place on his property a sign, easily readable, that includes the words, “Bad Dog,” the dog owner will not be liable, unless the injuries were caused by the owner’s negligence, or if the person bitten is under six years old.

Common Law Liability

In addition to Florida’s dog bite statute, those injured by dogs can also recover under the common law. In order to recover under the common law, the plaintiff must prove that the dog owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

Under Florida Law, a Dangerous Dog is:

• a dog that has aggressively bitten, attacked, endangered, or inflicted a “severe injury” on a human. A severe injury is one that causes broken bones, multiple bites, or disfiguring lacerations that require sutures or reconstructive surgery;
• a dog that has on more than one occasion severely injured or killed a domestic animal while off the owner’s premises;
• a dog that is used for dog fighting or trained for dog fighting; or
• a dog that, without provocation, has chased or approached a person on the streets, sidewalks, or any public place in a menacing fashion or with an apparent attitude of attack.

A dog will not be declared dangerous if the threat, injury, or damage was sustained by a person who, at the time, was unlawfully on the property, or lawfully on the property, but was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog, its owner, or a family member. Additionally, a dog will not be declared dangerous if it caused injuries when it was protecting or defending a person within the immediate vicinity of the dog from an unjustified attack or assault.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

Owners of dangerous dogs must register their dogs with the state.
An owner must either securely confine the dog indoors or confine it outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked pen or other structure that prevents the entry of young children, as well as the escape of the animal. When not confined, the dog must be muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under the control of a competent person.

Dangerous dog owners must post a clearly-visible warning sign at all entry points of the premises that informs both children and adults that a dangerous dog is on the property.
Dangerous dogs must be permanently identified with a tattoo inside the thigh or an electronic implantation.
The owner of a dangerous dog must immediately notify the appropriate animal control authority when the dog is loose or unconfined, when it has bitten a person or attacked an animal, when it is sold or given away, when it dies, or when it is moved to another address.

Liability of Dangerous Dog Owners

Any violation of the Dangerous Dog Statute carries a civil penalty of up to $500.
In addition to civil liability, the owner of a dangerous dog that attacks or bites a person or domestic animal, without provocation, is subject to a fine up to $1,000, and a term of imprisonment up to one year. In cases where a dangerous dog attacks and severely injures or kills a person, the owner is subject to a fine of up to $5,000 and a term of imprisonment of up to five years.

Florida Dog Bite Law

TITLE 45. TORTS
CHAPTER 767. DAMAGE BY DOGS
Fla. Stat. § 767.01 (2002)

§ 767.01. Dog owner’s liability for damages to persons, domestic animals, or livestock
Owners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done by their dogs to a person or to any animal included in the definitions of “domestic animal” and “livestock” as provided by s. 585.01.

HISTORY: RS 2341; ch. 4979, 1901; GS 3142; RGS 4957; CGL 7044; s. 1, ch. 94-339.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes: CASE NOTES TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL

MATERIALS

CASE NOTES
Torts : Causation
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI : Benefit Determinations : Medical Benefits : Rehabilitation
Torts : Causation

1. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, the words “damage done by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or livestock, or to persons” do not include cases where the dog does not itself inflict any damage; where the damage results from some physical agency set into motion by a chain of events which may have been triggered by the presence of the dog, absolute liability should not be imposed. Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 14426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1976).
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk

2. Defendant was entitled to rely on the defense of assumption of the risk under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 because plaintiff injured party incited and encouraged the dog’s actions that resulted in the fall that caused plaintiff’s injuries. Vandercar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227, 1957 Fla. App. LEXIS 651, 66 A.L.R.2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1957).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners

3. Trial judge erred in granting a new trial following a jury verdict finding no liability on plaintiff’s claim of injury by a dog pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, where the jury could have properly concluded that the defense of careless provocation under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 had been met due to plaintiff’s behavior directed at the dog’s owner, and where because the verdict was a general verdict, it could not be determined that the jury based its decision on the careless provocation defense. Rosenfelt v. Hall, 387 So. 2d 544, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1980).

4. Property owners could not be held liable to the victim of a dog attack because they did not own the offending animal. Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven, Inc., 287 So. 2d 359, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973).

5. Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 was not applicable to situations where a dog did not take affirmative or aggressive action toward an injured party; where a woman injured her back after she tripped over a dog that was lying on a living room floor, and where there was no indication that the dog had been acting aggressively, the statute did not apply. Rutland v. Biel, 277 So. 2d 807, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1973).

6. Where dog injured plaintiff, but did not bite plaintiff, dog’s owner was not required to have prior knowledge of dog’s dangerousness for plaintiff to recover. Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463, 1964 Fla. App. LEXIS 3628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1964), cert. dismissed, 173 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1965).
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals

7. Injured party, who was frightened and fell backward over some bicycles when a barking dog ran past her to join some boys who were playing, did not meet her burden of proof on a summary judgment motion, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), to show an affirmative or aggressive action on the part of a dog. Cohen v. Wall, 576 So. 2d 945, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 2663, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).

8. The Fireman’s Rule, as a common law defense, did not apply to claims under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 and Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, nor did any common law defenses apply to the statutory cause of action based on Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 and Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, and the only defenses available were those provided under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, which defenses also applied to a claim under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01. Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 548 So. 2d 215, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 735, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 390, 74 A.L.R.4th 1111 (Fla. 1989).

9. Fireman’s rule does not protect a dog owner in a lawsuit for damages under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01. Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 497 So. 2d 1289, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10530, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986).

10. Where police officer was injured while being chased by husband’s dogs after entering onto husband and wife’s property to investigate why a burglar alarm was sounding, trial court properly dismissed claim against wife because wife did not own dogs and was not subject to liability pursuant to Fla. Stat. chs. 767.01 or 767.04; additionally, with no statute superseding it, the common law defense of the fireman’s rule was not abrogated and could be asserted by wife. Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 497 So. 2d 1289, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10530, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986).

11. Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, which was consistently construed to virtually make an owner the insurer of a dog’s conduct, did not bar the dog owner from seeking contribution from the active tortfeasor, because Fla. Stat. ch. 768.31, of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, provided for contribution among tortfeasors even though the liability of the parties rested on different grounds. Wallace v. Strassel, 479 So. 2d 231, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17128, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1985).

12. Because Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 provides that dog owners shall be strictly liable for any damage done by their dogs, it was improper for the lower court to rule that the statute didn’t apply in the circumstances of the instant case, where defendant’s dog, tied to a wagon, chased after another dog causing the wagon to injure plaintiff’s leg; the dog was the proximate cause of the injury, even if the injury was not necessarily the result of some “canine characteristic” and, as such, was covered by the statute. Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1985 Fla. LEXIS 3412, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 159 (Fla. 1985).

13. Dog owner was strictly liable under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 for injuries caused to a child when a wagon being pulled by the dog struck the child; under ordinary standards of causation, the accident was caused by an affirmative or aggressive act of the dog. Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 1984 Fla. LEXIS 2909 (Fla. May 3 1984).

14. While chasing another dog present in the area constituted the type of canine characteristic within the contemplation of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, it was not that conduct which directly caused injury because, but for the wagon to which the dog was tied and which struck the victim, no injury would have occurred. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 18971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1982), quashed, 463 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1985).

15. Trial judge erred in granting a new trial following a jury verdict finding no liability on plaintiff’s claim of injury by a dog pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, where the jury could have properly concluded that the defense of careless provocation under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 had been met due to plaintiff’s behavior directed at the dog’s owner, and where because the verdict was a general verdict, it could not be determined that the jury based its decision on the careless provocation defense. Rosenfelt v. Hall, 387 So. 2d 544, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1980).

16. Defenses under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 where available to dog owner sued pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 by bite victim to recover damages for injuries incurred when victim fled from owner’s guard dogs. Rattet v. Dual SEC. Sys., 373 So. 2d 948, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).

17. Although the validity of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 cannot now be questioned because of the rules relating to statutory re-enactments, it should be given a restrictive scope because the compiler placed words in the compilation that were not there when the act was adopted. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15129, 4 A.L.R.4th 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).

18. Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, which imposed liability on dog owners for damage done by their dogs, was construed to impose strict liability on a dog owner for injuries received by a nearby child when the dog passively stepped on a loaded shotgun, causing it to discharge and injure the boy; the strict liability statute was held applicable even though the dog did not act aggressively, but merely became entangled with the shotgun on a car seat. Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1978).

19. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, the words “damage done by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or livestock, or to persons” do not include cases where the dog does not itself inflict any damage; where the damage results from some physical agency set into motion by a chain of events which may have been triggered by the presence of the dog, absolute liability should not be imposed. Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 14426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1976).

20. In a case where injured party jumped over a fence and landed on a dog, breaking his leg, summary judgment in favor of injured party was not proper because it did not appear as a matter of law that the dog did the damage complained of. Scott v. Gordon, 321 So. 2d 619, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 15575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).

21. Under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 husband and wife were strictly liable for damages caused by their dog to the injured party; evidence did not show that the injured party’s speed was the sole proximate cause of the accident which would have removed liability from the husband and wife dog owners to the injured party. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).

22. In connection with a claim that plaintiff was injured as a result of the actions of his neighbor’s dog, it was error to instruct the jury to consider the possible negligence of the victim in determining liability; in a dog injury case it is no defense that a plaintiff acted unreasonably unless his behavior was so blatant as to supersede the dog’s behavior as the legal or proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193, 1971 Fla. App. LEXIS 5377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. dismissed, 259 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972).

23. Parents of a child who was struck and killed by an automobile after he had been frightened by a dog and had run into the street could maintain an action against the dog owner under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01; the issue of whether fear of the dog was the cause of the death was for the jury to determine. Brandeis v. Felcher, 211 So. 2d 606, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 219 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1968).

24. A dog owner was responsible, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, for an injury that her dog inflicted on plaintiff; because the liability of dog owners for injuries sustained under 767.01 was based on an obligation as an insurer rather than on negligence, there was no need to show scienter, contributory negligence was not a defense, and there was no triable issue in the record as to assumption of risk. Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808, 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 4235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1965).

25. Petitioner dog owner could be liable under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 to respondent individual who was injured by petitioner’s dog even though those injuries were not the result of a bite, as there were no features contained in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 which would justify a finding that Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 had been repealed. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So. 2d 444, 1965 Fla. LEXIS 3388 (Fla. 1965).
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI : Benefit Determinations : Medical Benefits : Rehabilitation

26. Court properly affirmed an award to employer and worker’s compensation carrier, of a proportional share of employee’s settlement from a negligent third party tort-feasor because the statutory defense of contributory/ comparative negligence under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 was applicable. Associated Home Health Agency, Inc. v. Lore, 484 So. 2d 1389, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7012, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1986).

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS

1. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.02, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.02 Owner’s or Keeper’s General Liability for Injury Caused by Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

2. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.03, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.03 Owner or Keeper of Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

3. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.04, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.04 Plaintiff’s Lawful Entry on Private Property, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

4. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.06, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.06 Burden of Proof, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

5. 3-110 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 110.50, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 110.50 Firefighter’s Rule, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

6. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.01, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.01 Introduction, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

7. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.03, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.03 Statutory Strict Liability for Injuries Caused by Dogs, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

8. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.04, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.04 Defenses to Strict Liability, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group

9. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.05, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.05 Negligence as Alternative Theory of Recovery, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

TITLE 45. TORTS

CHAPTER 767. DAMAGE BY DOGS
Fla. Stat. § 767.04 (2002)
§ 767.04. Dog owner’s liability for damages to persons bitten
The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners’ knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person’s negligence contributed to the biting incident. A person is lawfully upon private property of such owner within the meaning of this act when the person is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him or her by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when the person is on such property upon invitation, expressed or implied, of the owner. However, the owner is not liable, except as to a person under the age of 6, or unless the damages are proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of the owner, if at the time of any such injury the owner had displayed in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign easily readable including the words “Bad Dog.” The remedy provided by this section is in addition to and cumulative with any other remedy provided by statute or common law.

HISTORY: s. 1, ch. 25109, 1949; s. 1, ch. 93-13; s. 1155, ch. 97-102.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes: CASE NOTES TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL
MATERIALS
CASE NOTES
Contracts Law : Contract Conditions & Provisions : Equitable Estoppel
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Duty Generally
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners
Torts : Real Property Torts : General Premises Liability
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals
Contracts Law : Contract Conditions & Provisions : Equitable Estoppel

1. Defendants were estopped from raising the defense that plaintiffs’ had ignored a “Bad Dog” sign in an action for strict liability for dog bites under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 by the doctrine of equitable estoppel; defendants had assured plaintiffs, invited business guests, that the “bad dog” on their property would be secured. Yorke v. Noble, 466 So. 2d 349, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12776, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1985).
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk

2. In a negligence action involving an injury caused by a dog, a grant of summary judgment in favor of the dog owners was reversed because the statutory defense in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 that a plaintiff mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated a dog was a question of fact for the jury. Staniszeski v. Walker, 550 So. 2d 19, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4093, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989).

3. Assumption of risk jury instruction was improperly allowed in dog bite victim’s negligence action against dog owner and insurer because Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 modified the common law action and superseded common law defenses. Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21, 1978 Fla. LEXIS 4771 (Fla. 1978).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Duty Generally

4. Because the legislature in enacting Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, imposing a requirement for a sign “easily readable,” was clearly intending a sign that was “legible” and “capable of being read,” and the requirement was for a sign that was capable of being read and was not a requirement that any possible victim of a dog-bite be “capable of reading” the sign, a sign was effective to protect property owner from liability regardless of injured victim’s failure to understand the warning solely because of an inability to read or write english. Registe v. Porter, 557 So. 2d 214, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 1104, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1990).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners

5. Dog owner was liable under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 for plaintiff’s injury suffered when she fell while running from owner’s dog, which had been ordered to attack by owner. Thomas v. Wyatt, 405 So. 2d 1369, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981).

6. Trial judge erred in granting a new trial following a jury verdict finding no liability on plaintiff’s claim of injury by a dog pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, where the jury could have properly concluded that the defense of careless provocation under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 had been met due to plaintiff’s behavior directed at the dog’s owner, and where because the verdict was a general verdict, it could not be determined that the jury based its decision on the careless provocation defense. Rosenfelt v. Hall, 387 So. 2d 544, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1980).

7. Liability and exemption created by Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 pertained only to dog owners, and where property owner was not also dog owner, she was neither liable under nor exonerated by the statute such that common law made homeowner liable for child’s dog bite even though warning signs were posted. Flick v. Malino, 356 So. 2d 904, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).

8. An appellate court determined that the taking of a milk bone out of a dog’s dish by a minor who wished to feed the dog did not constitute a provocation to except dog owners’ liability under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, which provided that no owner of any dog was to be liable for any damages to any person or his property when the person mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated the dog inflicting the damage. Sand v. Gold, 301 So. 2d 828, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 8632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1975).

9. Where the defendant failed to present any evidence to support his affirmative defense that the plaintiff was bitten and injured by the defendant’s dog as a result of the plaintiff’s provocation of the dog, the defendant’s liability was governed by Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 and the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict. Minisall v. Krysiak, 242 So. 2d 756, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 5386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1970).

10. Dog owner was not liable for dog bite injuries inflicted on a person who was lawfully on the owner’s premises although the owner did not display a sign containing the words “bad dog” as required by Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, where the owner displayed in a prominent place on the premises an easily readable sign bearing the words “beware of dogs.” Romfh v. Berman, 56 So. 2d 127, 1951 Fla. LEXIS 1008 (Fla. 1951), overruled, Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1965).
Torts : Real Property Torts : General Premises Liability

11. Economic invitee who was bitten by a dog while on the business premises had a common law cause of action against the business establishment which owned the dog. Stickney v. Belcher Yacht, Inc., 424 So. 2d 962, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1983), approved, in part, quashed, in part, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals

12. In plaintiff kennel worker’s suit against defendant dog owner for damages for dog’s bites under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, the independent contractor exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was not available to dog owner as a defense. Wipperfurth v. Huie, 654 So. 2d 116, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 374, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S 109 (Fla. 1995).

13. The term “owner”, as used in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, does not include a kennel owner or veterinarian who undertakes the care, custody, and control of a dog pursuant to an agreement with the dog’s actual owner. Wipperfurth v. Huie, 654 So. 2d 116, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 374, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S 109 (Fla. 1995).

14. Absent some special or relationship between the landlord and a dog kept on the premises by an occupant, the landowner was not liable for injuries that the dog caused away from the property under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04. Ny Tran v. Bancroft, 648 So. 2d 314, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 91, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1995).

15. Independent contractor defense was no longer viable in an action brought against a dog owner under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 and did not bar recovery by an employee of a dog kennel. Huie v. Wipperfurth, 632 So. 2d 1109, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 1682, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1994).

16. Florida’s dog-bite statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 recognizes only two statutory defenses, which are that the owner is not liable when the person bitten has mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated the dog, or where the owner prominently displays a “Bad Dog” sign; provocation is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant, so where the only defense against a dog-bite claim is that the dog was aggravated by a bitten minor, but none of the evidence supports the provocation defense, the minor plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on the issue. Freire v. Leon, 584 So. 2d 98, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 7350, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D 1982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1991).

17. The Fireman’s Rule, as a common law defense, did not apply to claims under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 and Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, nor did any common law defenses apply to the statutory cause of action based on Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 and Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, and the only defenses available were those provided under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, which defenses also applied to a claim under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01. Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 548 So. 2d 215, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 735, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 390, 74 A.L.R.4th 1111 (Fla. 1989).

18. In a negligence action involving an injury caused by a dog, a grant of summary judgment in favor of the dog owners was reversed because the statutory defense in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 that a plaintiff mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated a dog was a question of fact for the jury. Staniszeski v. Walker, 550 So. 2d 19, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4093, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989).

19. Victim of a dog bite could pursue the non-owner of the dog upon a common law liability claim because the insulation from dog bite liability provided a dog owner through compliance with Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 did not extinguish the possibility of pursuing the non-owner who could be linked to the dog. Ward v. Young, 504 So. 2d 528, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 7398, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1987).

20. Under the dog bite statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, a child of tender years could mischievously provoke a dog; thus, a dog owner’s liability was precluded under the statute where the jury determined that a child mischievously provoked the dog prior to being bitten. Porter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 497 So. 2d 927, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10529, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986).

21. Where police officer was injured while being chased by husband’s dogs after entering onto husband and wife’s property to investigate why a burglar alarm was sounding, trial court properly dismissed claim against wife because wife did not own dogs and was not subject to liability pursuant to Fla. Stat. chs. 767.01 or 767.04; additionally, with no statute superseding it, the common law defense of the fireman’s rule was not abrogated and could be asserted by wife. Kilpatrick v. Sklar, 497 So. 2d 1289, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10530, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986).

22. In a dog attack case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that they could consider all the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the age and maturity of the child, in deciding whether the child mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated the dog as contemplated by Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04. Reed v. Bowen, 503 So. 2d 1265, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11535, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).

23. Dog owner was liable for damages to one bitten by his dog despite his posting a “beware of dog” sign; the protection afforded dog owners by Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 did not preclude the application of equitable estoppel, and the owner’s statements to the victim that the dog was old and arthritic and that the sign was posted merely to prevent intruders estopped him from claiming the protection of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04. Godbey v. Dresner, 492 So. 2d 800, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9227, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).

24. The tort immunity of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 does not extend to a dog owner who affirmatively directs a business invitee to ignore a “Bad Dog” sign displayed on the premises; as a matter of law, a dog owner who tells a victim to ignore the “Bad Dog” sign and pretend it does not exist has not provided the genuine, effective and bona fide notice required by the dog bite statute, and the Florida Supreme Court will not allow a party who disavows the tenor of the “Bad Dog” sign to take advantage of its wording. Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29, 1986 Fla. LEXIS 2014, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 196 (Fla. 1986).

25. In an action by a mailman to recover for injuries incurred when he was bitten by a dog that jumped over a four-foot fence, which fence had a bad dog warning sign affixed in accordance with Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, the verdict form was improper in that it preempted the jury from deciding whether the sign sufficiently warned of the actual danger. Kaiser v. Baley, 474 So. 2d 906, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 15644, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985).

26. Business owner was liable to economic invitee bitten by dog at the store under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04; security guard who managed the dog was not strictly liable under the statute, but could be found negligent. Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney, 450 So. 2d 1111, 1984 Fla. LEXIS 2906 (Fla. 1984).

27. Economic invitee who was bitten by a dog while on the business premises had a common law cause of action against the business establishment which owned the dog. Stickney v. Belcher Yacht, Inc., 424 So. 2d 962, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1983), approved, in part, quashed, in part, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).

28. Dog owner was liable under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 for plaintiff’s injury suffered when she fell while running from owner’s dog, which had been ordered to attack by owner. Thomas v. Wyatt, 405 So. 2d 1369, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981).

29. Trial judge erred in granting a new trial following a jury verdict finding no liability on plaintiff’s claim of injury by a dog pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01, where the jury could have properly concluded that the defense of careless provocation under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 had been met due to plaintiff’s behavior directed at the dog’s owner, and where because the verdict was a general verdict, it could not be determined that the jury based its decision on the careless provocation defense. Rosenfelt v. Hall, 387 So. 2d 544, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1980).

30. Defendant’s decedent was not immune from liability by virtue of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 because it could not be said as a matter of law that a sign, even though posted in a prominent place, was easily readable to plaintiff, a three-year-old child. Flick v. Malino, 374 So. 2d 89, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1979).

31. Defenses under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 were available to dog owner sued pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 by bite victim to recover damages for injuries incurred when victim fled from owner’s guard dogs. Rattet v. Dual SEC. Sys., 373 So. 2d 948, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).

32. Nothing in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 holds a dog owner strictly liable in a dog bite case where the proximate cause of the injury is the intervening negligence of another person. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15129, 4 A.L.R.4th 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).

33. Dog was carelessly aggravated and provoked within the meaning of Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 where two strangers in strange urroundings held a large German Shepherd dog’s neck to immobilize a front leg for insertion of a needle and pressed his head down; such intervening efficient independent fault solely caused or resulted in injury to the veterinarian’s employee and relieved the owner of the dog from liability. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15129, 4 A.L.R.4th 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).

34. Owner of a dog is not liable to a third party under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 for damages from being injured by the dog subsequent to the delivery of possession and control of the dog to a qualified veterinarian for care or treatment and the acceptance of employment and possession by the veterinarian, in the absence of a showing of active negligence by the owner which contributes directly to and becomes the proximate cause of the injury. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15129, 4 A.L.R.4th 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).

35. Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04, under which defendant mother was sued by plaintiff daughter after daughter was bitten by mother’s dog, did not iolate Fla. Const. art. I, § 21, as the statute did not take away a right of redress for injury; rather, it provided that a dog owner should be liable even without the common law requirement of scienter for injuries caused by his dog, and that under certain circumstances, including injury which resulted after notice was given by a posted “bad dog” sign, no liability would lie. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681, 1970 Fla. LEXIS 2310 (Fla. 1970).

36. Petitioner dog owner could be liable under Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 to respondent individual who was injured by petitioner’s dog even though those injuries were not the result of a bite, as there were no features contained in Fla. Stat. ch. 767.04 which would justify a finding that Fla. Stat. ch. 767.01 had been repealed. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So. 2d 444, 1965 Fla. LEXIS 3388 (Fla. 1965).

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS
1. Florida Civil Procedure 3d § 7-13c, FLORIDA CIVIL PROCEDURE 3d, Chapter 7. Pleadings and Motions, § 7-13c Affirmative Defenses, Copyright 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a div of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

2. 1-14 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 14.01, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division I INSTRUCTIONS USED IN ALL CIVIL ACTIONS, § 14.01 Negligence of Child (Fla. Std. Jury Instr. [Civ.] 3.5, 3.5a, 3.6c, 4.1), Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

3. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.01, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.01 Owner’s or Keeper’s Liability for Dog Bite, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

4. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.02, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.02 Owner’s or Keeper’s General Liability for Injury Caused by Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

5. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.03, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.03 Owner or Keeper of Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

6. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.04, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.04 Plaintiff’s Lawful Entry on Private Property, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

7. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.07, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.07 Defendant: Posting of Warning Sign, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

8. Florida Residential Landlord Tenant Manual § 10.03, FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT MANUAL, VOLUME 1A, § 10.03. Landlordenant Negligence in Florida, Copyright § 2001 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

9. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.03, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.03 Statutory Strict Liability for Injuries Caused by Dogs, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

10. 2-40 Florida Torts § 40.04, Florida Torts, DIVISION III ACTIONS BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY, § 40.04 Defenses to Strict Liability, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

TITLE 45. TORTS

CHAPTER 767. DAMAGE BY DOGS

Fla. Stat. § 767.11 (2002)

§ 767.11. Definitions
As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

(1) “Dangerous dog” means any dog that according to the records of the appropriate authority:
(a) Has aggressively bitten, attacked, or endangered or has inflicted severe injury on a human being on public or private property;
(b) Has more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal while off the owner’s property;
(c) Has been used primarily or in part for the purpose of dog fighting or is a dog trained for dog fighting; or
(d) Has, when unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, provided that such actions are attested to in a sworn statement by one or more persons and dutifully investigated by the appropriate authority.

(2) “Unprovoked” means that the victim who has been conducting himself or herself peacefully and lawfully has been bitten or chased in a menacing fashion or attacked by a dog.

(3) “Severe injury” means any physical injury that results in broken bones, multiple bites, or disfiguring lacerations requiring sutures or reconstructive surgery.

(4) “Proper enclosure of a dangerous dog” means, while on the owner’s property, a dangerous dog is securely confined indoors or in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure, suitable to prevent the entry of young children and designed to prevent the animal from escaping. Such pen or structure shall have secure sides and a secure top to prevent the dog from escaping over, under, or through the structure and shall also provide protection from the elements.

(5) “Animal control authority” means an entity acting alone or in concert with other local governmental units and authorized by them to enforce the animal control laws of the city, county, or state. In those areas not served by an animal control authority, the sheriff shall carry out the duties of the animal control authority under this act.

(6) “Animal control officer” means any individual employed, contracted with, or appointed by the animal control authority for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of this act or any other law or ordinance relating to the licensure of animals, control of animals, or seizure and impoundment of animals and includes any state or local law enforcement officer or other employee whose duties in whole or in part include assignments that involve the seizure and impoundment of any animal.

(7) “Owner” means any person, firm, corporation, or organization possessing, harboring, keeping, or having control or custody of an animal or, if the animal is owned by a person under the age of 18, that person’s parent or guardian.

HISTORY: s. 2, ch. 90-180; s. 2, ch. 93-13; s. 1156, ch. 97-102.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes:

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS

1. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.01, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.01 Owner’s or Keeper’s Liability for Dog Bite, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

2. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.02, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.02 Owner’s or Keeper’s General Liability for Injury Caused by Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

3. 3-70 Florida Forms of Jury Instruction § 70.03, Florida Forms of Jury Instruction, Division III TORT ACTIONS, § 70.03 Owner or Keeper of Dog, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

TITLE 45. TORTS

CHAPTER 767. DAMAGE BY DOGS

Fla. Stat. § 767.13 (2002)
§ 767.13. Attack or bite by dangerous dog; penalties; confiscation; destruction

(1) If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. In addition, the dangerous dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time, or impounded and held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification under s. 767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. This 10-day time period shall allow the owner to request a hearing under s. 767.12. The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure.

(2) If a dog that has not been declared dangerous attacks and causes severe injury to or death of any human, the dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time or held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification under s. 767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. This 10-day time period shall allow the owner to request a hearing under s. 767.12. The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure. In addition, if the owner of the dog had prior knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, yet demonstrated a reckless disregard for such propensities under the circumstances, the owner of the dog is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(3) If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks and causes severe injury to or death of any human, the owner is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In addition, the dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time or held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification under s. 767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. This 10-day time period shall allow the owner to request a hearing under s. 767.12. The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure.

(4) If the owner files a written appeal under s. 767.12 or this section, the dog must be held and may not be destroyed while the appeal is pending.

(5) If a dog attacks or bites a person who is engaged in or attempting to engage in a criminal activity at the time of the attack, the owner is not guilty of any crime specified under this section.

HISTORY: s. 4, ch. 90-180; s. 4, ch. 93-13; s. 4, ch. 94-339.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes:

CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law : Procedural Due Process : Scope of Protection
1. Dog owner was denied due process and threatened with a loss of private property when the county animal control agency declared the owner’s dog to be dangerous and placed it under restrictions after the dog bit a visiting minor who had repeatedly provoked the dog; although the dog had been peaceable, the owner was deprived of the absolute defense of provocation because no hearing was afforded, unlike the situation in which other owners whose pets had already been declared dangerous and bit again, or whose pets aggressively attacked and caused severe injury to a human being were granted access to the courts under Fla. Stat. chs. 767.13(1) and (2) before the pets were permitted to be destroyed. County of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So. 2d 229, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 6496, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D 1468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993), aff’d, 635 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1994).

TITLE 45. TORTS

CHAPTER 767. DAMAGE BY DOGS

Fla. Stat. § 767.16 (2002)
§ 767.16. Bite by a police or service dog; exemption from quarantine
Any dog that is owned, or the service of which is employed, by a law enforcement agency, or any dog that is used as a service dog for blind, hearing impaired, or disabled persons, and that bites another animal or human is exempt from any quarantine requirement following such bite if the dog has a current rabies vaccination that was administered by a licensed veterinarian. HISTORY: s. 1, ch. 91-228.

Georgia Dog Law

Liability Statute

Georgia does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

Under Georgia common law, a dog owner is liable for damages if the owner knew, or should have known, that the dog had the propensity to bite and cause injury. Under Georgia law, a dog’s aggressiveness or menacing behavior alone is not sufficient to place the owner on notice of the dog’s propensity to bite.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

Under Georgia law, a “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, without provocation, inflicts severe injury on a human. A severe injury is one that results in death, broken bones, or disfiguring lacerations that require multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.
• a dog that, without provocation, aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans after the dog was classified as “potentially dangerous” and after the owner was put on notice that the dog is potentially dangerous.

The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

Under Georgia law, a “potentially dangerous dog” is a dog that, without provocation, bites a human.

Legal Responsibilities of Dog Owners

Owners must keep dangerous dogs and potentially dangerous dogs either securely confined indoors or confined outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked pen, fence, or structure that prevents entry of young children, as well as escape of the animal. When outside the enclosure, the dog must be muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and be under the physical restraint of a responsible person.

Owners must register dangerous and potentially dangerous dogs with the state.

Owners must post their property with a clearly-visible sign that warns people of the dog’s presence. The state has a uniform symbol that must be placed on the sign.

Owners must maintain liability insurance of at least $15,000 for personal injuries inflicted by the dog or a surety bond of $15,000 or more payable to any person injured by the dog.

Liability of Dog Owners

Owners of dangerous and potentially dangerous dogs are strictly liability for injuries and damages caused by their dogs. In addition to civil liability, owners face criminal penalties of up to $5,000 in fines and one year in prison for the first offense, and up to $10,000 in fines and ten years in prison for second and subsequent offenses.

Georgia Dog Bite Law

TITLE 51. TORTS
CHAPTER 2. IMPUTABLE NEGLIGENCE
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2002)

§ 51-2-7. Liability of owner or keeper of vicious or dangerous animal for injuries caused by animal
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash.
The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated fowl including roosters with spurs. The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated livestock.

HISTORY: Orig. Code 1863, § 2907; Code 1868, § 2913; Code 1873, § 2964; Code 1882, § 2964; Civil Code 1895, § 3821; Civil Code 1910, § 4417; Code 1933, § 105-110; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1033, § 1.

NOTES:
HISTORY OF SECTION. –The language of this section is derived in part from the decision in Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 40, 13 S.E. 803 (1891).

CROSS REFERENCES. –Care, confinement, etc., of wild animals, Ch. 5, T. 27.

LAW REVIEWS. –For annual survey article on tort law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (2000).
For note, “Is There (and Should There Be) Any “Bite’ Left in Georgia’s “First Bite’ Rule?” see 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1343 (2000).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
General Consideration Knowledge
Violation of Ordinances
Domesticated Livestock
Procedure

GENERAL CONSIDERATION
THIS SECTION IS BUT A RESTATEMENT OF COMMON LAW. Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 585 (1974).
The 1985 amendment of this section, substituting “may” for “shall” in the first sentence, brought the amount of statutory liability more in line with the liability imposed by the common law, since it did not purport to change the “first bite” rule, but rather supported the limited protection of the rule for pet owners by removing an inflexible strict liability standard. Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998).

SECTION IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE BASIS FOR RECOVERY WHEN INJURY IS CAUSED BY DOMESTIC ANIMAL. Callaway v. Miller, 118 Ga. App. 309, 163 S.E.2d 336 (1968).

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ATTACK BY ANIMAL. –The owner of a vicious or dangerous animal, who allows the same to go at liberty, is liable to one who sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event that the owner knows of its vicious or dangerous character. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

Under this section, which is but a restatement of the common law, to support an action for damages for injuries sustained by being bitten by a dog, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious, and that the owner had knowledge of this fact. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944); McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973).

An owner of a domestic animal who allows it to go at liberty is liable under this section to one who sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event the owner knows of its vicious or dangerous character. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

In order for a party to recover, it must appear that the animal had a propensity to do the act which caused the injury and that the defendant knew of it. McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973); Pearce v. Shanks, 153 Ga. App. 693, 266 S.E.2d 353 (1980).

CAT AND DOG BITE CASES TREATED SAME. –There is no authority for the assertion that cat bite cases should be treated differently than dog bite cases. Fellers v. Carson, 182 Ga. App. 658, 356 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 182 Ga. App. 910, 356 S.E.2d 658 (1987).

CITED in Phillips v. Cleveland, 31 Ga. App. 206, 120 S.E. 639 (1923); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 30 S.E.2d 398 (1944);
Rutherford v. Underwood, 84 Ga. App. 624, 66 S.E.2d 768 (1951); Thomas v. Richardson, 129 Ga. App. 834, 201 S.E.2d 653 (1973); Gordon v. Dawson, 146 Ga. App. 784, 247 S.E.2d 596 (1978); Rines v. Harris, 18 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Culver, 172 Ga. App. 183, 322 S.E.2d 294 (1984); McBride v. Wasik, 179 Ga. App. 244, 345 S.E.2d 921 (1986); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 356 S.E.2d 757 (1987); Gilbert v. Hudspeth, 182 Ga. App. 898, 357 S.E.2d 601 (1987); Pickard v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 595, 478 S.E.2d 432 (1996);

Bakhtiarnejad v. Cox Enters., Inc., 247 Ga. App. 205, 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000).

KNOWLEDGE
DOG’S DANGEROUS CHARACTER AND OWNER’S KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. –Under this section the dog’s dangerous character is at issue totally apart from the issue of the owner’s knowledge of his dangerous character, therefore, while the expert’s report concluding that the dog was dangerous or potentially dangerous could not be relevant to the issue of knowledge because it was issued after the attack on the plaintiff, the fact that the dog was declared dangerous or potentially dangerous three weeks after the attack were relevant to whether the dog had dangerous propensities at the time of the attack. Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 432 S.E.2d 658 (1993).

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF VICIOUS AND DANGEROUS CHARACTER.
–If owner does not know of vicious and dangerous character of his animal, he will not be liable for injury which is not usual and natural consequence to be anticipated from allowing an ordinary animal of that kind to go at large. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968).

UNFORESEEN AND UNFORESEEABLE ACTS OF DOG. –Owner of dog may not be found liable for unforeseen and unforeseeable act of dog simply because dog was not under owner’s direct control at the time the act took place. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

PROOF OF SCIENTER REQUIRED. –Under this section, it is still necessary, as at common law, to show not only that the animal is vicious or dangerous, but also that the owner or keeper knows of this fact. Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384, 49 S.E. 281 (1904).
Scienter is a necessary and a material fact which must be shown before there can be any finding of liability under this section.
Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969); McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Proof of scienter is essential to a suit under this section. Johnson v. Hurt, 120 Ga. App. 761, 172 S.E.2d 201 (1969). Proof that the owner of a dog either knew or should have known of the dog’s propensity to do the particular act which caused injury to the complaining party is indispensable to recovery against the owner. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980); Stanger v. Cato, 182 Ga. App. 498, 356 S.E.2d 97 (1987).

The size of a dog, its breed, and the fact that its owner keeps it restrained, does not establish any inference that the owner knows the dog to be dangerous. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830, 363 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IS NOT SATISFIED BY DOG OWNER’S USE OF A RESTRAINING CHAIN, OR POSTING OF “BEWARE OF DOG” SIGN. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).
CHAIN RESTRAINT MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT. –The simple fact that a dog is restrained on a chain may not be sufficient to establish the owner is free from liability for “careless management” under this section. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830, 363 S.E.2d 48 (1987).
OWNER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF DOG IF THERE IS LACK OF SCIENTER. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Where there is a lack of scienter even the breach of a leash law is not sufficient to hold the owner responsible for the acts of the dog. Turner v. Irvin, 146 Ga. App. 218, 246 S.E.2d 127 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

KNOWLEDGE OF PROPENSITY TO PARTICULAR HARM REQUIRED. –It is not enough for liability under this section that the possessor of the animal know of a propensity to do harm in one or more specific ways; it is necessary that he have reason to know of its propensity to do harm of the type which it inflicts, Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972); Penick v. Grimsley, 130 Ga. App. 722, 204 S.E.2d 510 (1974); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978); Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597, 466 S.E.2d 37 (1995); Clark v. Joiner, 242 Ga. App. 421, 530 S.E.2d 45 (2000).

KNOWLEDGE MAY BE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE. –To support a recovery a plaintiff must show either actual or constructive knowledge by the defendant of the animal’s danger to others. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

KNOWLEDGE PRESUMED IN CERTAIN CASES. –While this section does not set out how knowledge of the vicious nature of the animal may be acquired, under the common law this knowledge is presumed to exist when the animal involved belongs to a certain class of animals ferae naturae, such as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, baboons, apes, and monkeys, etc. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935). When a person is injured by an attack of an animal ferae naturae, the negligence of the owner or keeper thereof is presumed, because of the dangerous and ferocious propensities of a wild beast, such as a lion, tiger, leopard, bear, ape, baboon, and such wild beasts, and the law recognizes that safety lies only in keeping such animals perfectly secure. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).

A propensity on the part of a dog to bite people is not one of the instincts common to the species of which every owner must be presumed to have notice. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

WHAT CONSTITUTES KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMAL’S DANGEROUS NATURE. –In order to constitute notice to an owner or keeper of an animal’s vicious or dangerous nature, there should be an incident or incidents which would put a prudent man on notice to anticipate the event which occurred. A single incident may not adequately place a person on notice. The test should be whether the one incident was of such nature as to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that the animal was sufficiently dangerous as to be likely to cause an injury at a later time. Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

If a dog has “friendly” intentions but has habits which because of its size or other characteristics make it dangerous, then it seems that such behavior should be controlled. However, it is necessary that the owner, as previously pointed out, have knowledge of the pattern of the animal’s dangerous behavior before he can be held for failure to control the animal. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968).

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITY. –By presenting evidence that defendant’s animal was required to be on a leash by an ordinance of the applicable governmental body and that the animal was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the vicious propensity of defendant’s dog under this Code section. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor based upon uncontroverted evidence that defendant had no knowledge of his dog’s vicious propensity. Fields v. Thompson, 190 Ga. App. 177, 378 S.E.2d 390 (1989).

Defendant pet-owner’s statement to another, about three months before defendant’s dog bit plaintiff, asking that person “to do whatever was necessary . . . to keep the dogs from attacking. . .” raises genuine issues of material fact as to defendant’s prior knowledge of the dogs’ tendency to attack humans. Supan v. Griffin, 238 Ga. App. 404, 519 S.E.2d 22 (1999).

KNOWLEDGE OR NOTICE THAT DOG WILL BEHAVE FEROCIOUSLY TOWARD OTHER ANIMALS IS NOT NECESSARILY NOTICE THAT IT WILL ATTACK HUMAN BEINGS. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978). Knowledge of attacks on other animals, combined with the confinement by defendant of his dog, is not sufficient to show defendant’s knowledge of the dog’s vicious tendencies and therefore to create liability under this section. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

DOG’S MENACING BEHAVIOR ALONE IS SUFFICIENT TO APPRISE ITS OWNER OF ANIMAL’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

MENACING BEHAVIOR DOES NOT ESTABLISH VICIOUS PROPENSITY. –A dog’s barking and growling amount, at most, to menacing behavior, and menacing behavior does not establish vicious propensity under this section. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d 877 (1998). KNOWLEDGE OF FROLICSOME AFFECTION DIRECTED SOLELY TO OWNERS. –An owner’s knowledge of a dog’s frolicsome affection which is directed solely towards the owners is not such knowledge of a pattern of dangerous behavior as to put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the animal may cause injury by displaying such behavior towards another at a later date. Marshall v. Person, 176 Ga. App. 542, 336 S.E.2d 380 (1985).

FACT THAT DOG OWNER INVITED OR ALLOWED NEIGHBOR TO PET HIS DOG did not make him liable for the neighbor’s subsequent dog bite injuries, where the owner had no prior knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the dog would bite the neighbor. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d 877 (1998).

ADEQUACY OF OWNER’S MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL. –A new trial was authorized where material fact issues existed as to the adequacy of an owner’s management and control of her dog. Evans-Watson v. Reese, 188 Ga. App. 292, 372 S.E.2d 675 (1988). Even if defendant’s dog were vicious or dangerous, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant was careless in his management of the dog and whether plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own safety, where the dog was chained in an area accessible only by stepping over a 28″ high guardrail and which was not an area where people would normally pass. Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 191 Ga. App. 442, 382 S.E.2d 180 (1989).

GUARD DOGS. –The scienter requirement applies in the case of a dog specifically purchased and used for guarding commercial property. Wade v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000).

VICTIM’S KNOWLEDGE OF DOG’S AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. –Trial court properly granted summary judgment to dog owners in dog bite case in light of the evidence of the victim’s equal or superior knowledge of the dog’s aggressive tendencies and assumption of the risk in petting the dog. Durham v. Mason, 256 Ga. App. 467, 568 S.E.2d 530 (2002).

VIOLATION OF ORDINANCES
VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NOT NECESSARILY SCIENTER. –The fact that a mad dog is at large in violation of the municipal ordinance imposing a penalty upon its owner does not alter the rule that scienter must be shown. Langford v. Eskedor, 30 Ga. App. 799, 119 S.E. 431 (1923).

VIOLATION OF LOCAL ORDINANCE. –By presenting evidence that defendant’s dog was required by ordinance to be on a leash and that the dog was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the vicious propensity of the dog under this section. Oertel v. Chi Psi Fraternity, 239 Ga. App. 147, 521 S.E.2d 71 (1999).

VIOLATION OF LEASH LAW WAS IRRELEVANT UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS. –In the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to the victim even though the dog’s presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation of the county leash law. Brown v. Pierce, 176 Ga. App. 787, 338 S.E.2d 39 (1985).

DOG NOT CONFINED AS REQUIRED BY ORDINANCE. –Defendants’ dog was not “confined within the property limits of his owner or custodian,” as required by a county ordinance, where, although the animal may have been physically within the boundaries of defendants’ property at the time it bit plaintiffs’ son, it had broken loose from its chain. Tutak v. Fairley, 198 Ga. App. 307, 401 S.E.2d 73 (1991).

When a dog’s owner allowed the dog to run free inside his house, including having access to doors leading outside the house, a genuine fact issue was present as to whether the dog was allowed to roam free in violation of a local ordinance. Johnston v. Warendh, 252 Ga. App. 674, 556 S.E.2d 867 (2001).

DOMESTICATED LIVESTOCK
BULLS, STALLIONS, AND RAMS. –The law does not regard bulls, stallions, and rams as being abnormally dangerous animals, but rather as animals routinely kept for stud purposes, so that the particular danger involved in their dangerous tendencies has become a normal incident of civilized life. Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499, 433 S.E.2d 667 (1993).

INJURIES BY RUNAWAY HORSE. –The owner of a runaway horse is generally liable for injuries caused by him. Phillips v. Dewald, 79 Ga. 732, 7 S.E. 151, 11 Am. St. R. 458 (1887).

KNOWLEDGE THAT HORSE HAS THROWN RIDER DOES NOT SHOW PROPENSITY TO KICK. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

PROCEDURE
SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS. –It is not sufficient to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that his dog was vicious, but facts showing knowledge, either actual or constructive, must be alleged. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944). Where plaintiff did not allege that dog had ever made an attack on anyone prior to the time it injured her, or had ever given defendant cause to suspect that it might be vicious, except that it belonged to the breed of dogs known as German police dogs, and did not allege that the defendant was the owner of the dog, or that she ever had the dog under her personal supervision or control, petition did not set out a cause of action for damages sustained by plaintiff when bitten by the dog. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).
Petition alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that she was bitten by dog on entering the premises, and that defendant did not furnish plaintiff with a safe place to work, in that keeping the dog endangered her life and safety while she was in the performance of duties incident to her employment. Where no facts were alleged to show that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to work in the house with the dog present, the petition failed to set out a cause of action because of failure to allege facts showing the defendant knew, or should have known of the danger. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

Where in an action for damages it is alleged that the plaintiff was bitten and injured by a dog kept by the defendant, that the dog was vicious and accustomed to bite mankind which was known to the defendant, the allegations are sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga. App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

Where a petition alleges that defendant wrongfully and injuriously did keep a certain dog which he knew was used and accustomed to attack and bite mankind, and that he negligently and carelessly managed said dog in that he permitted the dog to go at liberty knowing the character of said dog and that the dog was vicious and that the defendant knew that it was vicious, the ferocious character of the dog and knowledge of the owner were sufficiently alleged as against a demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga. App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

KNOWLEDGE CAN DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. –Affidavit by the mother of a dog-bite victim that the dog’s owner told her that “she knew something like this would happen” was admissible, and was evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment for defendants. Johnson v. Kvasny, 230 Ga. App. 162, 495 S.E.2d 651 (1998).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS. –Where there was proof going to show that the plaintiff, at the time she was injured by reason of the horse running over her, was standing upon a sidewalk in a city, and one of the acts of negligence charged by the petition was the alleged driving of the horse upon the sidewalk, in violation of a city ordinance, and such ordinance was admitted in evidence without objection, it was not error for the court to charge upon the validity and legal effect of the ordinance, even though the evidence indicated that the driving of the horse on the sidewalk was unintentional on the part of the driver, where the court expressly instructed the jury that, if such act was unintentional, it would constitute no violation of the ordinance. Clackum v. Bagwell, 40 Ga. App. 831, 151 S.E. 689 (1930).

JURY QUESTION. –In an action for injuries to the plaintiff by a bull of the defendant, the questions of the viciousness of the bull, and the negligence of the defendant are questions for the jury. Van Harlengen v. Bearse, 26 Ga. App. 473, 106 S.E. 306 (1921).
Where a private zoo owner opens his private zoo for viewing without any charge to the public, it is a question for the jury whether the act of the defendant’s employee in removing a chimpanzee from its cage complied with that degree of care required by this section. Palmer Chem. & Equip. Co. v. Gantt, 123 Ga. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 492 (1971).

While a previous attack would not necessarily be required to say there is a jury issue on the question of knowledge that a dog had a propensity to attack human beings, at least some form of menacing behavior would be. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

Evidence that the dog’s owner knew that the dog had tried to attack another person and had scolded the dog for this behavior was behavior evidence such that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether the owner should have anticipated the subsequent successful attack on plaintiff. Thurmond v. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687, 520 S.E.2d 43 (1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SCOPE OF SECTION. –This section relates to a civil action for damages for injury caused by a vicious or dangerous animal kept by its owner where he with knowledge of the viciousness of the animal negligently allows the same to go at liberty. 1945-47 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 652.

BASIS OF LIABILITY. –If injury occurs to another by reason of the exercise of the vicious propensity of an animal, the owner will be held liable therefor, if he knew of the vicious character and negligently allowed such an animal to run at large. 1945-47 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 652.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. –Where a person is injured by an attack of an animal which by nature is vicious, the negligence of the owner is presumed because the law recognizes that safety lies only in keeping such animals perfectly secure, 1945-47 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 652.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. –4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 91 et seq.
C.J.S. –3A C.J.S., Animals, § 177 et seq.
ALR. –Duty and liability of master to servant injured by horse belonging to master, 26 ALR 871; 42 ALR 226; 60 ALR 468.
Character and extent of claims for which lien on animal damage feasant attaches, 26 ALR 1047.
Constitutionality of “dog laws”, 49 ALR 847.
Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to person thereon by dog not owned or harbored by former, 92 ALR 732.
Liability of owner of male animal who furnishes its service for breeding purposes, for damage inflicted during such services, 106 ALR 1418.
Owner or keeper of trespassing dog as subject to injunction or damages, 107 ALR 1323.
Owner’s liability, under legislation forbidding domestic animals to run at large on highways, as dependent on negligence, 34 ALR2d 1285.
Statutory liability for physical injuries inflicted by animal as surviving defendant’s death, 40 ALR2d 543.
Liability for injury to property inflicted by wild animal, 57 ALR2d 242.
Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by dog, 66 ALR2d 916.
Liability of landlord to tenant or member of tenant’s family, for injury by animal or insect, 67 ALR2d 1005.
Law as to cats, 73 ALR2d 1032; 8 ALR4th 1287.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 80 ALR2d 886.
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161.
Liability for injury or damage caused by bees, 86 ALR2d 791.
Master’s liability to agricultural worker injured other than by farm machinery, 9 ALR3d 1061.
Liability for injury or death of child social guest, 20 ALR3d 1127.
Owner’s or keeper’s liability for personal injury or death inflicted by wild animal, 21 ALR3d 603; 92 ALR3d 832; 66 ALR Fed. 305.
Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser, 64 ALR3d 1039.
Animals as attractive nuisance, 64 ALR3d 1069.
Keeping bees as nuisance, 88 ALR3d 992.
Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 ALR3d 832.
Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner’s or personal liability policy, 96 ALR3d 891.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee, 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injuries by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358.
Measure, elements, and amount of damages for killing or injuring cat, 8 ALR4th 1287.
Liability of person, other than owner of animal or owner or operator of motor vehicle, for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 21 ALR4th 132.
Liability of owner or operator of vehicle for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therin resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in stree tor highway, 21 ALR4th 159.
Liability of owner of animal for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 29 ALR4th 431.
Liability to adult social guest injured otherwise than by condition of premises, 38 ALR4th 200.
Liability for personal injury or death caused by trespassing or intruding livestock, 49 ALR4th 710.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 ALR4th 446.
Cat as subject of larceny, 55 ALR4th 1080.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute, 64 ALR4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat, 67 ALR4th 976.
Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 ALR4th 823.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 ALR4th 1004.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 ALR4th 374.
Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog, 11 ALR5th 127.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 68 ALR5th 599.
Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS secs. 1346, 2671 et seq.), for death or injury sustained by visitor to national park or national forest, 66 ALR Fed. 305.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this subpart, part, article, chapter or title.

Hawaii Dog Law

Liability Statute

Hawaii does not have a Dog Bite Statute that addresses an owner’s liability for injuries caused by a dog. Each county, however, has the power to enact ordinances regulating owners who own or keep any dog that has bitten, injured, or maimed a person.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover for injuries caused by a dog, the plaintiff must prove that the dog’s owner or keeper at the time of the injury was negligent. Hawaii law charges owners and keepers of dogs with a duty to take notice of their dog’s propensities and to use reasonable care to guard against the general propensities of the class of animal the dog belongs to, as well as particular propensities peculiar to that animal.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Hawaii does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Hawaii Dog Bite Law

DIVISION 4. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
TITLE 36. CIVIL REMEDIES AND DEFENSES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 663. TORT ACTIONS
PART I. LIABILITY; SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
HRS § 663-9 (2003)

[§ 663-9]. Liability of animal owners

(a) The owner or harborer of an animal, if the animal proximately causes either personal or property damage to any person, shall be liable in damages to the person injured regardless of the animal owner’s or harborer’s lack of scienter of the vicious or dangerous propensities of the animal.

(b) The owner or harborer of an animal which is known by its species or nature to be dangerous, wild, or vicious, if the animal proximately causes either personal or property damage to any person, shall be absolutely liable for such damage.

HISTORY: L 1980, c 218, § 2
NOTES:
CROSS REFERENCES. –As to actions for removal or destruction of dogs biting humans, see § 142-75.

CASE NOTES
WHAT MUST BE PROVEN UNDER THIS SECTION. –Under this section, persons suffering injury caused by an animal must prove negligence on the part of the animal’s owner in order to make the owner liable for the injury. The injured person must prove duty, breach of duty, and damages; however, the injured person need not prove the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities. This knowledge, scienter, is often referred to as the doctrine of the dog’s “first bite.” Hubbell v. Iseke, 6 Haw. App. 485, 727 P.2d 1131, cert. denied, 68 Haw. 691 (1986).

EFFECT OF SUBSECTION (B). –Subsection (b) of this section imposes strict liability on owners of animals known by their “species or nature to be dangerous, wild or vicious.” However, dogs are not included in this category since dogs are not generally of a known vicious nature. Hubbell v. Iseke, 6 Haw. App. 485, 727 P.2d 1131, cert. denied, 68 Haw. 691 (1986).

CITED in Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778 (D. Haw. 1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR4th.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability for injuries caused by cat. 68 A.L.R.4th 823.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries from electrically operated door. 44 A.L.R.5th 525.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 A.L.R.5th 599.

HAWAII LEGAL REPORTER.
As to comparative negligence in case of dog bite, see 85-1 Haw. Legal Rep. 85-0141.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this subpart, part, chapter, or title.

DIVISION 4. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
TITLE 36. CIVIL REMEDIES AND DEFENSES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER 663. TORT ACTIONS
PART I. LIABILITY; SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
HRS § 663-9.1 (2003)
[§ 663-9.1]. Exception of animal owners to civil liability
(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Premises” includes any building or portion thereof or any real property owned, leased, or occupied by the owner or harborer of an animal.

(2) “Enter or remain unlawfully” means to be in or upon premises when the person is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to be upon the premises. A person is not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon a premises if a warning or warnings have been posted reasonably adequate to warn other persons that an animal is present on the premises. A person who, regardless of the person’s intent, enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to the person by the owner of the premises or some other authorized person. A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to the person by the owner of the land or some other authorized person, or unless notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner.

(3) The definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” as contained in sections 702-206(1) and 702-206(2) shall apply.
(b) Notwithstanding sections 663-1 and 663-9, any owner or harborer of an animal shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from actions of the animal occurring in or upon the premises of the owner or harborer where the person suffering either personal or property damage as a proximate result of the actions of the animal is found by the trier of fact intentionally or knowingly to have entered or remained in or upon such premises unlawfully.
(c) Notwithstanding sections 663-1 and 663-9, any owner or harborer of an animal shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from actions of the animal where the trier of fact finds that:
(1) The animal caused such damage as a proximate result of being teased, tormented, or otherwise abused without the negligence, direction, or involvement of the owner or harborer; or
(2) The use of the animal to cause damage to person or property was justified under chapter 703.

HISTORY: L 1980, c 218, § 3; am imp L 1984, c 90, § 1 NOTES:
CROSS REFERENCES. –As to action against owner of dog which has bitten a human being on at least two separate occasions, see § 142-75.
RES
EARCH REFERENCES
ALR4th.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries from electrically operated door. 44 A.L.R.5th 525.

HAWAII LEGAL REPORTER.
As to comparative negligence in case of dog bite, see 85-1 Haw. Legal Rep. 85-0141.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this subpart, part, chapter, or title.

DIVISION 4. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
TITLE 36. CIVIL REMEDIES AND DEFENSES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 663. TORT ACTIONS
PART IV. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
HRS § 663-31 (2003)
§ 663-31. Contributory negligence no bar; comparative negligence; findings of fact and special verdicts

(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or the person’s legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person or in the case of more than one person, the aggregate negligence of such persons against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made.

(b) In any action to which subsection (a) of this section applies, the court, in a nonjury trial, shall make findings of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state:
(1) The amount of the damages which would have been recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(2) The degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage.

(c) Upon the making of the findings of fact or the return of a special verdict, as is contemplated by subsection (b) above, the court shall reduce the amount of the award in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made; provided that if the said proportion is greater than the negligence of the person or in the case of more than one person, the aggregate negligence of such persons against whom recovery is sought, the court will enter a judgment for the defendant.

(d) The court shall instruct the jury regarding the law of comparative negligence where appropriate.

HISTORY: L 1969, c 227, § 1; am L 1972, c 144, § 2(i); am L 1975, c 152, § 1; am L 1976, c 161, § 1; am imp L 1984, c 90, § 1

CASE NOTES
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE APPLIES ONLY TO CLAIMS ACCRUING AFTER JULY 14, 1969. Silva v. Oishi, 52 Haw. 129, 471 P.2d 524 (1970).
AND IS NOT APPLICABLE TO A CLAIM ACCRUING PRIOR TO THAT DATE. –Where plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident on November 12, 1966, the claim for relief accrued on that date, at which time the rule of contributory negligence was the recognized law of this jurisdiction. The comparative negligence statute, this section, which became effective on July 14, 1969, was not applicable to this suit and the court declined to adopt by itself the doctrine of comparative negligence for case, as the legislative enactment adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence in place of the common-law rule of contributory negligence was strictly within the legislative power, and as to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence for the case would have created unnecessary and unwarranted confusion in the law. Bissen v. Chiyoko Fujii, 51 Haw. 636, 466 P.2d 429 (1970).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE AGAINST ALL CLAIMS ACCRUING BEFORE JULY 14, 1969, the effective date of this section. Pacheco v. Hilo Elec. Light Co., 55 Haw. 375, 520 P.2d 62 (1974).

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM DEFEATED IF NEGLIGENCE GREATER THAN DEFENDANT’S. –Plaintiff’s recovery on her negligent products liability claim would only be defeated completely if the fact finder found that her negligence was greater than the negligence of the defendants. Wagatsuma v. Patch, 10 Haw. App. 547, 879 P.2d 572, cert. denied, 77 Haw. 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994).
This section barred plaintiff’s recovery, where arbitration award in separate action apportioned liabilities between parties and determined that plaintiff was 70 percent negligent and defendant 30 percent negligent. Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Haw. 143, 976 P.2d 904 (1999).

IN APPORTIONING NEGLIGENCE UNDER HAWAII’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE, the only negligence to be apportioned is causative negligence — negligence which contributed to the plaintiff’s injury. Dunbar v. Thompson, 79 Haw. 306, 901 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1995).

THIS SECTION CLEARLY CONFINES THE DETERMINATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE only among the parties (litigants) to the proceeding. Sugue v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 56 Haw. 598, 546 P.2d 527 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Venture, 68 Haw. 171, 707 P.2d 365 (1985).

CODEFENDANT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION. –This section may apply to actions other than those sounding entirely in tort, and there is no reason why one defendant should lose the protection of this section merely because a codefendant commits an intentional tort. Ozaki v. Association of Apt. Owners, 87 Haw. 265, 954 P.2d 644 (1998).

CONSTRUCTION WITH PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS. –Pure comparative negligence principles are applicable to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery in strict products liability cases. Torres v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 86 Haw. 383, 949 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1997).

SECTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY. –The plain meaning and legislative history of this section indicates that it was not intended to influence strict products liability law. Armstrong v. Cione, 69 Haw. 176, 738 P.2d 79, reconsideration denied, 69 Haw. 674 (1987).

Plaintiff’s strict liability claim arising out of injuries which he suffered when his hand went through the plate glass door of a shower was not defeated merely because he was found to be 67 per cent negligent and respondent to be 33 per cent liable. However, the glass shower door was not a “product” for purposes of a strict product liabilities course of action, and thus petitioner was not entitled to a strict products liability instruction. Armstrong v. Cione, 69 Haw. 176, 738 P.2d 79, reconsideration denied, 69 Haw. 674 (1987).

PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE REDUCED BUT DID NOT DEFEAT CLAIM SOUNDING IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY, even though his responsibility for the damages was determined to be greater than that of the defendants. Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 69 Haw. 231, 738 P.2d 416, reconsideration granted, 69 Haw. 674 (1987).

THIS SECTION DOES NOT AFFECT AN ACTION BETWEEN TWO JOINT TORTFEASORS under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, § § 663-11 through 663-17. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. GMC, 65 Haw. 428, 653 P.2d 96 (1982).

AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES REQUIRED. –The jury’s award to plaintiff of special damages but no general damages was improper. Dunbar v. Thompson, 79 Haw. 306, 901 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1995).

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM WAS BARRED under this section, the comparative negligence statute, where her husband’s negligence was greater than that of defendants, since where the initial claim of injury could not be maintained, the derivative action for loss of consortium must also fail. Mist v. Westin Hotels, Inc., 69 Haw. 192, 738 P.2d 85 (1987).

PRIMARY IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO RECREATIONAL SCUBA DIVING COMPANY. –The decision of a tourist on vacation, who entrusted the planning of a safe dive to an experienced professional dive company, and who was not so experienced that he fully understood all the ramifications of a lengthy, deep dive, did not have the knowledge and experience to appreciate the inherent dangers of the type of dive that caused his death, and his decision to participate in the deep dive was not a fully informed decision and could not be considered 100 per cent voluntary, so that under the circumstances of the case, primary implied assumption of the risk was not a defense. Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778 (D. Haw. 1993).

LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE ABOLISHED. –The apportionment of damages provision in this section has rendered the doctrine of last clear chance completely obsolete and is no longer viable in Hawaii. Rapoza v. Parnell, 83 Haw. 78, 924 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1996).

A CHILD IS ONLY REQUIRED TO USE THAT DEGREE OF CARE APPROPRIATE to his age, experience, and mental capacity. Viveiros v. State, 54 Haw. 611, 513 P.2d 487 (1973).

WHEN COSTS DUE PREVAILING PARTY MAY BE REDUCED OR DENIED. –Costs to which the prevailing party is otherwise entitled may be reduced or denied in the discretion of the court only where fault is shown in the conduct of the litigation. Abreu v. Raymond, 56 Haw. 613, 546 P.2d 1013 (1976).

DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A JURY DETERMINATION. –In a personal injury case an apportionment sanction deprived defendant of a jury determination as to the degree of negligence of the parties. Kamaunu v. Kaaea, 99 Haw. 432, 56 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2002).

THE DUTY OF THE JURY IN PASSING UPON THE PERCENTAGE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE is to give consideration to the whole record. Chainey v. Jensen, 1 Haw. App. 94, 614 P.2d 402 (1980).

INSTRUCTION AS TO LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF APPORTIONMENT. –Trial court, if requested and when appropriate, should inform the jury of the possible legal consequences of a verdict apportioning negligence among joint tortfeasors. Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 719 P.2d 387 (1986).

QUESTION TO JURY WAS IMPROPER. –Question to jury that required the jury to apportion the extent to which the parties’ fault contributed to the incident, rather than to plaintiff’s injuries, was improper. Dunbar v. Thompson, 79 Haw. 306, 901 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1995). REFUSAL TO GIVE JURY INSTRUCTION WAS ERROR. –The trial court should have instructed the jury on the law of comparative negligence and their failure to do so made the jury instructions that were given prejudicially insufficient. Rapoza v. Parnell, 83 Haw. 78, 924 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1996).

CITED in Farrior v. Payton, 57 Haw. 620, 562 P.2d 779 (1977) Anders v. State, 60 Haw. 381, 590 P.2d 564 (1979) Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592 P.2d 820 (1979) Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic Tours, Ltd., 64 Haw. 401, 642 P.2d 930 (1982) Geldert v. State, 3 Haw. App. 259, 649 P.2d 1165 (1982) McKeague v. Talbert, 3 Haw. App. 646, 658 P.2d 898 (1983) Park v. Esperanza, 4 Haw. App. 91, 662 P.2d 214 (1983) Lang v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 4 Haw. App. 237, 663 P.2d 640 (1983) Hakaru Shishido v. State, 4 Haw. App. 321, 666 P.2d 608 (1983) Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 70 Haw. 562, 777 P.2d 715 (1989) Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 72 Haw. 416, 823 P.2d 717 (1991) Kealoha v. County of Haw., 74 Haw. 308, 844 P.2d 670 (1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR4th.
Comparative negligence: Judgment allocating fault in action against less than all potential defendants as precluding subsequent action against parties not sued in original action. 4 A.L.R.5th 753.
Applicability of comparative negligence principles to intentional torts. 18 A.L.R.5th 525.
“Concert of activity,” “alternate liability,” “enterprise liability,” or similar theory as basis for imposing liability upon one or more manufacturers of defective uniform product, in absence of identification of manufacturer of precise unit or batch causing injury. 63 A.L.R.5th 195.
Comparative negligence of driver as defense to enhanced injury, crashworthiness, or second collision claim. 69 A.L.R.5th 625. Comparative negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of risk in action against owner of store, office, or similar place of business by invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow. 83 A.L.R.5th 589.

HAWAII LEGAL REPORTER.
As to defense of assumption of risk, see 79 Haw. Legal Rep. 79-0001.
As to judgment notwithstanding verdict where plaintiff assumed risk, see 81-1 Haw. Legal Rep. 81-289.
As to assumption of risk by trespasser, see 82-1 Haw. Legal Rep. 82-327.
As to comparative negligence in case of dog bite, see 85-1 Haw. Legal Rep. 85-0141.

LEGAL PERIODICALS
HAWAII BAR JOURNAL.
Article, A Proposal for the Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence in Hawaii, 5 Haw. B.J. 49 (1968).
Article, Judicial Legislation in the Supreme Court of Hawaii: A Brief Introduction to the “Felt Necessities of the Time,” 8 Haw. B.J. 77 (1971).
Article, Products Liability in Hawaii, 14 Haw. B.J. 127 (1979).
Article, Filling the “Empty Chair”: Some Thoughts About Sugue, 15 Haw. B.J. 69 (1980).

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII LAW REVIEW.
Article, the Scope of Liability for Neglect infliction of Emotional Distress: Making “The Punishment Fit the Crime. 1 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
Note, Rethinking Products Liability: Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 6 U. Haw. L. Rev. 613 (1984).
Note, Kaeo v. Davis: Informing Juries of the Effects of Their Special Verdicts Under the Law of Joint and Several Liability, 9 U. Haw. L. Rev. 275 (1987).
Comment, Armstrong v. Cione and Hao v. Owens — Illinois: Applying Pure Comparative Negligence Principles to Strict Products Liability Actions, 10 U. Haw. L. Rev. 393 (1988).
Note, Bertelmann v. Taas Associates: Limits on Dram Shop Liability; Barring Recovery of Bar Patrons, Their Estates and Survivors, 11 U. Haw. L. Rev. 277 (1989).
Article, Tort and Insurance “Reform” in a Common Law Court, 14 U. Haw. L. Rev. 55 (1992).

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE
CROSS REFERENCES. –As to procedural statutes superseded by the rules of the court, see note preceding Title 32. As to applicability of rules, see HRCP, Rules 1 and 81; HRPP, Rules 1 and 54; Circuit Court Rules, Rule 32. For provisions pertaining to the Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution, see Chapter 613.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE CHAPTER
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR4th.
Escalators. 1 A.L.R.4th 144.
Flammable clothing. 1 A.L.R.4th 251.
Defect in boat or its parts, supplies, or equipment. 1 A.L.R.4th 411.
Defective heating equipment. 1 A.L.R.4th 748.
Products liability in connection with prosthesis or other product designed to be surgically implanted in patient’s body. 1 A.L.R.4th 921.
Manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by repairs made under warranty. 2 A.L.R.4th 576.
Diethylstilbestrol. 2 A.L.R.4th 1091.
Snow throwers. 2 A.L.R.4th 1284.
Defective vehicular windows. 3 A.L.R.4th 489.
Farm machinery. 4 A.L.R.4th 13.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 A.L.R.4th 349.
Expert or opinion evidence that product is or is not defective, dangerous, or unreasonably dangerous. 4 A.L.R.4th 651.
Vehicular bumpers. 5 A.L.R.4th 483.
Personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in electrical system in motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.4th 662.
Liability of parent for injury to unemancipated child caused by negligence — modern cases. 6 A.L.R.4th 1066.
Clothes dryers. 6 A.L.R.4th 1262.
Glue and other adhesive products. 7 A.L.R.4th 155.
Elevators. 7 A.L.R.4th 852.
Industrial presses. 8 A.L.R.4th 70.
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to actions based on strict liability in tort. 9 A.L.R.4th 633.
Workers’ Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for employee injured by product manufactured, sold, or distributed by employer.
9 A.L.R.4th 873.
Liability of builder of residence for latent defects therein as running to subsequent purchasers from original vendee. 10 A.L.R.4th 385.
Transformers and other electrical equipment. 10 A.L.R.4th 854.
Ladders. 11 A.L.R.4th 1118.
Fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, etc. 12 A.L.R.4th 462.
Allowances of punitive damages. 13 A.L.R.4th 52.
Statute prohibiting use of name descriptive of engineering by business organization not practicing profession of engineering. 13 A.L.R.4th 676.
Preemption of strict liability in tort by provisions of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 A.L.R.4th 791.
Firearms, ammunition, and chemical weapons. 15 A.L.R.4th 910.
Tire rims and wheels. 16 A.L.R.4th 137.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence rules on assumption of risk. 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Liability of check printer for errors in identification or routing codes printed on check. 18 A.L.R.4th 923.
Firefighting equipment. 19 A.L.R.4th 326.
Third person, other than owner of animal or owner or operator of motor vehicle, for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway. 21 A.L.R.4th 132.
Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway. 21 A.L.R.4th 159.
“Concert of activity” or similar theory as basis for imposing liability upon one or more manufacturers of defective uniform product, in absence of identification of manufacturer of precise unit or batch causing injury. 22 A.L.R.4th 183.
Mechanical or chain saws or components thereof. 22 A.L.R.4th 206.
Release of, or covenant not to sue, one primarily liable for tort, but expressly reserving rights against one secondarily liable, as bar to recovery against latter. 24 A.L.R.4th 547.
Negligence of spouse or child as barring or reducing recovery for loss of consortium by other spouse or parent. 25 A.L.R.4th 118.
Contribution from joint tortfeasor who is spouse or otherwise in close familial relationship to injured party. 25 A.L.R.4th 1120.
Adequacy of warning provided to user of product. 26 A.L.R.4th 377.
Negligence of one parent contributing to injury or death of child as barring or reducing damages recoverable by other parent for losses suffered by other parent as result of injury or death of child. 26 A.L.R.4th 396.
Protective clothing and equipment. 27 A.L.R.4th 815.
Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway. 29 A.L.R.4th 431.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 A.L.R.4th 986.
Professional services within meaning of statute preserving individual liability of professional employees of professional corporation, association, or partnership. 31 A.L.R.4th 898.
Pest control or inspection contractor, liability for work and representations. 32 A.L.R.4th 682.
Strict products liability for failure to warn as dependent on defendant’s knowledge of danger. 33 A.L.R.4th 368.
Stud guns, staple guns, or parts thereof. 33 A.L.R.4th 1189.
Household appliance: liability of manufacturer or seller. 34 A.L.R.4th 95.
Household equipment relating to storage, preparation, cooking, and disposal of food. 35 A.L.R.4th 663.
Patent or obvious dangers. 35 A.L.R.4th 861.
Furnishings for home or office. 36 A.L.R.4th 170.
Bottle explosion or breakage. 36 A.L.R.4th 419.
Liability of person furnishing, installing, or servicing burglary or fire alarm system for burglary or fire loss. 37 A.L.R.4th 47.
Post-injury measures undertaken by defendant. 38 A.L.R.4th 583.
Duty of manufacturer or seller of component part incorporated in another product to warn of dangers. 39 A.L.R.4th 6.
Manufacturer’s responsibility for defective component supplied by another and incorporated in product. 39 A.L.R.4th 6.
Liability of professional corporaton of lawyers, or individual members thereof, for malpractice or other tort of another member. 39 A.L.R.4th 556.
Manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by repairs made under warranty. 40 A.L.R.4th 1218.
Alteration of product after it leaves hands of manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for product-caused harm. 41 A.L.R.4th 47.
Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or wilful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.
Construction materials or insulation containing formaldehyde. 45 A.L.R.4th 751.
Liability of manufacturer or seller as affected by failure of subsequent party in distribution chain to remedy or warn against defect of which he knew. 45 A.L.R.4th 777.
Perfumes, colognes, or deodorants. 46 A.L.R.4th 1197.
Evidence of industry custom or practice. 47 A.L.R.4th 621.
Liability for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein from collision with runaway horse, or horse left unattended or untied in street. 49 A.L.R.4th 653.br
Liability for personal injury or death caused by trespassing or intruding livestock. 49 A.L.R.4th 710.
Duty of insurer to pay for independent counsel when conflict of interest exists between insured and insurer. 50 A.L.R.4th 932.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in product liability actions concerning athletic, exercise, or recreational equipment. 50 A.L.R.4th 1226.
Joint venturers’ comparative liability for losses in absence of express agreement. 51 A.L.R.4th 371.
Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents in product liability action. 51 A.L.R.4th 1186.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in product liability actions concerning wearing apparel. 52 A.L.R.4th 276.
Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress. 52 A.L.R.4th 853.
Tennis club’s liability for tennis player’s injuries. 52 A.L.R.4th 1253.
Attorneys’ fees in product liability suit. 53 A.L.R.4th 414.
Liability for U-turn automobile collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.
Parent’s right to recover for loss of consortium in connection with injury to child. 54 A.L.R.4th 112.
Absolute liability: personal soaps. 54 A.L.R.4th 574.
Baseball player’s right to recover for baseball-related personal injuries from nonplayer. 55 A.L.R.4th 664.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in product liability actions concerning electrical generation and transmission equipment. 55 A.L.R.4th 1010.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in product liability action concerning lawn mowers. 55 A.L.R.4th 1062.
Civil liability for tobacco sales to minors. 55 A.L.R.4th 1238.
Commercial renter’s negligence liability for customer’s personal injuries. 57 A.L.R.4th 1186.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in product liability actions concerning paint, cleaners, or other chemicals. 58 A.L.R.4th 76.
Sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning bottles, cans, storage tanks, or other containers. 58 A.L.R.4th 160.
Local government tort liability: minority as affecting notice of claim requirement. 58 A.L.R.4th 402.
Toxic shock syndrome. 59 A.L.R.4th 50.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of multiple, nonmedical defendants — modern status. 59 A.L.R.4th 201.
Admissibility of impeached witness’ prior consistent statement — modern state civil cases. 59 A.L.R.4th 1000.
Primary liability of private chain franchisor for injury or death caused by franchise premises or equipment. 59 A.L.R.4th 1142.
Comparative fault: calculation of net recovery by applying percentage of plaintiff’s fault before or after subtracting amount of settlement by less than all joint tortfeasors. 71 A.L.R.4th 1108.
Products liability: tractors. 75 A.L.R.4th 312.
Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in negligence action based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury. 75 A.L.R.4th 443.
Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in action for strict liability or breach of warranty based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury. 75 A.L.R.4th 538.
Rescue doctrine: applicability and application of comparative negligence principles. 75 A.L.R.4th 875.
Products liability: general recreational equipment. 77 A.L.R.4th 1121.
Products liability: mechanical amusement rides and devices. 77 A.L.R.4th 1152.
Burden of proving feasibility of alternative safe design in products liability action based on defective design. 78 A.L.R.4th 154.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute limiting amount recoverable in dram shop action. 78 A.L.R.4th 542.
Right of child to action against mother for infliction of prenatal injuries. 78 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Products liability: hair straighteners and relaxants. 84 A.L.R.4th 1090.
Products liability: cutting or heating torches. 84 A.L.R.4th 1123.
Modern status of rule imputing motor vehicle driver’s negligence to passenger on joint venture theory. 3 A.L.R.5th 1.
Insured’s recovery of uninsured motorist claim against insurer as affecting subsequent recovery against tortfeasors causing injury. 3 A.L.R.5th 746.
Products liability: roofs and roofing materials. 3 A.L.R.5th 851.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries from electrically operated door. 44 A.L.R.5th 525.
Products liability: cement and concrete. 60 A.L.R.5th 413.
Products liability: Manufacturer’s postsale obligation to modify, repair, or recall product. 47 A.L.R.5th 395.
Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for injuries to head or brain. 50 A.L.R.5th 1.
Products liability: recovery for injury or death resulting from intentional inhalation of product’s fumes or vapors to produce intoxicating or similar effect. 50 A.L.R.5th 275.
Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for injuries to nerves or nervous system. 51 A.L.R.5th 467.

Idaho Dog Law

Liability Statute

Idaho does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover for injuries caused by a dog, the plaintiff must prove that the dog owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Vicious Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

Under Idaho law, a “vicious dog” is any dog that, when not provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites, or injures any person who was not trespassing at the time the injury occurred.

Owners’ Legal Responsibility

Owners must keep vicious dogs in a secure enclosure from which the dog cannot escape and for which entry and exit is controlled by the owner. When not in the enclosure, vicious dogs must be restrained by a chain that is sufficient to control the dog.

Owner’s Liability

In addition to civil liability, violations of the Dangerous Dog Statute carry fines up to $100.

Illinois Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, a person injured by a dog can recover damages against the dog’s owner if he or she proves:

• that the dog caused the injury;
• that the defendant owned the dog;
• that the injured person did not provoke the attack;
• that the injured person was acting in a peaceful manner at the time of the injury; and
• that the injured person was in a place where he had a legal right to be at the time of the injury.

Under the statute, the plaintiff need not prove negligence. In order to recover under the common law, the plaintiff must prove that the dog owner was negligent at the time of the injury.

Vicious and Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A vicious dog is one that:

• when unprovoked, bites or attacks a human being or other domestic animal;
• has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack without provocation, to cause injury or otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals; or
• has a trait or characteristic and a generally-known reputation for viciousness, dangerousness, or unprovoked attacks on a human or other animals, unless handled in a particular manner or with special equipment.

Legal Responsibilities of Vicious Dog Owners

Vicious dogs must be enclosed in a fence or structure at least 6 feet high that prevents entry of young children and prevents escape of the animal. The only times a vicious dog is allowed outside the enclosure are to go to the vet or to comply with a court order. During these times, the dog must be securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length.

The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is any dog which when either unmuzzled, unleashed, or unattended by its owner, or member of its owner’s family, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public place.

Liability of Owners with Dangerous Dogs

In Illinois, each county regulates the liability of dangerous dog owners.

Illinois Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALSbr
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/13 (2003)

[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363]
§ 510 ILCS 5/13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal
Sec. 13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b) of this Section, when the Administrator receives information that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal, the Administrator, or his authorized representative, shall have such dog or other animal confined under the observation of a licensed veterinarian for a period of 10 days. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. Such veterinarian shall report the clinical condition of the dog or other animal immediately, with confirmation in writing to the Administrator within 24 hours after the dog or other animal is presented for examination, giving the owner’s name, address, the date of confinement, the breed, description, age, and sex of such dog or other animal, on appropriate forms approved by the Department. The Administrator shall notify the attending physician or responsible health agency. At the end of the confinement period, the veterinarian shall submit a written report to the Administrator advising him of the final disposition of such dog or other animal on appropriate forms approved by the Department. When evidence is presented that such dog or other animal was inoculated against rabies within the time prescribed by law, it may be confined in the house of its owner, or in a manner which will prohibit it from biting any person for a period of 10 days, if the Administrator, or other licensed veterinarian, adjudges such confinement satisfactory. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. At the end of the confinement period, such dog or other animal shall be examined by the Administrator, or another licensed veterinarian.
It is unlawful for any person having knowledge that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal to refuse to notify the Administrator promptly. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to euthanize, sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of any such dog or other animal known to have bitten a person, until it is released by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to refuse or fail to comply with the written or printed instructions made by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. If such instructions cannot be delivered in person, they shall be mailed to the owner of such dog or other animal by regular mail, postage prepaid. The affidavit or testimony of the Administrator, or his authorized representative, delivering or mailing such instructions is prima facie evidence that the owner of such dog or other animal was notified of his responsibilities. Any expense incurred in the handling of any dog or other animal under this Section and Section 12 [510 ILCS 5/12] shall be borne by the owner.

(b) When a person has been bitten by a police dog, the police dog may continue to perform its duties for the peace officer or law enforcement agency and any period of observation of the police dog may be under the supervision of a peace officer. The supervision shall consist of the dog being locked in a kennel, performing its official duties in a police vehicle, or remaining under the constant supervision of its police handler.

(c) For the purpose of this Section:
“Immediately” means by telephone, in person, or by other than use of the mail.
“Law enforcement agency” means an agency of the State or a unit of local government that is vested by law or ordinance with the duty to maintain public order and to enforce criminal laws or ordinances.
“Peace officer” has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILCS 5/2-13]. “Police dog” means a dog trained to assist peace officers in their law enforcement duties.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795; 89-576, § 5.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363.
EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS.
The 1996 amendment by P.A. 89-576, effective January 1, 1997, added the section catchline; added the subsection (a) designation; in subsection (a), in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, added at the beginning “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section”; added subsection (b); added the subsection (c) designation; and in subsection (c), in the introductory language, substituted a semicolon for “the word” and added the definitions of Law enforcement agency, Peace officer and Police dog.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/15 (2003)

[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365]
§ 510 ILCS 5/15. [Vicious and dangerous dogs and other animals]
Sec. 15. (a) For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Vicious dog” means:
(i) Any individual dog that when unprovoked inflicts bites or attacks a human being or other animal either on public or private property.
(ii) Any individual dog with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack without provocation, to cause injury or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals.
(iii) Any individual dog that has as a trait or characteristic and a generally known reputation for viciousness, dangerousness or unprovoked attacks upon human beings or other animals, unless handled in a particular manner or with special equipment.
(iv) Any individual dog which attacks a human being or domestic animal without provocation.
(v) Any individual dog which has been found to be a “dangerous dog” upon 3 separate occasions.
No dog shall be deemed “vicious” if it bites, attacks, or menaces a trespasser on the property of its owner or harms or menaces anyone who has tormented or abused it or is a professionally trained dog for law enforcement or guard duties. Vicious dogs shall not be classified in a manner that is specific as to breed.
If a dog is found to be a vicious dog, the dog shall be subject to enclosure.

(2) “Dangerous Dog” means any individual dog which when either unmuzzled, unleashed, or unattended by its owner, or a member of its owner’s family, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack upon streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places.

(3) “Enclosure” means a fence or structure of at least 6 feet in height, forming or causing an enclosure suitable to prevent the entry of young children, and suitable to confine a vicious dog in conjunction with other measures which may be taken by the owner or keeper, such as tethering of a vicious dog within the enclosure. Such enclosure shall be securely enclosed and locked and designed with secure sides, top and bottom and shall be designed to prevent the animal from escaping from the enclosure.

(4) “Impounded” means taken into the custody of the public pound in the city or town where the vicious dog is found.

(5) “Found to be vicious dog” means (i) that the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or a law enforcement officer has conducted an investigation and made a finding in writing that the dog is a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and, based on that finding, the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director has declared in writing that the dog is a vicious dog or (ii) that the circuit court has found the dog to be a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and has entered an order based on that finding.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or maintain any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog unless such dog is at all times kept in an enclosure. The only times that a vicious dog may be allowed out of the enclosure are (1) if it is necessary for the owner or keeper to obtain veterinary care for the dog or (2) to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that the dog is securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length, and shall be under the direct control and supervision of the owner or keeper of the dog.
Any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog and which is not confined to an enclosure shall be impounded by the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the law enforcement authority having jurisdiction in such area and shall be turned over to a licensed veterinarian for destruction by lethal injection.
If the owner of the dog has not appealed the impoundment order to the circuit court in the county in which the animal was impounded within 7 working days, the dog may be humanely dispatched. A dog found to be a vicious dog shall not be released to the owner until the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director approves the enclosure as defined in this Section.
No owner or keeper of a vicious dog shall sell or give away the dog.
(c) It is unlawful for any person to maintain a public nuisance by permitting any dangerous dog or other animal to leave the premises of its owner when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods.
Guide dogs for the blind or hearing impaired, support dogs for the physically handicapped, and sentry, guard, or police-owned dogs are exempt from this Section; provided, an attack or injury to a person occurs while the dog is performing duties as expected. To qualify for exemption under this Section, each such dog shall be currently inoculated against rabies in accordance with Section 8 of this Act [510 ILCS 5/8]. It shall be the duty of the owner of such exempted dog to notify the Administrator of changes of address. In the case of a sentry or guard dog, the owner shall keep the Administrator advised of the location where such dog will be stationed. The Administrator shall provide police and fire departments with a categorized list of such exempted dogs, and shall promptly notify such departments of any address changes reported to him.
The Administrator, the State’s Attorney, or any citizen of the county in which a dangerous dog or other animal exists may file a complaint in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such, to abate the same, and to enjoin the owner of such dog or other animal from permitting same to leave his premises when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods. Upon the filing of a complaint in the circuit court, the court, if satisfied that this nuisance may exist, shall grant a preliminary injunction with bond in such amount as the court may determine enjoining the defendant from maintaining such nuisance. If the existence of the nuisance is established, the owner of such dog or other animal shall be in violation of this Act, and in addition, the court shall enter an order restraining the owner from maintaining such nuisance and may order that such dog or other animal be humanely dispatched.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 86-1460; 87-456.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365.

ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
See 8 Illinois Administrative Code, § 30.140.

CASE NOTES
LACK OF PROVOCATION
–INFERENCE
The lack of provocation by another animal can be inferred where that animal is confined in its own pen and it is clear it did not attack. Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 155 Ill. Dec. 615, 569 N.E.2d 1226 (4 Dist. 1991).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive,
threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance. 90 ALR5th 619.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/16 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366]
§ 510 ILCS 5/16. [Attack or injury by animal; liability of owner]
Sec. 16. If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366.

CASE NOTES
ANALYSIS
Applicability
Assumption of Risk
–Applicability
–Available Defense
–Not Shown
–Shown
Attacks or Injures
–Disjunctive
–Predictable Behavior
Burden of Proof
–Reduction
Cause of Action
Common Law Action
–Not Precluded
–Pleading
Contributory Negligence
–Jury Instruction
Control of Animal
–Right of Recovery
Coverage
–Scope
Damages
–New Trial
–Not Excessive
Effect of Amendment
–On Other Statutes
–On Scope of Section
Elements of Cause of Action
Horse Rental
Jury Instructions
Lawful Presence
–Improper Warning
–Licensee
–Parents’ Home
Legislative Intent
–Creation of Liabilities
–Inquiry
–Reasonable Interpretation
Liability
–Noncustodial Parent
–Not Absolute
–Not Shown
–Not Strict
–Of Keeper
–Running Dog
–Shown
Meritorious Defense
Negligence
–Not Necessary
Ownership
–Dogsitter
–Facts and Circumstances
–Harboring
–Not Shown
–Question of Fact
–Shown
Pleadings
Proportionality
–Illustrative Cases
Provocation
–In General
–Intent Immaterial
–Kicking and Pushing
–Not Shown
–Presence
–Relevant Evidence
–Scream
–Shown
–Source Immaterial
–Unintentional Acts
–Use of Dog Repellant
–Wilfulness Irrelevant
–Young Child
Purpose
Scope of Protection
Standing
–Parents of Minor
–Right to Recovery

APPLICABILITY
The Animal Control Act, 510 ILCS 5/1 et seq., did not cease to apply to equine injury cases after the enactment of the Equine Liability Act, 745 ILCS 47/1 et seq. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK

–APPLICABILITY
A plaintiff who assumes the risk of injury is not protected by this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

Where plaintiff, an admitted experienced cattleman, volunteered to assist with the movement of cattle, and the defendant knew plaintiff had experience with cattle and could reasonably assume that plaintiff was aware of their normal propensities and could or would take reasonable measures to protect himself, the common law defense of assumption of the risk was available even though the action was brought under this Act. Malott v. Hart, 167 Ill. App. 3d 209, 118 Ill. Dec. 69, 521 N.E.2d 137 (3 Dist. 1988).
The defense of assumption of the risk can be applied under this section. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).

–AVAILABLE DEFENSE
Proof of assumption of risk is not precluded as a defense to an action brought under this section. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

–NOT SHOWN
The plaintiff was not barred from recovery for her injuries by the doctrine of assumption of risk where she was injured while riding her horse when a horse ridden by another person kicked her and her horse while the plaintiff and the other rider were talking after meeting on a trail. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
Where the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiff expressly relieved them from any liability for injuries inflicted by their dog, and in the absence of evidence of a contractual or employment relationship between the parties, the doctrine of assumption of risk was inapplicable. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

–SHOWN
Where defendant voluntarily accepted responsibility for controlling defendant’s dog, placing herself within the definition of an owner, the trial court correctly ruled that she could not recover from the dog’s legal owner for injuries which resulted from her own failure to control the dog. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988).
Where plaintiff, a trained horsewoman, knew there were mares in the vicinity when she tried to mount a stallion, knew a stallion could become excited and uncontrollable around mares, but attempted to mount the stallion anyway, and where plaintiff accepted employment as a trainer of stallions knowing such horses were likely to buck or jump, the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fall from the stallion. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).
Where a plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily entered into a contract with the defendant to shoe the defendant’s horse and by his own admissions it was known to him and known within his profession that horses will sometimes kick while being shod, plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of injury. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

ATTACKS OR INJURES
–DISJUNCTIVE
The statutory words “attacks or injures” are disjunctive and allow the plaintiff to recover if the animal injured plaintiff but did not attack. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

–PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR
An animal is a passive causal force and cannot be a proximate cause of injuries if it stands still or moves away from a plaintiff in a usual, predictable manner known to the plaintiff. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

BURDEN OF PROOF
–REDUCTION
This section reduces the burden upon a plaintiff by eliminating the common-law requirement that an injured person prove and plead that an animal owner knew or should have known of his animal’s propensity to injure or attack people. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
The purpose of this section was to reduce the burden on plaintiffs by eliminating the common-law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that an animal owner either knew or should have known that the animal had a propensity to injure people. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).
CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action under this section can exist when an attack or an injury occurs. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COMMON LAW ACTION
–NOT PRECLUDED
A defendant landowner who was not the “owner” of the dog could nevertheless be found liable under the common law if she were aware of the dog’s viciousness. Severson v. Ring, 244 Ill. App. 3d 453, 185 Ill. Dec. 706, 615 N.E.2d 1 (3 Dist. 1993).
This section did not repeal the common law action for recovery as the result of a dog bite. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill. App. 2d 408, 222 N.E.2d 530 (2 Dist. 1966).

–PLEADING
Where plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleged only a common law theory of recovery rather than recovery under this section, and failed to allege the two common law elements of mischievous propensity and notice, this omission did not render the complaint defective under F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with its more relaxed pleading requirements than Illinois’ fact-pleading rules, in a diversity action; although the elements of a claim under this section could be inferred from the complaint, filing a new complaint was ordered to allow the issues to be presented more clearly. Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
–JURY INSTRUCTION
While instructions regarding the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence should not have been given in a case brought under a prior similar provision which made it unnecessary to prove negligence in order to recover damages, the instructions were not so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal of judgment in favor of plaintiff, especially since the evidence amply supported the verdict. Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 210 N.E.2d 207 (1965).

CONTROL OF ANIMAL
–RIGHT OF RECOVERY
There is no legal or policy justification for extending the protections of this Act to a rider of a horse; once the rider mounts the horse, the rider is no longer a bystander or observer, but is someone who has asserted dominion over the animal and is an active partner with the animal in recreational activity, and the rider assumes control and responsibility for the horse. While a cause of action may be stated under other theories of liability, there is none under this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, he or she cannot recover for injuries sustained when he or she fails to control the animal. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, she cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988); Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COVERAGE
–SCOPE
Coverage under this statute was intended for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal posed to them. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

DAMAGES
–NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff was properly awarded a new trial on the issues of damages alone where a jury verdict on the question of liability was adequately supported by the evidence under this section, and the questions of damages and liability were so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages would not have been unfair to the defendant. Barr v. Groll, 208 Ill. App. 3d 318, 153 Ill. Dec. 298, 567 N.E.2d 13 (5 Dist. 1991).

–NOT EXCESSIVE
Where the jury verdict was five times the amount of out-of-pocket expenses, the verdict did not provide grounds for reversal. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 108 Ill. App. 2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 125 (2 Dist. 1969).

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT
–ON OTHER STATUTES
Amendment adding “other animals” to this section was not intended to result in a revocation by implication of the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq.). McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

–ON SCOPE OF SECTION
The legislature, by amending this statute to encompass “other animals” besides dogs, did not intend to change the scope and general applicability of the statute to envelop a situation where domestic animals, such as horses, were running at large. McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The four elements that must be proved to establish a cause of action are (1) injury caused by an animal owned by the defendants; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the injured person; and (4) the presence of the injured person in a place where he has a legal right to be. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976); McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978); Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988); Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989); Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Duty is not an element of a cause of action against an owner under this section, nor is it necessary to prove negligence on the part of the owner. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987). In order for the plaintiff to recover under this section, he is required to prove: an attack by a dog; that the defendant is the owner of the dog; injury to the plaintiff; absence of provocation by the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was conducting himself peaceably in a place where he had a legal right to be. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

HORSE RENTAL
No claim exists under the act when a rider is thrown from a horse she has voluntarily mounted. Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 180 Ill. Dec. 386, 607 N.E.2d 280 (3 Dist. 1993).
Where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse, he cannot recover damages under this section from the person who rented the horse to him. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In an action arising from an attack of the plaintiff by the defendants’ dog, the court properly refused to use Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 111.04 (3d ed. 1995) because that instruction inaccurately states the law with regard to provocation by taking the view of the reasonable person, rather that the view of a reasonable dog. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

LAWFUL PRESENCE
Violation of traffic laws by injured plaintiffs who were illegally riding an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway when they were injured by colliding with the defendant’s dog did not necessarily preclude them from recovering under the statute; their activity was peaceable, though illegal, and they were in a place where they had a right to be, although they should not have been riding an all-terrain vehicle there. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 259 Ill. Dec. 821, 759 N.E.2d 601 (2 Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 198 Ill. 2d 614, 264 Ill. Dec. 324, 770 N.E.2d 218 (2002).

–IMPROPER WARNING
Where in the defendants’ building, no notices indicated that any part of the premises was used as a private residence, it was clear that when the plaintiff entered the building, crossed its lobby, entered the elevator and rode it to the fifth floor, the plaintiff was lawfully on the premises, she was also lawfully on the premises when she entered the fifth floor hall were she was attacked, since persons entering the building and riding its elevator would have no reason to believe that the fifth floor was used for residential purposes or that vicious dogs were kept there, where the sole warning to this effect was posted in a place where it could be seen only split seconds before one would enter the danger area, under these circumstances, the warning sign was in the wrong location, it did not give adequate warning of the danger, and gave no grounds for holding that persons who entered the hall had no legal right to be there. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App.
2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).

–LICENSEE
Plaintiff was a licensee on defendant’s land when he was bitten by defendant’s dog; therefore, he was in a place where he could lawfully be within the meaning of a prior similar provision. Dobrin ex rel. Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill. App. 2d 387, 259 N.E.2d 405 (1 Dist 1970).

–PARE
NTS’ HOME
The plaintiff was lawfully on the premises at the time the defendants’ dog attacked her, where the plaintiff, although an adult who resided elsewhere, was in the habit of visiting the defendants, her parents, on a regular basis and possessed a key to the defendants’ home, and where such possession was of a long-standing nature. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
–CREATION OF LIABILITIES
The legislature intended to create two liabilities on the part of the owner of a dog, one if the animal injured a person who was peaceably conducting himself in a place he could lawfully be, or one if the animal attacked a person under such circumstances. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–INQUIRY
Under this Act, the legislature did not intend to eliminate inquiry into whether an animal might be diseased, whether a dangerous propensity was undisclosed, whether a horse was properly saddled, or whether there was any attempt to match the rider with the horse. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
Where literal enforcement of this Act would result in great injustice which was not contemplated, the court will construe this Act to give effect to what must have been reasonably intended by the legislature. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).
LIABILITY

Where the injuries were caused by the animal’s behavior other than an attack on the victim, proximate cause between the animal’s behavior and the injury to the minor victim must be established. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
This Act contemplates some level of care, control, or custody, in order for a noncustodial parent to be held liable for the injuries caused by her son’s dog. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–NOT ABSOLUTE
While a plaintiff need not prove a defendant’s negligence under this Act, the statute does not impose absolute liability on animal owners. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
Under this Act, liability is not absolute (i.e., not strict liability) but qualified. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–NOT SHOWN
Where dog was in defendants’ home, behind a locked gate, and defendants stated the dog could not get out, and it was impossible for the dog to attack or injure plaintiff, there was no factual or reasonable basis for imposing liability under this section for fall suffered by plaintiff while visiting in defendants’ home, allegedly occasioned by becoming frightened on hearing the dog growl. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).
Where the plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over a dog who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, owner of the dog was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries under a prior similar provision because there was no overt act, vicious or otherwise, attributable to the dog that caused the injury to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (4 Dist. 1967).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was not guilty in a suit for damages for personal injuries brought under former similar provision. Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1 Dist. 1962).

–NOT STRICT
While the language of this section appears to be absolute, it does not impose strict liability on animal owners. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

–OF KEEPER
The keeper of an animal, as well as its owner, can be held liable under this Act; a keeper of an animal has been defined in terms of management, custody, care or control. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

–RUNNING DOG
Where it was established that the act of a dog running between plaintiff’s legs was the cause of her falling, evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under a prior similar provision upon the dog’s owner. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–SHOWN
The owner of a horse was liable for injuries caused when the horse kicked the plaintiff rider of another horse where the plaintiff did nothing to provoke the incident and was peaceably conducting herself in a place where she had a legal right to be. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
In an action on common law and statutory liability, plaintiff’s uncontroverted evidence clearly established a prima facie case of liability for damages resulting from dog attack under a prior similar provision. Kovac v. Ducharme, 2 Ill. App. 2d 80, 118 N.E.2d 629 (1 Dist. 1954).

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
Where defendant alleged in his petition that victim was bitten in defendant’s office, which was prohibited to the public and marked by visible warning signs, and victim alleged that the bite took place on used car lot, but testified that she saw defendant’s dog inside the office when she first arrived on the lot, defendant’s allegations raised a meritorious defense. Frostin v. Radick, 78 Ill. App. 3d 352, 33 Ill. Dec. 875, 397 N.E.2d 208 (1 Dist. 1979).

NEGLIGENCE
–NOT NECESSARY
This Act creates a right of action unlike the common law remedy, and in order to recover under the statute, it is unnecessary to prove negligence, at least as to the owner. Thompson v. Dawson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 695, 91 Ill. Dec. 586, 483 N.E.2d 1072 (4 Dist. 1985).

OWNERSHIP
–DOGSITTER
Minor who was taking care of defendant’s dog while defendant was out of town for five days was an owner for purposes of the statute and precluded from recovering against defendant for injuries sustained while caring for dog. Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill. App. 3d 892, 228 Ill. Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332 (4 Dist. 1997).

–FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
The question of whether or not a person is a keeper or harborer of a dog depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual case. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–HARBORING
Harboring means protecting; one who treats a dog as living at his house and undertakes to control his actions is the owner or keeper of the dog within the meaning of the law. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–NOT SHOWN
Where the owner of the animal is present and in control of it, the property owner cannot be considered an owner under the Act merely because the property owner permitted the animal to be on the premises. Goennenwein v. Rasof, 296 Ill. App. 3d 650, 695 N.E.2d 541 (2 Dist. 1998).
Where an owner-employee of a business occasionally took his dog to work and the dog was fed at those times, the business was not a harborer or keeper of the dog so as to make it liable for a dog attack occurring off the premises after the business had closed. Frost v. Robave, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 230 Ill. Dec. 612, 694 N.E.2d 581 (1 Dist. 1998).

–QUESTION OF FACT
The question of ownership of a dog that has bitten a plaintiff is usually one for the trier of fact. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–SHOWN
Farmhand was an “owner” under this Act where part of his job was to care for boar, and he was doing so at the time the boar attacked him; thus, he could not recover under this Act. Eyrich v. Johnson, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 216 Ill. Dec. 620, 665 N.E.2d 878 (3 Dist. 1996), appeal denied, 168 Ill. 2d 587, 219 Ill. Dec. 562, 671 N.E.2d 729 (1996).

PLEADINGS
Trial court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice where she had properly pleaded all but one of the four elements required and the drafting problem could be easily remedied by amendment. Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990).

Plaintiff adequately alleged a cause of action under the this section, and the section was applicable to the case. Chittum v. Evanston Fuel & Material Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 188, 48 Ill. Dec. 110, 416 N.E.2d 5 (1 Dist. 1980).

PROPORTIONALITY
–ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Where 18 month old plaintiff accidentally fell onto the middle of the dog, which was sleeping in the sun and the dog responded by repeatedly biting plaintiff on and about the head and face, resulting in seven lacerations, the largest one being four to five inches long, the viciousness of the dog’s attack on plaintiff, which was out of proportion to the unintentional act committed by plaintiff, clearly established the defendants’ liability for plaintiff’s damages. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).

PROVOCATION
–IN GENERAL
Provocation of a dog means any action or activity, whether intentional or unintentional, which would be reasonably expected to cause a normal dog in similar circumstances to attack. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

–INTENT IMMATERIAL
Had the legislature intended only intentional provocation to be a bar to recovery, it would have so specified; its conclusion apparently was that an owner or keeper of a dog who would attack or injure someone without provocation should be liable. This implies that the intent of the plaintiff is immaterial. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).
Provocation within the meaning of this section means either intentional or unintentional provocation. Nelson ex rel. Nel
son v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).
–KICKING AND PUSHING
Kicking or pushing of a dog, which bit plaintiff, on two occasions by the plaintiff and subsequently by his playmate was completely sufficient to constitute provocation, and the owner of the dog was not liable for the injuries the plaintiff sustained. Siewerth ex rel. Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill. App. 2d 64, 231 N.E.2d 644 (1 Dist. 1967).
–NOT SHOWN
Under a prior similar provision, where a plaintiff approached an apartment and a dog without giving a warning as to the nature of his visit, this act did not represent a threat to the security of the apartment, and the plaintiff was not required to have known that such conduct would be likely to provoke a dog to attack, since the plaintiff had a legal right to be in the hallway and her only actions at that point consisted of stepping off the elevator and walking a short distance toward the defendants’ apartment door. The term provocation was not intended to apply to a situation like this and thereby relieve from responsibility the owner of a vicious dog, which was specifically kept for protection, merely because the dog interpreted the visitor’s movements as hostile actions calling for attack. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).
Mere acts of untying a dog and feeding it, in the absence of any evidence of any characteristic or action of the dog that would tend to apprise the plaintiff that she might be injured by the dog, were not acts of provocation on her part under a prior similar provision. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–PRESENCE
Mere presence on private property does not constitute provocation, regardless of how the animal may view the visitor’s movements. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).

–RELEVANT EVIDENCE
The question of what conduct constitutes provocation is primarily a question of whether plaintiff’s actions would be provocative to the dog; thus, neither the fact that plaintiff had the owner’s permission to approach the dog nor the fact that plaintiff was conducting himself in a manner approved by a hired hand were matters bearing on the issue of provocation. Stehl v. Dose, 83 Ill. App. 3d 440, 38 Ill. Dec. 697, 403 N.E.2d 1301 (3 Dist. 1980).

–SCREAM
While plaintiff’s frightened scream certainly triggered the attack on her by defendants’ dog, that scream could not be regarded under any reasonable standard as having been sufficient to account for the savagery of the dog’s assault; thus, as a matter of law, no provocation could be said to have existed. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).

–SHOWN
Where the victim was attempting to retrieve from the dog’s mouth a bird it was chewing, and the child’s acts in striking the dog and or pulling its tail and ears were not directed to self-defense, while victim was too immature to appreciate the seriousness of his acts, his acts were provocation within the meaning of the Act as a matter of law. Vonbehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 203 Ill. Dec. 744, 640 N.E.2d 664 (4 Dist. 1994), appeal denied, 159 Ill. 2d 582, 207 Ill. Dec. 525, 647 N.E.2d 1018 (1995).

–SOURCE IMMATERIAL
There is no requirement that in order to avoid liability the injured party be the provocateur. The focus is on the conduct of the animal and whether its conduct was the result of an outside stimulus, the source of which is immaterial. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

–UNINTENTIONAL ACTS
An unintentional or accidental act can constitute provocation; however, where the acts which stimulated or excited the dog were unintentional, no provocation can be said to exist within the meaning of the statute if the acts cause the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).

Provocation cannot be said to exist within the meaning of this section where such unintentional stimuli as greeting or petting a dog result in the dog attacking the plaintiff viciously and the attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved; thus, eight year old child who was bitten by defendant’s dog which he was petting in her driveway was entitled to recovery under this section. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Where the acts which stimulated or excited a dog were unintentional, no provocation could be said to exist within the meaning of this section if the acts caused the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack was out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).
Where defendant’s dalmatian apparently only struck and scratched a child plaintiff with a forepaw in response to the plaintiff’s stepping or falling on its tail while it was gnawing on a bone, an act which scarcely could be described as vicious, the dog was provoked by the plaintiff’s unintentional acts and did not viciously react to these acts. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–USE OF DOG REPELLANT
Plaintiff’s acts in spraying dog with dog repellant were not provocative but were reasonable measures for self-protection evoked by the dog’s actions and deterred him only momentarily. Steichman v. Hurst, 2 Ill. App. 3d 415, 275 N.E.2d 679 (2 Dist. 1971).

–WILFULNESS IRRELEVANT
A determination of provocation does not require consideration of the degree of wilfulness which motivates the provoking cause. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–YOUNG CHILD
A young child is not exempted from responsibility for his or her acts which provoke a dog under this section. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this section of the Act was to eliminate the common law requirement that the victim prove the owner knew the animal had a vicious propensity. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
The purpose of this section is to require an animal owner to be responsible for injuries caused by his animal when that animal is acting of its own volition. Thus, if an outside stimulus causes the injury-causing behavior in the animal, no liability attaches. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

SCOPE OF PROTECTION
Plaintiff, who was injured when a horse that she was riding threw her from its back, could benefit from the protection of this Act, although the horse did not attack her. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

STANDING
–PARENTS OF MINOR
Parents of a minor child are responsible for that child’s medical expenses, and since the obligation to pay rests on the parents, a cause of action to recover such medical expenses from an animal owner liable for the child’s personal injuries under this section lies in the parents, not the child. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–RIGHT TO RECOVERY
The right to seek recovery is not limited to the person physically attacked by the dog; any injured person, including a parent of a minor, may recover under this section, and, in order to recover such medical expenses, such party must establish: (1) that the minor victim’s injury was caused by the animal owned by the defendant; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the minor child; and (4) the presence of the minor child in a place where he had a right to be. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive, threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

LEGAL PERIODICALS
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Torts,” see 21 S. Ill. U.L.J. 891 (1997).
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Tort Developments,” 19 S. Ill. U.L.J. 945 (1995).
For note on animal law and landlord liability, discussing Steinberg v. Petta, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986), see 76 Ill. B.J. 461 (1988).
For article, “Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees on Illinois Farm Land for Recreation,” see 1980 S. Ill. U.L.J. 369.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant.
87 ALR4th 1004.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.
Illinois Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/13 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363]
§ 510 ILCS 5/13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal
Sec. 13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section, when the Administrator receives information that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal, the Administrator, or his authorized representative, shall have such dog or other animal confined under the observation of a licensed veterinarian for a period of 10 days. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. Such veterinarian shall report the clinical condition of the dog or other animal immediately, with confirmation in writing to the Administrator within 24 hours after the dog or other animal is presented for examination, giving the owner’s name, address, the date of confinement, the breed, description, age, and sex of such dog or other animal, on appropriate forms approved by the Department. The Administrator shall notify the attending physician or responsible health agency. At the end of the confinement period, the veterinarian shall submit a written report to the Administrator advising him of the final disposition of such dog or other animal on appropriate forms approved by the Department. When evidence is presented that such dog or other animal was inoculated against rabies within the time prescribed by law, it may be confined in the house of its owner, or in a manner which will prohibit it from biting any person for a period of 10 days, if the Administrator, or other licensed veterinarian, adjudges such confinement satisfactory. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. At the end of the confinement period, such dog or other animal shall be examined by the Administrator, or another licensed veterinarian.
It is unlawful for any person having knowledge that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal to refuse to notify the Administrator promptly. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to euthanize, sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of any such dog or other animal known to have bitten a person, until it is released by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to refuse or fail to comply with the written or printed instructions made by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. If such instructions cannot be delivered in person, they shall be mailed to the owner of such dog or other animal by regular mail, postage prepaid. The affidavit or testimony of the Administrator, or his authorized representative, delivering or mailing such instructions is prima facie evidence that the owner of such dog or other animal was notified of his responsibilities. Any expense incurred in the handling of any dog or other animal under this Section and Section 12 [510 ILCS 5/12] shall be borne by the owner.
(b) When a person has been bitten by a police dog, the police dog may continue to perform its duties for the peace officer or law enforcement agency and any period of observation of the police dog may be under the supervision of a peace officer. The supervision shall consist of the dog being locked in a kennel, performing its official duties in a police vehicle, or remaining under the constant supervision of its police handler.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
“Immediately” means by telephone, in person, or by other than use of the mail.
“Law enforcement agency” means an agency of the State or a unit of local government that is vested by law or ordinance with the duty to maintain public order and to enforce criminal laws or ordinances.
“Peace officer” has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILCS 5/2-13]. “Police dog” means a dog trained to assist peace officers in their law enforcement duties.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795; 89-576, § 5.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363.

EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS.
The 1996 amendment by P.A. 89-576, effective January 1, 1997, added the section catchline; added the subsection (a) designation; in subsection (a), in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, added at the beginning “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section”; added subsection (b); added the subsection (c) designation; and in subsection (c), in the introductory language, substituted a semicolon for “the word” and added the definitions of Law enforcement agency, Peace officer and Police dog.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/15 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365]
§ 510 ILCS 5/15. [Vicious and dangerous dogs and other animals]
Sec. 15. (a) For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Vicious dog” means:
(i) Any individual dog that when unprovoked inflicts bites or attacks a human being or other animal either on public or private property.
(ii) Any individual dog with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack without provocation, to cause injury or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals.
(iii) Any individual dog that has as a trait or characteristic and a generally known reputation for viciousness, dangerousness or unprovoked attacks upon human beings or other animals, unless handled in a particular manner or with special equipment.
(iv) Any individual dog which attacks a human being or domestic animal without provocation.
(v) Any individual dog which has been found to be a “dangerous dog” upon 3 separate occasions.
No dog shall be deemed “vicious” if it bites, attacks, or menaces a trespasser on the property of its owner or harms or menaces anyone who has tormented or abused it or is a professionally trained dog for law enforcement or guard duties. Vicious dogs shall not be classified in a manner that is specific as to breed.
If a dog is found to be a vicious dog, the dog shall be subject to enclosure.

(2) “Dangerous Dog” means any individual dog which when either unmuzzled, unleashed, or unattended by its owner, or a member of its owner’s family, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack upon streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places.

(3) “Enclosure” means a fence or structure of at least 6 feet in height, forming or causing an enclosure suitable to prevent the entry of young children, and suitable to confine a vicious dog in conjunction with other measures which may be taken by the owner or keeper, such as tethering of a vicious dog within the enclosure. Such enclosure shall be securely enclosed and locked and designed with secure sides, top and bottom and shall be designed to prevent the animal from escaping from the enclosure.

(4) “Impounded” means taken into the custody of the public pound in the city or town where the vicious dog is found.

(5) “Found to be vicious dog” means (i) that the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or a law enforcement officer has conducted an investigation and made a finding in writing that the dog is a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and, based on that finding, the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director has declared in writing that the dog is a vicious dog or (ii) that the circuit court has found the dog to be a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and has entered an order based on that finding.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or maintain any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog unless such dog is at all times kept in an enclosure. The only times that a vicious dog may be allowed out of the enclosure are (1) if it is necessary for the owner or keeper to obtain veterinary care for the dog or (2) to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that the dog is securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length, and shall be under the direct control and supervision of the owner or keeper of the dog.
Any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog and which is not confined to an enclosure shall be impounded by the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the law enforcement authority having jurisdiction in such area and shall be turned over to a licensed veterinarian for destruction by lethal injection.
If the owner of the dog has not appealed the impoundment order to the circuit court in the county in which the animal was impounded within 7 working days, the dog may be humanely dispatched. A dog found to be a vicious dog shall not be released to the owner until the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director approves the enclosure as defined in this Section.
No owner or keeper of a vicious dog shall sell or give away the dog.
(c) It is unlawful for any person to maintain a public nuisance by permitting any dangerous dog or other animal to leave the premises of its owner when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods.
Guide dogs for the blind or hearing impaired, support dogs for the physically handicapped, and sentry, guard, or police-owned dogs are exempt from this Section; provided, an attack or injury to a person occurs while the dog is performing duties as expected. To qualify for exemption under this Section, each such dog shall be currently inoculated against rabies in accordance with Section 8 of this Act [510 ILCS 5/8]. It shall be the duty of the owner of such exempted dog to notify the Administrator of changes of address. In the case of a sentry or guard dog, the owner shall keep the Administrator advised of the location where such dog will be stationed. The Administrator shall provide police and fire departments with a categorized list of such exempted dogs, and shall promptly notify such departments of any address changes reported to him.
The Administrator, the State’s Attorney, or any citizen of the county in which a dangerous dog or other animal exists may file a complaint in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such, to abate the same, and to enjoin the owner of such dog or other animal from permitting same to leave his premises when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods. Upon the filing of a complaint in the circuit court, the court, if satisfied that this nuisance may exist, shall grant a preliminary injunction with bond in such amount as the court may determine enjoining the defendant from maintaining such nuisance. If the existence of the nuisance is established, the owner of such dog or other animal shall be in violation of this Act, and in addition, the court shall enter an order restraining the owner from maintaining such nuisance and may order that such dog or other animal be humanely dispatched.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 86-1460; 87-456.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365.

ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
See 8 Illinois Administrative Code, § 30.140.

CASE NOTES
LACK OF PROVOCATION
–INFERENCE
The lack of provocation by another animal can be inferred where that animal is confined in its own pen and it is clear it did not attack. Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 155 Ill. Dec. 615, 569 N.E.2d 1226 (4 Dist. 1991).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive,
threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance. 90 ALR5th 619.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/16 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366]
§ 510 ILCS 5/16. [Attack or injury by animal; liability of owner]
Sec. 16. If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366.

CASE NOTES
ANALYSIS
Applicability
Assumption of Risk
–Applicability
–Available Defense
–Not Shown
–Shown
Attacks or Injures
–Disjunctive
–Predictable Behavior
Burden of Proof
–Reduction
Cause of Action
Common Law Action
–Not Precluded
–Pleading
Contributory Negligence
–Jury Instruction
Control of Animal
–Right of Recovery
Coverage
–Scope
Damages
–New Trial
–Not Excessive
Effect of Amendment
–On Other Statutes
–On Scope of Section
Elements of Cause of Action
Horse Rental
Jury Instructions
Lawful Presence
–Improper Warning
–Licensee
–Parents’ Home
Legislative Intent
–Creation of Liabilities
–Inquiry
–Reasonable Interpretation
Liability
–Noncustodial Parent
–Not Absolute
–Not Shown
–Not Strict
–Of Keeper
–Running Dog
–Shown
Meritorious Defense
Negligence
–Not Necessary
Ownership
–Dogsitter
–Facts and Circumstances
–Harboring
–Not Shown
–Question of Fact
–Shown
Pleadings
Proportionality
–Illustrative Cases
Provocation
–In General
–Intent Immaterial
–Kicking and Pushing
–Not Shown
–Presence
–Relevant Evidence
–Scream
–Shown
–Source Immaterial
–Unintentional Acts
–Use of Dog Repellant
–Wilfulness Irrelevant
–Young Child
Purpose
Scope of Protection
Standing
–Parents of Minor
–Right to Recovery

APPLICABILITY
The Animal Control Act, 510 ILCS 5/1 et seq., did not cease to apply to equine injury cases after the enactment of the Equine Liability Act, 745 ILCS 47/1 et seq. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK

–APPLICABILITY
A plaintiff who assumes the risk of injury is not protected by this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

Where plaintiff, an admitted experienced cattleman, volunteered to assist with the movement of cattle, and the defendant knew plaintiff had experience with cattle and could reasonably assume that plaintiff was aware of their normal propensities and could or would take reasonable measures to protect himself, the common law defense of assumption of the risk was available even though the action was brought under this Act. Malott v. Hart, 167 Ill. App. 3d 209, 118 Ill. Dec. 69, 521 N.E.2d 137 (3 Dist. 1988).
The defense of assumption of the risk can be applied under this section. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).

–AVAILABLE DEFENSE
Proof of assumption of risk is not precluded as a defense to an action brought under this section. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

–NOT SHOWN
The plaintiff was not barred from recovery for her injuries by the doctrine of assumption of risk where she was injured while riding her horse when a horse ridden by another person kicked her and her horse while the plaintiff and the other rider were talking after meeting on a trail. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
Where the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiff expressly relieved them from any liability for injuries inflicted by their dog, and in the absence of evidence of a contractual or employment relationship between the parties, the doctrine of assumption of risk was inapplicable. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

–SHOWN
Where defendant voluntarily accepted responsibility for controlling defendant’s dog, placing herself within the definition of an owner, the trial court correctly ruled that she could not recover from the dog’s legal owner for injuries which resulted from her own failure to control the dog. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988).
Where plaintiff, a trained horsewoman, knew there were mares in the vicinity when she tried to mount a stallion, knew a stallion could become excited and uncontrollable around mares, but attempted to mount the stallion anyway, and where plaintiff accepted employment as a trainer of stallions knowing such horses were likely to buck or jump, the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fall from the stallion. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).
Where a plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily entered into a contract with the defendant to shoe the defendant’s horse and by his own admissions it was known to him and known within his profession that horses will sometimes kick while being shod, plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of injury. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

ATTACKS OR INJURES
–DISJUNCTIVE
The statutory words “attacks or injures” are disjunctive and allow the plaintiff to recover if the animal injured plaintiff but did not attack. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

–PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR
An animal is a passive causal force and cannot be a proximate cause of injuries if it stands still or moves away from a plaintiff in a usual, predictable manner known to the plaintiff. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

BURDEN OF PROOF
–REDUCTION
This section reduces the burden upon a plaintiff by eliminating the common-law requirement that an injured person prove and plead that an animal owner knew or should have known of his animal’s propensity to injure or attack people. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
The purpose of this section was to reduce the burden on plaintiffs by eliminating the common-law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that an animal owner either knew or should have known that the animal had a propensity to injure people. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).
CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action under this section can exist when an attack or an injury occurs. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COMMON LAW ACTION
–NOT PRECLUDED
A defendant landowner who was not the “owner” of the dog could nevertheless be found liable under the common law if she were aware of the dog’s viciousness. Severson v. Ring, 244 Ill. App. 3d 453, 185 Ill. Dec. 706, 615 N.E.2d 1 (3 Dist. 1993).
This section did not repeal the common law action for recovery as the result of a dog bite. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill. App. 2d 408, 222 N.E.2d 530 (2 Dist. 1966).

–PLEADING
Where plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleged only a common law theory of recovery rather than recovery under this section, and failed to allege the two common law elements of mischievous propensity and notice, this omission did not render the complaint defective under F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with its more relaxed pleading requirements than Illinois’ fact-pleading rules, in a diversity action; although the elements of a claim under this section could be inferred from the complaint, filing a new complaint was ordered to allow the issues to be presented more clearly. Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
–JURY INSTRUCTION
While instructions regarding the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence should not have been given in a case brought under a prior similar provision which made it unnecessary to prove negligence in order to recover damages, the instructions were not so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal of judgment in favor of plaintiff, especially since the evidence amply supported the verdict. Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 210 N.E.2d 207 (1965).

CONTROL OF ANIMAL
–RIGHT OF RECOVERY
There is no legal or policy justification for extending the protections of this Act to a rider of a horse; once the rider mounts the horse, the rider is no longer a bystander or observer, but is someone who has asserted dominion over the animal and is an active partner with the animal in recreational activity, and the rider assumes control and responsibility for the horse. While a cause of action may be stated under other theories of liability, there is none under this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, he or she cannot recover for injuries sustained when he or she fails to control the animal. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, she cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988); Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COVERAGE
–SCOPE
Coverage under this statute was intended for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal posed to them. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

DAMAGES
–NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff was properly awarded a new trial on the issues of damages alone where a jury verdict on the question of liability was adequately supported by the evidence under this section, and the questions of damages and liability were so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages would not have been unfair to the defendant. Barr v. Groll, 208 Ill. App. 3d 318, 153 Ill. Dec. 298, 567 N.E.2d 13 (5 Dist. 1991).

–NOT EXCESSIVE
Where the jury verdict was five times the amount of out-of-pocket expenses, the verdict did not provide grounds for reversal. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 108 Ill. App. 2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 125 (2 Dist. 1969).

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT
–ON OTHER STATUTES
Amendment adding “other animals” to this section was not intended to result in a revocation by implication of the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq.). McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

–ON SCOPE OF SECTION
The legislature, by amending this statute to encompass “other animals” besides dogs, did not intend to change the scope and general applicability of the statute to envelop a situation where domestic animals, such as horses, were running at large. McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The four elements that must be proved to establish a cause of action are (1) injury caused by an animal owned by the defendants; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the injured person; and (4) the presence of the injured person in a place where he has a legal right to be. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976); McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978); Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988); Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989); Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Duty is not an element of a cause of action against an owner under this section, nor is it necessary to prove negligence on the part of the owner. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987). In order for the plaintiff to recover under this section, he is required to prove: an attack by a dog; that the defendant is the owner of the dog; injury to the plaintiff; absence of provocation by the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was conducting himself peaceably in a place where he had a legal right to be. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

HORSE RENTAL
No claim exists under the act when a rider is thrown from a horse she has voluntarily mounted. Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 180 Ill. Dec. 386, 607 N.E.2d 280 (3 Dist. 1993).
Where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse, he cannot recover damages under this section from the person who rented the horse to him. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In an action arising from an attack of the plaintiff by the defendants’ dog, the court properly refused to use Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 111.04 (3d ed. 1995) because that instruction inaccurately states the law with regard to provocation by taking the view of the reasonable person, rather that the view of a reasonable dog. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

LAWFUL PRESENCE
Violation of traffic laws by injured plaintiffs who were illegally riding an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway when they were injured by colliding with the defendant’s dog did not necessarily preclude them from recovering under the statute; their activity was peaceable, though illegal, and they were in a place where they had a right to be, although they should not have been riding an all-terrain vehicle there. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 259 Ill. Dec. 821, 759 N.E.2d 601 (2 Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 198 Ill. 2d 614, 264 Ill. Dec. 324, 770 N.E.2d 218 (2002).

–IMPROPER WARNING
Where in the defendants’ building, no notices indicated that any part of the premises was used as a private residence, it was clear that when the plaintiff entered the building, crossed its lobby, entered the elevator and rode it to the fifth floor, the plaintiff was lawfully on the premises, she was also lawfully on the premises when she entered the fifth floor hall were she was attacked, since persons entering the building and riding its elevator would have no reason to believe that the fifth floor was used for residential purposes or that vicious dogs were kept there, where the sole warning to this effect was posted in a place where it could be seen only split seconds before one would enter the danger area, under these circumstances, the warning sign was in the wrong location, it did not give adequate warning of the danger, and gave no grounds for holding that persons who entered the hall had no legal right to be there. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App.
2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).

–LICENSEE
Plaintiff was a licensee on defendant’s land when he was bitten by defendant’s dog; therefore, he was in a place where he could lawfully be within the meaning of a prior similar provision. Dobrin ex rel. Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill. App. 2d 387, 259 N.E.2d 405 (1 Dist 1970).

–PARE
NTS’ HOME
The plaintiff was lawfully on the premises at the time the defendants’ dog attacked her, where the plaintiff, although an adult who resided elsewhere, was in the habit of visiting the defendants, her parents, on a regular basis and possessed a key to the defendants’ home, and where such possession was of a long-standing nature. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
–CREATION OF LIABILITIES
The legislature intended to create two liabilities on the part of the owner of a dog, one if the animal injured a person who was peaceably conducting himself in a place he could lawfully be, or one if the animal attacked a person under such circumstances. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–INQUIRY
Under this Act, the legislature did not intend to eliminate inquiry into whether an animal might be diseased, whether a dangerous propensity was undisclosed, whether a horse was properly saddled, or whether there was any attempt to match the rider with the horse. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
Where literal enforcement of this Act would result in great injustice which was not contemplated, the court will construe this Act to give effect to what must have been reasonably intended by the legislature. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).
LIABILITY

Where the injuries were caused by the animal’s behavior other than an attack on the victim, proximate cause between the animal’s behavior and the injury to the minor victim must be established. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
This Act contemplates some level of care, control, or custody, in order for a noncustodial parent to be held liable for the injuries caused by her son’s dog. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–NOT ABSOLUTE
While a plaintiff need not prove a defendant’s negligence under this Act, the statute does not impose absolute liability on animal owners. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
Under this Act, liability is not absolute (i.e., not strict liability) but qualified. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–NOT SHOWN
Where dog was in defendants’ home, behind a locked gate, and defendants stated the dog could not get out, and it was impossible for the dog to attack or injure plaintiff, there was no factual or reasonable basis for imposing liability under this section for fall suffered by plaintiff while visiting in defendants’ home, allegedly occasioned by becoming frightened on hearing the dog growl. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).
Where the plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over a dog who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, owner of the dog was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries under a prior similar provision because there was no overt act, vicious or otherwise, attributable to the dog that caused the injury to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (4 Dist. 1967).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was not guilty in a suit for damages for personal injuries brought under former similar provision. Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1 Dist. 1962).

–NOT STRICT
While the language of this section appears to be absolute, it does not impose strict liability on animal owners. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

–OF KEEPER
The keeper of an animal, as well as its owner, can be held liable under this Act; a keeper of an animal has been defined in terms of management, custody, care or control. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

–RUNNING DOG
Where it was established that the act of a dog running between plaintiff’s legs was the cause of her falling, evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under a prior similar provision upon the dog’s owner. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–SHOWN
The owner of a horse was liable for injuries caused when the horse kicked the plaintiff rider of another horse where the plaintiff did nothing to provoke the incident and was peaceably conducting herself in a place where she had a legal right to be. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
In an action on common law and statutory liability, plaintiff’s uncontroverted evidence clearly established a prima facie case of liability for damages resulting from dog attack under a prior similar provision. Kovac v. Ducharme, 2 Ill. App. 2d 80, 118 N.E.2d 629 (1 Dist. 1954).

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
Where defendant alleged in his petition that victim was bitten in defendant’s office, which was prohibited to the public and marked by visible warning signs, and victim alleged that the bite took place on used car lot, but testified that she saw defendant’s dog inside the office when she first arrived on the lot, defendant’s allegations raised a meritorious defense. Frostin v. Radick, 78 Ill. App. 3d 352, 33 Ill. Dec. 875, 397 N.E.2d 208 (1 Dist. 1979).

NEGLIGENCE
–NOT NECESSARY
This Act creates a right of action unlike the common law remedy, and in order to recover under the statute, it is unnecessary to prove negligence, at least as to the owner. Thompson v. Dawson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 695, 91 Ill. Dec. 586, 483 N.E.2d 1072 (4 Dist. 1985).

Where the injuries were caused by the animal’s behavior other than an attack on the victim, proximate cause between the animal’s behavior and the injury to the minor victim must be established. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
This Act contemplates some level of care, control, or custody, in order for a noncustodial parent to be held liable for the injuries caused by her son’s dog. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–NOT ABSOLUTE
While a plaintiff need not prove a defendant’s negligence under this Act, the statute does not impose absolute liability on animal owners. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
Under this Act, liability is not absolute (i.e., not strict liability) but qualified. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–NOT SHOWN
Where dog was in defendants’ home, behind a locked gate, and defendants stated the dog could not get out, and it was impossible for the dog to attack or injure plaintiff, there was no factual or reasonable basis for imposing liability under this section for fall suffered by plaintiff while visiting in defendants’ home, allegedly occasioned by becoming frightened on hearing the dog growl. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).
Where the plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over a dog who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, owner of the dog was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries under a prior similar provision because there was no overt act, vicious or otherwise, attributable to the dog that caused the injury to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (4 Dist. 1967).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was not guilty in a suit for damages for personal injuries brought under former similar provision. Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1 Dist. 1962).

–NOT STRICT
While the language of this section appears to be absolute, it does not impose strict liability on animal owners. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

–OF KEEPER
The keeper of an animal, as well as its owner, can be held liable under this Act; a keeper of an animal has been defined in terms of management, custody, care or control. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

–RUNNING DOG
Where it was established that the act of a dog running between plaintiff’s legs was the cause of her falling, evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under a prior similar provision upon the dog’s owner. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–SHOWN
The owner of a horse was liable for injuries caused when the horse kicked the plaintiff rider of another horse where the plaintiff did nothing to provoke the incident and was peaceably conducting herself in a place where she had a legal right to be. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
In an action on common law and statutory liability, plaintiff’s uncontroverted evidence clearly established a prima facie case of liability for damages resulting from dog attack under a prior similar provision. Kovac v. Ducharme, 2 Ill. App. 2d 80, 118 N.E.2d 629 (1 Dist. 1954).

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
Where defendant alleged in his petition that victim was bitten in defendant’s office, which was prohibited to the public and marked by visible warning signs, and victim alleged that the bite took place on used car lot, but testified that she saw defendant’s dog inside the office when she first arrived on the lot, defendant’s allegations raised a meritorious defense. Frostin v. Radick, 78 Ill. App. 3d 352, 33 Ill. Dec. 875, 397 N.E.2d 208 (1 Dist. 1979).

NEGLIGENCE
–NOT NECESSARY
This Act creates a right of action unlike the common law remedy, and in order to recover under the statute, it is unnecessary to prove negligence, at least as to the owner. Thompson v. Dawson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 695, 91 Ill. Dec. 586, 483 N.E.2d 1072 (4 Dist. 1985).

OWNERSHIP
–DOGSITTER
Minor who was taking care of defendant’s dog while defendant was out of town for five days was an owner for purposes of the statute and precluded from recovering against defendant for injuries sustained while caring for dog. Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill. App. 3d 892, 228 Ill. Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332 (4 Dist. 1997).

–FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
The question of whether or not a person is a keeper or harborer of a dog depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual case. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–HARBORING
Harboring means protecting; one who treats a dog as living at his house and undertakes to control his actions is the owner or keeper of the dog within the meaning of the law. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–NOT SHOWN
Where the owner of the animal is present and in control of it, the property owner cannot be considered an owner under the Act merely because the property owner permitted the animal to be on the premises. Goennenwein v. Rasof, 296 Ill. App. 3d 650, 695 N.E.2d 541 (2 Dist. 1998).
Where an owner-employee of a business occasionally took his dog to work and the dog was fed at those times, the business was not a harborer or keeper of the dog so as to make it liable for a dog attack occurring off the premises after the business had closed. Frost v. Robave, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 230 Ill. Dec. 612, 694 N.E.2d 581 (1 Dist. 1998).

–QUESTION OF FACT
The question of ownership of a dog that has bitten a plaintiff is usually one for the trier of fact. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–SHOWN
Farmhand was an “owner” under this Act where part of his job was to care for boar, and he was doing so at the time the boar attacked him; thus, he could not recover under this Act. Eyrich v. Johnson, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 216 Ill. Dec. 620, 665 N.E.2d 878 (3 Dist. 1996), appeal denied, 168 Ill. 2d 587, 219 Ill. Dec. 562, 671 N.E.2d 729 (1996).

PLEADINGS
Trial court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice where she had properly pleaded all but one of the four elements required and the drafting problem could be easily remedied by amendment. Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990).

Plaintiff adequately alleged a cause of action under the this section, and the section was applicable to the case. Chittum v. Evanston Fuel & Material Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 188, 48 Ill. Dec. 110, 416 N.E.2d 5 (1 Dist. 1980).

PROPORTIONALITY
–ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Where 18 month old plaintiff accidentally fell onto the middle of the dog, which was sleeping in the sun and the dog responded by repeatedly biting plaintiff on and about the head and face, resulting in seven lacerations, the largest one being four to five inches long, the viciousness of the dog’s attack on plaintiff, which was out of proportion to the unintentional act committed by plaintiff, clearly established the defendants’ liability for plaintiff’s damages. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).

PROVOCATION
–IN GENERAL
Provocation of a dog means any action or activity, whether intentional or unintentional, which would be reasonably expected to cause a normal dog in similar circumstances to attack. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

–INTENT IMMATERIAL
Had the legislature intended only intentional provocation to be a bar to recovery, it would have so specified; its conclusion apparently was that an owner or keeper of a dog who would attack or injure someone without provocation should be liable. This implies that the intent of the plaintiff is immaterial. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).
Provocation within the meaning of this section means either intentional or unintentional provocation. Nelson ex rel. Nel
son v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).
–KICKING AND PUSHING
Kicking or pushing of a dog, which bit plaintiff, on two occasions by the plaintiff and subsequently by his playmate was completely sufficient to constitute provocation, and the owner of the dog was not liable for the injuries the plaintiff sustained. Siewerth ex rel. Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill. App. 2d 64, 231 N.E.2d 644 (1 Dist. 1967).
–NOT SHOWN
Under a prior similar provision, where a plaintiff approached an apartment and a dog without giving a warning as to the nature of his visit, this act did not represent a threat to the security of the apartment, and the plaintiff was not required to have known that such conduct would be likely to provoke a dog to attack, since the plaintiff had a legal right to be in the hallway and her only actions at that point consisted of stepping off the elevator and walking a short distance toward the defendants’ apartment door. The term provocation was not intended to apply to a situation like this and thereby relieve from responsibility the owner of a vicious dog, which was specifically kept for protection, merely because the dog interpreted the visitor’s movements as hostile actions calling for attack. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).
Mere acts of untying a dog and feeding it, in the absence of any evidence of any characteristic or action of the dog that would tend to apprise the plaintiff that she might be injured by the dog, were not acts of provocation on her part under a prior similar provision. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–PRESENCE
Mere presence on private property does not constitute provocation, regardless of how the animal may view the visitor’s movements. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).

–RELEVANT EVIDENCE
The question of what conduct constitutes provocation is primarily a question of whether plaintiff’s actions would be provocative to the dog; thus, neither the fact that plaintiff had the owner’s permission to approach the dog nor the fact that plaintiff was conducting himself in a manner approved by a hired hand were matters bearing on the issue of provocation. Stehl v. Dose, 83 Ill. App. 3d 440, 38 Ill. Dec. 697, 403 N.E.2d 1301 (3 Dist. 1980).

–SCREAM
While plaintiff’s frightened scream certainly triggered the attack on her by defendants’ dog, that scream could not be regarded under any reasonable standard as having been sufficient to account for the savagery of the dog’s assault; thus, as a matter of law, no provocation could be said to have existed. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).

–SHOWN
Where the victim was attempting to retrieve from the dog’s mouth a bird it was chewing, and the child’s acts in striking the dog and or pulling its tail and ears were not directed to self-defense, while victim was too immature to appreciate the seriousness of his acts, his acts were provocation within the meaning of the Act as a matter of law. Vonbehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 203 Ill. Dec. 744, 640 N.E.2d 664 (4 Dist. 1994), appeal denied, 159 Ill. 2d 582, 207 Ill. Dec. 525, 647 N.E.2d 1018 (1995).

–SOURCE IMMATERIAL
There is no requirement that in order to avoid liability the injured party be the provocateur. The focus is on the conduct of the animal and whether its conduct was the result of an outside stimulus, the source of which is immaterial. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

–UNINTENTIONAL ACTS
An unintentional or accidental act can constitute provocation; however, where the acts which stimulated or excited the dog were unintentional, no provocation can be said to exist within the meaning of the statute if the acts cause the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).

Provocation cannot be said to exist within the meaning of this section where such unintentional stimuli as greeting or petting a dog result in the dog attacking the plaintiff viciously and the attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved; thus, eight year old child who was bitten by defendant’s dog which he was petting in her driveway was entitled to recovery under this section. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Where the acts which stimulated or excited a dog were unintentional, no provocation could be said to exist within the meaning of this section if the acts caused the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack was out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).
Where defendant’s dalmatian apparently only struck and scratched a child plaintiff with a forepaw in response to the plaintiff’s stepping or falling on its tail while it was gnawing on a bone, an act which scarcely could be described as vicious, the dog was provoked by the plaintiff’s unintentional acts and did not viciously react to these acts. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–USE OF DOG REPELLANT
Plaintiff’s acts in spraying dog with dog repellant were not provocative but were reasonable measures for self-protection evoked by the dog’s actions and deterred him only momentarily. Steichman v. Hurst, 2 Ill. App. 3d 415, 275 N.E.2d 679 (2 Dist. 1971).

–WILFULNESS IRRELEVANT
A determination of provocation does not require consideration of the degree of wilfulness which motivates the provoking cause. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–YOUNG CHILD
A young child is not exempted from responsibility for his or her acts which provoke a dog under this section. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this section of the Act was to eliminate the common law requirement that the victim prove the owner knew the animal had a vicious propensity. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
The purpose of this section is to require an animal owner to be responsible for injuries caused by his animal when that animal is acting of its own volition. Thus, if an outside stimulus causes the injury-causing behavior in the animal, no liability attaches. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

SCOPE OF PROTECTION
Plaintiff, who was injured when a horse that she was riding threw her from its back, could benefit from the protection of this Act, although the horse did not attack her. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

STANDING
–PARENTS OF MINOR
Parents of a minor child are responsible for that child’s medical expenses, and since the obligation to pay rests on the parents, a cause of action to recover such medical expenses from an animal owner liable for the child’s personal injuries under this section lies in the parents, not the child. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–RIGHT TO RECOVERY
The right to seek recovery is not limited to the person physically attacked by the dog; any injured person, including a parent of a minor, may recover under this section, and, in order to recover such medical expenses, such party must establish: (1) that the minor victim’s injury was caused by the animal owned by the defendant; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the minor child; and (4) the presence of the minor child in a place where he had a right to be. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive, threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

LEGAL PERIODICALS
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Torts,” see 21 S. Ill. U.L.J. 891 (1997).
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Tort Developments,” 19 S. Ill. U.L.J. 945 (1995).
For note on animal law and landlord liability, discussing Steinberg v. Petta, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986), see 76 Ill. B.J. 461 (1988).
For article, “Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees on Illinois Farm Land for Recreation,” see 1980 S. Ill. U.L.J. 369.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant.
87 ALR4th 1004.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.
Illinois Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/13 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363]
§ 510 ILCS 5/13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal
Sec. 13. Dog or other animal bites; observation of animal. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section, when the Administrator receives information that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal, the Administrator, or his authorized representative, shall have such dog or other animal confined under the observation of a licensed veterinarian for a period of 10 days. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. Such veterinarian shall report the clinical condition of the dog or other animal immediately, with confirmation in writing to the Administrator within 24 hours after the dog or other animal is presented for examination, giving the owner’s name, address, the date of confinement, the breed, description, age, and sex of such dog or other animal, on appropriate forms approved by the Department. The Administrator shall notify the attending physician or responsible health agency. At the end of the confinement period, the veterinarian shall submit a written report to the Administrator advising him of the final disposition of such dog or other animal on appropriate forms approved by the Department. When evidence is presented that such dog or other animal was inoculated against rabies within the time prescribed by law, it may be confined in the house of its owner, or in a manner which will prohibit it from biting any person for a period of 10 days, if the Administrator, or other licensed veterinarian, adjudges such confinement satisfactory. The Department may, by regulation, permit such confinement to be reduced to a period of less than 10 days. At the end of the confinement period, such dog or other animal shall be examined by the Administrator, or another licensed veterinarian.
It is unlawful for any person having knowledge that any person has been bitten by a dog or other animal to refuse to notify the Administrator promptly. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to euthanize, sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of any such dog or other animal known to have bitten a person, until it is released by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. It is unlawful for the owner of such dog or other animal to refuse or fail to comply with the written or printed instructions made by the Administrator, or his authorized representative. If such instructions cannot be delivered in person, they shall be mailed to the owner of such dog or other animal by regular mail, postage prepaid. The affidavit or testimony of the Administrator, or his authorized representative, delivering or mailing such instructions is prima facie evidence that the owner of such dog or other animal was notified of his responsibilities. Any expense incurred in the handling of any dog or other animal under this Section and Section 12 [510 ILCS 5/12] shall be borne by the owner.
(b) When a person has been bitten by a police dog, the police dog may continue to perform its duties for the peace officer or law enforcement agency and any period of observation of the police dog may be under the supervision of a peace officer. The supervision shall consist of the dog being locked in a kennel, performing its official duties in a police vehicle, or remaining under the constant supervision of its police handler.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
“Immediately” means by telephone, in person, or by other than use of the mail.
“Law enforcement agency” means an agency of the State or a unit of local government that is vested by law or ordinance with the duty to maintain public order and to enforce criminal laws or ordinances.
“Peace officer” has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILCS 5/2-13]. “Police dog” means a dog trained to assist peace officers in their law enforcement duties.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795; 89-576, § 5.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 363.

EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS.
The 1996 amendment by P.A. 89-576, effective January 1, 1997, added the section catchline; added the subsection (a) designation; in subsection (a), in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, added at the beginning “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section”; added subsection (b); added the subsection (c) designation; and in subsection (c), in the introductory language, substituted a semicolon for “the word” and added the definitions of Law enforcement agency, Peace officer and Police dog.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/15 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365]
§ 510 ILCS 5/15. [Vicious and dangerous dogs and other animals]
Sec. 15. (a) For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Vicious dog” means:
(i) Any individual dog that when unprovoked inflicts bites or attacks a human being or other animal either on public or private property.
(ii) Any individual dog with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack without provocation, to cause injury or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals.
(iii) Any individual dog that has as a trait or characteristic and a generally known reputation for viciousness, dangerousness or unprovoked attacks upon human beings or other animals, unless handled in a particular manner or with special equipment.
(iv) Any individual dog which attacks a human being or domestic animal without provocation.
(v) Any individual dog which has been found to be a “dangerous dog” upon 3 separate occasions.
No dog shall be deemed “vicious” if it bites, attacks, or menaces a trespasser on the property of its owner or harms or menaces anyone who has tormented or abused it or is a professionally trained dog for law enforcement or guard duties. Vicious dogs shall not be classified in a manner that is specific as to breed.
If a dog is found to be a vicious dog, the dog shall be subject to enclosure.

(2) “Dangerous Dog” means any individual dog which when either unmuzzled, unleashed, or unattended by its owner, or a member of its owner’s family, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack upon streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places.

(3) “Enclosure” means a fence or structure of at least 6 feet in height, forming or causing an enclosure suitable to prevent the entry of young children, and suitable to confine a vicious dog in conjunction with other measures which may be taken by the owner or keeper, such as tethering of a vicious dog within the enclosure. Such enclosure shall be securely enclosed and locked and designed with secure sides, top and bottom and shall be designed to prevent the animal from escaping from the enclosure.

(4) “Impounded” means taken into the custody of the public pound in the city or town where the vicious dog is found.

(5) “Found to be vicious dog” means (i) that the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or a law enforcement officer has conducted an investigation and made a finding in writing that the dog is a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and, based on that finding, the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director has declared in writing that the dog is a vicious dog or (ii) that the circuit court has found the dog to be a vicious dog as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and has entered an order based on that finding.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or maintain any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog unless such dog is at all times kept in an enclosure. The only times that a vicious dog may be allowed out of the enclosure are (1) if it is necessary for the owner or keeper to obtain veterinary care for the dog or (2) to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that the dog is securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length, and shall be under the direct control and supervision of the owner or keeper of the dog.
Any dog which has been found to be a vicious dog and which is not confined to an enclosure shall be impounded by the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the law enforcement authority having jurisdiction in such area and shall be turned over to a licensed veterinarian for destruction by lethal injection.
If the owner of the dog has not appealed the impoundment order to the circuit court in the county in which the animal was impounded within 7 working days, the dog may be humanely dispatched. A dog found to be a vicious dog shall not be released to the owner until the Administrator, an Animal Control Warden, or the Director approves the enclosure as defined in this Section.
No owner or keeper of a vicious dog shall sell or give away the dog.
(c) It is unlawful for any person to maintain a public nuisance by permitting any dangerous dog or other animal to leave the premises of its owner when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods.

Guide dogs for the blind or hearing impaired, support dogs for the physically handicapped, and sentry, guard, or police-owned dogs are exempt from this Section; provided, an attack or injury to a person occurs while the dog is performing duties as expected. To qualify for exemption under this Section, each such dog shall be currently inoculated against rabies in accordance with Section 8 of this Act [510 ILCS 5/8]. It shall be the duty of the owner of such exempted dog to notify the Administrator of changes of address. In the case of a sentry or guard dog, the owner shall keep the Administrator advised of the location where such dog will be stationed. The Administrator shall provide police and fire departments with a categorized list of such exempted dogs, and shall promptly notify such departments of any address changes reported to him.
The Administrator, the State’s Attorney, or any citizen of the county in which a dangerous dog or other animal exists may file a complaint in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such, to abate the same, and to enjoin the owner of such dog or other animal from permitting same to leave his premises when not under control by leash or other recognized control methods. Upon the filing of a complaint in the circuit court, the court, if satisfied that this nuisance may exist, shall grant a preliminary injunction with bond in such amount as the court may determine enjoining the defendant from maintaining such nuisance. If the existence of the nuisance is established, the owner of such dog or other animal shall be in violation of this Act, and in addition, the court shall enter an order restraining the owner from maintaining such nuisance and may order that such dog or other animal be humanely dispatched.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 86-1460; 87-456.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 365.

ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
See 8 Illinois Administrative Code, § 30.140.

CASE NOTES
LACK OF PROVOCATION
–INFERENCE
The lack of provocation by another animal can be inferred where that animal is confined in its own pen and it is clear it did not attack. Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 155 Ill. Dec. 615, 569 N.E.2d 1226 (4 Dist. 1991).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive, threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance. 90 ALR5th 619.

CHAPTER 510. ANIMALS
ANIMAL CONTROL ACT
510 ILCS 5/16 (2003)
[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366]
§ 510 ILCS 5/16. [Attack or injury by animal; liability of owner]
Sec. 16. If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.

HISTORY: Source: P.A. 78-795.
NOTES:
NOTE.
This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 8, para. 366.
CASE NOTES
ANALYSIS
Applicability
Assumption of Risk
–Applicability
–Available Defense
–Not Shown
–Shown
Attacks or Injures
–Disjunctive
–Predictable Behavior
Burden of Proof
–Reduction
Cause of Action
Common Law Action
–Not Precluded
–Pleading
Contributory Negligence
–Jury Instruction
Control of Animal
–Right of Recovery
Coverage
–Scope
Damages
–New Trial
–Not Excessive
Effect of Amendment
–On Other Statutes
–On Scope of Section
Elements of Cause of Action
Horse Rental
Jury Instructions
Lawful Presence
–Improper Warning
–Licensee
–Parents’ Home
Legislative Intent
–Creation of Liabilities
–Inquiry
–Reasonable Interpretation
Liability
–Noncustodial Parent
–Not Absolute
–Not Shown
–Not Strict
–Of Keeper
–Running Dog
–Shown
Meritorious Defense
Negligence
–Not Necessary
Ownership
–Dogsitter
–Facts and Circumstances
–Harboring
–Not Shown
–Question of Fact
–Shown
Pleadings
Proportionality
–Illustrative Cases
Provocation
–In General
–Intent Immaterial
–Kicking and Pushing
–Not Shown
–Presence
–Relevant Evidence
–Scream
–Shown
–Source Immaterial
–Unintentional Acts
–Use of Dog Repellant
–Wilfulness Irrelevant
–Young Child
Purpose
Scope of Protection
Standing
–Parents of Minor
–Right to Recovery

APPLICABILITY
The Animal Control Act, 510 ILCS 5/1 et seq., did not cease to apply to equine injury cases after the enactment of the Equine Liability Act, 745 ILCS 47/1 et seq. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).

ASSUMPTION OF RISK
–APPLICABILITY
A plaintiff who assumes the risk of injury is not protected by this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

Where plaintiff, an admitted experienced cattleman, volunteered to assist with the movement of cattle, and the defendant knew plaintiff had experience with cattle and could reasonably assume that plaintiff was aware of their normal propensities and could or would take reasonable measures to protect himself, the common law defense of assumption of the risk was available even though the action was brought under this Act. Malott v. Hart, 167 Ill. App. 3d 209, 118 Ill. Dec. 69, 521 N.E.2d 137 (3 Dist. 1988).
The defense of assumption of the risk can be applied under this section. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).

–AVAILABLE DEFENSE
Proof of assumption of risk is not precluded as a defense to an action brought under this section. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).
–NOT SHOWN
The plaintiff was not barred from recovery for her injuries by the doctrine of assumption of risk where she was injured while riding her horse when a horse ridden by another person kicked her and her horse while the plaintiff and the other rider were talking after meeting on a trail. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
Where the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiff expressly relieved them from any liability for injuries inflicted by their dog, and in the absence of evidence of a contractual or employment relationship between the parties, the doctrine of assumption of risk was inapplicable. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

–SHOWN
Where defendant voluntarily accepted responsibility for controlling defendant’s dog, placing herself within the definition of an owner, the trial court correctly ruled that she could not recover from the dog’s legal owner for injuries which resulted from her own failure to control the dog. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988).
Where plaintiff, a trained horsewoman, knew there were mares in the vicinity when she tried to mount a stallion, knew a stallion could become excited and uncontrollable around mares, but attempted to mount the stallion anyway, and where plaintiff accepted employment as a trainer of stallions knowing such horses were likely to buck or jump, the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fall from the stallion. Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 92 Ill. Dec. 136, 484 N.E.2d 867 (4 Dist. 1985).
Where a plaintiff admitted that he had voluntarily entered into a contract with the defendant to shoe the defendant’s horse and by his own admissions it was known to him and known within his profession that horses will sometimes kick while being shod, plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of injury. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

ATTACKS OR INJURES
–DISJUNCTIVE
The statutory words “attacks or injures” are disjunctive and allow the plaintiff to recover if the animal injured plaintiff but did not attack. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556
N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

–PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR
An animal is a passive causal force and cannot be a proximate cause of injuries if it stands still or moves away from a plaintiff in a usual, predictable manner known to the plaintiff. King v. Ohren, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 145 Ill. Dec. 138, 556 N.E.2d 756 (1 Dist. 1990).

BURDEN OF PROOF
–REDUCTION
This section reduces the burden upon a plaintiff by eliminating the common-law requirement that an injured person prove and plead that an animal owner knew or should have known of his animal’s propensity to injure or attack people. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
The purpose of this section was to reduce the burden on plaintiffs by eliminating the common-law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that an animal owner either knew or should have known that the animal had a propensity to injure people. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).
CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action under this section can exist when an attack or an injury occurs. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COMMON LAW ACTION
–NOT PRECLUDED
A defendant landowner who was not the “owner” of the dog could nevertheless be found liable under the common law if she were aware of the dog’s viciousness. Severson v. Ring, 244 Ill. App. 3d 453, 185 Ill. Dec. 706, 615 N.E.2d 1 (3 Dist. 1993).
This section did not repeal the common law action for recovery as the result of a dog bite. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill. App. 2d 408, 222 N.E.2d 530 (2 Dist. 1966).

–PLEADING
Where plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleged only a common law theory of recovery rather than recovery under this section, and failed to allege the two common law elements of mischievous propensity and notice, this omission did not render the complaint defective under F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with its more relaxed pleading requirements than Illinois’ fact-pleading rules, in a diversity action; although the elements of a claim under this section could be inferred from the complaint, filing a new complaint was ordered to allow the issues to be presented more clearly. Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
–JURY INSTRUCTION
While instructions regarding the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence should not have been given in a case brought under a prior similar provision which made it unnecessary to prove negligence in order to recover damages, the instructions were not so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal of judgment in favor of plaintiff, especially since the evidence amply supported the verdict. Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 210 N.E.2d 207 (1965).

CONTROL OF ANIMAL
–RIGHT OF RECOVERY
There is no legal or policy justification for extending the protections of this Act to a rider of a horse; once the rider mounts the horse, the rider is no longer a bystander or observer, but is someone who has asserted dominion over the animal and is an active partner with the animal in recreational activity, and the rider assumes control and responsibility for the horse. While a cause of action may be stated under other theories of liability, there is none under this Act. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, he or she cannot recover for injuries sustained when he or she fails to control the animal. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
Where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, she cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal. Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (3 Dist. 1988); Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

COVERAGE
–SCOPE
Coverage under this statute was intended for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal posed to them. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

DAMAGES
–NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff was properly awarded a new trial on the issues of damages alone where a jury verdict on the question of liability was adequately supported by the evidence under this section, and the questions of damages and liability were so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages would not have been unfair to the defendant. Barr v. Groll, 208 Ill. App. 3d 318, 153 Ill. Dec. 298, 567 N.E.2d 13 (5 Dist. 1991).

–NOT EXCESSIVE
Where the jury verdict was five times the amount of out-of-pocket expenses, the verdict did not provide grounds for reversal. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Eckles, 108 Ill. App. 2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 125 (2 Dist. 1969).

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT
–ON OTHER STATUTES
Amendment adding “other animals” to this section was not intended to result in a revocation by implication of the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (510 ILCS 55/1 et seq.). McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978).

ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The four elements that must be proved to establish a cause of action are (1) injury caused by an animal owned by the defendants; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the injured person; and (4) the presence of the injured person in a place where he has a legal right to be. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976); McQueen v. Erickson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 859, 19 Ill. Dec. 113, 378 N.E.2d 614 (2 Dist. 1978); Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988); Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989); Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Duty is not an element of a cause of action against an owner under this section, nor is it necessary to prove negligence on the part of the owner. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).
In order for the plaintiff to recover under this section, he is required to prove: an attack by a dog; that the defendant is the owner of the dog; injury to the plaintiff; absence of provocation by the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was conducting himself peaceably in a place where he had a legal right to be. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

HORSE RENTAL
No claim exists under the act when a rider is thrown from a horse she has voluntarily mounted. Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 180 Ill. Dec. 386, 607 N.E.2d 280 (3 Dist. 1993).
Where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse, he cannot recover damages under this section from the person who rented the horse to him. Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (3 Dist. 1988).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In an action arising from an attack of the plaintiff by the defendants’ dog, the court properly refused to use Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 111.04 (3d ed. 1995) because that instruction inaccurately states the law with regard to provocation by taking the view of the reasonable person, rather that the view of a reasonable dog. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

LAWFUL PRESENCE
Violation of traffic laws by injured plaintiffs who were illegally riding an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway when they were injured by colliding with the defendant’s dog did not necessarily preclude them from recovering under the statute; their activity was peaceable, though illegal, and they were in a place where they had a right to be, although they should not have been riding an all-terrain vehicle there. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 259 Ill. Dec. 821, 759 N.E.2d 601 (2 Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 198 Ill. 2d 614, 264 Ill. Dec. 324, 770 N.E.2d 218 (2002).

–IMPROPER WARNING
Where in the defendants’ building, no notices indicated that any part of the premises was used as a private residence, it was clear that when the plaintiff entered the building, crossed its lobby, entered the elevator and rode it to the fifth floor, the plaintiff was lawfully on the premises, she was also lawfully on the premises when she entered the fifth floor hall were she was attacked, since persons entering the building and riding its elevator would have no reason to believe that the fifth floor was used for residential purposes or that vicious dogs were kept there, where the sole warning to this effect was posted in a place where it could be seen only split seconds before one would enter the danger area, under these circumstances, the warning sign was in the wrong location, it did not give adequate warning of the danger, and gave no grounds for holding that persons who entered the hall had no legal right to be there. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).

–LICENSEE
Plaintiff was a licensee on defendant’s land when he was bitten by defendant’s dog; therefore, he was in a place where he could lawfully be within the meaning of a prior similar provision. Dobrin ex rel. Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill. App. 2d 387, 259 N.E.2d 405 (1 Dist 1970).

–PARENTS’ HOME
The plaintiff was lawfully on the premises at the time the defendants’ dog attacked her, where the plaintiff, although an adult who resided elsewhere, was in the habit of visiting the defendants, her parents, on a regular basis and possessed a key to the defendants’ home, and where such possession was of a long-standing nature. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
–CREATION OF LIABILITIES
The legislature intended to create two liabilities on the part of the owner of a dog, one if the animal injured a person who was peaceably conducting himself in a place he could lawfully be, or one if the animal attacked a person under such circumstances. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–INQUIRY
Under this Act, the legislature did not intend to eliminate inquiry into whether an animal might be diseased, whether a dangerous propensity was undisclosed, whether a horse was properly saddled, or whether there was any attempt to match the rider with the horse. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other g rounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
Where literal enforcement of this Act would result in great injustice which was not contemplated, the court will construe this Act to give effect to what must have been reasonably intended by the legislature. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 38 Ill. Dec. 525, 403 N.E.2d 756 (2 Dist. 1980).

LIABILITY
Where the injuries were caused by the animal’s behavior other than an attack on the victim, proximate cause between the animal’s behavior and the injury to the minor victim must be established. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
This Act contemplates some level of care, control, or custody, in order for a noncustodial parent to be held liable for the injuries caused by her son’s dog. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–NOT ABSOLUTE
While a plaintiff need not prove a defendant’s negligence under this Act, the statute does not impose absolute liability on animal owners. Guthrie v. Zielinski, 185 Ill. App. 3d 266, 133 Ill. Dec. 341, 541 N.E.2d 178 (2 Dist. 1989).
Under this Act, liability is not absolute (i.e., not strict liability) but qualified. Harris v. Walker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 105 Ill. Dec. 426, 504 N.E.2d 526 (3 Dist. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 116 Ill. Dec. 702, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).

–NOT SHOWN
Where dog was in defendants’ home, behind a locked gate, and defendants stated the dog could not get out, and it was impossible for the dog to attack or injure plaintiff, there was no factual or reasonable basis for imposing liability under this section for fall suffered by plaintiff while visiting in defendants’ home, allegedly occasioned by becoming frightened on hearing the dog growl. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).
Where the plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over a dog who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, owner of the dog was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries under a prior similar provision because there was no overt act, vicious or otherwise, attributable to the dog that caused the injury to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (4 Dist. 1967).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was not guilty in a suit for damages for personal injuries brought under former similar provision. Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1 Dist. 1962).

–NOT STRICT
While the language of this section appears to be absolute, it does not impose strict liability on animal owners. Partipilo v. Dimaria, 211 Ill. App. 3d 813, 156 Ill. Dec. 207, 570 N.E.2d 683 (1 Dist. 1991).

–OF KEEPER
The keeper of an animal, as well as its owner, can be held liable under this Act; a keeper of an animal has been defined in terms of management, custody, care or control. Kirchgessner v. County of Tazewell, 162 Ill. App. 3d 510, 114 Ill. Dec. 224, 516 N.E.2d 379 (3 Dist. 1987).

–RUNNING DOG
Where it was established that the act of a dog running between plaintiff’s legs was the cause of her falling, evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under a prior similar provision upon the dog’s owner. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–SHOWN
The owner of a horse was liable for injuries caused when the horse kicked the plaintiff rider of another horse where the plaintiff did nothing to provoke the incident and was peaceably conducting herself in a place where she had a legal right to be. Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 239 Ill. Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1 (1 Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 186 Ill. 2d 566, 243 Ill. Dec. 560, 723 N.E.2d 1161 (1999).
In an action on common law and statutory liability, plaintiff’s uncontroverted evidence clearly established a prima facie case of liability for damages resulting from dog attack under a prior similar provision. Kovac v. Ducharme, 2 Ill. App. 2d 80, 118 N.E.2d 629 (1 Dist. 1954).

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
Where defendant alleged in his petition that victim was bitten in defendant’s office, which was prohibited to the public and marked by visible warning signs, and victim alleged that the bite took place on used car lot, but testified that she saw defendant’s dog inside the office when she first arrived on the lot, defendant’s allegations raised a meritorious defense. Frostin v. Radick, 78 Ill. App. 3d 352, 33 Ill. Dec. 875, 397 N.E.2d 208 (1 Dist. 1979).

NEGLIGENCE
–NOT NECESSARY
This Act creates a right of action unlike the common law remedy, and in order to recover under the statute, it is unnecessary to prove negligence, at least as to the owner. Thompson v. Dawson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 695, 91 Ill. Dec. 586, 483 N.E.2d 1072 (4 Dist. 1985).

OWNERSHIP
–DOGSITTER
Minor who was taking care of defendant’s dog while defendant was out of town for five days was an owner for purposes of the statute and precluded from recovering against defendant for injuries sustained while caring for dog. Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill. App. 3d 892, 228 Ill. Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332 (4 Dist. 1997).

–FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
The question of whether or not a person is a keeper or harborer of a dog depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual case. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–HARBORING
Harboring means protecting; one who treats a dog as living at his house and undertakes to control his actions is the owner or keeper of the dog within the meaning of the law. Steinberg ex rel. Martinez v. Petta, 139 Ill. App. 3d 503, 94 Ill. Dec. 187, 487 N.E.2d 1064 (1 Dist. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 114 Ill. 2d 496, 103 Ill. Dec. 725, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).

–NOT SHOWN
Where the owner of the animal is present and in control of it, the property owner cannot be considered an owner under the Act merely because the property owner permitted the animal to be on the premises. Goennenwein v. Rasof, 296 Ill. App. 3d 650, 695 N.E.2d 541 (2 Dist. 1998).
Where an owner-employee of a business occasionally took his dog to work and the dog was fed at those times, the business was not a harborer or keeper of the dog so as to make it liable for a dog attack occurring off the premises after the business had closed. Frost v. Robave, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 528, 230 Ill. Dec. 612, 694 N.E.2d 581 (1 Dist. 1998).

–QUESTION OF FACT
The question of ownership of a dog that has bitten a plaintiff is usually one for the trier of fact. Papesh v. Matesevac, 223 Ill. App. 3d 189, 165 Ill. Dec. 370, 584 N.E.2d 549 (3 Dist. 1991).

–SHOWN
Farmhand was an “owner” under this Act where part of his job was to care for boar, and he was doing so at the time the boar attacked him; thus, he could not recover under this Act. Eyrich v. Johnson, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 216 Ill. Dec. 620, 665 N.E.2d 878 (3 Dist. 1996), appeal denied, 168 Ill. 2d 587, 219 Ill. Dec. 562, 671 N.E.2d 729 (1996).

PLEADINGS
Trial court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice where she had properly pleaded all but one of the four elements required and the drafting problem could be easily remedied by amendment. Moore v. Roberts, 193 Ill. App. 3d 541, 140 Ill. Dec. 405, 549 N.E.2d 1277 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 546, 144 Ill. Dec. 259, 555 N.E.2d 378 (1990).
Plaintiff adequately alleged a cause of action under the this section, and the section was applicable to the case. Chittum v. Evanston Fuel & Material Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 188, 48 Ill. Dec. 110, 416 N.E.2d 5 (1 Dist. 1980).

PROPORTIONALITY
–ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Where 18 month old plaintiff accidentally fell onto the middle of the dog, which was sleeping in the sun and the dog responded by repeatedly biting plaintiff on and about the head and face, resulting in seven lacerations, the largest one being four to five inches long, the viciousness of the dog’s attack on plaintiff, which was out of proportion to the unintentional act committed by plaintiff, clearly established the defendants’ liability for plaintiff’s damages. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).

PROVOCATION
–IN GENERAL
Provocation of a dog means any action or activity, whether intentional or unintentional, which would be reasonably expected to cause a normal dog in similar circumstances to attack. Kirkham v. Will, 311 Ill. App. 3d 787, 244 Ill. Dec. 174, 724 N.E.2d 1062 (5 Dist. 2000).

–INTENT IMMATERIAL
Had the legislature intended only intentional provocation to be a bar to recovery, it would have so specified; its conclusion apparently was that an owner or keeper of a dog who would attack or injure someone without provocation should be liable. This implies that the intent of the plaintiff is immaterial. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).
Provocation within the meaning of this section means either intentional or unintentional provocation. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–KICKING AND PUSHING
Kicking or pushing of a dog, which bit plaintiff, on two occasions by the plaintiff and subsequently by his playmate was completely sufficient to constitute provocation, and the owner of the dog was not liable for the injuries the plaintiff sustained. Siewerth ex rel. Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill. App. 2d 64, 231 N.E.2d 644 (1 Dist. 1967).

–NOT SHOWN
Under a prior similar provision, where a plaintiff approached an apartment and a dog without giving a warning as to the nature of his visit, this act did not represent a threat to the security of the apartment, and the plaintiff was not required to have known that such conduct would be likely to provoke a dog to attack, since the plaintiff had a legal right to be in the hallway and her only actions at that point consisted of stepping off the elevator and walking a short distance toward the defendants’ apartment door. The term provocation was not intended to apply to a situation like this and thereby relieve from responsibility the owner of a vicious dog, which was specifically kept for protection, merely because the dog interpreted the visitor’s movements as hostile actions calling for attack. Messa v. Sullivan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 386, 209 N.E.2d 872 (1 Dist. 1965).
Mere acts of untying a dog and feeding it, in the absence of any evidence of any characteristic or action of the dog that would tend to apprise the plaintiff that she might be injured by the dog, were not acts of provocation on her part under a prior similar provision. McEvoy v. Brown, 17 Ill. App. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 652 (3 Dist. 1958).

–PRESENCE
Mere presence on private property does not constitute provocation, regardless of how the animal may view the visitor’s movements. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).

–RELEVANT EVIDENCE
The question of what conduct constitutes provocation is primarily a question of whether plaintiff’s actions would be provocative to the dog; thus, neither the fact that plaintiff had the owner’s permission to approach the dog nor the fact that plaintiff was conducting himself in a manner approved by a hired hand were matters bearing on the issue of provocation. Stehl v. Dose, 83 Ill. App. 3d 440, 38 Ill. Dec. 697, 403 N.E.2d 1301 (3 Dist. 1980).

–SCREAM
While plaintiff’s frightened scream certainly triggered the attack on her by defendants’ dog, that scream could not be regarded under any reasonable standard as having been sufficient to account for the savagery of the dog’s assault; thus, as a matter of law, no provocation could be said to have existed. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).

–SHOWN
Where the victim was attempting to retrieve from the dog’s mouth a bird it was chewing, and the child’s acts in striking the dog and or pulling its tail and ears were not directed to self-defense, while victim was too immature to appreciate the seriousness of his acts, his acts were provocation within the meaning of the Act as a matter of law. Vonbehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 203 Ill. Dec. 744, 640 N.E.2d 664 (4 Dist. 1994), appeal denied, 159 Ill. 2d 582, 207 Ill. Dec. 525, 647 N.E.2d 1018 (1995).

–SOURCE IMMATERIAL
There is no requirement that in order to avoid liability the injured party be the provocateur. The focus is on the conduct of the animal and whether its conduct was the result of an outside stimulus, the source of which is immaterial. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

–UNINTENTIONAL ACTS
An unintentional or accidental act can constitute provocation; however, where the acts which stimulated or excited the dog were unintentional, no provocation can be said to exist within the meaning of the statute if the acts cause the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 188 Ill. Dec. 744, 618 N.E.2d 1314 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 153 Ill. 2d 570, 191 Ill. Dec. 630, 624 N.E.2d 818 (1993).
Provocation cannot be said to exist within the meaning of this section where such unintentional stimuli as greeting or petting a dog result in the dog attacking the plaintiff viciously and the attack is out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved; thus, eight year old child who was bitten by defendant’s dog which he was petting in her driveway was entitled to recovery under this section. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Pitchford, 219 Ill. App. 3d 152, 161 Ill. Dec. 767, 579 N.E.2d 24 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 142 Ill. 2d 665, 164 Ill. Dec. 928, 584 N.E.2d 140 (1991).
Where the acts which stimulated or excited a dog were unintentional, no provocation could be said to exist within the meaning of this section if the acts caused the dog to attack the plaintiff viciously and the vicious attack was out of all proportion to the unintentional acts involved. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 148 Ill. Dec. 805, 561 N.E.2d 111 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 135 Ill. 2d 566, 151 Ill. Dec. 392, 564 N.E.2d 847 (1990).
Where defendant’s dalmatian apparently only struck and scratched a child plaintiff with a forepaw in response to the plaintiff’s stepping or falling on its tail while it was gnawing on a bone, an act which scarcely could be described as vicious, the dog was provoked by the plaintiff’s unintentional acts and did not viciously react to these acts. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–USE OF DOG REPELLANT
Plaintiff’s acts in spraying dog with dog repellant were not provocative but were reasonable measures for self-protection evoked by the dog’s actions and deterred him only momentarily.
Steichman v. Hurst, 2 Ill. App. 3d 415, 275 N.E.2d 679 (2 Dist. 1971).

–WILFULNESS IRRELEVANT
A determination of provocation does not require consideration of the degree of wilfulness which motivates the provoking cause. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

–YOUNG CHILD
A young child is not exempted from responsibility for his or her acts which provoke a dog under this section. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Lewis, 36 Ill. App. 3d 130, 344 N.E.2d 268 (5 Dist. 1976).

PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this section of the Act was to eliminate the common law requirement that the victim prove the owner knew the animal had a vicious propensity. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).
The purpose of this section is to require an animal owner to be responsible for injuries caused by his animal when that animal is acting of its own volition. Thus, if an outside stimulus causes the injury-causing behavior in the animal, no liability attaches. Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 119 Ill. Dec. 948, 523 N.E.2d 704 (4 Dist. 1988).

SCOPE OF PROTECTION
Plaintiff, who was injured when a horse that she was riding threw her from its back, could benefit from the protection of this Act, although the horse did not attack her. Ennen v. White, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 174 Ill. Dec. 219, 598 N.E.2d 416 (4 Dist.), cert. denied, 147 Ill. 2d 626, 180 Ill. Dec. 148, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (1992).

STANDING
–PARENTS OF MINOR
Parents of a minor child are responsible for that child’s medical expenses, and since the obligation to pay rests on the parents, a cause of action to recover such medical expenses from an animal owner liable for the child’s personal injuries under this section lies in the parents, not the child. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

–RIGHT TO RECOVERY
The right to seek recovery is not limited to the person physically attacked by the dog; any injured person, including a parent of a minor, may recover under this section, and, in order to recover such medical expenses, such party must establish: (1) that the minor victim’s injury was caused by the animal owned by the defendant; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the minor child; and (4) the presence of the minor child in a place where he had a right to be. Claxton ex rel. Claxton v. Grose, 226 Ill. App. 3d 829, 168 Ill. Dec. 554, 589 N.E.2d 954 (4 Dist. 1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
“ATTACK”
The word “attack”, as used in the Animal Control Act, is not limited to actual physical contact, but also encompasses aggressive, threatening, or menacing behavior that does not culminate in biting or other injury. 2002 Op. Atty. Gen (02-001).

LEGAL PERIODICALS
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Torts,” see 21 S. Ill. U.L.J. 891 (1997).
For article, “Survey of Illinois Law: Tort Developments,” 19 S. Ill. U.L.J. 945 (1995).
For note on animal law and landlord liability, discussing Steinberg v. Petta, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986), see 76 Ill. B.J. 461 (1988).
For article, “Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees on Illinois Farm Land for Recreation,” see 1980 S. Ill. U.L.J. 369.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 87 ALR4th 1004.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.

Indiana Dog Law

Liability Statute of Dog Owners for Damages Sustained by Postal Employees and Other Government Workers

Under this statute, if a dog, without provocation, bites a postal or other government worker who is lawfully doing his or her job on the owner’s property, the owner may be liable for any damages, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness or the owner’s knowledge of its viciousness. This statute essentially relieves postal workers and other government employees of the burden of proving the owner’s knowledge of viciousness.

Common Law Liability

Under Indiana’s common law, all dogs are presumed to be harmless. This legal presumption is overcome by evidence of a known or dangerous propensity as shown by specific acts of the animal. A dangerous propensity is a tendency by the animal to do an act which might endanger someone’s personal safety in a given situation. Even when the owner or keeper has knowledge of dangerous propensities, liability is based on negligence. In other words, the plaintiff must prove that the owner did not take reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Indiana does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

INDIANA DOG LAW

TITLE 15. AGRICULTURE AND ANIMALSbr
ARTICLE 5. LIVESTOCK AND ANIMAL CONTROL
CHAPTER 12. LIABILITY OF OWNER OF DOG WHO BITES PERSONS

Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 15-5-12-1 (2003)
§ 15-5-12-1. Liability of dog owner for damages sustained by postal employees and others
If a dog, without provocation, bites any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may be required to go for the purpose of discharging any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States of America, the owner of such dog may be held liable for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.
HISTORY: Acts 1951, ch. 37, § 1, p. 89.
NOTES:
INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Civil, No. 21.57.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Duty.
DUTY.
IC 15-5-12-1 allows the fact finder to use discretion in determining whether a dog’s owner should be held liable in cases where the statute applies; trial court erred by finding that a person who owned a dog that bit a U.S. Postal Service letter carrier while the dog was under another person’s control was negligent per se. Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 771 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. App. 2002).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES. Contributory negligence as a defense to a cause of action based upon violation of statute imposing duty upon keeper of animals. 10 A.L.R.2d 853.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 A.L.R.4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 A.L.R.4th 1120.
Validity and construction of statute, ordinance, or regulation applying to specific dog breeds, such as “pit bulls” or “bull terriers.” 80 A.L.R.4th 70.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 87 A.L.R.4th 1004.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 89 A.L.R.4th 374.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 A.L.R.5th 599.

Iowa Dog Bite Law

TITLE IX. LOCAL GOVERNMENTbr
SUBTITLE 1. COUNTITLES
CHAPTER 351. DOGS AND OTHER ANIMALS
Iowa Code § 351.28 (2003)

351.28 Liability for damages.
The owner of a dog shall be liable to an injured party for all damages done by the dog, when the dog is caught in the action of worrying, maiming, or killing a domestic animal, or the dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person, except when the party damaged is doing an unlawful act, directly contributing to the injury. This section does not apply to damage done by a dog affected with hydrophobia unless the owner of the dog had reasonable grounds to know that the dog was afflicted with hydrophobia and by reasonable effort might have prevented the injury.

HISTORY: [C73, § 1485; C97, § 2340; S13, § 2340; C24, 27, 31, 35, 39, § 5450; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, § 351.28]
83 Acts, ch 117, § 1

Kansas Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 47. LIVESTOCK AND DOMESTIC ANIMALSbr
ARTICLE 1. STOCK RUNNING AT LARGE
K.S.A. § 47-122 (2002)

47-122. Unlawful for certain animals to run at large.
It shall be unlawful for any domestic animal, other than dogs and cats, to run at large.

HISTORY: L. 1929, ch. 211, § 1; L. 1986, ch. 195, § 6; July 1.
NOTES:
LAW REVIEW AND BAR JOURNAL REFERENCES:
“Kansas Fence Laws and Trespassing Livestock,” Sam Brownback, 56 J.K.B.A., No. 3, 15 (1986).
“Kansas Dog Bite Liability Law,” Kelly W. Johnston, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 2, 6, 9 (2001).

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS
Domestic animals; livestock; peacocks. 93-102.
Provision in 47-122 that it is unlawful for domestic animals to run at large is provision for civil liability. 2001-54.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Animal on highway; “run at large” construed; damage action; negligence. Wilson v. Rule, 169 K. 296, 297, 300, 219 P.2d 690; Abbott v. Howard, 169 K. 305, 307, 308, 309, 312, 316, 317, 318, 319, 219 P.2d 696.

2. Damage action; automobile collision with cow; instructions and alleged trial errors considered; judgment upheld. Clark v. Carson, 188 K. 261, 262, 264, 265, 362 P.2d 71.

3. Negligence action; motorist collided with defendant’s horse; evidence of prior escapes of defendant’s horses properly admitted. Cooper v. Eberly, 211 K. 657, 662, 667, 508 P.2d 943.

4. Cited in holding insurer has no right of subrogation where plaintiff’s car collided with steer. Yunghans v. Carson, 9 K.A.2d 45, 48, 670 P.2d 928 (1983).

5. Cited; under 47-301 et seq., injured party must prove owner failed to exercise due care in enclosing animal. Walborn v. Stockman, 10 K.A.2d 597, 599, 602, 706 P.2d 465 (1985).

Kentucky Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this strict liability statute, the owner of a dog that injures someone is liable for all damages.

Vicious Dog Statute

Under this statute, a person who is “attacked” by a dog can file a complaint in Kentucky’s District Court that charges the owner with keeping a vicious dog. The statute states that an “attack” means a dog’s attempt to bite or a dog’s successful bite of a human, so long as the victim did not illegally enter or trespass on the dog owner’s property at the time of the attack. After the complaint is filed, a District Court judge will hear the case and then determine if the dog is “vicious.” If the dog owner fails to appear in court, or if the judge finds that the owner’s dog viciously, and without cause, attacked a person, the owner will be responsible to pay for all damages. In that case, the judge is also required to order the owner of the vicious dog to confine the dog in a locked enclosure at least 7 feet high or in a locked kennel run with a secure top. Under the statute, the dog is only permitted to leave the enclosure to visit a veterinarian or to be turned into an animal shelter. At these times, the law requires that the dog be muzzled.
The statute also makes it illegal for a vicious dog to run at large. If a vicious dog is found running at large, an animal control or peace officer may kill the animal.

Reporting Requirements

Kentucky law requires that doctors report a dog bite victim’s name, age, gender, and the precise location of the bite to the local health department within 12 hours of rendering treatment. In cases where the victim is a child and no medical attention is sought, the law requires the child’s parent or guardian to report the bite. If the victim is an adult who fails to seek medical attention, the law requires the victim or a person caring for the victim to make the report.

Authority to Kill or Seize Dog

Any person who observes a dog attacking a person is authorized to kill or seize the dog, without liability.

Kentucky Dog Bite Law

TITLE XXI. AGRICULTURE AND ANIMALSbr
CHAPTER 258. DOGS
PENALTIES
KRS § 258.990 (2002)

§ 258.990. Penalties

(1) Any person who violates KRS 258.015, 258.035, 258.055, 258.065 or 258.085, shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($ 10) nor more than one hundred dollars ($ 100). Each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.

(2) The owner of any dog not vaccinated according to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable to pay all damages for personal injuries resulting from the bite of such dog, if rabid.

(3) (a) Any person violating or failing or refusing to comply with KRS 258.095 to 258.365 and subsections (3) and (4) of this section, except KRS 258.235(5)(a), shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than five dollars ($ 5) and not more than one hundred dollars ($ 100) or be imprisoned for not less than five (5) nor more than sixty (60) days or both so fined and imprisoned.
(b) Any person violating KRS 258.235(5)(a) shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($ 50) nor more than two hundred dollars ($ 200), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days, or by both fine and imprisonment.

(4) All fines collected under subsection (3) of this section shall after costs and commissions have been deducted, be paid to the department to be credited to the livestock fund.
HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 119, § § 11 and 40; 1958, ch. 126, § 34; 1998, ch. 440, § 11, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES:
COMPILER’S NOTES. Former KRS 258.990 (68a-8, 68a-9, 68b-20, 68b-33) was repealed by Acts 1954, § 41.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL. Where a county failed to appoint a dog warden or establish a dog pound, the penalty provisions of this section would apply to the fiscal court members in their initial capacity, even though the county itself is cloaked with sovereign immunity. OAG 79-161.

CITED: Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1959).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES. 3A C.J.S., Animals, § § 13, 30, 97, 187, 202, 273.

Louisiana Dog Law

Liability Statute

Louisiana has a negligence liability statute that makes a dog owner liable for damages caused by his or her dog, only if the plaintiff shows that the owner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the animal’s behavior would cause damage, that damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that the owner failed to act reasonably to prevent the injury. In cases where the dog owner could have prevented the injury, the owner will be liable, unless the owner shows the injured person provoked the attack.

Dangerous Dog Statute The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• any dog that, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the past 36 months engages in any behavior that requires a defensive action by any person to prevent bodily injury when the person or the dog are off the dog owner’s property; or
• any dog that, when unprovoked, bites a person and causes an injury; or
• any dog that, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior 36-month period has killed, seriously bitten, inflicted injury, or otherwise caused injury to a domestic animal off the owner’s property.

Dog Owners’ Legal Responsibilities

Dangerous dogs must be properly restrained or confined. When on the owner’s property, the dog must be either kept indoors or outdoors in a secure enclosure. The enclosure must be a fence or other structure that prevents the entry of young children, as well as the escape of the dog. When off the owner’s property, the dog must be restrained by a leash that prevents escape or access to other persons.

The owner of a dangerous dog must post signs around the dog’s outdoor enclosure that are no more than 30 feet apart and placed at each entry and exit point. The signs must bear the words, “Beware of Dog,” or “Dangerous Dog,” in letters at least three-and-one-half inches high and must be readily visible to any person approaching the enclosure.

Dangerous dogs must be registered with the local dog licensing authority.

Dog Owners’ Liability

In addition to civil liability, any violations of the Dangerous Dog Statute result in fines of not more than $300.

Vicious Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A “vicious dog” is one that was previously determined to be a dangerous dog and that, when unprovoked, kills or inflicts serious bodily injury on a human. Under Louisiana law, “serious bodily injury” is an injury that results in unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of bodily function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.

It is unlawful to own a vicious dog in Louisiana.

Dog Owners’ Liability

TITLE V. OBLIGATIONS ARISING WITHOUT AGREEMENTbr
CHAPTER 3. OF OFFENSES AND QUASI OFFENSES
La. C.C. Art. 2321 (2003)

Art. 2321 Damage caused by animals
The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage caused by the animal. However, he is answerable for the damage only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his animal’s behavior would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nonetheless, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages for injuries to persons or property caused by the dog and which the owner could have prevented and which did not result from the injured person’s provocation of the dog. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes: CASE NOTES TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL
MATERIALS LAW REVIEWS
CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure : Trials : Judgment as Matter of Law
Civil Procedure : Relief From Judgment : Motions for New Trial
Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Burdens of Proof
Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Inferences & Presumptions
Evidence : Relevance : Character Evidence
Governments : Legislation : Interpretation
Governments : Legislation : Types of Statutes
Torts : Causation : Proximate Cause
Torts : Damages
Torts : Damages : Damages Generally
Torts : Damages : Compensatory Damages
Torts : Multiple Defendants : Apportionment of Damages
Torts : Negligence : Negligence Generally
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Comparative & Contributory Negligence
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Duty Generally
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners
Torts : Negligence : Proof of Negligence
Torts : Negligence : Proof of Negligence : Res Ipsa Loquitur
Torts : Real Property Torts : General Premises Liability
Torts : Real Property Torts : Landlord-Tenant Liabilities
Torts : Real Property Torts : Trespass
Torts : Strict Liability : Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals
Civil Procedure : Trials : Judgment as Matter of Law

1. In a horsewoman’s tort suit under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 against her uncle for injuries she suffered when a horse, which she had arranged for her uncle to buy, threw her, motions under La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1811 for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, under La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 1972 and 1973 for a new trial, were properly denied. Smith v. American Indem. Ins. Co., 598 So. 2d 486, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 997 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992).
Civil Procedure : Relief From Judgment : Motions for New Trial

2. In a horsewoman’s tort suit under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 against her uncle for injuries she suffered when a horse, which she had arranged for her uncle to buy, threw her, motions under La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1811 for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, under La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 1972 and 1973 for a new trial, were properly denied. Smith v. American Indem. Ins. Co., 598 So. 2d 486, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 997 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992).
Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Burdens of Proof

3. Although a cow owner took reasonable and prudent steps to maintain her fences in good condition, she had the burden of proving how a cow escaped from her property onto a highway where it caused an accident, and, by failing to sustain that burden, under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2803 and La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 she was liable for personal injuries suffered by an automobile driver and several adult and minor passengers. Womack v. Rhymes, 300 So. 2d 226, 1974 La. App. LEXIS 3182 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1974).

Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Inferences & Presumptions
4. Where a nine-year-old boy had been told not to enter a back yard, he was old enough to be required to obey that instruction, and dog owners had satisfied the legal obligation imposed upon them by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 by keeping their dogs secured and permitting no one to enter their yard without the presence of their son; they met their burden of proof that their dog’s bite was caused by the fault of the boy himself by proceeding into the yard contrary to the owners’ instructions. Dotson v. Continental Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 284, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3987 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975).
Evidence : Relevance : Character Evidence

5. In a horsewoman’s tort suit under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, against her uncle for injuries she suffered when a horse, which she had arranged for her uncle to buy, threw her, the exclusion of character evidence under La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 404 did not apply; under art. 2321 there had to be a showing that the horse posed an unreasonable risk of harm which could not be determined without examining the behavior of the animal. Smith v. American Indem. Ins. Co., 598 So. 2d 486, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 997 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992). Governments : Legislation : Interpretation

6. Provocation under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 could be imputed to animals as well as to people, and where the uncontroverted evidence showed that plaintiffs’ small dog charged defendants’ larger dogs as if to attack them, and that this provoked the larger dogs to attack plaintiff’s dog, defendants were not liable for plaintiffs’ veterinarian bill. Mccoy v. Lucius, La. App. 36894, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 536 (La.App. 2 Cir. Mar. 5 2003).

7. There was no dispute that the dogs kept by defendants caused the damage to plaintiffs’ dog; the two remaining elements of La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 were whether the owner was able to prevent the damage, but failed to do so, and whether defendants’ dogs were provoked. Mccoy v. Lucius, La. App. 36894, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 536 (La.App. 2 Cir. Mar. 5 2003).
Governments : Legislation : Types of Statutes

8. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 is a negligence statute rather than a strict liability statute. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).
Torts : Causation : Proximate Cause

9. Where an oncoming auto in a supermarket parking lot startled the plaintiff and caused her to step onto a defective drainage area and fall, the driver of the auto was not an intervening actor, since the oncoming auto was not an extraordinary event; it may have been a concurrent cause, but Louisiana jurisprudence required the third person to be the sole cause of the damage. Ruffo v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 424 So. 2d 470, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8708 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1982).

10. Cattle owner negligently failed to maintain a fence enclosing his livestock, which broke through a weak spot and trampled a sweet potato field, but the farmers failed to prove pecuniary loss because the crop had been ruined by excess rainfall. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).
Torts : Damages

11. Despite the declaration of La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 that the owner of an animal is answerable for the damage he has done, the owner of a cow was not that was struck by a car was not responsible for the car’s damages because the cow had escaped from an enclosure only in consequence of the negligence of another driver who had just damaged the enclosure. Ansardi v. Potter, 71 So. 2d 347, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 632 (La.App., Orleans 1954).
Torts : Damages : Damages Generally

12. Provocation under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 could be imputed to animals as well as to people, and where the uncontroverted evidence showed that plaintiffs’ small dog charged defendants’ larger dogs as if to attack them, and that this provoked the larger dogs to attack plaintiff’s dog, defendants were not liable for plaintiffs’ veterinarian bill. Mccoy v. Lucius, La. App. 36894, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 536 (La.App. 2 Cir. Mar. 5 2003).

13. Imposing the burden of proof upon the owner of an animal to exculpate himself from “even the slightest degree of negligence” is the interpretation that Louisiana Courts of Appeal consistently apply in “stock law” cases; however, where a driver hit a farmer’s cow on a clear day, and the evidence showed the driver was checking the tape player, the driver was 75 percent at fault, but was entitled to general damages, medical expenses, and property damages, subject to a reduction for the driver’s percentage of fault. Buller v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Cos., La. App. 2002-820, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 197 (La.App. 3 Cir. Feb. 5 2003).

Torts : Damages : Compensatory Damages
14. Cattle owner negligently failed to maintain a fence enclosing his livestock, which broke through a weak spot and trampled a sweet potato field, but the farmers failed to prove pecuniary loss because the crop had been ruined by excess rainfall. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).
Torts : Multiple Defendants : Apportionment of Damages

15. In the employee’s personal injury action against the employer, a lessor, and a lessee, the trial court did not err under La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2317, 2321, and 2322 in failing to allow the allocation of third-party fault against the manufacturer of the menu board that injured the employee. Myers v. Burger King Corp., La. App. 92-0400, 638 So. 2d 369, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 1581 (La.App. 4 Cir. May 26 1994).
Torts : Negligence : Negligence Generally

16. Imposing the burden of proof upon the owner of an animal to exculpate himself from “even the slightest degree of negligence” is the interpretation that Louisiana Courts of Appeal consistently apply in “stock law” cases; however, where a driver hit a farmer’s cow on a clear day, and the evidence showed the driver was checking the tape player, the driver was 75 percent at fault, but was entitled to general damages, medical expenses, and property damages, subject to a reduction for the driver’s percentage of fault. Buller v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Cos., La. App. 2002-820, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 197 (La.App. 3 Cir. Feb. 5 2003).

17. In father’s suit under La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2316 against store and escalator manufacturer due to child’s injuries from sticking a hand into the moveable parts of store’s escalator, strict liaibility was not imposed; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, imposing strict liability for damages caused by an animal, was only an exception to the basic rule that plaintiffs must prove negligence in order to recover. Norberg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 So. 2d 795, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3212 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1975).

18. Animal owner was liable for damages under La. Code Civ. Ann. art. 2321 and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2803 where the evidence as to the adequacy of his fences and generally reasonable precautions did not overcome the presumption of negligence when his cow ran out onto a highway and caused an accident with a vehicle driver. Quarles v. Tolar, 312 So. 2d 350, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3094 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1975).

19. Where a store owner gave no adequate warning to a customer of its vicious dog on the premises and who posted no sign prohibiting the public from entering the area where the dog was kept, under La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2321, 2315, and 2316, the owner was liable for injuries the dog inflicted on the customer. Cavallino v. Craft Motor Co., 244 So. 2d 333, 1971 La. App. LEXIS 6457 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1971).

20. Because a farmer failed to prove that he was free from any negligence and failed to maintain proper fencing, the trial court erred by rejecting car owner’s demands in a negligence action involving a collision between a car and a horse. Liner v. McEnery, 176 So. 2d 786, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4204 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1965).

21. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 would impose an absolute liability upon the owner of an animal, irrespective of the existence of any ordinance, but art. 2321 is subject to the negligence or fault requirements of La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2316; thus, although art. 2321 declares, unqualifiedly, that the owner of an animal is answerable for the damage the animal has done, the interpretation, which has been put upon art. 2321, consistently, is that the owner of an animal is liable for damages done by the animal only in cases where the owner was guilty of some fault or negligence in his ownership or possession of the animal. Raziano v. T. J. James & Co., 57 So. 2d 251, 1952 La. App. LEXIS 490 (La.App., Orleans 1952).
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Assumption of Risk

22. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317 and La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 are based on neither negligence nor fault, but from the obligations arising from custody and ownership; the defenses to such cases are: (1) fault of the victim; (2) fault of a third person; and (3) irresistible force. Goutierrez v. R & J Quarterhorse Stables, 509 So. 2d 551, 1987 La. App. LEXIS 9293 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987).

23. Assumption of risk and contributory negligence were common law defenses to negligence actions, while La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317 was based on neither negligence nor fault, but on the obligations arising from custody and ownership; the causation defenses applicable to cases under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317 were: (1) fault of the victim, (2) fault of a third person, and (3) irresistible force. Rozell v. La. Animal Breeders Coop., 496 So. 2d 275, 1986 La. LEXIS 7480 (La. 1986).
24. Worker assumed the risk of injury when he entered a bullpen alone that employees had been told not to enter, thus his recovery for personal injuries sustained was barred and his suit for damages was dismissed. Rozell v. La. Animal Breeders Coop., Inc., 486 So. 2d 968, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6487 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986).

25. A landowner was not entitled to damages when struck by a stray bull penned on his property, as the presumption of strict liability imposed on the bull’s owner by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 was overridden when the landowner voluntarily and knowingly placed himself in a dangerous location after employees of the owner, who were sent to retrieve the bull, warned the owner not to go into the pen or help load the bull into their trailer. Dufrene v. Fournier, 420 So. 2d 1178, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8224 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1982).

26. Fault of the victim was a defense to strict liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321; thus, the employee could not bring an action in tort against her employer or the owner of the horse from which she was thrown because the employee assumed the risk of injury when she exercised the horse. Roberts v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 394 So. 2d 696, 1981 La. App. LEXIS 3517 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981).

27. Horse owner was not strictly liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 for injuries suffered by a rider in a horseback riding accident; the owner was exculpated from fault and liability by the fault of the rider who assumed the risk of horseback riding when she voluntarily participated in a trail ride involving other horses and riders. Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 3729, 6 A.L.R.4th 349 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1979).
Torts : Negligence : Defenses : Comparative & Contributory Negligence

28. Where the owner’s dog was kept in a fenced yard, his gate was reinforced with an iron bar, the neighbor entered the owner’s yard to retrieve his son’s football, and the owner’s dog bit the neighbor, a judgment which allocated 25 percent of the fault to the neighbor and 75 percent of the fault to the owner was affirmed because (1) the owner was strictly liable for the dog bites under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 and the owner failed to prove that the neighbor actually provoked the dog, (2) the allocation of fault between the parties was proper because the neighbor could have waited to retrieve the football until the owner was home, (3) the neighbor’s status as a trespasser was irrelevant to the strict liability imposed on a dog owner, and (4) the owner knew of the dog’s propensity to bite. Pepper v. Triplet, La. App. 2002-0022, 834 So. 2d 624, 2002 La. App. LEXIS 3972 (La.App. 1 Cir. Dec. 20 2002).

29. Owner and trainer of a racehorse were liable for the damage done to an automobile by a racehorse that was spooked and ran away even though the automobile was parked in a fire zone where attended horses might pass; the runaway racehorse was an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone whose automobile was in his path no matter where it was parked. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Simon, 598 So. 2d 1255, 1992 La. App. LEXIS 1250 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992).

30. Dog bite victim was 100 percent at fault in entering a fenced yard before the dog was chained, despite the owner’s warnings. Hayes v. McFarland, 535 So. 2d 568, 1988 La. App. LEXIS 2750 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988).

31. Jury properly held that the owners of a dog were strictly liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 for the dog’s attack on an 11-year-old child, but the child’s damages were reduced by 50 percent pursuant to La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2323 because she was at fault for negligently walking into the dog owners’ backyard. Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 So. 2d 685, 1987 La. App. LEXIS 9565 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1987).

32. Dog owner was not liable to a woman who knocked at his residence door, startling his dog who was just inside into lunging out the door and biting the victim, because the victim’s non-negligent fault mitigated the owner’s strict statutory liability. Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 5047 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1977).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Duty Generally

33. Dog owner was not liable, under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, where his dog entered a neighbor’s home and the neighbor injured herself while trying to remove the dog; the neighbor voluntarily exposed herself to the danger of tripping over the dog. Thompson v. Sicard, 385 So. 2d 334, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 3920 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1980).

34. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, which makes the owner of an animal answerable for the damage it causes, is not a codal state-wide stock law, and is not the only statute applicable to cases involving motorists and cattle collisions on the highway; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2803, which prohibits allowing livestock to go at large on certain public highways, is a special statute to control this situation, and it is not within the province of a court to repeal an express, clear, and explicit statute. Flores v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 337 So. 2d 264, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3989 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1976).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners

35. Imposing the burden of proof upon the owner of an animal to exculpate himself from “even the slightest degree of negligence” is the interpretation that Louisiana Courts of Appeal consistently apply in “stock law” cases; however, where a driver hit a farmer’s cow on a clear day, and the evidence showed the driver was checking the tape player, the driver was 75 percent at fault, but was entitled to general damages, medical expenses, and property damages, subject to a reduction for the driver’s percentage of fault. Buller v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Cos., La. App. 2002-820, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 197 (La.App. 3 Cir. Feb. 5 2003).

36. Race horse did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to a veterinarian’s assistant during a tubing procedure because the assistant was experienced in dealing with race horses and the particular race horse was known to be gentle and well behaved. Bowen v. Skillman, La. App. 28217, 671 So. 2d 1216, 1996 La. App. LEXIS 581 (La.App. 2 Cir. Apr. 3 1996).

37. A dog owner was not liable for the injuries a child sustained when she ran into a street after she was frightened by the owner’s dogs, which were not vicious and did not chase her; the child reacted unreasonably to the barking dogs after she was told they were not dangerous. Marchand v. York, 624 So. 2d 440, 1993 La. App. LEXIS 2827 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1993).

38. Where a horse owner entrusted the daily care of his horse to his caretaker and the caretaker gave a rider express permission to take the horse out, the owner was liable for all damages that resulted from a collision between the horse and car after the horse was spooked and ran wildly into the path of the oncoming car. Dotson v. Matthews, 480 So. 2d 860, 1985 La. App. LEXIS 10592, 49 A.L.R.4th 639 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985).

39. Dog owner was not liable, under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, where his dog entered a neighbor’s home and the neighbor injured herself while trying to remove the dog; the neighbor voluntarily exposed herself to the danger of tripping over the dog. Thompson v. Sicard, 385 So. 2d 334, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 3920 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1980).

40. Injured parties could not recover against a cattle owner where they failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the ownership of a cow they hit on a highway which was required to recover under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321. Stutts v. Lyles, 332 So. 2d 917, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3671 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1976).

41. The fault provided in La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 is in the nature of strict liability, as an exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of negligence, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2316. Dotson v. Continental Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 284, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3987 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975).

42. Animal owner was liable for damages under La. Code Civ. Ann. art. 2321 and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2803 where the evidence as to the adequacy of his fences and generally reasonable precautions did not overcome the presumption of negligence when his cow ran out onto a highway and caused an accident with a vehicle driver. Quarles v. Tolar, 312 So. 2d 350, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3094 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1975).

43. In a personal injury action based upon a vehicular collision with a horse, the burden of proof rested upon the owner of the horse to establish that he was not negligent in allowing the animal to be on the highway; the horse owner failed to prove that he was not negligent. Schexnider v. Allstate Ins. Co., 304 So. 2d 825, 1974 La. App. LEXIS 4576 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974).

44. Although a cow owner took reasonable and prudent steps to maintain her fences in good condition, she had the burden of proving how a cow escaped from her property onto a highway where it caused an accident, and, by failing to sustain that burden, under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:2803 and La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 she was liable for personal injuries suffered by an automobile driver and several adult and minor passengers. Womack v. Rhymes, 300 So. 2d 226, 1974 La. App. LEXIS 3182 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1974).

45. Although the language used in La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 indicates that absolute liability is imposed on the owner for damages caused by his animal, jurisprudence is settled that the cited article must be read and considered with La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 and that the owner is liable for damage done by the animal only in cases where he is chargeable with some fault or negligence. Bryant v. McCann, 297 So. 2d 262, 1974 La. App. LEXIS 4398 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974).

46. Plaintiff, whose daughter was scratched by a dog while playing in the dog owner’s yard, failed to establish that the dog had shown a dangerous propensity in the past, or that the owner had reason to suspect the dog was dangerous. Losch v. Travelers Ins. Co., 264 So. 2d 240, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 5988 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972).

47. Where a store owner gave no adequate warning to a customer of its vicious dog on the premises and who posted no sign prohibiting the public from entering the area where the dog was kept, under La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2321, 2315, and 2316, the owner was liable for injuries the dog inflicted on the customer. Cavallino v. Craft Motor Co., 244 So. 2d 333, 1971 La. App. LEXIS 6457 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1971).

48. Although La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 appeared to subject the owner of an animal to absolute liability for any damage caused by it regardless of fault, the section was uniformly read in conjunction with La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2316 to require a showing that the animal owner had knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities before assessing fault against the owner. Rolen v. Maryland Cas. Co., 240 So. 2d 42, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4920 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1970).

49. Owner of an animal is answerable for damages caused by it only in instances where the owner is guilty of some fault or negligence in the ownership or possession of the animal. Braswell v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 204, 1969 La. App. LEXIS 5517 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1969).

50. There was no liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 on the owner of the dog that bit because the occurrence which brought about the damage was an unforeseen event; where there had been no occurrence or incident in the past and the dog had not bitten or displayed a vicious or ferocious disposition, the owner was not liable for damages to the child who was bitten. Cabaness v. Mascarella, 203 So. 2d 912, 1967 La. App. LEXIS 4756 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1967).

51. Where a filly owner had knowledge of prior episodes of the filly’s kicking, he was found negligent in not alerting the victim as to the dangerous propensity of the filly because a warning by the filly’s owner would have alerted the victim as to the animal’s characteristics and made him anticipatory of his reactions. Tamburello v. Jaeger, 249 LA. 25, 184 So. 2d 544, 1966 La. LEXIS 2476 (1966).

52. Farmer was negligent in failing to block a gully under his fence, thus enabling the escape of a bull which ran into a highway where a vehicle collided with it, and he was liable for injuries to the vehicle’s occupants under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321. Kennedy v. Frierson, 142 So. 2d 838, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 2112 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1962).

53. Trial court erred in applying La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 literally and in holding a dog owner liable for injuries caused by a dog bite where there is a fault or negligence requirement in the statute and the owner established that he had no actual or constructive knowledge of any vicious characteristics possessed by the dog. Marsh v. Snyder, 113 So. 2d 5, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 1180 (La.App., Orleans 1959).

54. Cattle owner negligently failed to maintain a fence enclosing his livestock, which broke through a weak spot and trampled a sweet potato field, but the farmers failed to prove pecuniary loss because the crop had been ruined by excess rainfall. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).

55. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 is a negligence statute rather than a strict liability statute. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).

86. Under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, the neighbor could only be held liable for the injured party’s injuries if he had turned his dog loose and the dog was a dangerous or noxious animal that had harmed someone previously. Martinez v. Modenbach, 396 So. 2d 471, 1981 La. App. LEXIS 3679 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1981).

87. Fault of the victim was a defense to strict liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321; thus, the employee could not bring an action in tort against her employer or the owner of the horse from which she was thrown because the employee assumed the risk of injury when she exercised the horse. Roberts v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 394 So. 2d 696, 1981 La. App. LEXIS 3517 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981).

88. Defendants were not strictly liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendants’ dog was the cause-in-fact of her injury. Dosch v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 392 So. 2d 718, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 4853 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1980).

89. Horse owners were properly relieved of strict liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 for an injury sustained by a person walking the horse in the Mardi Gras parade, because an exception to such liability was satisfied when the injury was shown to have been caused by an intervening third party who grabbed the horse’s bit and caused the animal to rear. Dufour v. Tabony, 374 So. 2d 186, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 2903 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1979).

90. Horse owner was not strictly liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 for injuries suffered by a rider in a horseback riding accident; the owner was exculpated from fault and liability by the fault of the rider who assumed the risk of horseback riding when she voluntarily participated in a trail ride involving other horses and riders. Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 3729, 6 A.L.R.4th 349 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1979).

91. Although La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 provided that the owner of an animal was answerable for damages caused in strict liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2316, the horse’s owner and rider exculpated himself from presumed fault where he proved that the claimant’s approach from the horse’s rear was the cause of the kick which harmed the claimant. Hebert v. Maryland Cas. Co., 366 So. 2d 1044, 1978 La. App. LEXIS 3377 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978).

92. Operator of a recreation area and its insurer were not strictly liable for injuries to horseback riders whose horses threw them when there was a sudden clap of thunder; in order to hold the owner of an animal strictly liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, the riders had to prove that there was a domestic animal, which was actually or constructively under the control of the owner, or which he had an obligation to restrain, the presence of which caused an unreasonable risk of harm to others and which injured an innocent third party. Alfonso v. Market Facilities of Houston, Inc., 356 So. 2d 86, 1978 La. App. LEXIS 3404 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978).

93. Owner of a baby calf was not liable for injuries suffered by a woman who was feeding the calf when she was allegedly struck and knocked to the ground by the animal because the woman had the actual care, custody, and control of the calf and under that circumstance, the strict liability imposed by La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2317 and 2321 did not apply. Brooks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 So. 2d 660, 1978 La. App. LEXIS 3415 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978).

94. Dog owners could not escape the liability imposed by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 by arguing that the dog was provoked to bite by a two-year-old child; a child of tender years was incapable of discerning the consequences of his actions and was therefore incapable of acting negligently. Betbeze v. Cherokee Nat’l Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 577, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 3655 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1977).

95. Dog owner was not liable to a woman who knocked at his residence door, startling his dog who was just inside into lunging out the door and biting the victim, because the victim’s non-negligent fault mitigated the owner’s strict statutory liability. Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 5047 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1977).

96. Owners of animals are answerable for damages caused by their animals. Motors Ins. Corp. v. Melder, 336 So. 2d 954, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 4689 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976).

97. Injured parties could not recover against a cattle owner where they failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the ownership of a cow they hit on a highway which was required to recover under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321. Stutts v. Lyles, 332 So. 2d 917, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3671 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1976).

98. Dog gifted primarily to defendant was not also the property of defendant’s wife even though the dog was used to guard her separately owned property; hence, under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, only defendant was answerable for the damage his dog caused. Brown v. Yokum, 325 So. 2d 874, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3858 (Jan. 13, 1976).

99. In father’s suit under La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2316 against store and escalator manufacturer due to child’s injuries from sticking a hand into the moveable parts of store’s escalator, strict liaibility was not imposed; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321, imposing strict liability for damages caused by an animal, was only an exception to the basic rule that plaintiffs must prove negligence in order to recover. Norberg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 So. 2d 795, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3212 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1975).

100. Where a nine-year-old boy had been told not to enter a back yard, he was old enough to be required to obey that instruction, and dog owners had satisfied the legal obligation imposed upon them by La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 by keeping their dogs secured and permitting no one to enter their yard without the presence of their son; they met their burden of proof that their dog’s bite was caused by the fault of the boy himself by proceeding into the yard contrary to the owners’ instructions. Dotson v. Continental Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 284, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3987 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975).

101. The fault provided in La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 is in the nature of strict liability, as an exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of negligence, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2316. Dotson v. Continental Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 284, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3987 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975).

102. Dog owner, who brought several dogs to an agricultural fair to participate in a casual dog show, was liable under La. Civ. Code Ann. art 2321 to a child who was bitten by one of the dogs; the owner owner was presumed to be at fault and did not prove any exonerating fault on the part of the child’s mother or the fair sponsor. Adkins v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 328, 1975 La. App. LEXIS 3803 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975).

103. In a personal injury action stemming from a dog bite, the dog’s owner was liable because under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 when a domesticated animal harmed another, the master of the animal was presumed to be at fault. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 1974 La. LEXIS 3828 (La. 1974).

104. Although the owner of a lost or strayed animal may discharge himself for liability for damage caused by that animal by abandoning it to the person who sustained the damage, the owner remains liable for all damages where he has turned loose a dangerous animal. Cox v. Reliance Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 370, 1973 La. App. LEXIS 5974 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1973).

105. Although La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 appeared to subject the owner of an animal to absolute liability for any damage caused by it regardless of fault, the section was uniformly read in conjunction with La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2316 to require a showing that the animal owner had knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities before assessing fault against the owner. Rolen v. Maryland Cas. Co., 240 So. 2d 42, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4920 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1970).

106. The award of damages under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 for personal injuries a breeder sustained as a result of dog bite was upheld where the evidence established that the owner knew of the viciousness of the dog and failed to warn the breeder. Beach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 215, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4784 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1970).

107. There was no liability under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 on the owner of the dog that bit because the occurrence which brought about the damage was an unforeseen event; where there had been no occurrence or incident in the past and the dog had not bitten or displayed a vicious or ferocious disposition, the owner was not liable for damages to the child who was bitten. Cabaness v. Mascarella, 203 So. 2d 912, 1967 La. App. LEXIS 4756 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1967).

108. A dog owner was liable in negligence for personal injuries a three-year-old neighbor boy suffered in an unprovoked mauling where the dog had a prior history of biting humans, and the owner had refused to take steps to prevent future attacks; where the owner had knowledge, the liability protection afforded by La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2315 and 2321 did not apply. Voelker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 So. 2d 136, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5004 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1966).

109. Where a filly owner had knowledge of prior episodes of the filly’s kicking, he was found negligent in not alerting the victim as to the dangerous propensity of the filly because a warning by the filly’s owner would have alerted the victim as to the animal’s characteristics and made him anticipatory of his reactions. Tamburello v. Jaeger, 249 LA. 25, 184 So. 2d 544, 1966 La. LEXIS 2476 (1966).

110. Because a farmer failed to prove that he was free from any negligence and failed to maintain proper fencing, the trial court erred by rejecting car owner’s demands in a negligence action involving a collision between a car and a horse. Liner v. McEnery, 176 So. 2d 786, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4204 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1965).

111. Farmer was negligent in failing to block a gully under his fence, thus enabling the escape of a bull which ran into a highway where a vehicle collided with it, and he was liable for injuries to the vehicle’s occupants under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321. Kennedy v. Frierson, 142 So. 2d 838, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 2112 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1962).

112. Trial court erred in applying La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 literally and in holding a dog owner liable for injuries caused by a dog bite where there is a fault or negligence requirement in the statute and the owner established that he had no actual or constructive knowledge of any vicious characteristics possessed by the dog. Marsh v. Snyder, 113 So. 2d 5, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 1180 (La.App., Orleans 1959).

113. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2321 is a negligence statute rather than a strict liability statute. Harris v. Roy, 108 So. 2d 7, 1958 La. App.
LEXIS 700 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958).

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS

1. Louisiana Tort Law § 1-2, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 1. THE NATURE OF TORT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA, § 1-2 Fault, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

2. Louisiana Tort Law § 1-8, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 1. THE NATURE OF TORT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA, § 1-8 Strict Liability, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

3. Louisiana Tort Law § 3-4, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 3. NEGLIGENCE — GENERAL OVERVIEW, § 3-4 Causation, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

4. Louisiana Tort Law § 4-2, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 4. CAUSE-IN-FACT, § 4-2 The “But For” Test, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

5. Louisiana Tort Law § 8-5, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 8. PROVING FAULT, § 8-5 Presumptions, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

6. Louisiana Tort Law § 8-6, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 8. PROVING FAULT, § 8-6 Res Ipsa Loquitur, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

7. Louisiana Tort Law § 9-12, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 9. DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE: THE VICTIM’S SUBSTANDARD CONDUCT, § 9-12 Assumption of the Risk, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

8. Louisiana Tort Law § 14-1, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 14. STRICT LIABILITY, § 14-1 The Concept and Its Abrogation, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

9. Louisiana Tort Law § 14-7, LOUISIANA TORT LAW, CHAPTER 14. STRICT LIABILITY, § 14-7 Domestic Animals, Copyright § 2002 LEXIS Law Publishing, a Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.

LAW REVIEWS
1. 44 LA Bar Jnl. 155, DEPARTMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, William T. D’Zurilla, Darryl M. Phillips, Alicia M. Bendana, John S. McLindon, John B. King, Richard J. Arsenault, Robert L. Waddell, Juan J. Lizarraga, Greg Guidry and Elise Mayers Bouchner, John Y. Pearce, Robert J. David, Paul Damian Rees, Malcolm S. Murchison, August, 1996, Copyright (c) 1996 by the Louisiana State Bar Association, Louisiana Bar Journal

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3. 43 La. L. Rev. 801, NOTE: CONTRIBUTING NEGLIGENCE — WHE
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4. 44 La. L. Rev. 1171, RUMINA
TIONS ON TORT LAW: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF WEX MALONE: THE VIABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE TO STRICT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA., Mack E. Barham *, MAY, 1984, Copyright (c) 1984 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

5. 44 La. L. Rev. 1213, RUMINATIONS ON TORT LAW: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF WEX MALONE: DISCERNING THE PARENT’S LIABILITY FOR THE HARM INFLICTED BY A NONDISCERNING CHILD., Charles A. Marvin *, MAY, 1984, Copyright (c) 1984 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

6. 44 La. L. Rev. 1485, NOTE: Entrevia v. Hood: Back to Loescher v. Parr., Elizabeth Baucum, MAY, 1984, Copyright (c) 1984 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

7. 44 La. L. Rev. 1519, NOTE: When Cause-In-Fact Is More Than A Fact: The Malone-Green Debate On The Role Of Policy In Determining Factual Causation In Tort Law., James E. Viator, MAY, 1984, Copyright (c) 1984 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

8. 44 La. L. Rev. 1791, NOTE: Joint Custody And Parents’ Liability Under Civil Code Article 2318., George David Ernest, III, JULY, 1984, Copyright (c) 1984 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

9. 47 La. L. Rev. 791, ARTICLE: ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, COMPARATIVE FAULT AND STRICT LIABILITY AFTER ROZELL., John Kennedy *, MARCH, 1987, Copyright (c) 1987 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

10. 49 La. L. Rev. 1, ARTICLE: THE JUDICIAL REVIVAL OF LOUISIANA’S CIVILIAN TRADITION: A SURPRISING TRIUMPH FOR THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE., Kenneth M. Murchison *, SEPTEMBER, 1988, Copyright (c) 1988 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

11. 49 La. L. Rev. 565, ARTICLE: A PRIMER ON THE LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT., John Kennedy *, JANUARY, 1989, Copyright (c) 1989 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

12. 49 La. L. Rev. 1163, NOTE: Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co. — Louisiana’s Attempt at Comparative Causation., Carla Ann Clark, MAY, 1989, Copyright (c) 1989 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

13. 49 La. L. Rev. 1351, COMMENT: CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2324: A BROKEN PATH TO LIMITED SOLIDARY LIABILITY., M. Kevin Queenan, JULY, 1989, Copyright (c) 1989 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

14. 52 La. L. Rev. 323, ARTICLE: Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. *, NOVEMBER, 1991, Copyright (c) 1991 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

15. 53 La. L. Rev. 1935, NOTE: Louisiana Premises Liability in the Post-Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative Era., David A. Szwak, JULY, 1993, Copyright (c) 1993 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

16. 56 La. L. Rev. 215, ARTICLE: The Ongoing “Turf War” for Louisiana Tort Law: Interpreting Immunity and the Solidarity Skirmish, Frank L. Maraist * Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. **, Fall, 1995, Copyright (c) 1995 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

17. 57 La. L. Rev. 267, NOTE: Celestine v. Union Oil Company of California: Repairmen and the Unreasonable Risk Determination in Louisiana Strict Liability Jurisprudence, L. Etienne Balart, Fall, 1996, Copyright (c) 1996 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

18. 57 La. L. Rev. 439, ARTICLE: Community Property Considerations in Law Suits By and Against Spouses, Lee Hargrave *, Winter, 1997, Copyright (c) 1997 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

19. 58 La. L. Rev. 1, ARTICLE: The Vocabulary of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, David W. Robertson *, Fall, 1997, Copyright (c) 1997 Louisiana Law Review, Louisiana Law Review

20. 46 Loy. L. Rev. 535, SPEECH: THE FATE OF THE GENERAL CLAUSE IN A CROSS-CULTURAL SETTING: THE TORT EXPERIENCE OF LOUISIANA *, Vernon Valentine Palmer **, Fall, 2000, Copyright (c) 2000 Loyola Law Review, Loyola Law Review

v 21. 59 Tul. L. Rev. 228, NOTE: STRICT LIABILITY — CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE IN Hyde v. Chevron USA., GAIL MAXINE BROWNFELD, October, 1984, Copyright § Tulane University 1984.Tulane Law Review

22. 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1303, ARTICLE: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE INNER STRUCTURE OF STRICT LIABILITY: COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW, AND COMPARATIVE LAW., VERNON PALMER *, June, 1988, Copyright § Tulane University 1988.Tulane Law Review

23. 68 Tul. L. Rev. 69, THE NEW LAW OF CO-OWNERSHIP: A KOMMENTAR *, Symeon C. Symeonides ** and Nicole Duarte Martin ***, November, 1993, Copyright § Tulane University 1993.Tulane Law Review

24. 69 Tul. L. Rev. 457, ARTICLE: CONTORTIONS ALONG THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN CONTRACTS AND TORTS, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN JR. *, December, 1994, Copyright (c) Tulane University 1994., Tulane Law Review

25. 71 Tul. L. Rev. 339, ARTICLE: Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, Frank L. Maraist *, Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. **, December, 1996, Copyright (c) Tulane University 1996., Tulane Law Review

26. 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1445, ESSAY: Influences of the Louisiana Civil Code in Latin America, Rolf Knutel *, May 1996, Copyright (c) Tulane University 1996., Tulane Law Review

27. 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1197, ARTICLE: Ruminations on the Revision of the Louisiana Law of Acquisitive Prescription and Possession, Lee Hargrave *, March, 1999, Copyright (c) 1999 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review

28. 49 Tul. L. Rev. 719, NOTE: Tort — Damage Caused by Animals — Louisiana Adopts Strict Liability, James C. Gulotta, March, 1975, Copyright (c) 1975 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review

29. 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1194, NOTE: Tort — Damage Caused by Minors under the Age of Discretion — Strict Vicarious Liability Imposed on Parents, Harvey D. Wagar III, May, 1975, Copyright (c) 1975 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review

30. 52 Tul. L. Rev. 869, NOTE: Constitutional Law–State Forfeiture Statute Held Violative of Due Process, Darrell K. Cherry, June, 1978, Copyright (c) 1978 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review.

31. 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1111, ARTICLE: Louisiana Tort Law at the Crossroads, Andre Tunc*, June, 1974, Copyright (c) 1974 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review

32. 44 Tul. L. Rev. 119, COMMENT: Tort Law in Louisiana–The Supplementary Tort Articles 2317-2322, Gary E. Theall, December, 1969, Copyright (c) Tulane University 1969., Tulane Law Review

33. 51 Tul. L. Rev. 1217, COMMENT: Comparative Negligence in the United States–The Advent of Its Adoption in Louisiana, Stephen D. Juge and Van R. Boyette, June, 1977, Copyright (c) 1977 Tulane University, Tulane Law Review.

Maine Dog Law

Negligence Liability Statute

Maine has a liability statute based on negligence. Under this statute, when a dog injures a person because the owner or keeper was negligent, the owner or keeper is liable in a civil action for the amount of damage done, so long as the injury did not occur due to the fault of the person injured.

Strict Liability Statute

Under this statute, when a dog injures a person off the owner’s or keeper’s property, the owner or keeper is liable in damages for the injury. Fault of the injured person may not reduce the damages recovered for physical injury, unless the judge determines the fault of the injured person exceeded that of the dog’s owner or keeper.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

Under Maine law, a “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that bites a person who, at the time of the injury, is not trespassing on the owner’s or keeper’s property; or
• a dog that causes a reasonable person who is not on the owner’s or keeper’s property and who is acting peacefully to fear injury by assault or the threat of assault of that person or that person’s domestic animal.

Owner’s Liability

Once a dog is determined to be dangerous, the owner or keeper commits a civil violation that may result in a $1,000 fine.
After a hearing concerning the dog, the judge may order the dog muzzled, restrained, or confined indoors or outdoors in an enclosure. The judge may also order the dog to be destroyed, depending on the severity of the injury.
After the hearing, the judge may order the dog owner to pay restitution to the injured person for any damages the dog caused.
If an owner or keeper refuses or neglects to comply with a judge’s order and the dog injures another person, the owner or keeper must pay the injured person treble (or triple) damages and costs to be recovered by a civil action.

Maine Dog Bite Law

TITLE 7. AGRICULTURE AND ANIMALS
PART 9. ANIMAL WELFARE
CHAPTER 717. ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
7 M.R.S. § 3907 (2003)

§ 3907. Definitions
As used in this Part, and in every law relating to or affecting animals, unless the context indicates otherwise, the following terms have the following meanings.

1. ACT. “Act” means the Animal Welfare Board Act.
1-A. ABANDONED DOG. “Abandoned dog” means a dog that has been deserted by its owner or keeper.
2. ANIMAL. “Animal” means every living, sentient creature not a human being.

3. ANIMAL CONTROL. “Animal control” means control of dogs, cats, and domesticated or undomesticated animals in accordance with section 3948.

4. ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER. “Animal control officer” means the person appointed periodically by a municipality pursuant to chapter 725. 5. REPEALED. Laws 1993, c. 657, § 2.

5-A. ANIMAL SHELTER. “Animal shelter” means a facility that includes a physical structure or part of a physical structure that provides temporary or permanent shelter to stray, abandoned, abused or owner-surrendered animals.

6. AT LARGE. “At large” means off the premises of the owner and not under the control of any person whose personal presence and attention would reasonably control the conduct of the animal.

7. BOARD. “Board” means the Animal Welfare Board or its duly authorized agent.

8. BOARDING KENNEL. “Boarding kennel” means any place, building, tract of land or abode in or on which 3 or more privately owned dogs or other pets, or both, are kept at any one time for their owners in return for a fee.

8-A. BREEDING KENNEL. “Breeding kennel” means a facility operated for the purpose of breeding or buying, selling or in any way exchanging dogs or cats for value that exchanges more than 16 dogs or 16 cats in a 12-month period.

9. BUSINESS DAY. “Business day” means any day of the calendar year other than a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
9-A. CAT IDENTIFICATION. “Cat identification” means:
A. A registered microchip used in conjunction with a visible collar and tag, with a faceted, reflective ear stud or a tipped or notched ear;
B. A collar or collar and tag worn by the cat that provides the current name, address and telephone number of the owner; or
C. A collar and tag providing the name and address of the animal shelter that issued the tag.

10. CLERK; MUNICIPAL CLERK. “Clerk” or “municipal clerk” means the clerk of a municipality, the deputy clerk or assistant clerk, where directed by the clerk, carrying out the duties of this Part.

11. COMMISSIONER. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources or his duly authorized agent.

12. CONSTABLE. “Constable” means a law enforcement officer appointed by municipal officers pursuant to law.
12-A. REPEALED. Laws 1999, c. 498, § 1.
12-B. FOSTER HOME. “Foster home” means a facility that includes a physical structure or part of a physical structure and that contracts with an animal shelter to provide temporary shelter to stray, abandoned, abused or owner-surrendered animals.
12-C. DOG. “Dog” means a member of the genus and species known as canis familiaris or any canine, regardless of generation, resulting from the interbreeding of a member of canis familiaris with a wolf hybrid as defined in subsection 30.
12-D. DANGEROUS DOG. “Dangerous dog” means a dog that bites an individual who is not trespassing on the dog owner’s or keeper’s premises at the time of the bite or a dog that causes a reasonable and prudent person who is not on the dog owner’s or keeper’s premises and is acting in a reasonable and nonaggressive manner to fear imminent bodily injury by assaulting or threatening to assault that individual or individual’s domestic animal. “Dangerous dog” does not include a dog certified by the State and used for law enforcement use.
For the purposes of this definition, “dog owner’s or keeper’s premises” means the residence or residences, including buildings and land and motor vehicles, belonging to the owner or keeper of the dog.

13. GUIDE DOG OR HEARING DOG KEPT FOR BREEDING PURPOSES. “Guide dog or hearing dog kept for breeding purposes” means a male or female dog owned by a nonprofit organization for the purpose of producing puppies to be trained as guide dogs or hearing dogs and living with a resident of the State.

14. GUIDE DOG OR HEARING DOG KEPT PRIOR TO TRAINING. “Guide dog or hearing dog kept prior to training” means a dog under 18 months of age, owned by a nonprofit organization for the purpose of training as a guide dog or hearing dog and living temporarily with a resident of the State prior to training.

15. HUMANE AGENT. “Humane agent” means an employee of the department who assists in enforcing this Part.
15-A. REPEALED. Laws 1993, c. 657, § 4.

16. KEEPER. “Keeper” means a person in possession or control of a dog or other animal. A person becomes the keeper of a stray domesticated animal, other than a dog or livestock, if the person feeds that animal for at least 10 consecutive days.

17. KENNEL. “Kennel” means one pack or collection of dogs or wolf hybrids kept in a single location under one ownership for breeding, hunting, show, training, field trials and exhibition purposes.

18. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER. “Law enforcement officer” means any person who, by virtue of his public employment, is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order, enforce any law of this State establishing a civil violation, prosecute offenders or make arrests for crimes, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes.
18-A. LIVESTOCK. “Livestock” means cattle, equines, sheep, goats, swine and domesticated deer, fowl and rabbits.

19. MUNICIPALITY. “Municipality” means an organized city, town or plantation.

20. MUTILATE. “Mutilate” means to injure or disfigure by irreparably damaging body parts. “Mutilate” does not include conduct performed by a licensed veterinarian or conduct that conforms to accepted veterinary practices.

21. OWNER. “Owner” means a person owning, keeping or harboring a dog or other animal.

22. PERSON. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association or any other legal entity.
22-A. REPEALED. Laws 1997, c. 690, § 6.
22-B. PET. “Pet” means a dog, cat or other domesticated animal commonly kept as a companion, but does not include tamed animals that are ordinarily considered wild animals or livestock.

23. PET SHOP. “Pet shop” means a place or vehicle in or on which any dogs, cats, rodents, reptiles, fish, pet birds, exotic birds or exotic animals not born and raised on those premises are kept for the purpose of sale to the public.

24. RESPECTIVE MUNICIPALITY. “Respective municipality” means, in the case of towns, plantations and cities, the municipality where the dog or ferret is found; in the case of unorganized territories, the municipality near or adjacent to the unorganized territory where the dog or ferret is found; or the designee of that municipality.

25. REPEALED. Laws 1993, c. 657, § 10.
25-A. STRAY. “Stray” means off the owner’s premises and not under the control of a person.

26. TORMENT, TORTURE AND CRUELTY. “Torment, torture and cruelty” means every act, omission or neglect, whether by the owner or any other person, where unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is caused or permitted.
26-A. UNORGANIZED TERRITORY. “Unorganized territory” means all areas located within the jurisdiction of the State, except areas located within organized cities and towns, and Indian reservations. “Unorganized territory” does not include plantations.

27. VERTEBRATE. “Vertebrate” means a subphylum of chordate animals comprising those having a brain enclosed in a skull or cranium and a segmented spinal column, including mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish.

28. WARRANT. “Warrant” means an order of municipal officers directing a police officer, constable, sheriff or animal control officer to enter a complaint and summons against the owners or keepers of unlicensed dogs following notice of and noncompliance with a violation of law.

29. WELL CARED FOR. “Well cared for” means that the animal is receiving necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper shelter, protection from the weather and humanely clean conditions and that the animal has not been nor is being injured, overworked, tormented, tortured, abandoned, poisoned, beaten, mutilated or exposed to a poison with the intent that it be taken by the animal.

30. WOLF HYBRID. “Wolf hybrid” means a mammal that is the offspring of the reproduction between a species of wild canid or wild canid hybrid and a domestic dog or wild canid hybrid. “Wolf hybrid” includes a mammal that is represented by its owner to be a wolf hybrid, coyote hybrid, coydog or any other kind of wild canid hybrid.

Maryland Dog Law

Liability Statute

Maryland does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

Under Maryland’s common law, a dog owner is liable for injuries caused by his or her dog when the owner fails to exercise reasonable care, fails to control the animal, or fails to prevent the harm caused by the animal. The owner’s knowledge of the dog’s propensities is relevant in determining the degree of control a reasonable person would have taken under the circumstances. Even if the owner is unaware of the dog’s mischievous propensity, the owner can still be found negligent if he failed to exercise reasonable care in controlling the animal or preventing the harm.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that has bitten a person;
• a dog that has killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal when not on its owner’s property; or
• a dog that has attacked without provocation.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Dangerous Dogs

It is illegal for a dangerous dog owner to leave the dog unattended on the owner’s property, unless it is either confined indoors or is securely enclosed outdoors in a locked pen or other structure designed to restrain the dog. It is also illegal to allow a dangerous dog to leave the owner’s property unless the dog is securely restrained and muzzled.

Dog Owners’ Liability

A person who violates the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of up to $2,500.

Maryland Dog Bite Law

CRIMINAL LAW
TITLE 10. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, CONDUCT, AND SENSIBILITIES
SUBTITLE 6. CRIMES RELATING TO ANIMALS
Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. § 10-619 (2002)

§ 10-619. Dangerous dog

(a) Definitions. –
(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Dangerous dog” means a dog that:
(i) without provocation has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person; or
(ii) is determined by the appropriate unit of a county or municipal corporation under subsection (c) of this section to be a potentially dangerous dog and, after the determination is made:
1. bites a person;
2. when not on its owner’s real property, kills or inflicts severe injury on a domestic animal; or
3. attacks without provocation.
(3) (i) “Owner’s real property” means real property owned or leased by the owner of a dog.
(ii) “Owner’s real property” does not include a public right-of-way or a common area of a condominium, apartment complex, or townhouse development.
(4) “Severe injury” means a physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.

(b) Exception. — This section does not apply to a dog owned by and working for a governmental or law enforcement unit.

(c) Determination of potentially dangerous dog. — An appropriate unit of a county or municipal corporation may determine that a dog is potentially dangerous if the unit:
(1) finds that the dog:
(i) has inflicted a bite on a person while on public or private real property;
(ii) when not on its owner’s real property, has killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal; or
(iii) has attacked without provocation; and
(2) notifies the dog owner in writing of the reasons for this determination.

(d) Prohibited. — A dog owner may not:
(1) leave a dangerous dog unattended on the owner’s real property unless the dog is:
(i) confined indoors;
(ii) in a securely enclosed and locked pen; or
(iii) in another structure designed to restrain the dog; or
(2) allow a dangerous dog to leave the owner’s real property unless the dog is leashed and muzzled, or is otherwise securely restrained and muzzled.

(e) Required notice. — An owner of a dangerous dog or potentially dangerous dog who sells or gives the dog to another shall notify in writing:
(1) the authority that made the determination under subsection (c) of this section, of the name and address of the new owner of the dog; and
(2) the person taking possession of the dog, of the dangerous behavior or potentially dangerous behavior of the dog.
(f) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $ 2,500.

HISTORY: An. Code 1957, art. 27, § 70E(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (b)-(f); 2002, ch. 26, § 2.
NOTES:

REVISOR’S NOTE
This section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 70E(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (b) through (f). In subsections (a)(2) and (c) of this section, the references to a “unit” of a county or municipal corporation are substituted for the former references to a county or municipal “authority” for consistency within this article. See General Revisor’s Note to article. Similarly, in subsection (c) of this section, the reference to a governmental or law enforcement “unit” is substituted for the former reference to a governmental or law enforcement “agency”.
In subsection (a)(3) of this section, the defined term “owner’s real property” is substituted for the former defined term “real property” for clarity and accuracy.
In subsections (c)(2) and (d) of this section, the references to the “dog owner” are substituted for the former references to the “owner” for clarity.
In subsection (d) of this section, the reference to a “municipal corporation” is substituted for the former reference to a “municipality” for consistency with Md. Constitution, Art. XI-E.
In subsection (e) of this section, the defined term “person” is substituted for the former word “owner” for consistency within this article.
Former Art. 27, § 70E (a)(3) which defined “owner” to mean “any person or local entity that has a possessory right in a dog” is deleted as surplusage.

DEFINED TERMS:
“Animal” § 10-601
“County” § 1-101
“Person” § 1-101

EDITOR’S NOTE. –Section 2, ch. 364, Acts 1988, which enacted a prior similar provision, provides that “this act may not be applied or construed to limit the authority of a county or municipal authority to enact legislation that regulates to a greater extent the ownership or possession of dangerous dogs.”

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this part, subtitle, title, division or article.
Maryland Dog Bite Law

CRIMINAL LAW
TITLE 10. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, CONDUCT, AND SENSIBILITIES
SUBTITLE 6. CRIMES RELATING TO ANIMALS
Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. § 10-619 (2002)
§ 10-619. Dangerous dog

(a) Definitions. –
(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Dangerous dog” means a dog that:
(i) without provocation has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person; or
(ii) is determined by the appropriate unit of a county or municipal corporation under subsection (c) of this section to be a potentially dangerous dog and, after the determination is made:
1. bites a person;
2. when not on its owner’s real property, kills or inflicts severe injury on a domestic animal; or
3. attacks without provocation.
(3) (i) “Owner’s real property” means real property owned or leased by the owner of a dog.
(ii) “Owner’s real property” does not include a public right-of-way or a common area of a condominium, apartment complex, or townhouse development.
(4) “Severe injury” means a physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.

(b) Exception. — This section does not apply to a dog owned by and working for a governmental or law enforcement unit.

(c) Determination of potentially dangerous dog. — An appropriate unit of a county or municipal corporation may determine that a dog is potentially dangerous if the unit:
(1) finds that the dog:
(i) has inflicted a bite on a person while on public or private real property;
(ii) when not on its owner’s real property, has killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal; or
(iii) has attacked without provocation; and
(2) notifies the dog owner in writing of the reasons for this determination.

(d) Prohibited. — A dog owner may not:
(1) leave a dangerous dog unattended on the owner’s real property unless the dog is:
(i) confined indoors;
(ii) in a securely enclosed and locked pen; or
(iii) in another structure designed to restrain the dog; or
(2) allow a dangerous dog to leave the owner’s real property unless the dog is leashed and muzzled, or is otherwise securely restrained and muzzled.

(e) Required notice. — An owner of a dangerous dog or potentially dangerous dog who sells or gives the dog to another shall notify in writing:
(1) the authority that made the determination under subsection (c) of this section, of the name and address of the new owner of the dog; and
(2) the person taking possession of the dog, of the dangerous behavior or potentially dangerous behavior of the dog.

(f) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $ 2,500.

HISTORY: An. Code 1957, art. 27, § 70E(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (b)-(f); 2002, ch. 26, § 2.
NOTES:
REVISOR’S NOTE
This section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 70E(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (b) through (f). In subsections (a)(2) and (c) of this section, the references to a “unit” of a county or municipal corporation are substituted for the former references to a county or municipal “authority” for consistency within this article. See General Revisor’s Note to article. Similarly, in subsection (c) of this section, the reference to a governmental or law enforcement “unit” is substituted for the former reference to a governmental or law enforcement “agency”.
In subsection (a)(3) of this section, the defined term “owner’s real property” is substituted for the former defined term “real property” for clarity and accuracy.
In subsections (c)(2) and (d) of this section, the references to the “dog owner” are substituted for the former references to the “owner” for clarity.
In subsection (d) of this section, the reference to a “municipal corporation” is substituted for the former reference to a “municipality” for consistency with Md. Constitution, Art. XI-E.
In subsection (e) of this section, the defined term “person” is substituted for the former word “owner” for consistency within this article.
Former Art. 27, § 70E (a)(3) which defined “owner” to mean “any person or local entity that has a possessory right in a dog” is deleted as surplusage.

DEFINED TERMS:
“Animal” § 10-601
“County” § 1-101
“Person” § 1-101

EDITOR’S NOTE. –Section 2, ch. 364, Acts 1988, which enacted a prior similar provision, provides that “this act may not be applied or construed to limit the authority of a county or municipal authority to enact legislation that regulates to a greater extent the ownership or possession of dangerous dogs.”
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this part, subtitle, title, division or article.

Massachusetts Dog Law

Liability Statute

If any dog injures a person, the dog’s owner or keeper will be liable for damages, so long as the victim was not committing a trespass or other tort or was not teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog at the time of the injury. In cases where the victim is under seven years old, the law presumes that the child was not committing a trespass or other tort and was not teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog, and the burden of proof is on the defendant. Finally, in cases where the dog is owned by a minor, the child’s parent or guardian will be liable for damages.

Treble Damages Statute

In Massachusetts, local authorities can issue orders regarding control of certain dogs. If a local authority orders a dog to be restrained, and the dog thereafter injures a person, the dog’s owner or keeper will be liable in treble, or triple, the amount of damages sustained.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Massachusetts does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

CHAPTER 140. LICENSES
DOGS
ALM GL ch. 140, § 145A (2003)

§ 145A. Anti-Rabic Vaccine.
The board of health of a city or town shall, upon application, furnish free of charge to any uninsured resident thereof who has been exposed to rabies, or may have been so exposed, anti-rabic vaccine and anti-rabic treatment, in accordance with rules and regulations which the department of public health is hereby authorized to make. Except in Boston, such person shall have the right to select his own physician, who shall be paid by the city or town at a rate established as hereinafter provided, and the fact that a physician is a member of a board of health shall not disqualify him from being so selected and from being paid by the city or town for his services. Boards of health shall establish rates of compensation for such treatment. A city or town so furnishing vaccine and treatment shall be reimbursed for the cost thereof, not exceeding fifty dollars in the case of any one person, from the dog fund of the county in which is situated the city or town where the person treated was exposed to rabies, except that if such exposure occurred in Suffolk county such reimbursement shall be made by the city or town where such person was exposed to rabies, and except that if such vaccine and treatment are given by the board of health of a city or town because of a bite by or other exposure to rabies from a dog required to be licensed therein, the city or town shall not be so reimbursed, unless such dog is licensed at the time of such bite or other exposure. No such reimbursement shall include any part of the salary of a salaried city or town physician. The county commissioners of all counties except Suffolk, acting jointly, or the county commissioners of each county, except Suffolk, shall contract for the supplying of such vaccine to the several cities and towns on the order of their respective boards of health, and shall, from time to time, notify said boards of the terms and conditions of contracts made hereunder. No city or town for which a supply of such vaccine is provided by a contract as aforesaid shall be reimbursed hereunder for any such vaccine not purchased under such contract.

HISTORY: 1932, 289, § 3; 1934, 320, § 9; 1937, 375; 1939, 42
Amended by 1996, 151, § 337, approved June 30, 1996, by § 690, effective July 1, 1996

NOTES:
EDITORIAL NOTE–
The 1996 amendment, in the first sentence, added “uninsured” preceding “resident”.

CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS REGULATIONS–
Treatment of persons exposed to rabies, 105 CMR 335.001 et seq.

CHAPTER 140. LICENSES
DOGS
ALM GL ch. 140, § 155 (2003)
§ 155. Liability of Owner for Damage by Dog.
If any dog shall do any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or if the owner or keeper be a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage, unless such damage shall have been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, is under seven years of age at the time the damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action.

HISTORY: 1791, 38, § 4; 1797, 53, § 5; 1798, 54, § 3; 1812, 146, § 3; RS 1836, 58, § 13; GS 1860, 88, § 59; PS 1882, 102, § 93; RL 1902, 102, § 146; 1934, 320, § 18; 1968, 281

NOTES:
EDITORIAL NOTE–
The 1968 amendment added a sentence to shift the burden of proof of certain factors in dog-bite cases from plaintiff to the defendant where the plaintiff is a minor under 7 years of age.

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY REFERENCES–
2 Mass Jur, Personal Injury and Torts § § 20:8, 20:10-20:15.
Cause of Action Against Owner or Keeper of Domestic Animal to Recover for Personal Injuries Caused by Animal. 14 COA 685.

ANNOTATIONS–
Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by dog. 66 ALR2d 916.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 ALR4th 1120.

TEXTS–
Mottla, Proof of Cases in Massachusetts, § § 670, 671.

CASE NOTES
1. In general
2. Essentials of liability
3. Act of dog entailing liability
4. Owner or keeper
5. Conduct of injured person
6. Pleadings and practice
7. Damages
1. In general

The validity of this section has never been doubted. In re Opinion of Justices (1925) 251 Mass 569, 147 NE 681.
Nothing shows the purpose of this section better than its terms. Canavan v George (1935) 292 Mass 245, 198 NE 270.
Nothing in the terms of this section imports that it is not applicable to a rabid dog. Leone v Falco (1935) 292 Mass 299, 198 NE 273.
The amendment of this section was not intended to have any retroactive effect. Cudlassi v MacFarland (1939) 304 Mass 612, 24 NE2d 512.

Individual may not successfully sue her employer for damages incurred in single incident through instrumentality owned by employer but unrelated to employer’s business. Barrett v Rodgers (1990) 408 Mass 614, 562 NE2d 480.
Where employee was attacked by employer’s dog when she leaned over to pet dog which had no role in employer’s business, employee was barred by exclusivity provisions of Workers Compensation Act from recovering in action seeking damages for physical and mental injuries, disfigurement, medical expenses, loss of compensation, and interference with enjoyment of life. Barrett v Rodgers (1990) 408 Mass 614, 562 NE2d 480.

ALM GL c 140 § 155 is intended to benefit those who are unable to protect themselves from injury by dogs. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.
In action by plaintiff who was bitten by dog that was confined behind fence at defendant’s residence, it was error for court to grant defendant’s ALM CIV Rule 41(b)(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at close of plaintiff’s evidence based solely on insufficiency of evidence to establish that defendant was owner of dog, without addressing issue of whether defendant was dog’s “keeper.” Burgess v Uzarins (1999) 20 Mass App Div 81.

2. Essentials of liability
It is settled that this section does not merely increase the damages recoverable at common law for an injury caused by a dog. It creates a new and different cause of action. Canavan v George (1935) 292 Mass 245, 198 NE 270.
Doubtless one of the purposes of this section was to relieve, as a matter of trial procedure, a person injured by a dog from the burden of proving all the essentials of the common law liability. Leone v Falco (1935) 292 Mass 299, 198 NE 273.
The underlying principle of this section is clearly that the risk of harm resulting from the act of a dog to a person who is without fault, so far as this harm can be measured in damages, is placed upon the owner or keeper of the dog and not upon the faultless injured person. Leone v Falco (1935) 292 Mass 299, 198 NE 273.
The instant section imposes strict liability on the owner or keeper of dog which does damage to a person or property, and proof of negligence or other fault of the owner or of knowledge of dangerous propensities of the dog is not required. Malchanoff v Truehart (1968) 354 Mass 118, 236 NE2d 89.
Dog bite statute (ALM GL c 140 § 155) is indifferent to any question of negligence. Brown v Bolduc (1990) 29 Mass App 909, 556 NE2d 1051. ALM GL c 140 § 155 imposes strict liability. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.

3. Act of dog entailing liability
The liability imposed by this section is not limited to injury caused by biting of dog. Canavan v George (1935) 292 Mass 245, 198 NE 270.
The terms of this section are not narrowed in meaning by the use of the word “assault” in related statutes. (GL c 140 § § 156-159.) On the contrary there is more reason for thinking that the use of the word “assault” in these sections and its omission from § 155 show that it was not intended that § 155 should be limited to injuries resulting from assaults. Canavan v George (1935) 292 Mass 245, 198 NE 270.
Liability under this section is not negatived by proof that the owner or keeper was not at fault; that he neither knew, nor had reason to know, that the dog had any extraordinary, dangerous propensity, or that the dog had no such propensity. The wrong actionable under this section “consists not in the act of the master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog, but in the act of the dog for which the master is responsible.” Leone v Falco (1935) 292 Mass 299, 198 NE 273.
Under the instant section, unlike the common law, the owner or keeper of a dog is liable for injury resulting from an act of the dog without proof that he was negligent or otherwise at fault, or that he knew or had reason to know that the dog had any dangerous propensity. Rossi v Del Duca (1962) 344 Mass 66, 181 NE2d 591.
This section is broad enough to cover injuries caused by a dog running into a person. Poirier v Rogers (1957) 14 Mass App Dec 154. Visitor to premises where dog was kept recovered judgment against dog’s owner on basis of dog bite statute, where St. Bernard dog weighing 125 pounds bit visitor on nose, requiring 48 sutures and resulting in some permanent disfigurement. Brown v Bolduc (1990) 29 Mass App 909, 556 NE2d 1051.

4. Owner or keeper
Where the owner of a dog exhibited it at a fair but maintained control of it and was holding the chain when it broke loose and bit the plaintiff, the operators of the fair were not the keeper within the meaning of this section although the dog was exhibited under their regulation. Cruickshank v Brockton Agricultural Soc. (1927) 260 Mass 283, 157 NE 357.
The owner and the keeper of a dog are not liable jointly and severally as tortfeasors under this section; an election must be made to sue either the owner or the keeper; and if a judgment is obtained against one no suit against the other can be maintained even if the judgment remains unsatisfied. Maillet v Mininno (1929) 266 Mass 86, 165 NE 15.
The fact that a license to keep the dog that the plaintiff alleged caused his damage was issued to the son was evidence that the dog was owned by him, but such evidence was not conclusive–it could be rebutted by evidence tending to show that the defendant was the owner. Curran v Burkhardt (1941) 310 Mass 466, 38 NE2d 622.
Ownership is question of fact for jury. Curran v Burkhardt (1941) 310 Mass 466, 38 NE2d 622.
The plaintiff was entitled to recover if he proved his injury was caused by a dog owned by the defendant, and it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the evidence was also sufficient to show that the defendant was also the keeper of the dog. Curran v Burkhardt (1941) 310 Mass 466, 38 NE2d 622.
In a case where a husband and wife were sued for injuries inflicted by a dog, it was held that the plaintiff having proved joint ownership of the dog in the husband and wife, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove in addition that the husband and wife were joint keepers. Koller v Duggan (1963) 346 Mass 270, 191 NE2d 475.
Where a housekeeper whose employer knew that she habitually walked and fed his dog had obtained a verdict in superior court awarding her damages when the dog injured her seriously while on a walk, for there was a question of fact for the jury as to whether she was keeper of the dog within statute imposing liability upon owner or keeper. Siira v Shields (1972) 360 Mass 874, 277 NE2d 825.
Dog owner’s parents who allowed daughter [owner] to live in their trailer rent free and to keep horses there and who visited daughter frequently were not keepers of dog and were not obliged to give warning to daughter’s guests about danger from dog or to insist on other precautions. Brown v Bolduc (1990) 29 Mass App 909, 556 NE2d 1051.
Since there was adequate evidence that plaintiff, visiting her sister’s house, was not “keeper” of dog and that dog damaged plaintiff, judge erred in allowing directed verdict for defendant dog owner. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.
“Keeper” of dog may not maintain action against “owner” of dog under ALM GL c 140 § 155. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.
Judge erred in ruling that there was insufficient proof that plaintiff was not “keeper” of dog and in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict in action brought pursuant to ALM GL c 140 § 155, where there was jury issue whether plaintiff’s act of moving dog from inside house to back porch fit within general description of keepership. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.
Veterinary technician bitten by dog in her care as she attempted to muzzle dog in preparation for operation was “keeper” of dog and thus disqualified for recovery under ALM GL c 140 § 155. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.
Defendants were not “keepers” of dog in question within meaning of ALM GL c 140 § 155 merely on basis that dog had stayed in truck in driveway of defendants’ home on 2 prior occasions and that dog bit plaintiff while defendant was walking dog on leash. McRae v Siler 1999 Mass App Div 18.
Father (and landlord) of dog owner was entitled to summary judgment in action by social worker who was bitten when visiting owner’s premises, even though owner and his father shared same 2-family dwelling, where owner maintained separate apartment, owner had purchased, housed and fed dog, and father never walked, trained, played with or disciplined dog. Seletsky v Ruiz 2002 Mass. App. Div. 100.
Father’s mere ownership of a house and his knowledge that his son kept a dog on the premises were not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to father’s status as a co-keeper. Seletsky v Ruiz (2002) 2002 Mass App Div 100, 2002 Mass App Div LEXIS 41.

5. Conduct of injured person
In an earlier case, it was said that it is a well-settled rule that the plaintiff in an action under this section, for injuries caused by a dog is not entitled to recover if his own negligence or misconduct contributed to his injury. Ryan v Marren (1914) 216 Mass 556, 104 NE 353.
The strict liability imposed by the instant section is of no avail to a plaintiff if at the time of the injury he was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog, and it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to plead and prove that he has done none of those things. Rossi v Del Duca (1962) 344 Mass 66, 181 NE2d 591.
Where a child, pursued by one dog, entered the land on which the defendant kept a dog, in order to escape the pursuing dog, and where the child was injured by defendant’s dog, it could have been found that the child was not, as to the defendant, a trespasser but that she had a qualified privilege to enter the land in order to prevent serious harm to herself and, hence, that the child was not barred from recovery under the instant section. Rossi v Del Duca (1962) 344 Mass 66, 181 NE2d 591.
Where plaintiff beauty salon customer was injured by the owner’s dog when the customer bent down to pat the dog, it was held that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that she was not committing a trespass or other tort at the time of the injury and that she was not teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog, but it was not enough to bar the plaintiff that her act of patting the dog might have constituted a technical trespass against the dog. Koller v Duggan (1963) 346 Mass 270, 191 NE2d 475.
Under the provision of the instant section barring recovery where the injured person was “committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog”, the word “trespass” viewed in the context of the entire statute, which evidences a legislative recognition of a possessor of land to keep a dog for protection against trespassers, does not include a technical trespass against the dog, as where the injured person was patting the dog when injured. In such latter case, the injured person would be barred only by conduct toward the dog which constituted “teasing, tormenting or abusing” the dog. Koller v Duggan (1963) 346 Mass 270, 191 NE2d 475.
While, under the instant section, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that she was not teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog, evidence that the plaintiff, who was 3 years old at the time, offered the dog a bone, whereupon he bit her, is sufficient to provide an inference that she was not teasing the dog, and, additionally, the age of the plaintiff could be taken into account in determining whether she was teasing the dog. Malchanoff v Truehart (1968) 354 Mass 118, 236 NE2d 89.
The entry upon the land of another, or into his premises, at usual and reasonable hours and in a customary manner for any of the common purposes of life, is not regarded as a trespass, so that a plaintiff who entered defendant’s premises in the daytime to ascertain whether the defendant would permit the plaintiff to ride the defendant’s horse for pay, was not guilty of trespass, having had an implied license to go upon the land, and defendant’s allegation that the boy was a trespasser, was no defense to the boy’s action for personal injuries resulting from his being bitten by the defendant’s dog. Raboin v O’Connor (1970) 44 Mass App Dec 24.
A plaintiff who entered onto the defendant’s premises in the daytime to determine whether the defendant would permit him to ride the defendant’s horse for pay, and who was chased by the defendant’s dog, did not “tease” the dog by ramming his bicycle into the dog to prevent being attacked and bitten, so as to establish a defense to the plaintiff’s action for personal injuries resulting from being bitten. Raboin v O’Connor (1970) 44 Mass App Dec 24.
A child, 12 years of age, not a trespasser, and not engaged in teasing or tormenting the animal was entitled to recover damages when bitten by a dog. Tornberg v Hairston (1972) 48 Mass App Dec 116.
Record supported judge’s finding that plaintiff’s striking of dog in attempt to and in course of terminating fight between dog and other dog did not amount to abusing dog, and judgment for plaintiff was upheld. Burgoyne v Owen (1991) 1991 Mass App Div 192. Plaintiff dog bite victim, a child, was not engaging in tortious conduct which precludes recovery under ALM GL c 140, § 155 by fighting with defendant’s child in an essentially harmless child’s altercation when defendant turned her dog loose on plaintiff. Dawley v Chase (1977, Mass App Div) 1977 Adv Sheets 856.

6. Pleadings and practice
As a rule, proof that the defendant is the keeper will suffice without more. Ryan v Marren (1914) 216 Mass 556, 104 NE 353.
In an action at common law for personal injuries sustained by misconduct of defendant in setting his dog on the plaintiff the latter need not allege or prove that he was in the exercise of due care. But on obtaining a verdict plaintiff is not entitled to double damages because recovery is at common law and not under this section, as it formerly read. Zink v Foss (1915) 221 Mass 73, 108 NE 906.
This section in terms is broad enough to impose liability where the declaration alleges plaintiff was “injured” by dog. Canavan v George (1935) 292 Mass 245, 198 NE 270.
An instruction that “the burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish by a fair preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff was injured as a result of his teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog,” was erroneous and harmful, notwithstanding ALM GL c 231 § 85, providing that contributory negligence shall be an affirmative defence to be set up in the answer and proved by the defendant. Sullivan v Ward (1939) 304 Mass 614, 24 NE2d 672, 130 ALR 437.

7. Damages
Where plaintiff was injured at time when the statutory liability of the defendant was “double the amount of damages sustained,” a vested right to double remedial damages arose, as right was not affected by the 1934 amendment to this section, which was not intended to have any retroactive effect. Cudlassi v MacFarland (1939) 304 Mass 612, 24 NE2d 512.
The phrase “damage to either the body or property of any person” appearing in the instant section, does not mean that recovery thereunder is limited to damages which are the direct result of an injury but, under the statute, recovery may be had by a parent for consequential damages. Rossi v Del Duca (1962) 344 Mass 66, 181 NE2d 591.
Judge erred in trebling damages found by jury, where citations issued by dog officer for apparent violations of municipal leash law were not restraint orders issued under ALM GL c 140 § 157 which, if issued, would have permitted trebling of damages. Carmel v Grandbois (1988) 25 Mass App 1000, 522 NE2d 428.
In action for damages against owner of dog, plaintiff is confined to compensatory damages authorized by ALM GL c 140 § 155 in absence of restraint order issued under ALM GL c 140 § 157. Carmel v Grandbois (1988) 25 Mass App 1000, 522 NE2d 428.
Judge erred in ruling that plaintiff had not sufficiently proven that dog proximately caused her injuries and in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict in action brought pursuant to ALM GL c 140 § 155, where plaintiff was holding dog’s collar in one hand and undoing chain with other hand when dog ran forward, pulling plaintiff over and causing her to fall and severely injure her hip, even if dog’s behavior was affectionate and not malign and even if there was no direct collision or contact between dog and plaintiff. Salisbury v Ferioli (2000) 49 Mass App 485, 730 NE2d 373.

Michigan Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, a dog owner is absolutely liable for injuries caused by his or her dog, regardless of the owner’s knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, in cases where the injury occurred on public property or while the victim was lawfully on private property. The only exception is when the injury occurred because the injured person provoked the dog. Under this statute, any negligence on the part of the injured person is no defense

Common Law Liability

In addition to seeking recovery for damages under Michigan’s Dog Bite Statute, victims of dog bites can also seek to recover money damages under the common law. The common law, however, requires that the injured person prove that the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute
Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”"

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that bites or attacks a person; or
• a dog that bites or attacks and causes serious injury or death to another dog while the other dog is on the dog owner’s property or under the dog owner’s control.

Under the statute, a dangerous dog does not include an animal that bites or attacks a trespasser, a dog that bites or attacks a person who provokes or torments the animal, or a dog that is responding in a manner that an ordinary and reasonable person would conclude was designed to protect a person if that person is engaged in a lawful activity or is being assaulted.

If a dog is declared dangerous by a judge because it caused serious injury or death to a person or another dog, the judge must enter an order that requires the dog to be destroyed. If the judge finds that the dog is dangerous but did not cause serious injury or death, the dog may still be destroyed, or the court may take any action appropriate to protect the public from the dog.

Dog Owners’ Liability

In addition to being subject to civil liability, the owner of a dangerous dog that kills a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. An involuntary manslaughter conviction carries up to 15 years imprisonment, a fine of up to $7,500, or both.

The owner of a dangerous dog that attacks a person and causes serious injury, other than death, is guilty of a felony punishable by up to four years imprisonment, a fine not less than $2,000, community service work for not less than 500 hours, or any combination of these penalties. Serious injury means a permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of a bodily function.

If an animal was previously found to be dangerous and the dog attacks or bites a person and causes an injury that is not serious, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment of not more than 90 days, a fine up to $500, community service work for not less than 240 hours, or any combination of these penalties.

Michigan Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 287 ANIMAL INDUSTRY
LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR DOG BITE
MCLS § 287.351 (2002)
MCL § 287.351

§ 287.351. Person bitten by dog; liability of owner; “person lawfully on property of owner” defined
Sec. 1. (1) If a dog bites a person, without provocation while the person is on public property, or lawfully on private property, including the property of the owner of the dog, the owner of the dog shall be liable for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.

(2) A person is lawfully on the private property of the owner of the dog within the meaning of this act if the person is on the owner’s property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him or her by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or if the person is on the owner’s property as an invitee or licensee of the person lawfully in possession of the property unless said person has gained lawful entry upon the premises for the purpose of an unlawful or criminal act.

HISTORY: Act 73, 1939, p 132; imd eff May 4, 1939.
Pub Acts 1939, No. 73, § 1, imd eff May 4, 1939; amended by Pub Acts 1988, No. 142, eff March 30, 1989 (see Mich Const note below).

NOTES:
Editor’s notes:
Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. IV, § 27, provides:
“No act shall take effect until the expiration of 90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed, but the legislature may give immediate effect to acts by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.”
Cross References:
Common-law liability of dog owner for damages committed by it, § 287.288.
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § § 13, 15, 16, 18
Judgments § 18.25
Parent and Child § 32
ALR notes:
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 ALR4th 446.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute, 64 ALR4th 963.
Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 ALR4th 823.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee, 74 ALR4th 1120.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 ALR4th 374.
Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog, 11 ALR5th 127.

CASE NOTES
1. Liability
2. Contributory negligence
3. Evidence
4. Instructions
5. Questions of law and fact
6. Trespassers

1. Liability
A victim’s actions before being bitten by defendant’s dog did not amount to provocation, regardless of whether the court adopted a standard that unintentional as well as intentional acts could constitute provocation under the dog-bite statute, where the dog’s biting of the victim was out of proportion to the victim’s action of unintentionally dropping a ball near the dog. Bradacs v Jiacobone (2001) 244 Mich App 263, 625 NW2d 108.
A landlord who promulgated rules and regulations regarding tenants’ dogs did not owe a third party a duty to use reasonable care to enforce the rules where the landlord did not know of the dangerous proclivities of a tenant’s dog who injured the third party. Braun v York Props. (1998) 230 Mich App 138, 583 NW2d 503.
The doctrine of parental immunity does not bar a child’s cause of action based on strict liability of a dog owner for injuries inflicted by an unprovoked dog. Thelen v Thelen (1989) 174 Mich App 380, 435 NW2d 495.
Where complaint alleges that defendant dog owners were liable for plaintiff’s injuries under both common-law and under dog-bite statute, and defendants plead contributory negligence, litigants and trial courts might feel that the claims are so totally incompatible that at some stage of proceedings prior to actual trial plaintiff should be compelled to elect which claim he will pursue and upon which, at trial, he will introduce proofs. Veal v Spencer (1974) 53 Mich App 560, 220 NW2d 158.
This act places absolute liability on owner, except for provocation of dog, irrespective of place where dog bites a person. Nicholes v Lorenz (1973) 49 Mich App 86, 211 NW2d 550, affd (1976) 396 Mich 53, 237 NW2d 468.
Defendant owners’ 17-year-old daughter who was on premises while owners were not at home could properly be said to be in lawful possession of premises for purposes of applying this section. Cox v Hayes (1971) 34 Mich App 527, 192 NW2d 68.

2. Contributory negligence
Contributory negligence is not a defense to an action maintained under this section. Veal v Spencer (1974) 53 Mich App 560, 220 NW2d 158. Provocation is the only defense in an action under this section; contributory negligence is not a defense, except as the negligence might bear on provocation. Nicholes v Lorenz (1973) 49 Mich App 86, 211 NW2d 550, affd (1976) 396 Mich 53, 237 NW2d 468.
Three-year-old deaf-mute would not be held to same degree of responsibility for knowledge of existing danger from defendants’ dog as would adult licensee for purposes of recovering under this section. Cox v Hayes (1971) 34 Mich App 527, 192 NW2d 68.

3. Evidence
Appellate court’s holding that prior behavior of dog was inadmissible as irrelevant under this section was affirmed by equally divided court. Nicholes v Lorenz (1976) 396 Mich 53, 237 NW2d 468.
Evidence in action under this section showing that dog was tied on defendant’s premises and that minor plaintiff was playing on the premises and stepped on dog’s tail raised defense of provocation, which was properly submitted to jury. Nicholes v Lorenz (1973) 49 Mich App 86, 211 NW2d 550, affd (1976) 396 Mich 53, 237 NW2d 468.
In action under this section, evidence as to dog’s prior behavior was irrelevant and admission of testimony as to such behavior was reversible error. Nicholes v Lorenz (1973) 49 Mich App 86, 211 NW2d 550, affd (1976) 396 Mich 53, 237 NW2d 468.
In nonjury action for dog bite suffered by three-year-old deaf-mute when bitten by defendants’ dog while in latter’s backyard, trial court’s finding that, although defendants’ 17-year-old daughter was home alone at time of incident, plaintiff could not be implied licensee was contrary to clear preponderance of evidence disclosing that plaintiff often accompanied defendants’ 17-year-old daughter into defendants’ yard, that defendants never voiced desire not to have neighborhood children coming into yard to plaintiff or members of her family, and that when children were seen in yard they were not asked to leave. Cox v Hayes (1971) 34 Mich App 527, 192 NW2d 68.
Under this section, plaintiff may establish right to recovery from owner upon proof by preponderance of evidence that plaintiff was on property as invitee or licensee, either expressed or implied, of owner or one in lawful possession thereof. Cox v Hayes (1971) 34 Mich App 527, 192 NW2d 68.
In action under this section, exclusion of defendant’s conviction in traffic court on charge of harboring vicious dog in violation of city ordinance from evidence was not abuse of discretion in view of dissimilarity between civil and criminal proceedings. Zaitzeff v Raschke (1971) 31 Mich App 87, 187 NW2d 564, revd on other grounds (1972) 387 Mich 577, 198 NW2d 309.

4. Instructions
Where complaint alleges that defendant dog owners were liable for plaintiff’s injuries under both common-law and under dog-bite statute, and defendants plead contributory negligence, a definite problem arises, a proper approach to which would involve a jury instruction which distinguishes between application of the two counts and the application of the defense of contributory negligence to same. Veal v Spencer (1974) 53 Mich App 560, 220 NW2d 158.

5. Questions of law and fact
An unintentional act may constitute provocation within the meaning of the Michigan dog-bite statute; since the dog-bite statute imposes liability on dog owners without regard to fault, the defense of provocation must be construed without concern for fault on the part of the person committing the provocation; the focus must be on the nature of the act committed, not upon the intent with which the act was committed, and on whether that act was sufficient to provoke the dog’s attack; accordingly, it is a jury question whether under a particular set of circumstances the attempt by a minor to hug a dog constituted sufficient provocation so as to render the owner of the animal exempt from liability. Palloni v Smith (1988) 167 Mich App 393, 421 NW2d 699, revd on other grounds (1988) 431 Mich 871, 429 NW2d 593, reconsideration den (1989, Mich) 1989 Mich LEXIS 117 and (questioned in Bradacs v Jiacobone (2001) 244 Mich App 263, 625 NW2d 108).
In action against owners of dog which bit child and had previously bitten another child, whether previous biting of child had been provoked by victim was properly submitted to jury as issue of fact under evidence, and dog would not be considered vicious as matter of law because it had previously bitten another child. Veal v Spencer (1974) 53 Mich App 560, 220 NW2d 158.

6. Trespassers
Statutory action for dog bite inflicted on plaintiff when he entered defendants’ yard to retrieve ball was properly subjected to summary disposition where it was undisputed that plaintiff had neither express nor implied permission to enter defendants’ property and that he knew he was trespassing, so that there was no record which could be developed to raise an issue on which reasonable minds could differ. Alvin v Simpson (1992) 195 Mich App 418, 491 NW2d 604, app den (1993) 442 Mich 888, 502 NW2d 39.

Minnesota Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under Minnesota law, if a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures a person who is acting peacefully in any place where the person may lawfully be, the owner is liable in damages to the person in the full amount of the injury sustained.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, without provocation, inflicts substantial bodily harm on a human. Substantial bodily harm is bodily injury that involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or that causes a temporary but substantial impairment of the function of a bodily organ, or that causes a fracture of any bodily member.
• a dog that kills a domestic animal, without provocation, while off the owner’s property; or
• a dog that has been found to be “potentially dangerous,” and thereafter aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.

The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, when unprovoked, bites a human or domestic animal;
• a dog that, when unprovoked, chases or approaches a person in any place, other than the dog owner’s property, in an apparent attitude of attack; or
• a dog that has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack when unprovoked, and causes or otherwise threatens the safety of humans or domestic animals.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Potentially Dangerous Dogs

Under Maine law, a potentially dangerous dog must have a microchip. Additionally, individual counties or cities can regulate the legal responsibilities of potentially dangerous dogs owners.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners with Dangerous Dogs

Dangerous dogs owners must register their dogs with local authorities and pay an annual registration fee of up to $500. Dangerous dogs must be identified with a microchip device and wear a tag with a dangerous dog symbol on their collars.
Owners must keep dangerous dogs securely confined indoors, or, if outdoors, in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure suitable to prevent the dog from escaping. When the dog is outside the enclosure, it must be muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under the reasonable control of a responsible person.
Owners of dangerous dogs must post their property with a clearly-visible warning sign that includes a symbol to inform children that the dog is on the property. The warning symbol is a uniform one, specified by Minnesota’s Commissioner of Public Safety.
Dangerous dog owners must post a surety bond of at least $50,000 payable to any person injured, or they must maintain a liability policy of at least $50,000, insuring the owner for personal injuries inflicted by the dangerous dog.

Minnesota Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 347 DOGS AND CATS
REGULATION OF DANGEROUS DOGS
Minn. Stat. § 347.50 (2002)
347.50 Definitions

Subdivision 1. Terms. For the purpose of sections 347.50 to 347.56, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given them.
Subd. 2. Dangerous dog. “Dangerous dog” means any dog that has:
(1) without provocation, inflicted substantial bodily harm on a human being on public or private property;
(2) killed a domestic animal without provocation while off the owner’s property; or
(3) been found to be potentially dangerous, and after the owner has notice that the dog is potentially dangerous, the dog aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.
Subd. 3. Potentially dangerous dog. “Potentially dangerous dog” means any dog that:
(1) when unprovoked, inflicts bites on a human or domestic animal on public or private property;
(2) when unprovoked, chases or approaches a person, including a person on a bicycle, upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public or private property, other than the dog owner’s property, in an apparent attitude of attack; or (3) has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, causing injury or otherwise threatening the safety of humans or domestic animals.
Subd. 4. Proper enclosure. “Proper enclosure” means securely confined indoors or in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure suitable to prevent the animal from escaping and providing protection from the elements for the dog. A proper enclosure does not include a porch, patio, or any part of a house, garage, or other structure that would allow the dog to exit of its own volition, or any house or structure in which windows are open or in which door or window screens are the only obstacles that prevent the dog from exiting.
Subd. 5. Owner. “Owner” means any person, firm, corporation, organization, or department possessing, harboring, keeping, having an interest in, or having care, custody, or control of a dog.
Subd. 6. Substantial bodily harm. “Substantial bodily harm” has the meaning given it under section 609.02, subdivision 7a.
Subd. 6a. Great bodily harm. “Great bodily harm” has the meaning given it under section 609.02, subdivision 8.
Subd. 7. Animal control authority. “Animal control authority” means an agency of the state, county, municipality, or other governmental subdivision of the state which is responsible for animal control operations in its jurisdiction.
HISTORY: HISTORY: 1988 c 711 s 1; 1989 c 37 s 3-5; 1994 c 550 s 1; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 8 s 14,15

Missouri Dog Law

Liability Statute

Missouri does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In Missouri, a person can recover damages for personal injuries against a dog owner if the plaintiff can prove that the owner knew, or should have know, of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that the owner failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm, so long as the attack occurred while the victim was on public property or lawfully on private property.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Missouri does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Missouri Dog Bite Law

TITLE 21. PUBLIC SAFETY AND MORALS
CHAPTER 322. PROTECTION AGAINST RABIES
REGULATIONS IN CERTAIN COUNTIES
§ 322.140 R.S.Mo. (2003)

§ 322.140. Animal bite, report to county health department in absence of county rules–investigation of report–responsibility of owner–rulemaking authority

1. If a county does not adopt rules and regulations pursuant to sections 322.090 to 322.130, whenever an animal bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease, the incident shall be immediately reported to the county health department. The county health department shall immediately report the incident to the department of health and senior services and shall cooperate fully with the department of health and senior services in its investigation.

2. Upon receipt of an incident report where an animal bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease, the department of health and senior services shall investigate the incident and shall have discretion to order the animal quarantined, isolated, impounded, tested, immunized or disposed of to prevent and control rabies or zoonotic disease.

3. With regard to exposure to rabies or zoonotic disease the department of health and senior services shall, in its investigation and issuance of its order, consider the following:
(1) Prior vaccinations for rabies or zoonotic disease;
(2) The degree of exposure to rabies or zoonotic disease;
(3) The history and prior behavior of the animal prior to exposure;
(4) The availability and effectiveness of human postexposure immunization for rabies or zoonotic disease;
(5) The willingness of the individual so exposed to submit to postexposure immunization for rabies or zoonotic disease; and (6) Any other relevant information.

4. It shall be unlawful for the owner of an animal that bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease to knowingly fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order of the department of health and senior services declaring a quarantine, isolation, impounding, testing, immunization or disposal of an animal. It shall also be unlawful for an owner of an animal that bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease to sell, give away, transfer, transport to another area or otherwise dispose of an animal until the animal has been released by the department of health and senior services. A violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor.

5. The owner of an animal that bites or otherwise possibly transmits rabies or any zoonotic disease shall be responsible for all costs associated with the incident, including:
(1) The cost to test the animal for rabies or zoonotic disease;
(2) The cost to test the exposed person for rabies or zoonotic disease; and
(3) The cost to treat the person exposed to rabies or zoonotic disease.

6. The department of health and senior services shall have authority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the classification of disease as a zoonotic disease. Any rule or portion of a rule, as that term is defined in section 536.010, RSMo, that is created under the authority delegated in this section shall become effective only if it complies with and is subject to all of the provisions of chapter 536, RSMo, and, if applicable, section 536.028, RSMo. This section and chapter 536, RSMo, are nonseverable and if any of the powers vested with the general assembly pursuant to chapter 536, RSMo, to review, to delay the effective date or to disapprove and annul a rule are subsequently held unconstitutional, then the grant of rulemaking authority and any rule proposed or adopted after August 28, 2001, shall be invalid and void.

HISTORY: L. 2001 S.B. 462

Montana Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, the owner of any dog that bites any person, without provocation, is liable for damages, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness or the owner’s knowledge of the dog’s viciousness, so longs as the bite occurred while the injured person was on public property or lawfully on private property.

Vicious Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”"

A “vicious dog” is:

• a dog that, without provocation, bites or attempts to bite any person; or
• a dog that harasses, chases, bites, or attempts to bite any other domestic pet or any livestock animal.

Legal Responsibilities/Liability of Dog Owners

Each county in Montana has the power to enact laws regarding the regulation of vicious dogs, as well as the owners’ responsibilities.

Montana Dog Bite Law

TITLE 27 CIVIL LIABILITY, REMEDIES, AND LIMITATIONSbr
CHAPTER 1 AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES — LIABILITY
PART 7 LIABILITY
Mont. Code Anno., § 27-1-715 (2002)

27-1-715 Liability of owner of vicious dog.

(1) The owner of any dog which shall without provocation bite any person while such person is on or in a public place or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, located within an incorporated city or town shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.

(2) A person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner within the meaning of this section when he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States of America or when he is on such property as an invitee or licensee of the person lawfully in possession of the property.

HISTORY:
En. Sec. 1, Ch. 113, L. 1943; R.C.M. 1947, 17-409.

NOTES:
Part Cross-References Governmental entities — liability exposure, Title 2, ch. 9.
Governmental liability for actions resulting in surface water and ground water damage, 2-9-111.
Weed management district liability restrictions, 7-22-2111.
Limitation on landowner liability to recreationists, 23-2-321; Title 70, ch. 16, part 3.
Responsibility and liability of snowmobile area operators, 23-2-651 through 23-2-655.
Accounting review committees — limitation for persons serving on or nonprofit corporations performing as, 37-50-403.
Immunity of public personnel administering or supervising court-ordered service, 45-9-204.
Emergency medical services — liability protection for physician or nurse serving as off-line medical director, 50-6-317.
Do not resuscitate orders, health care professionals’ withholding of life-sustaining procedures pursuant to — immunity, 50-10-102.
Public authorities exempt for improper or unauthorized installations of utilities or underground facilities by others, 69-4-507.
Liability for death or injury to railroad employees, 69-14-1006.
Solid waste disposal in violation of law — absolute liability, 75-10-212.
Immunity of volunteer fire company or department and employees for hazardous or deleterious substance cleanup, 75-10-725.
Cross-References
Vicious dog control, 7-23-2109.
Chapter Case Notes
Voluntary Act Precluding False Imprisonment Claim — Lack of Underlying Tort Precluding Civil Conspiracy Claim: A woman with breast cancer was advised by Hughes, a radiation oncologist, to undergo therapeutic radiology for the disease. Prior to radiation, an oncologist makes specific marks on the affected area to identify where to direct radiation beams. However, in addition to the marks directing radiation beams, Hughes drew a “smiley face” on the woman’s breast by drawing two dime-sized “eyes” above the nipple of the breast and outlining the scar from the breast biopsy for the “mouth”. The woman complained to hospital administration, and an ad hoc investigative committee recommended that Hughes receive a letter of reprimand, have a term of probation, have a chaperone while working, and be evaluated by the Montana Professional Assistance Program (MPAP). Hughes agreed to a medical, psychiatric, or chemical dependency evaluation and voluntarily enrolled in two such programs in Texas and Kansas. After release, Hughes signed an aftercare agreement. Hughes then brought suit against the individual members of the ad hoc committee and MPAP, alleging false imprisonment, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and civil right violations related to the disciplinary actions. Summary judgment was granted to defendants in federal District Court on the civil rights claims, and the remaining charges were remanded to state District Court, where they were also summarily dismissed. Hughes appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the false imprisonment claim because Hughes voluntarily signed the treatment agreements and submitted to evaluation. Two elements of false imprisonment are the restraint of an individual against the individual’s will and the unlawfulness of that restraint, but because no material fact existed as to the voluntariness of Hughes’s action, the false imprisonment claim failed as a matter of law. Further, to sustain a civil conspiracy claim, plaintiff must allege a tort committed by one of the conspirators, but because the false imprisonment claim failed, there was no underlying tort action to form a basis for civil conspiracy, so that claim failed as well. Hughes v. Pullman, 2001 MT 216, 306 M 420, 36 P3d 339 (2001).
Civil Conspiracy — Elements — Summary Judgment Properly Granted: David, his wife Susan, their minor child, and the parties’ defunct business sued Pierce Flooring and others for civil damages, including damages resulting from a civil conspiracy, stemming from criminal acts of vandalism taken against the plaintiffs’ competing business. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment against David and the other plaintiffs on the civil conspiracy claim. Citing Duffy v. Butte Teachers’ Union No. 332, 168 M 246, 541 P2d 1199 (1975), and Grenz v. Medical Management NW., Inc., 250 M 58, 817 P2d 1151 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that the elements of a cause of action for civil conspiracy are: (1) two people (and, as in this case, a person may be a corporation); (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had held that there was “probably sufficient evidence of elements 1, 2, 4, and 5″ but that the plaintiffs failed to prove a genuine issue of material fact as to element 3. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the District Court correctly concluded that there was no evidence of a “meeting of the minds on the object or course of action” between the defendants. Rocky Mtn. Enterprises, Inc. v. Pierce Flooring, 286 M 282, 951 P2d 1326, 54 St. Rep. 1410 (1997).
Unjust Enrichment — Misconduct by Defendant Required — Denial of Restitution to Defaulting Purchaser: Upon default by purchasers, seller resold the property. Purchasers sought restitution, contending it was unfair to allow seller to be unjustly enriched by selling the property twice. However, restitution is normally denied to a defaulting purchaser. (See Contract Damages in Montana Part II: Reliance and Restitution, Burnham, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (1984).) Further, in order for the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment to apply, plaintiff must show some element of misconduct or fault on the part of defendant. Schweigert v. Fowler, 240 M 424, 784 P2d 405, 47 St. Rep. 1 (1990).

Nebraska Dog Law

Liability Statute

A dog owner is strictly liable for any damages that any person, other than a trespasser, sustains after being bitten by a dog, so long as the injured person did not provoke the attack. Dog owners are also strictly liable for damages if their dog, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, injures, worries, or chases any person. Under this statute, all persons who are injured by dogs, except trespassers, are not required to prove that the dog owner had knowledge of the dog’s vicious tendency or that the dog had previously bitten anyone. The statute also permits trespassers to recover for dog-bite injuries if they prove that the dog’s owner knew of the animal’s vicious propensity.

Common Law Liability

In addition to the Dog Bite statute, a dog owner will be liable for injury caused by a dog under the common law if the plaintiff shows that the dog was vicious and that the owner knew or had reason to know of its viciousness.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

In Nebraska, a “dangerous dog” is any dog that, according to the records of an animal control authority:

• has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person. A severe injury is one that results in disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery, a broken bone, or one that creates a potential danger to the victim’s life or health.
• # has killed a domestic animal, without provocation, while the dog was off the owner’s property; or
• has been previously determined to be a “potentially dangerous dog” and it thereafter aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.
• Under the statute, a dog cannot be labeled “dangerous” if it caused an injury that was not severe, or if the injured person was, at the time of the injury, committing a willful trespass or any other tort on the dog owner’s property, or if the injured person was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog, and that person has, in the past, been observed or reported to have tormented, abused, or assaulted the dog, or who was committing or attempting to commit a crime.

The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• any dog that, when unprovoked, inflicts a non-severe injury on a human or injures a domestic animal, or chases or approaches a person off the owner’s property in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack; or
• any specific dog with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack when unprovoked, to cause injury, or to threaten the safety of humans or domestic animals.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

Dangerous dog owners cannot permit their dogs to go beyond their property, unless the dog is securely restrained by a chain or leash.
While unattended on the owner’s property, dangerous dogs must either be securely confined indoors or confined outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure designed to prevent the entry of young children, as well as the escape of the animal. The pen or structure must have secure sides and a secure top. If it has no bottom secured to the sides, the sides must be embedded into the ground.
The owner of a dangerous dog must post a clearly-visible sign warning people of the dog’s presence on the property.

Liability of Owners with Dangerous Dog

In addition to civil liability, a violation of the Dangerous Dog Statute subjects the owner to a fine of up to $500.

Dog Collar Statute

This statute requires all dog owners to keep a collar with a metallic identification tag around their dogs’ necks at all times. The dog owner’s name must be plainly inscribed on the tag.

CHAPTER 54. LIVESTOCK
ARTICLE 6. DOGS AND CATS
(a) DOGS
R.R.S. Neb. § 54-601 (2002)

§ 54-601. Dogs; personal property; owner liable for damages
Dogs are hereby declared to be personal property for all intents and purposes, and the owner or owners of any dog or dogs shall be liable for any and all damages that may accrue (1) to any person, other than a trespasser, by reason of having been bitten by any such dog or dogs and (2) to any person, firm, or corporation by reason of such dog or dogs killing, wounding, injuring, worrying, or chasing any person or persons or any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to such person, firm, or corporation. Such damage may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction of the amount claimed.
HISTORY: Laws 1877, § 1, p. 156; Laws 1899, c. 4, § 1, p. 54; R.S.1913, § 172; C.S.1922, § 169; C.S.1929, § 54-601; R.S.1943, § 54-601; Laws 1947, c. 192, § 1, p. 629; Laws 1961, c. 268, § 1, p. 786; Laws 1992, LB 1011, § 1.

ANALYSIS
Construction
ANALYSIS
Construction
Purpose
Applicability
“Chase.”
Common law actions
Elements
Intentional provocation
Landlord
Negligence
Playful and mischievous
“Running at large.”
Strict liability
Traveler on adjacent highway
“Trespasser.”
Unlawful killing of dog
“Worry.”
“Wound.”

CONSTRUCTION
JUDICIAL DECISIONS

CONSTRUCTION
This section removes the common law “scienter” requirement so that nontrespassers are no longer required to prove that a dog owner had knowledge of the dog’s vicious tendency or that the dog had previously bitten anyone in order to maintain an action against the owner; trespassers, however, are still required to prove the dog owner’s knowledge of the animal’s propensity for viciousness. Guzman v. Barth, 250 Neb. 763, 552 N.W.2d 299 (1996).
This section must be construed strictly because it abrogates a common-law right. Paulsen ex rel. Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W.2d 233 (1979); Guzman v. Barth, 250 Neb. 763, 552 N.W.2d 299 (1996).

PURPOSE
The legislature by enacting this section removed the common-law restriction of proving scienter or knowledge of the dangerous propensities of dogs, but only as it applied to the actions specified in the statute. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).
The legislature was fully aware of the need for protection from the intentional, deliberate, and purposeful acts of dogs and as a result restricted this section to those acts manifesting such qualities. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

APPLICABILITY
Where an action regarding a dog bite was not against the dog owner, but against the owners of the leased property, this section did not apply. McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201 (1989).
“CHASE.”
The word “chase” is defined variously as “to follow quickly or persistently in order to catch or harm” and “to make run away; drive” or “to go in pursuit.” Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

COMMON LAW ACTIONS
This section does not abrogate the common law tort action for injuries caused by dogbites. Guzman v. Barth, 250 Neb. 763, 552 N.W.2d 299 (1996).

ELEMENTS
Evidence showing that the defendants’ dog first chased and then collided with the plaintiff’s motorcycle, causing the motorcycle to tip over and injure the plaintiff, was sufficient to support summary judgment on plaintiff’s strict liability claim. Johnson v. Lindley, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Neb. 1999).

INTENTIONAL PROVOCATION
This section creates a cause of action based upon strict liability on the part of a dog owner; however, the injured person will be barred from recovering if he intentionally provoked the animal and thereby caused it to attack him. Whether such provocation was intentional and knowing is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Paulsen ex rel. Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W.2d 233 (1979).

LANDLORD
A landlord is liable for injuries caused by the attack of a tenant’s dog only where the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the dog and where the landlord, having that knowledge, nevertheless leased the premises to the dog’s owner or, by the terms of the lease, had the power to control the harboring of a dog by the tenant and neglected to exercise that power. McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201 (1989).

NEGLIGENCE
Whatever liability may attach to the owner of dogs, contributing to the injury of the stock, is in the nature of negligence in allowing his dogs to escape from his control; for if the dog is under the control of its owner when doing the act, it is then the act of the owner, and not of the dog. Cook v. Pickrel, 20 Neb. 433, 30 N.W. 421 (1886).

PLAYFUL AND MISCHIEVOUS
In response to a summary judgment motion, the owners’ unsubstantiated assertion that their dog was behaving in a “playful and mischievous” manner when it chased and then collided with the plaintiff’s motorcycle was insufficient to raise the issue as an affirmative defense in a summary judgment proceeding. Johnson v. Lindley, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Neb. 1999).
When the words “killing,” “wounding,” “worrying,” or “chasing,” are read together, they exclude playful and mischievous acts of dogs. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975); Holden ex rel. Holden v. Schwer, 242 Neb. 389, 495 N.W.2d 269 (1993).
Where the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the playful and mischievous act of defendant’s dog, the injury was not within the scope of protection afforded by this section. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

“RUNNING AT LARGE.”
A dog is not running at large when he is within calling distance and sight of the owner’s family and under their control. Brown v. Graham, 80 Neb. 281, 114 N.W. 153 (1907).

STRICT LIABILITY
An owner may be strictly liable for injuries inflicted by his dog without any proof that the owner knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Holden ex rel. Holden v. Schwer, 242 Neb. 389, 495 N.W.2d 269 (1993).
Dog owners are statutorily liable for any and all damage without proof of scienter or knowledge of dangerous propensities of their dog for biting and by reason of such dog or dogs killing, wounding, worrying, or chasing domestic animals and persons. Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

TRAVELER ON ADJACENT HIGHWAY
The owner of a dog, known by him to have vicious and mischievous propensities, owes a legal duty to protect from injury a traveler passing along the highway adjacent to his premises. Netusil v. Novak, 122 Neb. 749, 241 N.W. 531 (1932).
The owner of a dog known by him to have vicious propensities was held liable to a traveler passing along highway for shock causing nervous prostration where the dog growled and bared teeth menacingly without leaving the owner’s premises. Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931), modified on other grounds, Paulsen v. Courtney, 202 Neb. 791, 277 N.W. 233 (1979).

“TRESPASSER.”
A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon premises in possession of another without the express or implied consent of the possessor. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).
A person can trespass on another’s property by simply extending his or her arm over the boundary fence. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).
In making a determination as to whether a child was capable of the necessary intent to be classed as a trespasser, the standard of conduct to be used is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under the circumstances. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).
The word “trespasser,” as used in this section, must be construed strictly. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).
The trial court was in error in holding as a matter of law that a child was not a trespasser into the defendant’s dog’s kennel and that the defendant was liable for the child’s dog bite injuries. Kenney v. Barna, 215 Neb. 863, 341 N.W.2d 901 (1983).

UNLAWFUL KILLING OF DOG
No person has a right to kill a dog for past and finished misconduct of the dog so killed. Brown v. Graham, 80 Neb. 281, 114 N.W. 153 (1907).
A dog has a money value, which the owner may recover from one who wrongfully and unlawfully kills his dog. Nehr v. State, 35 Neb. 638, 53 N.W. 589 (1892).

“WORRY.”
The word “worry” means “to treat roughly as with continual biting” or “to bite or tear with the teeth.” Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

“WOUND.”
The word “wound” is defined as “an injury of a person or animal in which the skin or other membrane is broken, as by violence or surgery.” Donner v. Plymate, 193 Neb. 647, 228 N.W.2d 612 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 87 ALR4th 1004.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 ALR4th 1120.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 7 ALR4th 607.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Construction and application of ordinances to unrestrained dogs, cats, or other domesticated animals. 1 ALR4th 994.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE CHAPTER
CROSS REFERENCES.
Constitutional provisions:
Corporate farming or ranching, see Article XII, § 8, Constitution of Nebraska.
Taxation, method of, see Article VIII, § 1, Constitution of Nebraska.
Bureau of Animal Industry, see § 81-202.
Commodity Code, see § 8-1701.
Dairy industry:
Manufacturing Milk Act, Nebraska, see § 2-3946.
Pasteurized Milk Law, Nebraska, see § 2-3901.
Department of Agriculture:
Establishment, see § § 81-101 to 81-103.
General powers, see § 81-201.
Equine activities, liability, warning signs, see sections 25-21,249 to 25-21,253.
Experiment and extension stations, University of Nebraska, see § 85-145 et seq. and Chapter 85, article 2.
Express companies, care of livestock, see § 86-502 et seq.
Fence viewers, livestock owners, see § 34-106.
Hay, municipal inspection and weighing powers, see § § 16-224 and 17-554.
Horse thieves, posting of rewards for, see § 29-415.
Insurance of livestock, companies may be formed to provide, see § 44-201.
Liens:
Agricultural production input, see § 52-1401 et seq.
Animal service, see § 52-1501 et seq.
Filing system, farm product security interests, see § 52-1301 et seq.
Veterinarian, see § 52-701.
Livestock exposition, conducting a prerequisite to procuring license for horseracing, see § 2-1204.
Livestock Feeders and Breeders Association, Nebraska, see § 2-2806.
Livestock forage vehicles, restrictions, see § 60-6,305.
Livestock lanes adjacent to public roads, see § § 39-1808 et seq.
Livestock loan company, investments authorized, see § 8-148.02.
Livestock waste control facility, associated water structures, requirements, see § 46-257.
Municipalities, powers of:
First-class cities, see § § 16-210, 16-235, 16-237, 16-240, and 16-901.
Livestock feeding facility or project, prohibited acts, see § 13-1102.
Metropolitan-class cities, see § 14-102.
Primary-class cities, see § § 15-208, 15-217 et seq., and 15-237.
Second-class cities and villages, see § § 17-121, 17-138, 17-547, 17-557, and 17-1001.
Nonstock cooperative marketing companies, see § 21-1401 et seq.
Pathogenic microorganisms, regulation, see § 71-1801 et seq.
Poultry, disease control, Poultry Disease Control Act, Nebraska, see § 2-3001 et seq.
Predators, destruction, see § 37-559.
Rabies, vaccination and control, see § 71-4401 et seq.
Railroads:
Fences and cattle guards, duties and liabilities, see § § 74-601 et seq.
Shippers, duties and liabilities to, see Chapter 74, article 5.
Real estate used for ranching, interest in, reports required, see § 76-1520 et seq.
Sheep and cattle, tax for predatory animal control program, see § 23-361.
State Veterinarian, see § 81-202 et seq.
Taxation, exemption, see § 77-202.
Town meeting, regulatory power of electors at, see § 23-224.
Veterinarians:
Lien of, see § 52-701.
Practice of veterinary medicine and surgery, see § § 71-1,152.01 to 71-1,166.
State Veterinarian, see § 81-202 et seq.
University of Nebraska, cooperative program in veterinary medicine, see § § 85-180.13 et seq. and 85-1,104.
Watering:
Criminal acts, see § 28-1308.
Ground water, domestic use preference, see § 46-613.

Nevada Dog Law

Liability Statute

Nevada does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover for dog-bite injuries, the plaintiff must prove that the dog owner was negligent and that the owner’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog:”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, without provocation, on two separate occasions within an 18-month period, behaves menacingly, to a degree that would lead a reasonable person to defend himself against substantial bodily harm, whenever the dog is:
• off the premises of its owner or keeper; or
• not confined in a cage, pen or vehicle.

“Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ or which causes prolonged physical pain.

The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A dog is vicious if:

• without provocation, it kills or inflicts substantial bodily harm upon a human being; or
• # after its owner or keeper was notified by a law enforcement agency that it is dangerous, it continues to behave menacingly to a degree that would lead a reasonable person to defend himself against substantial bodily harm, whenever the dog is:
• off the premises of its owner or keeper; or
• not confined in a cage, pen or vehicle.

Liability of Owners with Vicious Dogs

It is illegal for a person to own a vicious dog. If a person illegally owns a vicious dog and the dog attacks someone and causes substantial bodily harm, the owner or keeper is guilty of a felony that carries a term of one to four years in prison. The judge may also impose a fine up to $5,000 and order the dog destroyed.

Nevada Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 244. COUNTIES: GOVERNMENT
HEALTH AND SAFETY
NRS § 244.359 (2003)

§ 244.359. Ordinance concerning control of animals; license fee and designation of and requirement of liability insurance policy for inherently dangerous animals; applicability; civil liability in lieu of criminal penalty in certain circumstances

1. Each board of county commissioners may enact and enforce an ordinance or ordinances:
(a) Fixing, imposing and collecting an annual license fee on dogs and providing for the capture and disposal of all dogs on which the license fee is not paid.
(b) Regulating or prohibiting the running at large and disposal of all kinds of animals.
(c) Establishing a pound, appointing a poundkeeper and prescribing his duties.
(d) Prohibiting cruelty to animals.
(e) Designating an animal as inherently dangerous and requiring the owner of such an animal to obtain a policy of liability insurance for the animal in an amount determined by the board of county commissioners.

2. Any ordinance or ordinances enacted pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 may apply throughout an entire county or govern only a limited area within the county which shall be specified in the ordinance or ordinances.

3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a board of county commissioners may by ordinance provide that the violation of a particular ordinance enacted pursuant to this section imposes a civil liability to the county in an amount not to exceed $ 500, instead of a criminal penalty. An ordinance enacted pursuant to this section that creates an offense relating to bites of animals, vicious or dangerous animals, horse tripping or cruelty to animals must impose a criminal penalty for the offense. As used in this subsection, “horse tripping” does not include tripping a horse to provide medical or other health care for the horse.

HISTORY: 1973, p. 558; 2001, ch. 449, § 1, p. 2279.
NOTES:
EFFECT OF AMENDMENT. –The 2001 amendment, effective June 6, 2001, added subdivision 1(e) and subsection 3.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
REGULATION OF FREE-RANGING LIVESTOCK. –Counties have authority, pursuant both to specific authority under this section, and pursuant to their police powers, to enact ordinances regulating livestock grazing; however, a county may not categorically declare free-ranging livestock a public nuisance, in absence of a pre-established state or county prohibition of such activity. AGO 98-22 (8-7-1998).

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this chapter or title

New Hampshire Dog Law

Liability Statute

Any person who is injured by another person’s dog is entitled to recover damages from the dog’s owner, keeper, or possessor, unless the injury occurred when the injured person was trespassing or committing some other tort. This statute imposes strict liability and does not require proof of negligence. A parent or guardian is liable for damages if the dog’s owner or keeper is a minor.

Dogs as a Menace, a Nuisance or Vicious
Under this statute, a dog is a menace, nuisance, or vicious if:

• when not engaged in legal hunting or herding, it is running at large and not under the control of any person;
• it barks for continuous periods of more than 30 minutes during the nighttime hours;
• it digs, scratches, excretes, or scatters waste or garbage on someone else’s property;
• it is female and permitted to run at large while in heat;
• it growls, snaps at, runs after, or chases a person;
• it runs after, or chases bicycles, cars, motorcycles, or other vehicles on public roadways; or
• whether alone or in a pack with other dogs, it bites, attacks, or preys on game animals, domestic animals, fowl, or people.

Liability of Dog Owners

If a dog is declared to be a menace, a nuisance, or vicious, and the owner fails to abate, or stop, the behavior, or when the owner fails to comply with any local dog laws, the dog can be taken into custody and, depending on the violation, the owner is subject to a fine ranging from $25 to $200.

New Hampshire Dog Bite Law

TITLE XLV. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 466. DOGS AND CATS
REMEDIES AND PENALTIES FOR INJURIES DONE BY DOGS
RSA 466:19 (2002)

§ 466:19. Liability of Owner or Keeper
Any person to whom or to whose property, including sheep, lambs, fowl, or other domestic creatures, damage may be occasioned by a dog not owned or kept by such person shall be entitled to recover damages from the person who owns, keeps, or possesses the dog, unless the damage was occasioned to a person who was engaged in the commission of a trespass or other tort. A parent or guardian shall be liable under this section if the owner or keeper of the dog is a minor.

HISTORY: 1851, 1124. CS 133:7. GS 105:7. GL 115:10. PS 118:9. PL 150:23. RL 180:23. RSA 466:19. 1989, 158:1. 1991, 213:1. 1995, 98:11, eff. Jan. 1, 1996.

NOTES:
AMENDMENTS–1995. Substituted “such person” for “him” preceding “shall be”, “damages from” for “such damage of” following “recover”, “owns, keeps, or possesses the dog” for “owns or keeps the dog, or has it in his possession” preceding “unless the damage” and “a person who” for “him while he” preceding “was engaged” in the first sentence.
–1991. Inserted “including sheep, lambs, fowl, or other domestic creatures” following “property”.
–1989. Added the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS
1. Common law.
2. Purpose.
3. Construction.
4. Construction with other laws.
5. Basis for liability/-Generally.
6. /-Liability as keeper.
7. /-Liability as person in possession.
8. Defenses/-Exercise of care by owner.
9. /-Contributory negligence.
10. /-Trespass or other tort.
11. Pleadings.
12. Instructions.

1. COMMON LAW.
In an action at common law for injuries caused by a dog, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish that the owner of the dog knew or had reason to know that it had vicious propensities. Orne v. Roberts (1871) 51 N.H. 110. See also Gagnon v. Frank (1927) 83 N.H. 122, 139 A. 373.

2. PURPOSE.
The purpose for the enactment of this section was to obviate the difficulty of showing the owner’s knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog as required at common law. Allgeyer v. Lincoln (1984) 125 N.H. 503, 484 A.2d 1079.
The purpose of this section, imposing liability on the keeper of a dog for injuries and property damage caused by it to any person, unless the danger was occasioned while such person was engaged in the commission of a trespass or other tort, is to obviate the difficulty of showing the owner’s or keeper’s knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog as required by common law. Wike v. Allison (1964) 105 N.H. 393, 200 A.2d 860.

3. CONSTRUCTION.
Legislature did not intend wording of this section to encompass father’s claim for mental and emotional injuries incurred as a result of witnessing defendants’ dog attack his daughter. Douglas v. Fulis (1994) 138 N.H. 740, 645 A.2d 76.
This section is to be given a reasonable interpretation. Gagnon v. Frank (1927) 83 N.H. 122, 139 A. 373.
One hired to care for the dog may not recover under this section. Gagnon v. Frank (1927) 83 N.H. 122, 139 A. 373.

4. CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER LAWS.
This section and RSA 466:20 were not intended to cover a situation where no vicious or mischievous acts by a dog were alleged. Noyes v. Labrecque (1965) 106 N.H. 357, 211 A.2d 421.

5. BASIS FOR LIABILITY–GENERALLY.
Trial court erred in requiring plaintiffs to elect between their common law negligence claims and their claim under the dog bite statute. Hewes v. Roby (1992) 135 N.H. 476, 606 A.2d 810.
This section makes owners or keepers of dogs strictly liable for harm caused by their dogs’ vicious or mischievous acts. All geyer v. Lincoln (1984) 125 N.H. 503, 484 A.2d 1079.
A person injured by a dog may recover damages from either the owner or the keeper, but not from both. Gagnon v. Martin (1976) 116 N.H. 336, 358 A.2d 406.

6. –LIABILITY AS KEEPER.
Where the evidence showed that a husband had sole care and control of a dog and that his wife had nothing to do with the dog, the wife was not chargeable as its keeper. Janus v. Akstin (1941) 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552.
The word “kept” implies more than a mere harboring of the animal for a limited purpose or time, and a person becomes liable as a “keeper” only when, either with or without the owner’s permission, he undertakes to manage, control or care for a dog in the manner of dog owners in general; it is not enough that he permits the casual presence of a dog upon his premises and merely feeds or shelters it. Raymond v. Bujold (1938) 89 N.H. 380, 199 A. 91.
One who retains another’s lost dog in his possession for only a limited time and only for the purpose of delivering it to its owner upon demand is not its keeper within this section. Raymond v. Bujold (1938) 89 N.H. 380, 199 A. 91.

7. –LIABILITY AS PERSON IN POSSESSION.
The fact that a head of a family merely permitted a dog to remain in his household did not warrant a finding that he was “in possession,” so as to be liable under this section for injuries caused by it, where the actual ownership, care, custody and control of the dog was in an adult member of the family. Glidden v. Szybiak (1949) 95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233.
A finding that a wife had her husband’s dog in her possession was not warranted where the husband testified that his wife did not like the dog and that the husband when there, and his boy when the husband was away, took care of the dog. Janus v. Akstin (1941) 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552.

8. DEFENSES–EXERCISE OF CARE BY OWNER.
In actions under this section, no question of care or negligence on the part of the dog owner is involved; t he utmost vigilance to prevent his dog from doing an injury affords him no defense. Chickering v. Lord (1894) 67 N.H. 555, 32 A. 773.

9. –CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Comparative fault statute, RSA 507:7-d, applies to cases brought under the dog owners liability statute. Bohan v. Ritzo (1996) 141 N.H. 210, 679 A.2d 597.
Where the events which gave rise to plaintiffs’ action occurred before the effective date of statute which abolished defense of contributory negligence as it applied to statutory liability, defense of contributory negligence applied to their claim under the dog bite statute and the defense of comparative negligence applied to their negligence claim. Hewes v. Roby (1992) 135 N.H. 476, 606 A.2d 810.
This section does not confer a right of action to a person whose injury is due wholly or in part to his own negligence. Wike v. Allison (1964) 105 N.H. 393, 200 A.2d 860.
The doctrine of contributory negligence applies in an action to enforce the statutory liability. Quimby v. Woodbury (1885) 63 N.H.
370. 10. –TRESPASS OR OTHER TORT.
In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained as the result of being bitten by dogs in the possession of defendant, plaintiff’s entry on defendant’s land on lawful business at a reasonable hour of the day without being warned or asked to leave and without disturbing or damaging defendant’s property did not constitute a “trespass or other tort” within the meaning of this section. Frenette v. Gillis (1965) 106 N.H. 210, 208 A.2d 453.
In an action under this section to recover for a dog bite received by a child, the fact that the child engaged in play with the dog and pulled its ears did not constitute a trespass which would prevent recovery where there was no evidence that the dog was in any way injured thereby. Glidden v. Szybiak (1949) 95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233.

11. PLEADINGS.
Where defendants’ dog ran toward plaintiff’s leg as if to bite him, resulting in plaintiff’s reacting instinctively, falling, and badly injuring himself, plaintiff sufficiently alleged mischievousness on part of dog, and an actual bite or other direct physical contact was not required. Bohan v. Ritzo (1996) 141 N.H. 210, 679 A.2d 597.
The declaration in an action to recover for injury done by a dog is not defective because it fails to formally allege plaintiff’s freedom from fault. Smith v. Hallahan (1910) 75 N.H. 534, 78 A. 122.

12. INSTRUCTIONS.
An instruction that “if the head of a family, having the possession and control of a house or premises, suffer or permit a dog to be kept on the premises in the way such domestic animals are usually kept, . . . such head of a family may be regarded as the keeper of a dog within the meaning of the statute” is sufficiently favorable to the defendant. Cummings v. Riley (1872) 52 N.H. 368.
CITED. Cited in East Kingston v. Towle (1868) 48 N.H. 57; McIntire v. Plaisted (1876) 57 N.H. 606; Whitaker v. Warren (1880) 60 N.H. 20; Chickering v. Lord (1894) 67 N.H. 555, 32 A. 773; Unity v. Pike (1894) 68 N.H. 71, 44 A. 78; Colby v. Lee (1928) 83 N.H. 303, 142 A. 115; Richards v. Leppard (1978) 118 N.H. 666, 392 A.2d 588; Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp. (1986) 127 N.H. 556, 503 A.2d 823.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
NEW HAMPSHIRE PRACTICE
8 N.H.P. Personal Injury § § 97, 111, 162.
ALR
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 ALR4th 1120.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show. 68 ALR5th 599.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner’s or personal liability policy. 96 ALR3d 891.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE
CROSS REFERENCES
Animal care, breeding and feed, see RSA 435.
Animal use in science classes and science fairs, see RSA 644:8-c.
Beekeeping, see RSA 429.
Companion animals in housing for the elderly, see RSA 161-F:30 et seq.
Confinement of animal in motor vehicle or other enclosed space, see RSA 644:8-aa.
Cruelty to animals generally, see RSA 644:8.
Diseases of domestic animals, see RSA 436.
Docking tail of horse, see RSA 644:8-b.
Exhibitions of fighting animals, see RSA 644:8-a.
Fish and game generally, see RSA 206 et seq.
Horse and dog racing, see RSA 284.
Interference with police dogs or horses, see RSA 644:8-d.
Liability of owners of livestock trespassing in burial places or graveyards, see RSA 635:3.
Liability of persons using traps for injury or damage to domestic animals, see RSA 210:18.
Lien for food and care of animals, see RSA 448:2-a.
Lien for pasturage of animals, see RSA 448:2.
Lien for stallion service fee, see RSA 448:3.
Sale of pets and disposition of unclaimed animals, see RSA 437.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE CHAPTER
AMENDMENTS–1994. 1994, 99:1, eff. July 9, 1994, added “and cats” in the chapter heading.

CROSS REFERENCES
Animal population control program, see RSA 437-A.
Applicability of chapter to wolf hybrids, see RSA 466-A:2.
Hunting with dogs, see RSA 207:12-a et seq.
Licensing of cats, see RSA 466:13-a.
Power of city council to adopt ordinances regulating keeping of dogs, see RSA 47:17.
Rabies control, see RSA 436:99 et seq.
Use of dogs by deaf, blind or hearing or mobility impaired persons, see RSA 167-D.

NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE HEADING
CROSS REFERENCES
Liability of owners for damages to game by dogs, see RSA 466:33 et seq.
Liability of owners for failure to control dogs deemed to be vicious, a menace or a nuisance, see RSA 466:31-a.
Liability of owners for failure to restrain dogs under municipal dog control ordinances, see RSA 466:30-a.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
CJS
Animals § § 177-187, 194, 196, 197, 287, 288, 290, 291.

New Jersey Dog Law

Liability Statute

The owner of any dog that bites a person in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the owner’s property, is liable for damages, regardless of the dog’s former viciousness or the owner’s knowledge of its viciousness.

Vicious and Potentially Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A vicious dog is:

• a dog that, when not provoked, has killed a person or has caused serious bodily injury. Serious bodily injury is bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
• a dog that has engaged in dog-fighting activities.

Once a dog is declared vicious, it will be destroyed

The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that has caused bodily injury to a person during an unprovoked attack and poses a serious threat of bodily injury or death to a person. Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
• a dog that has severely injured or killed another domestic animal; provided that the dog injured or killed was not the aggressor;
• a dog that poses a threat of death to another domestic animal; or
• a dog that has been trained, tormented, badgered, baited or encouraged to engage in unprovoked attacks upon people or domestic animals.

Legal Responsibilities of Potentially Dangerous Dog Owners

The owner must register the dog as potentially dangerous.
The dog must be enclosed in a structure that has sound sides, a top and a bottom, and that prevents it from escaping. A fence must be placed around the enclosure that is at least 6 feet high and at least 3 feet from the enclosure. The enclosure must be locked to prevent entry by other people. If taken out of the enclosure, the dog must be securely muzzled and restrained with a tether approved by an animal control officer that has a minimum tensile strength that is more than what is required to restrict the dog’s movements to a radius of no more than 3 feet from the owner.
The owner must conspicuously display a sign on his property warning that a potentially dangerous dog is on the premises. The sign must be visible and legible from 50 feet of the dog’s enclosure.
Dangerous dog owners may be required to maintain liability insurance in an amount determined by a municipal judge to cover any damage or injury caused by the potentially dangerous dog.

Liability of Owners with Potentially Dangerous Dogs

Violations of any provision of the Potentially Dangerous Dog Statute subject the owner to fines of up to $1,000 per day and seizure of the dog.
Municipalities can enact procedures to register potentially dangerous dogs and they can require an owner to pay a fee.

New Jersey Dog Bite Law

TITLE 4. AGRICULTURE AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS
CHAPTER 19. DOGS, TAXATION AND LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
ARTICLE 3. INJURY
N.J. Stat. § 4:19-16 (2003)

§ 4:19-16. Liability of owner regardless of viciousness of dog
The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.
For the purpose of this section, a person is lawfully upon the private property of such owner when he is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner thereof.
LexisNexis (TM) Notes:

CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure : Jury Trials : Jury Instructions
Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Inferences & Presumptions
Torts : Damages : Compensatory Damages
Torts : Multiple Defendants : Joint & Several Liability
Torts : Negligence : Defenses
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners
Torts : Real Property Torts : General Premises Liability
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals
Civil Procedure : Jury Trials : Jury Instructions

1. Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury of the circumstances under which plaintiff could be considered lawfully on defendant’s dog owner’s property pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16; plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider whether he went onto defendant’s property in order to defend his family from a dog attack or a perceived threat from the dog, such right should have been considered an implied invitation. Trisuzzi v. Tabatchnik, 285 N.J. Super. 15, 666 A.2d 543, 1995 N.J. Super. LEXIS 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).

2. Although the legislature did not intend to abolish the defense of contributory negligence in enacting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, the legislature did intent the salutary and just result of precluding recovery by one whose negligence proximately resulted in his injury; thus although the trial court did not properly frame the jury charge related to contributory negligence, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff and required inclusion of the charge. Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535, 1964 N.J. Super. LEXIS 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964).
Evidence : Procedural Considerations : Inferences & Presumptions

3. Comparative Negligence Act was applicable to the statutory strict liability imposed by the dog-bite statute; thus, defendant had the burden to prove plaintiff’s unreasonable and voluntary exposure to a known risk. Budai v. Teague, 212 N.J. Super. 522, 515 A.2d 822, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1408 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986).
Torts : Damages : Compensatory Damages

4. Where a child was bitten by a dog and also suffered injuries as a result of having been knocked down by the dog, the dog bite statute imposed liability on the dog’s owner for all damages suffered by the person bitten, not just those damages that resulted from the bite alone. Gross v. Dunham, 91 N.J. Super. 519, 221 A.2d 555, 1966 N.J. Super. LEXIS 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966).
Torts : Multiple Defendants : Joint & Several Liability

5. Grandparents and dog owners were jointly and severally liable for injuries suffered by a 23-month old dog bite victim; despite the fact that dog’s owners were strictly liable under the Dog Bite Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, they were responsible only for their pro rata share of the damages. Petersen v. Tolstow, 184 N.J. Super. 84, 445 A.2d 84, 1982 N.J. Super. LEXIS 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982). Torts : Negligence : Defenses

6. Parents were not entitled to the parent-child immunity on their child’s claim for damages caused by a dog bite from the parents’ dog, where the child brought his action under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, and where § 4:19-16 imposed strict liability on dog owners for any damages to any person bitten by the owners’ dogs. Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373, 1976 N.J. Super. LEXIS 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners

7. Both the owner and her friend considered the dog theirs: they shared the burdens and benefits of the dog as a family pet and held themselves out as his owners; therefore, both the friend and the owner were the dog’s “owners,” subject to liability for the injuries to the child as a result of the dog’s bite. Pippin v. Fink, 350 N.J. Super. 270, 794 A.2d 893, 2002 N.J. Super. LEXIS 188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).

8. Parents were not entitled to the parent-child immunity on their child’s claim for damages caused by a dog bite from the parents’ dog, where the child brought his action under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, and where § 4:19-16 imposed strict liability on dog owners for any damages to any person bitten by the owners’ dogs. Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373, 1976 N.J. Super. LEXIS 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
Torts : Real Property Torts : General Premises Liability

9. Where the dog is not known to the shopkeeper to be vicious, then principles of ordinary negligence, rather than absolute liability under the dog bite statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, define the shopkeeper’s liability; if it was reasonably foreseeable that shoppers would be bitten by a dog tied up at the store entrance, the fact that the shopkeeper did not create the hazardous condition would not preclude liability where the shopkeeper had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition for a reasonable period and failed to act in a reasonable manner to reduce the hazard. Nakhla v. Singer-shoprite, Inc., 205 N.J. Super. 184, 500 A.2d 411, 1985 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1522, 67 A.L.R.4th 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985).

10. Trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that before it could impose liability upon a dog owner for injuries sustained when the child of an employee of the dog owner was bitten by the dog, it must find that the child was expressly or impliedly invited onto the portion of the dog owner’s property where the dog was chained. De Robertis v. Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 462 A.2d 1260, 1983 N.J. LEXIS 2735 (1983).
Torts : Strict Liability : Injuries Caused by Animals

11. Owner of a dog was strictly liable under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16 for injuries suffered by a meter reader who, while lawfully on the owner’s property, was bitten by the dog. Pingaro v. Rossi, 322 N.J. Super. 494, 731 A.2d 523, 1999 N.J. Super. LEXIS 226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).

12. Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury of the circumstances under which plaintiff could be considered lawfully on defendant’s dog owner’s property pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16; plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider whether he went onto defendant’s property in order to defend his family from a dog attack or a perceived threat from the dog, such right should have been considered an implied invitation. Trisuzzi v. Tabatchnik, 285 N.J. Super. 15, 666 A.2d 543, 1995 N.J. Super. LEXIS 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).

13. In a negligence action where pedestrian was chased by stray dogs and fell on the sidewalk in front of homeowner’s home; the dog bit statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, was inapplicable as there was no bite inflicted on pedestrian and the dogs apparently did not make contact with or physically touch pedestrian in any fashion. Rodriguez v. Cordasco, 279 N.J. Super. 396, 652 A.2d 1250, 1995 N.J. Super. LEXIS 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).

14. Where a dog had never bitten anyone in seven years and plaintiff had petted the dog on numerous occasions, it was impossible to conclude that plaintiff’s action in touching the dog was anything more than mere negligence; mere negligence did not constitute a defense in a strict liability action. Budai v. Teague, 212 N.J. Super. 522, 515 A.2d 822, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1408 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986).

15. Where the dog is not known to the shopkeeper to be vicious, then principles of ordinary negligence, rather than absolute liability under the dog bite statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, define the shopkeeper’s liability; if it was reasonably foreseeable that shoppers would be bitten by a dog tied up at the store entrance, the fact that the shopkeeper did not create the hazardous condition would not preclude liability where the shopkeeper had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition for a reasonable period and failed to act in a reasonable manner to reduce the hazard. Nakhla v. Singer-shoprite, Inc., 205 N.J. Super. 184, 500 A.2d 411, 1985 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1522, 67 A.L.R.4th 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985).

16. Trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that before it could impose liability upon a dog owner for injuries sustained when the child of an employee of the dog owner was bitten by the dog, it must find that the child was expressly or impliedly invited onto the portion of the dog owner’s property where the dog was chained. De Robertis v. Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 462 A.2d 1260, 1983 N.J. LEXIS 2735 (1983).

17. Grandparents and dog owners were jointly and severally liable for injuries suffered by a 23-month old dog bite victim; despite the fact that dog’s owners were strictly liable under the Dog Bite Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, they were responsible only for their pro rata share of the damages. Petersen v. Tolstow, 184 N.J. Super. 84, 445 A.2d 84, 1982 N.J. Super. LEXIS 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982).

18. Under the Dog Bite Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, only the owner of a dog was strictly liable for that dog’s bite, and a keeper of the dog could only be held liable if the keeper knew of the dog’s viciousness. Mascola v. Mascola, 168 N.J. Super. 122, 401 A.2d 1114, 1979 N.J. Super. LEXIS 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979).

19. Summary judgment in favor of city was proper in minor’s suit after being bitten by a dog owned by a tenant of a city owned dwelling because under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, it was the dog’s owner who was to be held strictly liable for damages due to a dog bite; the term “dangerous condition” as used in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, specifically N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2, was restricted to physical conditions; and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, specifically N.J. Stat. Ann. § § 59:2-4 and 59:2-3(b), barred minor from contending that city was liable for failure to adopt or enforce a law or for administrative action or inaction. Cogsville v. Trenton, 159 N.J. Super. 71, 386 A.2d 1362, 1978 N.J. Super. LEXIS 822 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978).

20. Parents were not entitled to the parent-child immunity on their child’s claim for damages caused by a dog bite from the parents’ dog, where the child brought his action under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, and where § 4:19-16 imposed strict liability on dog owners for any damages to any person bitten by the owners’ dogs. Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373, 1976 N.J. Super. LEXIS 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).

21. Dog bite statute did not impose liability on dog owner for injuries suffered by bystander who was knocked to the ground when the dog broke free from its leash; the court declined to extend the statute to cover non-bite injuries. Hayes v. Mongiovi, 121 N.J. Super. 272, 296 A.2d 567, 1972 N.J. Super. LEXIS 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972).

22. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16 imposes strict liability on dog owners whose dogs are ordinarily harmless but who have the potential to bite. Tanga v. Tanga, 94 N.J. Super. 5, 226 A.2d 723, 1967 N.J. Super. LEXIS 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).

23. Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, a dog owner was strictly liable for injuries caused when his cocker spaniel bit a visiting eight-year-old child in the face; although the dog had no history of viciousness; under these circumstances, the legislature intended to allocate the risk of injury to an innocent dog owner rather than to an innocent bystander. Tanga v. Tanga, 94 N.J. Super. 5, 226 A.2d 723, 1967 N.J. Super. LEXIS 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).

24. Where a child was bitten by a dog and also suffered injuries as a result of having been knocked down by the dog, the dog bite statute imposed liability on the dog’s owner for all damages suffered by the person bitten, not just those damages that resulted from the bite alone. Gross v. Dunham, 91 N.J. Super. 519, 221 A.2d 555, 1966 N.J. Super. LEXIS 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966).

25. Although the legislature did not intend to abolish the defense of contributory negligence in enacting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16, the legislature did intent the salutary and just result of precluding recovery by one whose negligence proximately resulted in his injury; thus although the trial court did not properly frame the jury charge related to contributory negligence, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff and required inclusion of the charge. Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535, 1964 N.J. Super. LEXIS 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964).

26. In a personal injury action, the lower court improperly entered judgment for infant for injuries inflicted by tavern owner’s dog because there was a factual question as to whether infant was an invitee pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:19-16. Smigielski v. Nowak, 124 N.J.L. 235, 11 A.2d 251, 1940 N.J. Super. LEXIS 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1940).

New Mexico Dog Law

Liability Doctrine

In New Mexico, if a dog owner knows or has reason to know that his or her dog has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, the owner is subject to liability for harm done, even if the owner exercised the utmost care to prevent the dog from causing the injury. If, however, the victim knew that the dog was dangerous, but excited the dog or voluntarily got in its way, the owner will not be liable.

Common Law Liability

If a dog owner does not know or does not have reason to know of the dangerous propensities abnormal to the dog’s class, the owner may be liable for injuries caused by the dog if the plaintiff proves the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Vicious Dog Statute

It is unlawful for any person to keep any dog known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure humans, unless the dog is securely kept to prevent injury to any person.

New Mexico Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 77. LIVESTOCK CODE
ARTICLE 1. DOGS AND DOMESTICATED ANIMALS
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-1-10 (2002)

§ 77-1-10. Vicious animals; rabid or unvaccinated dogs and cats; failure to destroy
A. It is unlawful for any person to keep any animal known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure human beings unless such animal is securely kept to prevent injury to any person.
B. It is unlawful to keep any unvaccinated dog or cat or any animal with any symptom of rabies.
C. It is unlawful to fail or to refuse to destroy vicious animals or unvaccinated dogs or cats with symptoms of rabies as prescribed by regulation of the health and environment department [department of health] for the protection of public health and safety.
HISTORY: Laws 1901, ch. 105, § 3; Code 1915, § 220; C.S. 1929, § 4-2003; 1941 Comp., § 49-104; 1953 Comp., § 47-1-3; Laws 1959, ch. 176, § 7; 1973, ch. 170, § 7; 1977, ch. 253, § 56; 1979, ch. 194, § 3.

NOTES:
BRACKETED MATERIAL. –The bracketed reference to the department of health was inserted by the compiler, as Laws 1991, ch. 25, § 16 repeals former 9-7-4 NMSA 1978, relating to the health and environment department, and enacts a new 9-7-4 NMSA 1978, creating the department of health. The bracketed material was not enacted by the legislature and is not part of the law.
THE 1977 AMENDMENT substituted “health services division of the health and environment department” for “health and social services department” and “division” for “department” in the second paragraph.
THE 1979 AMENDMENT substituted “failure to destroy” for “procedure following death from rabies” in the catchline, designated the first sentence of the previously undesignated first paragraph as Subsection A and the second sentence of the previously undesignated first paragraph as Subsection B, substituted “vicious” for “vicous” following “known to be” and “or” for “and” following “to attack” in Subsection A, substituted “with any symptom” for “which has shown any symptom” in Subsection B, deleted “except that, if such animal has bitten a human being, it shall be confined for a ten-day period” from the end of Subsection B, deleted the last sentence of the previously undesignated first paragraph and the second undesignated paragraph, relating to the sending of the head of any animal suspected of having died of rabies to a laboratory, added Subsection C and made other minor changes.

COMMON LAW DEEMED TEST OF LIABILITY FOR DOG BITE. –There is no statute in New Mexico making the owner of a dog an insurer against damages inflicted by it. The only statute on the subject is this section, making it unlawful to keep a dog known to be vicious. Thus, common law is the test of liability in an action for injuries to a minor child who was severely bitten by a dog while on the premises of the defendant. Perkins v. Drury, 57 N.M. 269, 258 P.2d 379 (1953).
AM. JUR. 2D, A.L.R. AND C.J.S. REFERENCES. –Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner’s or personal liability policy, 96 A.L.R.3d 891.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 A.L.R.4th 446.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute, 64 A.L.R.4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat, 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 A.L.R.4th 823.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee, 74 A.L.R.4th 1120.
Validity and construction of statute, ordinance, or regulation applying to specific dog breeds, such as “pit bulls” or “bull terriers,” 80 A.L.R.4th 70.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 A.L.R.4th 1004.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 A.L.R.4th 374.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 68 A.L.R.5th 599.

UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL
CHAPTER 5. ANIMALS
N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-506 (2003)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
13-506 Liability of dog owner
An owner of a dog is liable for damages proximately caused by the dog if the owner knew, or should have known, that the dog was vicious or had a tendency or natural inclination to be vicious.
[The owner of such a dog is not liable to the person injured, if the injured person had knowledge of the propensities of the dog and wantonly excited it or voluntarily and unnecessarily put himself in the way of the dog.]

DIRECTIONS FOR USE
This instruction should be used when the issue and the evidence is that of damages from attack or bite by a dog.

NOTES:
COMPILER’S ANNOTATIONS
COMMITTEE COMMENT. –Section 77-1-10 NMSA 1978 states that it is unlawful for a person to keep an animal known to be vicious and liable to attack and injure human beings unless the animal is secure.
Reference to the case of Perkins v. Drury, 57 N.M. 269, 258 P.2d 379 (1953), should be made by the trial lawyers and the court in any case involving a claim of damages as the result of an attack by a domestic animal. It is apparent that the common law prevails in this area in New Mexico. Scienter on the part of the defendant is required. The vicious propensity of the dog must have been previously manifested against a human being. It is insufficient that the dog exhibited vicious tendencies toward other animals.
See also the case of Torres v. Rosenbaum, 56 N.M. 663, 248 P.2d 662 (1952).
In the first edition, the substance of this instruction was covered by UJI 5.3.

INSTRUCTION MANDATORY IN DOG-BITE CASES. –It is error for the district court to give jury instructions on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence when this mandatory instruction states the entire law of liability and relief from liability in connection with dog-bite injuries. Aragon v. Brown, 93 N.M. 646, 603 P.2d 1103 (Ct. App. 1979).

INSTRUCTION IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY. –This instruction imposes strict liability once knowledge is proven, thus, it cannot be given to the jury in an action under the waiver of immunity provision of 41-4-6 NMSA 1978, which embodies a negligence theory of recovery. Smith v. Village of Ruidoso, 128 N.M. 470, 994 P.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1999).

NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST A MUNICIPALITY NOT PRECLUDED. –This section does not provide the sole theory of liability in dog-bite cases. A negligence claim under 41-4-6 NMSA 1978 is appropriate where the dog owner lacks knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities and ineffectively controls the animal in a situation where it would reasonably be expected that injury could occur. Smith v. Village of Ruidoso, 128 N.M. 470, 994 P.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1999).
AM. JUR. 2D, A.L.R. AND C.J.S. REFERENCES. –4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 114 et seq.
Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser, 64 A.L.R.3d 1039.
3A C.J.S. Animals § 232.

New York Dog Law

Liability Statute

New York does not have a Dog Bite Statute that outlines when an owner will be subject to statutory liability, except in cases involving dangerous dogs. However, New York does have a statute for civil penalties. Under that statute, in addition to common law liability, a dog owner who negligently permits his or her dog to bite someone is subject to a civil penalty of up to $400. In cases where the dog causes a serious injury, the owner will be subject to a civil penalty up to $800.

Common Law Liability

In cases where a dog owner knows, or should have known, of the dog’s vicious propensities, the owner will be subject to strict liability for injuries inflicted by the dog. Where the owner does not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, the plaintiff must prove that the owner was negligent and that the owner’s negligence caused the attack. In cases where a person was injured by a dangerous dog, the victim can recover under the common law, as well as the Dangerous Dog Statute.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A dangerous dog is:

• a dog that, without justification, attacks a person, a companion animal, a farm animal or a domestic animal and causes physical injury or death. “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
• a dog that behaves in a manner which a reasonable person would believe poses a serious and unjustified imminent threat of serious physical injury or death to one or more persons, companion animals, farm animals or domestic animals. “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious or protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ.
• a dog that, without justification, attacks a service dog, guide dog or hearing dog and causes physical injury or death.

Any person who witnesses a dog attack or a threatened dog attack upon a person, companion animal, farm animal, or domestic animal may make a complaint to a dog control officer or a police officer of the appropriate municipality. The dog control officer or police officer must then make a complaint under oath to a municipal judge, who will determine if there is probable cause to believe the dog is a dangerous dog. The person bringing the complaint must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the dog is dangerous. If the judge is satisfied that the dog is dangerous, the judge must order neutering or spaying of the dog, microchipping of the dog, and one or more of the following, as deemed appropriate under the circumstances and as deemed necessary to protect the public:

• Evaluation of the dog by a certified applied behaviorist, a board certified veterinary behaviorist, or another recognized expert in the field and completion of training or other treatment deemed appropriate by the expert. The dog owner will be responsible for all costs associated with evaluations and training.
• Secure, humane confinement of the dog for a period of time and in a manner deemed appropriate by the judge, but in all instances, the confinement must prevent the escape of the dog, protect the public from unauthorized contact with the dog, and protect the dog from the elements.
• Restraint of the dog on a leash by an adult 21 years of age or older whenever the dog is on public property.
• Muzzling the dog whenever it is on public property in a manner that will prevent it from biting any person or animal.
• Maintenance of a liability insurance policy in an amount to be determined by the judge, but not in excess of $100,000 for personal injury or death resulting from an attack by the dangerous dog.
• Euthanasia or permanent confinement of the dog if the judge finds that the dog, without justification, attacked a person and caused serious physical injury or death; or that the dog had a known vicious propensity as evidenced by a previous unjustified attack on a person that caused serious physical injury or death; or that the dog, without justification caused serious physical injury or death to a companion animal, a farm animal, or a domestic animal, and has, in the past two years, caused unjustified physical injury or death to a companion or farm animal.

Dangerous Dog Owners Liability

A dog owner who negligently permits a dog to bite a person causing serious physical injury, is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $800.
A dog owner who negligently permits a dog that was previously determined to be dangerous, to bite a person causing serious physical injury is subject to a fine of $1,000, a term of imprisonment up to 90 days, or both.
If any dog, which was determined to be a dangerous dog, without justification, kills a person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he is lawfully entitled to be, regardless of whether such dog escapes without fault of the owner, the owner will be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, which carries a penalty of up to one year in prison.
The owner of a dangerous dog is strictly liable for medical costs resulting from injury caused by the dog to a person, companion animal, farm animal, or domestic animal, so long as the dog attacked without justification.

New York Dog Bite Law

AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAWbr
ARTICLE 7. LICENSING, IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF DOGS
NY CLS Agr & M § 121 (2003)

§ 121. Dangerous dogs

1. If any dog shall attack any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, such person or any other person witnessing the attack may destroy such dog while so attacking or while being pursued thereafter, and no liability in damages or otherwise shall be incurred on account of such destruction.

2. (a) If any dog shall attack, chase or worry any domestic animal, as defined in section one hundred eight of this article, while such animal is in any place where it may lawfully be, the owner or caretaker of such domestic animal, or any other person witnessing such attack may, for the purpose of preventing the killing or injury of such domestic animal, destroy such dog while so attacking, chasing, worrying or while being pursued thereafter, and no liability in damages or otherwise shall be incurred on account of such destruction.
(b) (Added, L 2000) If any dog shall attack and injure any service dog, guide dog or hearing dog, any person witnessing the attack may for the purpose of preventing the killing or injury of such service dog, guide dog or hearing dog, destroy such attacking dog and no liability in damages or otherwise shall be incurred on account of such destruction.

3. Any person may make a complaint of an attack upon a person or of an attack, chasing or worrying of a domestic animal to a dog control officer of the appropriate municipality. Such officer shall immediately inform the complainant of his right to commence a proceeding as provided in subdivision four of this section and, if there is reason to believe the dog is a dangerous dog, the officer shall forthwith commence such proceeding himself.

4. Any person may, and any dog control officer as provided in subdivision three hereof shall, make a complaint under oath or affirmation to any municipal judge or justice of such attack, chasing or worrying. Thereupon, the judge or justice shall immediately determine if there is probable cause to believe the dog is a dangerous dog and, if so, shall issue an order to any dog control officer, peace officer, acting pursuant to his special duties, or police officer directing such officer to immediately seize such dog and hold the same pending judicial determination as herein provided. Whether or not the judge or justice finds there is probable cause for such seizure, he shall, within five days and upon written notice of not less than two days to the owner of the dog, hold a hearing on the complaint. If satisfied that the dog is a dangerous dog, the judge or justice shall then order [fig 1] any dog control officer, peace officer, acting pursuant to his special duties, or police officer to [fig 2] cause the dog to be euthanized immediately, or shall order the owner to confine securely such dog permanently [fig 3] except as provided in subdivision six of this section. The owner shall confine the dog indoors or in an enclosed and locked pen or structure as provided for in the order. Such pen or enclosure shall have a secure top and sides and shall be designed to prevent an unauthorized entry of a person, the escape of the dog and to provide protection from the elements. If the owner fails [fig 4] to confine the dog as required by such order, any dog control officer, peace officer, acting pursuant to his special duties, or police officer shall destroy such dog on or off the premises of the owner.

5. (Added, L 1997) A dog shall not be declared dangerous if the court determines the conduct of the dog (a) was justified because the threat, injury or damage was sustained by a person who at the time was committing a crime or offense upon the owner or custodian or upon the property of the owner or custodian of the dog, or (b) was justified because the injured person was tormenting, abusing or assaulting the dog or has in the past tormented, abused or assaulted the dog; or (c) was responding to pain or injury, or was protecting itself, its kennels or its offspring.

6. (Added, L 1997) (a) In addition to an order of confinement, issued pursuant to subdivision four of this section, the judge or justice may order the owner or custodian to securely chain and muzzle the dog and require that the dog be under physical restraint of a responsible person when (i) confined in the presence of persons other than the owner or custodian, and (ii) outside such enclosure for brief periods only when and for the period necessary to urinate, defecate or receive medical treatment.
(b) The muzzle described in paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall be made in a manner that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or respiration but shall prevent it from biting any person or animal.

7. The owner of a dog who, through any act or omission, negligently permits his or her dog to bite a person, service dog, guide dog or hearing dog causing physical injury shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed four hundred dollars in addition to any other applicable penalties.

8. (Added, L 1997) The owner of a dog who, through any act or omission, negligently permits his or her dog to bite a person causing serious physical injury shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed eight hundred dollars in addition to any other applicable penalties.

9. (Added, L 1997) The owner of a dog who, through any act or omission, negligently permits his or her dog, which had previously been determined to be dangerous pursuant to this article, to bite a person causing serious physical injury, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by a period of imprisonment not to exceed ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in addition to any other applicable penalties.

10. (Added, L 1997) If any dog, which had previously been determined by a judge or justice to be a dangerous dog, as defined in section one hundred eight of this article, shall without justification kill or cause the death of any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, regardless of whether such dog escapes without fault of the owner, the owner shall b e guilty of a class A misdemeanor in addition to any other penalties.

11. (Added, L 1997) The owner shall not be liable pursuant to subdivision seven, eight, nine or ten of this section if the dog was coming to the aid or defense of a person during the commission or attempted commission of a murder, robbery, burglary, arson, rape in the first degree as defined in subdivision one or two of section 130.35 of the penal law, sodomy in the first degree as defined in subdivision one or two of section 130.50 of the penal law or kidnapping within the dwelling or upon the real property of the owner of the dog and the dog injured or killed the person committing such criminal activity.

12. (Added, L 1997) Nothing contained herein shall limit or abrogate any claim or cause of action any person who is injured by a dog with a vicious disposition or a vicious propensity may have under common law or by statute. The provisions of this section shall be in addition to such common law and statutory remedies.

13. Nothing contained herein shall restrict the rights and powers derived from the provisions of title four of article twenty-one of the public health law relating to rabies and any rule and regulation adopted pursuant thereto.

HISTORY: Add, L 1978, ch 220, § 2, eff Jan 1, 1980.
Former § 121, add, L 1929, ch 173, § 2, with substance transferred from § 122, amd, L 1970, chs 928, 1002, repealed, L 1978, ch 220, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1980.
Prior § 121, add, L 1922, ch 48, eff Apr 1, 1922, repealed, L 1929, ch 173, § 1, eff June 1, 1929.
See 1978 note under Article heading.
Amd, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 2, par (a), formerly entire sub 2, so designated sub 2, par (a), L 2000, ch 263, § 3, eff Nov 1, 2000.
Sub 2, par (b), add, L 2000, ch 263, § 3, eff Nov 1, 2000.
Sub 4, amd, L 1980, ch 843, § 114, eff Sept 1, 1980, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
The 1997 act deleted at fig 1 “the owner or”, at fig 2 “destroy the dog”, at fig 3 “or at such time as otherwise specified in the order” and at fig 4 “to destroy or”
Sub 5, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Former sub 5, redesignated sub 13, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 6, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 7, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998; amd, L 2000, ch 263, § 3, eff Nov 1, 2000.
Sub 8, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 9, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 10, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 11, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 12, add, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.
Sub 13, formerly sub 5, so designated sub 13, L 1997, ch 530, § 4, eff Sept 1, 1998.

NOTES:
CROSS REFERENCES:
This section referred to in § § 109, 119
Control of acute communicable diseases, CLS Pub Health Law Art 21 § § 2100 et seq
Rabies, CLS Pub Health Law Art 21, Title 4, § § 2140 et seq

RESEARCH REFERENCES AND PRACTICE AIDS:
3 NY Jur 2d, Animals § § 54, 135, 136

CAUSES OF ACTION:
Cause of Action Against Owner or Keeper of Domestic Animal to Recover for Personal Injuries Caused by Animal, 14 COA 685

CASE NOTES
The provisions of Agr & M Law § 121, providing for the control and destruction of dangerous dogs, does not require that an animal have actually bitten its victim in order to be subject to controlling sanctions, and a dog that while running loose on two occasions attacked but did not bite a 16-year old boy would be ordered permanently confined. Brooks v Hemingway (1980) 107 Misc 2d 190, 433 NYS2d 551.
Court erred in ordering destruction of 2 of defendant’s dogs where only one dog actually engaged in any aggressive behavior, second dog’s aggression was directed solely at another dog, and neither dog attacked any person or had any history of violent behavior toward human beings; under CLS Agr & M § 108, dog at which aggression was directed was not considered “domestic animal” for purposes of CLS Agr & M § 121.People v Noga (1996, Sup App T) 168 Misc 2d 131, 645 NYS2d 268.
A dog control officer does not have the status or powers of a peace officer. A peace officer listed in section 2.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law and having the duty to enforce dog control, may exercise his peace officer powers to enforce the provisions of Article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law. 1981 Op Atty Gen April 30 (Informal).
A town constable may provide dog control services under Article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law for his own town and by municipal contract for other towns. As peace officers, town constables must be trained in accordance with the provisions of section 2.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 1982 Op Atty Gen May 27 (informal).
A county may enact a local law regulating pit bulls which would require the owners of all pit bulls to register the dogs with an agency of county government, maintain liability insurance, muzzle the dogs in all public places, and post the property where the dog is located with a notice of “Dangerous Dog”. 1991 Ops Atty Gen I 91-75.
State law has preempted the field of dog control. Local regulation of certain subjects is specifically authorized by Article 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law. Ops Atty Gen 83-F12.
Fines imposed by town justice court for criminal offenses and speeding violations occurring within village are property of town; however, fines for violations of dog control legislation occurring within village which has dog control program are paid to village. 1987 Op St Compt No. 87-86.
CASE NOTES UNDER FORMER § 116
Where defendant tried unsuccessfully to chase away a dog that was killing fowls on his premises and thereupon shot the dog while it was actually in the act of killing his fowls, he was within his rights at common law in protecting his property upon his own premises and, moreover, was exempt from liability under § 107 and this section. Mattice v L’Amereaux (1951) 279 AD 683, 108 NYS2d 51.
Although no appeal lies from an order issued in a proceeding, this is not counter to due process of law, for statute provides for a hearing before such an order is made. Re Foote (1927) 129 Misc 2, 221 NYS 302.
There can be no appeal from a determination in a justice court. Re Foote (1927) 129 Misc 2, 221 NYS 302.
A dog or cat is not a domestic animal within the meaning of this section. Vail v Terry (1947) 190 Misc 536, 75 NYS2d 543.
One cannot be convicted of harboring a vicious dog under this section in the absence of a showing that the dog in question attacked either a person or a domestic animal as defined by § 107. Vail v Terry (1947) 190 Misc 536, 75 NYS2d 543.
There is no basis for imposing a penalty on the owner of a dangerous dog under this section. De Mers v Nocks (1966) 49 Misc 2d 667, 268 NYS2d 195.
A dog which had on several occasions entered complainant’s property and approached her with growls and bared teeth constituted a dangerous dog within the meaning of this section, notwithstanding that the dog had never bitten complainant. Stating that the words “attack upon a person” are the standard to be used in determining whether or not a dog is dangerous, the court held that the term “attack” was intended to mean overt actions by a dog which might cause reasonable apprehension of harm or injury to a person, together with apparent ability in the dog to inflict such harm. People ex rel. Laborie v Habes (1967) 52 Misc 2d 768, 277 NYS2d 70.
Dogs, which attacked a young man who was peaceably conducting himself in a place where he was lawfully entitled to be, and which did not engage in a mere playful snap or accidental, spontaneous biting, but a prolonged, vicious and utterly unprovoked series of attacks were “dangerous” within the Agriculture and Markets Law, and where dogs which were captured by police were not only identified as same dogs who attacked young man, but were identified as belonging to respondent, order was entered requiring respondent for a period of 18 months, to securely confine dogs by means of a chain leash to a fenced enclosure on his property, upon default of which, dogs were to be dealt with in accordance with the law and without need of further process of court. Re Fugazy (1974) 82 Misc 2d 135, 368 NYS2d 652.
In proceeding pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law to determine whether two dogs alleged to be owned by respondent were dangerous dogs, court took judicial notice of its own records indicating that respondent had 38 convictions for violations of leash law ordinances. Re Fugazy (1974) 82 Misc 2d 135, 368 NYS2d 652.
Standard of proof, in case in which petitioner seeks an order requiring the killing or confinement of a dangerous dog, is proof by a fair preponderance of credible evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Giandalone v Zepieri (1976) 86 Misc 2d 79, 381 NYS2d 621.
Dog, which broke away from its attendant, ran onto petitioner’s premises and, without provocation, bit petitioner on his elbow and hand and which, without provocation, chased another person to front door of house on such premises, was a “dangerous dog” within statute providing that “If satisfied . . . that the dog is a dangerous dog, such justice or magistrate shall order the owner . . . to kill the dog immediately; or may order the owner securely to confine such dog.” Giandalone v Zepieri (1976) 86 Misc 2d 79, 381 NYS2d 621.
Order for destruction of private property should recite full compliance with requirements of statute. 1943 Op Atty Gen Jan. 2. A city may not enact an ordinance providing that any person who is disturbed by the howling of a dog may destroy such dog after once notifying the owner to cause a discontinuance of the howling. 1955 Op Atty Gen 135 (informal).
Proposed village ordinance may not provide for restraint of dogs running at large or for summary destruction of same in a manner inconsistent with provisions of Art 7 of the Agriculture and Markets Law. 1955 Op Atty Gen 193 (informal).
Fees in a proceeding in a justice court brought pursuant to this section for the confining of a dog charged with an attack on a human being must be collected in advance from the party requesting the particular service. The prevailing party may include fees paid by him in his bill of costs. 1947 Op St Compt 335.
Where a town constable is called by a county dog warden to destroy a dog that is molesting a flock of chickens, the constable is not entitled to a fee from the town. 1956 Op St Compt 340.

North Carolina Dog Law

Liability Statute

North Carolina does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

To establish the liability of the owner or keeper of a dog under North Carolina’s common law, the plaintiff must present evidence that the dog had previously demonstrated its dangerous propensities, and that the dog’s owner or keeper at the time of the injury had knowledge of the those propensities. There is no requirement that the plaintiff prove that the dog bit someone in the past.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is a dog that:

• without provocation, has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person. A severe injury means any physical injury that results in broken bones, disfiguring lacerations, or that requires cosmetic surgery or hospitalization.
• a dog owned primarily for dog fighting or any dog trained for dog fighting.
• a dog that has been previously determined to be “potentially dangerous” and continues the behavior and has engaged in one or more behaviors associated with a potentially dangerous dog.

The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that inflicts a bite on a person that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations or requires cosmetic surgery or hospitalization; or
• a dog that has killed or inflicted severe injury upon a domestic animal when not on the owner’s real property; or
• a dog that has approached a person when not on the owner’s property in a vicious or terrorizing manner in an apparent attitude of attack.
• Under the statute, a dog is not “potentially dangerous” if it inflicted injury on a person who was committing a willful trespass or other tort, was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog, had tormented, abused, or assaulted the dog, or was committing or attempting to commit a crime.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

Owners must confine dangerous dogs indoors, or, if outdoors, in a securely enclosed and locked pen, or in another structure designed to restrain the dog.
Dangerous dogs are not permitted to go beyond the owner’s property line, unless the dog is leashed, securely restrained, and muzzled.

Liability of Dangerous Dog Owners

The owner of a dangerous dog is strictly liable in civil damages for any injuries or property damage the dog inflicts upon a person, his property, or another animal.
Any violation of the Dangerous Dog Statute carries a maximum punishment of 30 days in prison or a fine up to $1,000.
The owner of a dangerous dog that attacks a person and causes physical injuries requiring medical treatment in excess of $100 commits a crime and faces a penalty within the judge’s discretion.

North Carolina Dog Bite Law

CHAPTER 67. DOGSbr
ARTICLE 1A. DANGEROUS DOGS
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 67-4.1 (2003)

§ 67-4.1. Definitions and procedures
(a) As used in this Article, unless the context clearly requires otherwise and except as modified in subsection (b) of this section, the term:

(1) “Dangerous dog” means
a. A dog that:
1. Without provocation has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person; or
2. Is determined by the person or Board designated by the county or municipal authority responsible for animal control to be potentially dangerous because the dog has engaged in one or more of the behaviors listed in subdivision (2) of this subsection.
b. Any dog owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of dog fighting, or any dog trained for dog fighting.

(2) “Potentially dangerous dog” means a dog that the person or Board designated by the county or municipal authority responsible for animal control determines to have:
a. Inflicted a bite on a person that resulted in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations or required cosmetic surgery or hospitalization; or
b. Killed or inflicted severe injury upon a domestic animal when not on the owner’s real property; or
c. Approached a person when not on the owner’s property in a vicious or terrorizing manner in an apparent attitude of attack.

(3) “Owner” means any person or legal entity that has a possessory property right in a dog.

(4) “Owner’s real property” means any real property owned or leased by the owner of the dog, but does not include any public
right-of-way or a common area of a condominium, apartment complex, or townhouse development.

(5) “Severe injury” means any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations or required cosmetic surgery or hospitalization.
(b) The provisions of this Article do not apply to:
(1) A dog being used by a law enforcement officer to carry out the law enforcement officer’s official duties;
(2) A dog being used in a lawful hunt;
(3) A dog where the injury or damage inflicted by the dog was sustained by a domestic animal while the dog was working as a hunting dog, herding dog, or predator control dog on the property of, or under the control of, its owner or keeper, and the damage or injury was to a species or type of domestic animal appropriate to the work of the dog; or
(4) A dog where the injury inflicted by the dog was sustained by a person who, at the time of the injury, was committing a willful trespass or other tort, was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog, had tormented, abused, or assaulted the dog, or was committing or attempting to commit a crime.
(c) The county or municipal authority responsible for animal control shall designate a person or a Board to be responsible for determining when a dog is a “potentially dangerous dog” and shall designate a separate Board to hear any appeal. The person or Board making the determination that a dog is a “potentially dangerous dog” must notify the owner in writing, giving the reasons for the determination, before the dog may be considered potentially dangerous under this Article. The owner may appeal the determination by filing written objections with the appellate Board within three days. The appellate Board shall schedule a hearing within 10 days of the filing of the objections. Any appeal from the final decision of such appellate Board shall be taken to the superior court by filing notice of appeal and a petition for review within 10 days of the final decision of the appellate Board. Appeals from rulings of the appellate Board shall be heard in the superior court division. The appeal shall be heard de novo before a superior court judge sitting in the county in which the appellate Board whose ruling is being appealed is located.

HISTORY: 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1023, s. 1.
CASE NOTES
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS DOG. –The definition of “potentially dangerous dog” as set forth in subdivision (a)(2)c is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Caswell County v. Hanks, 120 N.C. App. 489, 462 S.E.2d 841 (1995).
OWNER OR KEEPER. –Jury award to the victim of a dog bite was vacated as the trial court erred by not granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict because the victim failed to establish that the defendants who the victim sued were the owners or the keepers of the dog that bit the victim; rather the evidence showed that it was the defendant’s son and the son’s girlfriend that owned the dog that bit the victim. Lee v. Rice, — N.C. App. –, 572 S.E.2d 219 (2002).

APPEAL. –The language of the statute in this case is mandatory, providing that the appeal to superior court shall be heard de novo. Caswell County v. Hanks, 120 N.C. App. 489, 462 S.E.2d 841 (1995).

North Dakota Dog Law

Liability Statute

North Dakota does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

Under the common law, a person can recover damages for injuries caused by a dog if he or she proves that the owner was negligent and that the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

North Dakota Does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Dogs as a Public Nuisance

Under this statute, any dog that habitually molests a person traveling peaceably on the public road or street is a public nuisance. If the victim files a written complaint with a district or municipal judge, the judge will give notice to the owner and require that the owner take the necessary action to prevent the dog from engaging in that behavior. If the judge receives a second complaint, the owner will be required to appear in court and may be subject to fines or other court orders.

Ohio Dog Law

Liability Statute

The owner or keeper of a dog is strictly liable in damages for any injury, death, or personal loss caused by the dog, unless, at the time of the injury, the victim was committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the property of the owner or keeper, or unless the injured person was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense against any person, or was teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog on the owner’s or keeper’s property.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, without provocation, has killed or caused serious injury to any person;
• a dog that, without provocation, has caused injury, other than deat
• a pit bull.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Dangerous and Vicious Dogs

Dangerous and vicious dogs must be kept in a securely confined locked pen that has a top, locked fenced yard, or other locked enclosure that has a top. Alternatively, dangerous dogs may be tied with a leash or tether, so that the dog is adequately restrained. Dangerous and vicious dogs are permitted to be unrestrained when they are lawfully engaged in hunting and accompanied by an owner, keeper, or handler.

When a dangerous or vicious dog is off its owner’s premises, the dog must be kept on a chain-link leash or tether that is not more than 6 feet long. The leash or tether must be controlled be a person of suitable age and discretion. Otherwise, the leash or tether must be securely attached, tied, or affixed to the ground or a stationary object, so that the dog is adequately restrained to prevent it from causing injury to any person. Alternatively, the dog must be muzzled.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Vicious Dogs

The owner of a vicious dog must maintain a liability insurance policy providing coverage of not less than $100,000 for damages caused by the dog.

Ohio Dog Bite Law

TITLE IX [9] AGRICULTURE — ANIMALS — FENCES
CHAPTER 955: DOGS
[PROHIBITIONS]

ORC Ann. 955.28 (Anderson 2002)
§ 955.28 Dog may be killed for certain acts; owner liable for damages.

(A) Subject to divisions (A)(2) and (3) of section 955.261 [955.26.1] of the Revised Code, a dog that is chasing or approaching in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, that attempts to bite or otherwise endanger, or that kills or injures a person or a dog that chases, injures, or kills livestock, poultry, other domestic animal, or other animal, that is the property of another person, except a cat or another dog, can be killed at the time of that chasing, approaching, attempt, killing, or injury. If, in attempting to kill such a dog, a person wounds it, he is not liable to prosecution under the penal laws which punish cruelty to animals.

(B) The owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog is liable in damages for any injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the dog, unless the injury, death, or loss was caused to the person or property of an individual who, at the time, was committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense on the property of the owner, keeper, or harborer, or was committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense against any person, or was teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog on the owner’s, keeper’s, or harborer’s property.

HISTORY:
: RS § § 4212-1, 4212-2; 93 v 128, 129; 94 v 118, § § 1, 2; GC § 5838; 124 v 428; Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53; 142 v H 352. Eff 7-10-87.

NOTES:
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED SECTIONS
Examination of claim and reimbursement, RC § § 955.41, 955.42.

-COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION
-Killing dogs:
- CA–Food Code § 31101 et seq
- FL–Stat Ann § 767.03
- IL–Ann Stat ch 8 § 368
- IN–Code § 15-5-7-2
- KY–Rev Stat Ann § 258.235
- MI–Comp Laws Ann § 287.279
- NY–Agri Law § 121
- PA–CSA tit 3 § 459-601 et seq, tit 34 § 2384, tit 53 § § 3912, 3913
-Liability of dog owner:
- CA–Food Code § 31501 et seq; Civil Code § § 3342, 3342.5
- FL–Stat Ann § 767.01 et seq
- IL–Ann Stat ch 8 § 366
- IN–Code § § 15-5-7-1, 15-5-12-1
- KY–Rev Stat Ann § 258.275
- MI–Comp Laws Ann § § 287.280, 287.351
- NY–Agri Law § 125
- PA–CSA tit 3 § § 459-501 et seq, 459-701 et seq

TEXT DISCUSSION
Liability for injury caused by dog. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 19.02
Strict liability for injury by animals. Premises Liability § § 8.16 to 8.19

FORMS
Abusing dog on owner’s property (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.03
Answer for dog bite. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 19.11
Answer for maliciously killing a dog. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 19.15
Common-law rule. 2 OJI 217.07
Complaint for dog bite. 1 Ohio Civ. Prac. § § 2.27, 19.09
Injury to trespasser (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.05
Interrogatories to defendant in dog bite case. 2 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 19.10
Liability of owner of dog (standard instruction). 2 OJI 217.01
Affirmative defenses. 2 OJI 217.03

RESEARCH AIDS
Civil liability for violation of statute:
O-Jur3d: Ani § § 75-85; Death § 44
Am-Jur2d: Ani § 112 et seq

ALR
Civil liability of landowner for killing or injuring trespassing dog. 15 ALR2d 578.
Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog. 11 ALR5th 127.
Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance. 11 ALR3d 1399.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 89 ALR4th 374.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 ALR4th 1120.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser. 64 ALR3d 1039.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dog bite. 51 ALR4th 446.
Personal liability of public officer for killing or injuring animal while carrying out statutory duties with respect to it. 2 ALR3d 822.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.

LAW REVIEW
Dogs; liability for injury. Note. 5 OSLJ 433 (1939).
Liability of dog owners (1951 Legislation). John E. Hallen. 12 OSLJ 343 (1951).
Taking the bite out of pit bull attacks: Is there an answer? Comment. 15 ONorthLRev 83 (1989).
Vicious-dog legislation — controlling the pit bull: Am. Sub. H.B. 352: an overview — dogs under control. Note. 13 DaytonULRev 297 (1988).

CASE NOTES AND OAG
1. (1986) Assumption of the risk is not a permissible defense to an action for a dog bite brought pursuant to RC § 955.28: Pulley v. Malek, 25 OS3d 95, 25 OBR 145, 495 NE2d 402.
2. (1983) Action based on the liability created by RC § 955.28 for injuries caused by a dog is governed by RC § 2305.07, not 2305.10: Bora v. Kerchelich, 2 OS3d 146, 2 OBR 692, 443 NE2d 509.
3. (1964) This section, which imposes a rule of absolute liability upon the owner or harborer of a dog for damages or injury caused by such dog (with certain exceptions), creates a new and different cause of action in no way dependent upon common-law principles and does not abrogate the common-law right of action for damage or injury caused by a dog. A suit may be instituted either under the statute or at common law: Warner v. Wolfe, 176 OS 389, 27 OO2d 356, 199 NE2d 860.
4. (1954) This section imposes an absolute liability on the owner or keeper of a dog for any damage or injury caused by that dog, subject only to the exceptions contained in the second sentence of such section and the qualification that the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damage or injury: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.
5. (1954) An action for damages alleged to have been caused by a dog exists by reason of this section, is purely statutory, and is not based on negligence: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.
6. (1954) In an action for damages to personal property alleged to have been caused by a dog, the issues to be submitted to the jury are (1) ownership or keepership of the dog, (2) whether the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damages, and (3) the monetary amount of the damages: Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 OS 105, 56 OO 169, 126 NE2d 337.
7. (1924) One who has been injured by a dog may sue either at common law or under the statute: Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.
8. (1924) An action for death by wrongful act may be brought where the death is due to injuries inflicted by a dog: Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.
9. (1922) The owner of a dog which causes damages by chasing and worrying one who is driving an automobile is liable for such damage: Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 OS 75, 140 NE 669 [affirming judgment of court of appeals, which affirmed, Von Rohr v. Silverglade, 22 NP(NS) 333].
10. (1922) The liability imposed by this section is not dependent upon the negligence of such owner or keeper: Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 OS 75, 140 NE 669 [affirming 6 OApp 322, which affirmed Von Rohr v. Silverglade, 22 NP(NS) 333].
11. (1913) This and GC § 5839 (repealed 124 v 428) impose absolute liability on owner of the dog, and it is not necessary to allege or prove his knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog or his negligence in keeping him: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, 23 CD 221, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362]; Job v. Harlan, 13 OS 485; Gries v. Zeck, 24 OS 329; Lisk v. Hora, 109 OS 519, 143 NE 545.
12. (1913) In an action for injuries inflicted by a dog, evidence tending to show the dog had bitten another person prior to the time the plaintiff was bitten, and that defendant had knowledge thereof, is inadmissible: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362].
13. (1913) In an action brought under this section and GC § 5839 (repealed 124 v 428 [432]) for injuries inflicted by a dog, punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 OS 61, 105 NE 192 [reversing 14 CC(NS) 511, which affirmed Buffon v. Kleybolte, 12 NP(NS) 80, 22 OD 362].
14. (1909) It is competent to prove that a dog had acquired a habit of attacking sheep, in support of a disputed allegation that he attacked and injured sheep on a particular occasion: Rumbaugh v. McCormick, 80 OS 211, 88 NE 410.
15. (1900) One may negligently keep and harbor a vicious dog, knowing him to be such, without being the owner of the animal; and he may thus keep and harbor a vicious dog without owning or controlling the premises where he may be kept, and he may be chargeable with notice of the viciousness of the dog through his neglect to take notice of his vicious habits: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.
16. (1900) When it has been shown that the animal has been kept after knowledge of his dangerous character has been acquired, or circumstances have been shown from which the law would imply knowledge, and an injury has followed, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.
17. (1900) Two or more persons may be joined as defendants in an action to recover damages for a personal injury inflicted by a vicious dog, which is negligently kept and harbored by such persons with knowledge that it was vicious and dangerous: Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879.
18. (1895) An injury caused by a dog belonging to one, which enters upon the premises of another is trespass: Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 OS 552, 40 NE 716, 49 AmSt 741, 27 LRA 862; Hayes v. Guard, 9 OApp 377.
19. (1874) Tenants in possession may be sued jointly for trespass by animals which are kept or harbored by them upon their common premises, although the several animals are owned by them separately and individually: Jack v. Hudnall, 25 OS 255.
20. (1873) In an action against two or more defendants in which the petition averred an injury caused by “a pack or lot of dogs owned, harbored and unlawfully kept by defendants” the fact that the evidence showed that one defendant owned some of the dogs and the other defendant owned others was not a material variance from such averment: McAdams v. Sutton, 24 OS 333.
20.1 (1998) A landlord can be liable for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog only where the landlord acquiesces in the dog being kept in common areas or in an area shared by the landlord and tenant: Burgess v. Tackas, 125 OApp3d 294, 708 NE2d 285.
20.2 (1997) Dog owner was not entitled to directed verdict on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages when evidence was presented which indicated dog owner had knowledge of the vicious nature of the dog, yet allowed the dog to continue prowling the neighborhood; reasonable minds could conclude that dog owner acted with conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others: Cattaneo v. Taylor, No. 97-CA-45 (5th Dist.), 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5886.
20.3 (1997) The owner of the campgrounds was not an owner, keeper or harborer of the dog: Root v. Thousand Adventures of Ohio, Inc., No. 96CA006477 (9th Dist.), 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1278.
20.4 (1996) A “keeper” of a dog is not a person protected by RC § 955.28(B): Johnson v. Allonas, 116 OApp3d 447, 688 NE2d 549.
20.5 (1995) A four-year-old cannot commit a crime or intentional act as a matter of law, but may still be found to be a trespasser for purposes of the affirmative defense for a dog bite: Padgett v. Sneed, No. C-940145 (1st Dist.), 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3012.
20.6 (1994) Both civil and criminal trespass are valid defense established by RC § 955.28(B): Bruggeman v. Fishbaugh, 96 OApp3d 200, 644 NE2d 1051.
20.7 (1994) Inasmuch as RC § 955.28(B) imposes strict liability for a dog bite, evidence of the dog’s nonaggressive history toward children is irrelevant and inadmissible. Evidence that a child affectionately rubbed a dog while positioned between it and its food is not sufficient to prove that the child teased, tormented or abused it: Quellos v. Quellos, 96 OApp3d 31, 643 NE2d 1173.
21. (1993) By enacting RC § 955.28(B), the legislature intended to protect those people who are not in a position to control the dog. The legislature did not intend to protect those persons (the owner, keeper or harborer of the dog) who have, by the terms of the statute, an absolute duty to control the animal. A “keeper” is not within the class of people that the legislature intended to protect by enacting the strict liability provision contained in RC § 955.28(B). “Keepers” or “harborers” of dogs that proximately cause injury to them still have a common law cause of action against the dog’s owner: Khamis v. Everson, 88 OApp3d 220, 623 NE2d 683.
22. (1992) Landlords out of possession can be found liable for injuries caused by animals owned and kept on the leased premises by the tenant where the landlord has knowledge of the dangerous animal but fails to take any action to have the animal removed or confined. A vendor under a land installment contract who retains only legal title to the property has no such liability: Flint v. Holbrook, 80 OApp3d 21, 608 NE2d 809.
23. (1992) A dog owner who would otherwise be liable under RC § 955.28 may be entitled to immunity under the workers’ compensation laws: Horn v. Cassan, 78 OApp3d 353, 604 NE2d 816.
24. (1990) Proof of a compensable injury is an essential element of a claim under RC § 955.28: Jones v. Washington, 67 OApp3d 176, 586 NE2d 228.
25. (1988) An invitee who remains on the property of another person for purpose of his own, outside the scope of the invitation, does not thereby become a trespasser in the absence of his entering upon some clearly delimited part of the premises upon which his entry is not permitted: Dayton v. McLaughlin, 50 OApp3d 69, 552 NE2d 965.
26. (1984) Under RC § 955.28, the owner of a dog may be liable to a person “teasing, tormenting, or abusing” such dog if the dog were located anywhere other than on the owner’s property at the time in question: Ramsey v. King, 14 OApp3d 138, 14 OBR 154, 470 NE2d 241.
27. (1984) As a matter of law, a three-year-old child is incapable of “teasing, tormenting, or abusing” a dog, within the meaning of RC § 955.28: Ramsey v. King, 14 OApp3d 138, 14 OBR 154, 470 NE2d 241.
28. (1983) Revised Code § 955.28, the dog bite statute, does not establish negligence per se; rather, the statute establishes liability without regard to fault or the dog owner’s negligence: Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Associates Realty, Inc., 11 OApp3d 242, 11 OBR 368, 464 NE2d 169.
29. (1983) Where a dog owner is subjected to personal liability under RC § 955.28 as a direct result of the negligent or wrongful acts of a third person, the dog owner, or his subrogee, may maintain an action for indemnity against the negligent third party; however, if there is negligence of the dog owner which proximately contributes to the injury, he becomes a joint tortfeasor with the negligent third person, and an action seeking contribution is the appropriate recourse: Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Associates Realty, Inc., 11 OApp3d 242, 11 OBR 368, 464 NE2d 169.
30. (1982) The owner of an errant dog that strays upon the public highways is held to strict liability for the damage or harm caused by such straying: Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 5 OApp3d 223, 5 OBR 508, 451 NE2d 253.
31. (1982) The issues to be decided by the trier of facts in an action under RC § 955.28 are (1) ownership or keeping of the dog, (2) whether the actions of the dog were the proximate cause of the damage, and (3) the monetary amount of the damage: Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 5 OApp3d 223, 5 OBR 508, 451 NE2d 253.
32. (1982) Revised Code § 955.28 imposes strict liability on the owner or keeper of a dog that causes injury, unless the injured person was trespassing on the property of the owner or teasing the dog: Garrard v. McComas, 5 OApp3d 179, 5 OBR 363, 450 NE2d 730.
33. (1959) Where a female dog, the day after giving birth to a litter of pups, attacks a small boy, who is in a room adjoining that in which such litter of pups is being kept and does not approach the pen where they are kept, and where such dog, after jumping out of the pen and running through a door, travels 20 feet or more to reach such boy, there is not shown any relationship between any protective instinct of such female dog and her conduct in attacking such boy; and the requirement of notice to the owner of such dog of its viciousness, as a necessary element for recovery at common law of punitive damages for harboring a vicious dog, is not proved: Tynan v. Hanlon, 110 OApp 77, 12 OO2d 252, 159 NE2d 769.
34. (1958) A dog on its master’s premises is not a vagrant and cannot be said to be running at large: Perkins v. Hattery, 106 OApp 361, 7 OO2d 100, 155 NE2d 73.
35. (1958) The words, “chases, worries, injuries, or kills,” as used in this section mean that, for the killing of a dog to be permitted, the dog must be killed while in the act of chasing, worrying, injuring, or killing: Perkins v. Hattery, 106 OApp 361, 7 OO2d 100, 155 NE2d 73.
36. (1947) It is not necessary for a pleader to expressly allege whether he is relying on the statute or on the common law. The facts pleaded will disclose that: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.
37. (1947) Where only ownership or harboring is alleged and proven, the only liability established is that created by the statute, and that liability is limited to responding for actual damage: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.
38. (1947) In order to state a cause of action under this section, for damage caused by a dog, it is not necessary to allege that the dog was vicious, that the defendant had knowledge of its vicious trait or negligence in any respect. Ownership or harboring is sufficient to impose liability: McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 OApp 351, 37 OO 203, 79 NE2d 137.
39. (1935) A man who discharged a gun at a dog which was fighting with his dog was held guilty of violating an ordinance making the discharge of firearms unlawful: McCollum v. Cincinnati, 51 OApp 67, 4 OO 49, 199 NE 603 [dismissed, 130 OS 159].
40. (1934) The owner and harborer of a dog were held jointly liable for injuries to a person bitten by the dog: Rosenblatt v. Bosse, 50 OApp 449, 4 OO 159, 198 NE 636.
41. (1933) The owner of a dog which jumped against a boy on roller skates, causing him to go into the street where he was struck by an automobile and injured, is liable for the injuries thus sustained: Bailey v. Prickett, 15 OLA 336 (App).
42. (1932) Employee who cared for dog held not precluded from recovering for injuries caused by dog: Bevin v. Griffiths, 44 OApp 94, 184 NE 401, 37 OLR 530.
43. (1932) Evidence that defendant employer harbored dog, which injured servant by moving rapidly against her, made issue for jury, in action for damages, though dog was not vicious or mischievous: Bevin v. Griffiths, 44 OApp 94, 184 NE 401, 37 OLR 530.
44. (1931) Suit may be maintained either under statute or at common law for injury caused by dogs known to be vicious: Roettinger v. Graser, 42 OApp 452, 181 NE 926.
45. (1930) Under this section owner of dog kept on premises is liable for damage to trespasser thereon by reason of bite of dog: Kingsley v. Yocom, 34 OApp 226, 170 NE 180.
46. (1928) One who owns or harbors a dog is liable for injuries inflicted by dog: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97. 47. (1928) Two or more persons may harbor a dog and thus be jointly liable for injuries inflicted by bite of dog, under this section: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97.
48. (1928) Joint recovery against husband and wife for injuries inflicted by dog owned by husband is justified under evidence that both spouses harbored dog: Sawrey v. Grant, 31 OApp 14, 165 NE 97.
49. (1926) One who wounds a dog trailing rabbits on his land and incidentally worrying sheep, and leaves it mangled, is not exempt from prosecution therefor under GC § 13376 (RC § 959.13), by reason of this section, relating to killing dogs worrying sheep, or by GC § 13361 (RC § 959.02) et seq, relative to offenses against domestic animals: Uebele v. State, 21 OApp 459, 153 NE 215.
50. (1915) For a discussion of what amounts to “harboring” a dog, see Mehmert v. Kelso, 6 OApp 69, 26 CC(NS) 350, 28 CD 515, 61 Bull 299.
51. (1908) In an action to recover damages resulting from plaintiff’s being bitten by a dog which was owned or harbored by the defendant, the allegation that plaintiff was so bitten “without warning or provocation” on her part, is equivalent to the allegation that such occurrence was “without fault on her part”: Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.
52. (1908) In an action to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s being bitten by a dog which defendant owned or harbored, evidence that defendant had stated that the dog was “all right” and that he got good care and fresh water every day, and that defendant refused to permit the dog to be killed, together with evidence that the dog was seen about defendant’s residence, is sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the question whether defendant owned or harbored such dog: Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.
53. (1908) A minor may perhaps recover damages for loss of time due to an injury, if such injury prevents such minor from going to school, but if the loss of time took place in the summer, and the record does not show that the minor would have gone to school during such time, if it had not been for such injury, such minor cannot recover for such loss of time: Tuttle v. Furi, 22 CC(NS) 388, 33 CD 626.
54. (1911) The words “such dog” used in the last sentence of this statute, is the same as “such dog” as previously used, and refers to a dog that chases, worries, injures or kills a sheep, lamb, kid, goat or domestic fowl or domestic animal or persons as far as liability of the owner for such injury or damage caused by the dog is concerned: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].
55. (1911) A petition which states that the plaintiff was lawfully on the defendant’s premises, and while there was bitten, without his fault, by the defendant’s dog while it was running at large thereon in the day time, unmuzzled, shows a cause of action: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].
56. (1911) This section was enacted soon after the decision in Hayes v. Smith, 62 OS 161, 56 NE 879, in order to change the rule laid down in that case to the effect that defendant’s knowledge of the vicious propensities of a dog and his negligent keeping of such dog thereafter was the gist of the action: Frerich v. Blake, 18 CC(NS) 466, 33 CD 163 [affirmed, without opinion, sub nomine, Blake v. Frerick, 88 OS 544].
56.1 (1994) Civil trespass by the injured party is an exception to strict liability under RC § 955.28: Burden v. Dunlap, No. 1-94-14 (3rd Dist.), 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2551.
57. (1992) Civil trespass as well as criminal trespass remain valid defenses to strict liability for injury or loss caused by a dog pursuant to RC § 955.28(B): Buttermore v. Thompson, No. CA-8754 (5th Dist.), 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3246.
58. (1992) Liability as a harborer of a dog under RC § 955.28 is not defeated merely by virtue of the status as landlord but is determined by whether the landlord permitted the tenant’s dog to be kept in common areas: Godsey v. Franz, No. 91WM000008 (6th Dist.), 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1087.
58.1 (2001) Liability under RC § 955.28 applies only to an owner, a keeper or a harborer of the dog. The statute does not provide for vicarious liability: Croley v. Moon Ent., Inc., 118 OMisc2d 151, 2001-Ohio-4366, 770 NE2d 148 (CP).
58.2 (2001) Punitive damages are appropriate in a dog bite case where the owners know that the dog has previously attacked others: Volz v. Hudson, 115 OMisc2d 63, 761 NE2d 711 (MC).
59. (1995) As a matter of law, a child under the age of three cannot be found to have teased, tormented or abused a dog: Meier v. Morrison, 72 OMisc2d 16, 655 NE2d 451 (CP).
60. (1995) If a parent’s negligent supervision of a child contributed to the child’s being bitten by another’s dog, the parent may be liable for contribution in an action under RC § 955.28: Meier v. Morrison, 72 OMisc2d 12, 655 NE2d 449 (CP).
61. (1989) There are three elements which must be proven to hold a person strictly liable under RC § 955.28: (1) the defendant is the owner or keeper of the dog; (2) the dog in question is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage; and (3) the monetary amount of the damages. In proving proximate cause, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that defendant’s dog was more than a passive instrumentality in a claim of events leading to injury, i.e., a defendant cannot be automatically penalized for mere dog ownership: Smith v. Jett Hill Farm, Inc., 61 OMisc2d 338, 579 NE2d 295 (CP).
62. (1986) Where a household employee of a complying employer, while acting in the scope of and in the course of her employment, receives instructions from her employer as to her duties in attaching the household dog to a runner chain, and is bitten by that dog, the incident and her resultant injury have occurred in the scope of and in the course of her employment, and her complying employer shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such injuries: Rowe v. Riess, 30 OMisc2d 28, 30 OBR 292, 506 NE2d 1237 (CP).
63. (1945) A person who is in possession and control of the premises where the dog lives, and silently acquiesces in the dog being kept there by the owner, can be held liable as a “harborer” of the dog: Sengel v. Maddox, 31 OO 201 (CP).
64. (1940) An action for injuries caused by a vicious dog may be brought against the owner or harborer of the dog either under the common law theory or under this section: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).
65. (1940) The owner of a dog is liable for injuries sustained by one who goes upon the owner’s premises to rescue an injured child and escape from further attacks by the dog: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).
66. (1940) The elements necessary to establish liability are the ownership of the dog and the injury sustained because of the dog: Knoblauch v. Coufal, 18 OO 35 (MC).
67. (1933) General Code § 5652-14a (RC § 955.22) in no way relaxes the rule of absolute liability established by this section: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.
68. (1933) Liability of an owner for injuries inflicted by his dog is established by proof of ownership, together with the fact that the injuries complained of were inflicted by that particular dog: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.
69. (1933) The liability imposed by this section upon an owner for injuries inflicted by his dog, is in no sense dependent upon negligence, and a refusal of the court to charge upon the subject of negligence and ordinary care is not error: Bohne v. Clerke, 32 NP(NS) 395.
70. (1903) The provisions of this section do not apply to cases where a person wilfully tortures a dog or unnecessarily abuses it: Mick v. State, 8 NP(NS) 54, 19 OD 489.
71. (1931) Township trustees may not sue the owner of a dog for damages to horses, sheep, cattle, swine, mules or goats caused by such dog when the dog was registered and was destroyed within forty-eight hours after discovery that the loss was so caused: 1931 OAG No. 3713.

Oklahoma Dog Law

Liability Statute

A dog owner is strictly liable for damages when his or her dog, without provocation, bites or injures any person, so long as the injured person is in a place where he had a lawful right to be when the injury occurred.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, when unprovoked, bites a human; or
• # a dog that, when unprovoked, kills or severely injures a domestic animal.

The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that, when unprovoked, has inflicted severe injury on a human being. A severe injury means any physical injury that results in broken bones or lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.
• a dog that has been previously found to be potentially dangerous and the dog thereafter aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans; or
• a dog that has been previously found to be potentially dangerous and the dog thereafter kills or severely injures a domestic animal.

Legal Responsibilities and Liability of Owners of Potentially Dangerous Dogs

The legal responsibilities and liabilities of potentially dangerous dog owners may be regulated by local, municipal, and county authorities. The regulations, however, cannot be breed specific.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

Dangerous dogs must be registered with the state.

Dangerous dogs must either be confined indoors or confined outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure that prevents the entry of children, as well as the dog’s escape. The pen or structure must have secure sides and a secure top. When outside the enclosure, the dog must be muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and physically restrained by a responsible person over the age of 16.

The owner must post the property with a clearly-visible warning sign that alerts people that a dangerous dog is on the property. The owner must also conspicuously display a sign with a warning symbol that informs children of the presence of a dangerous dog

Dangerous dog owners must maintain liability insurance or a surety bond of at least $50,000, insuring the owner for any personal injuries inflicted by the dangerous dog

Liability of Owners with Dangerous Dogs

When a dangerous dog is permitted outside its enclosure and is not restrained by a responsible person, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor and faces up to one year in prison and up to $5,000 in fines, or both.

TITLE 4. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 3. DOGS AND CATS
4 Okl. St. § 42.1 (2002)

§ 42.1. Personal injury by dog–Liability of owner

The owner or owners of any dog shall be liable for damages to the full amount of any damages sustained when his dog, without provocation, bites or injures any person while such person is in or on a place where he has a lawful right to be.

4 Okl. St. § 42.3 (2002)

§ 42.3. Exceptions to application of act–Existing rights and liabilities
Provided that this act shall not apply to rural areas of this state or to any cities or towns that do not have city or village United States mail delivery service. Provided, nothing herein shall be construed as diminishing any right or liability for injury by dog bites now existing under the laws of this state

Oregon Dog Law

Liability Statute

Oregon does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In Oregon, a person can recover for dog-bite injuries if he or she proves that the injury was caused by the dog owner’s negligence. In cases where the dog owner knew of the dog’s vicious propensities, the owner will be held strictly liable.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Oregon does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Oregon Dog Bite Law

TITLE 48. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 609. ANIMAL CONTROL; EXOTIC ANIMALS; DEALERS
DOGS
ORS § 609.093 (2001)

609.093. Considerations prior to disposing of chasing, menacing or biting dog.

In determining whether a dog should be killed as provided under ORS 609.090 (7) or 609.990, a dog control board, county governing body or court shall consider the following factors:

(1) The circumstances of the bite, including whether the dog was provoked by the person bitten;

(2) Whether the keeper has a history of maintaining dogs that are a public nuisance;

(3) The impact of keeper actions on the behavior of the dog;

(4) The severity of the bite;

(5) The ability and inclination of the keeper to prevent the dog from chasing or menacing another person on premises other than the premises occupied exclusively by the keeper or from biting another person;

(6) Whether the dog can be relocated to a secure facility;(7) The effect that a transfer of ownership would have on ensuring the health and safety of the public;

(8) Whether the dog has unjustifiably chased or menaced a person on a prior or subsequent occasion; and

(9) Any other factors that the board, governing body or court may deem relevant.

HISTORY: 1999 c.658 § 2; 2001 c.636 § 8

TITLE 48. ANIMALS

CHAPTER 609. ANIMAL CONTROL; EXOTIC ANIMALS; DEALERS
DOGS

ORS § 609.097 (2001)
609.097. Exception to dog as public nuisance.
A dog is not a public nuisance under ORS 609.090 (5) or 609.095 and may not be destroyed under ORS 609.090 or 609.990 if the dog menaces, chases or bites a person wrongfully assaulting the dog or the dog’s keeper or if the dog menaces, chases or bites a person trespassing upon premises occupied exclusively by the dog’s keeper after being provoked by that person.
HISTORY: 1975 c.499 § 4; 1999 c.658 § 9; 2001 c.636 § 10

Pennsylvania Dog Law

Confinement of Dogs Statute

Pennsylvania’s Dog Law requires owners and keepers to have reasonable control over their dogs at all times. The law also requires owners to confine their dogs on their premises, and restrain their dogs with a collar, chain, or other device to prevent straying. Dog bite victims who prove that a dog owner violated Pennsylvania’s confinement statute, may recover under a theory of negligence per se.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover damages under Pennsylvania’s common law, the injured person must show that the dog owner’s negligence caused the injuries.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The meaning of a “dangerous dog”

A dangerous dog” is:

• (1) a dog that has done one or more of the following:
• a dog that has inflicted severe injury on a person without provocation. “Severe injury” is any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.
• a dog that has killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal, without provocation, while off the owner’s property.
• a dog that has attacked a person without provocation;
• a dog that has been used in the commission of a crime.
• (2) a dog that has either or both of the following:
• a history of attacking people and/or domestic animals without provocation;
• a propensity to attack people and/or domestic animals without provocation. A propensity to attack can be proven by a single incident of the conduct described in (1), above.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners with Dangerous Dog Owners

Dog owners must register their dogs as dangerous.

Dangerous dog owners must maintain liability insurance coverage of at least $50,000 insuring the owner for any personal injuries inflicted by the dangerous dog.

A dangerous dog owner must maintain a proper enclosure to confine the dog. The owner must also post the premises with a clearly visible warning sign that there is a dangerous dog on the property, and conspicuously display a sign with a warning symbol that informs children of the presence of a dangerous dog.

When the dangerous dog is outside of its owner’s house or outside of its enclosure, the dog must be muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under the physical restraint of a responsible person.

Dangerous dog owners must notify the Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement, the State Dog Warden, and the local police department if the dangerous dog is on the loose, is unconfined, has attacked another animal, has attacked a person, has died, or has been sold or given away. If the dangerous dog was sold or given away, the owner must provide the Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement and the State Dog Warden with the name, address, and telephone number of the new owner.

Liability of Owners with Dangerous Dogs

If a dangerous dog, through the intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct of its owner, attacks a person or domestic animal, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, and faces up to two years in prison.

If a dangerous dog, through the intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct of its owner, aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death of a person, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree, and faces up to five years in prison.

If a dangerous dog is owned by a minor, the minor’s parent or guardian will be liable for injuries and property damage caused by an unprovoked attack.

Pennsylvania Dog Bite Law

TITLE 3. AGRICULTURE
CHAPTER 8. DOGS
DOG LAW
ARTICLE I. SHORT TITLE AND DEFINITIONS
3 P.S. § 459-101 (2002)

§ 459-101. Short title
This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Dog Law.”
LexisNexis (TM) Notes: CASE NOTES TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL

MATERIALS

CASE NOTES
Governments : Local Governments : Police Power
Governments : State & Territorial Governments : Relations With Governments
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners
Governments : Local Governments : Police Power

1. Kennel owner was properly restricted in the number of dogs owner could house at her residence because owner’s kennel license issued by the state did not preempt the city from enforcing its own animal control law. Muehlieb v. City of Phila., 133 Pa. Commw. 133, 574 A.2d 1208, 1990 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 286 (1990).
Governments : State & Territorial Governments : Relations With Governments

2. Kennel owner was properly restricted in the number of dogs owner could house at her residence because owner’s kennel license issued by the state did not preempt the city from enforcing its own animal control law. Muehlieb v. City of Phila., 133 Pa. Commw. 133, 574 A.2d 1208, 1990 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 286 (1990).
Torts : Negligence : Duty : Animal Owners

3. No matter how innocent the victim may be or how serious the injury sustained, the owner of a dog is not responsible for the consequences of the dog’s bite if the owner has no reason to know the viciousness or dangerous propensities of the dog beforehand even though the owner violated the Dog Law of Pennsylvania as codified at former 3 P.S. 460-1205 (now 3 P.S. § 459-101 et seq.). Freeman v. Terzya, 229 Pa. Super. 254, 323 A.2d 186, 1974 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2186 (1974).

TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS
1. P.L.E. ANIMALS § 2, Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, VOLUME 1e, § 2 Dog Licensing, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

TITLE 3. AGRICULTURE
CHAPTER 8. DOGS
DOG LAW
ARTICLE V. OFFENSES OF DOGS
3 P.S. § 459-502 (2002)
§ 459-502. Dog bites; detention and isolation of dogs

(a) CONFINEMENT.–ANY DOG WHICH BITES OR ATTACKS A HUMAN BEING SHALL BE CONFINED IN QUARTERS APPROVED BY A DESIGNATED EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, A STATE DOG WARDEN OR EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AN ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER OR A POLICE OFFICER. SUCH DOG MAY BE DETAINED AND ISOLATED IN AN APPROVED KENNEL OR AT THE DOG OWNER’S PROPERTY. WHERE SUCH DOG IS DETAINED IS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER. ALL DOGS SO DETAINED MUST BE ISOLATED FOR A MINIMUM OF TEN DAYS. ANY COSTS INCURRED IN THE DETAINING AND ISOLATION OF SUCH DOG SHALL BE PAID BY THE OFFENDING DOG’S OWNER. WHEN THE DOG’S OWNER IS NOT KNOWN, THE COMMONWEALTH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL REASONABLE COSTS FOR HOLDING AND DETAINING SUCH DOG.

(b) BITE VICTIMS.–THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING THE BITE VICTIM OF THE MEDICAL RESULTS OF THE OFFENDING DOG’S CONFINEMENT. ANY COST TO THE VICTIM FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT RESULTING FROM AN ATTACKING OR BITING DOG MUST BE PAID FULLY BY THE OWNER OF SUCH DOG. THE COMMONWEALTH SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT COSTS TO THE VICTIM.

(c) EXCEPTION.–WHEN A DOG THAT BITES OR ATTACKS A HUMAN BEING IS A SERVICE DOG OR A POLICE WORK DOG IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, SAID DOG NEED NOT BE CONFINED IF IT IS UNDER THE ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF A LICENSED DOCTOR OF VETERINARY MEDICINE.

LexisNexis (TM) Notes:
CASE NOTES
Governments : Agriculture & Food : Animal Protection
1. The court affirmed the determination that although a dog attacked a little girl without provocation causing severe injuries, the dog could not be a declared danger under 3 P.S. § 459-502; the incident giving rise to the filing of the original complaint could not alone establish the dog’s history or propensity to attack. Eritano v. Commonwealth, 547 Pa. 372, 690 A.2d 705, 1997 Pa. LEXIS 439 (1997).

Rhode Island Dog Law

Liability Statute

Rhode Island does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

A person who was injured by a dog can recover damages from the dog’s owner if he or she proves that the dog owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Vicious Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A “vicious dog” is:

• any dog that, when unprovoked, in a vicious or terrorizing manner, approaches any person in an apparent attitude of attack in any public place;
• any dog with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals;
• any dog that bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or domestic animal, without provocation, in any public or private place;
• any dog owned for the purpose of dog fighting or any dog trained for dog fighting.

Under this statute, a dog is not vicious if the injury was sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort on the owner’s property, or who was teasing, tormenting, provoking, abusing or assaulting the dog, or who was committing or attempting to commit a crime at the time of the injury. A dog may not be declared vicious if it was protecting or defending a person from an unjustified attack or assault, or if it injured another dog that was teasing, tormenting, abusing, or assaulting it.

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Vicious Dogs

The owner of a vicious dog must maintain liability insurance of at least $100,000 for injuries that may be caused by the dog.

The owner must register the dog and have the dog’s registration identification number tattooed on its upper inner left rear thigh.

A vicious dog must be kept inside a fence or a structure that is at least 6 feet high and that prevents the entry of young children, as well as the escape of the dog. The enclosure must be locked and have secure sides, top, and bottom. Vicious dogs are not permitted outside the owner’s home or the dog’s enclosure, unless the dog must go to the vet, or is complying with the orders or directions of a dog officer, or is getting its vicious dog tattoo. When not confined, the dog must be securely muzzled and restrained with a chain having a minimum tensile strength of 300 pounds and not exceeding 3 feet in length. The dog must also be under the direct control and supervision of its owner or keeper.

The owner must display a sign on his or her property warning that there is a vicious dog on the premises. The sign must be visible and capable of being read from the public highway.

It is unlawful to leave a vicious dog in the care of someone under 16.
It is unlawful to sell or give away a vicious dog.

Owners must notify the police department or a dog officer within two hours if a vicious dog is loose, if it is unconfined, if it attacked another animal, if it attacked a human, or if it died.

Dog Owners Liability

If a vicious dog, when unprovoked, attacks, assaults, bites, or otherwise injures any human being while out of or within the dog’s enclosure or otherwise on or off the owner’s property, regardless of whether it was leashed and muzzled, the owner may be liable, without fault, for all damages sustained. Damages are recoverable in a civil action. It is not necessary for the injured person to prove that the owner or keeper knew that the dog had vicious propensities.

If the owner of a vicious dog is a minor, the child’s parent or guardian will be liable for all injuries caused by an unprovoked attack by the vicious dog.

In addition to civil liability, vicious dog owners must pay a $1,000 fine if a vicious dog, when unprovoked, injures or kills a person.

Rhode Island Dog Bite Law

TITLE 4. ANIMALS AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
CHAPTER 13. DOGS
R.I. Gen. Laws § 4-13-16 (2002)

§ 4-13-16. Action for damages to animals — Double damages on second recovery — Destruction of offending dog

If any dog kills, wounds, worries, or assists in killing, wounding or worrying, any sheep, lamb, cattle, horse, hog, swine, fowl, or other domestic animal belonging to or in the possession of any person, or assaults, bites, or otherwise injures any person while traveling the highway or out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of that dog, the owner or keeper of the dog shall be liable to the person aggrieved, for all damage sustained, to be recovered in a civil action, with costs of suit. If afterwards any such damage is done by that dog, the owner or keeper of the dog shall pay to the party aggrieved double the damage, to be recovered in the manner set forth and an order shall be made by the court before whom that second recovery is made, for killing the dog. The order shall be executed by the officer charged with the execution of the order, and it shall not be necessary, in order to sustain this action, to prove that the owner or keeper of the dog knew that the dog was accustomed to causing this damage.

HISTORY: G.L. 1896, ch. 111, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 135, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 136, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 639, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 4-13-16.

NOTES:
COLLATERAL REFERENCES. Anguish at property damage by or to dog. 28 A.L.R.2d 1070.
Constitutionality of law making owner liable for damage done by dog. 49 A.L.R. 847.
Contributory negligence as a defense to a cause of action based upon violation of statute imposing duty upon keeper of animals. 10 A.L.R.2d 853.
Excessiveness of verdict in action for injury by dog bite. 46 A.L.R. 1277; 102 A.L.R. 1125.
Highways, liability for damages due to dog interfering with travel in. 11 A.L.R. 270.
Inadequate damages for injuries by dog. 16 A.L.R.2d 1368.
Injury by dog as wilful or malicious injury so as to preclude it or judgment procured on it from operation of bankruptcy discharge. 26 A.L.R.2d 1368.
Joint liability of several independent owners of dogs for injury by them. 9 A.L.R. 946; 35 A.L.R. 409; 91 A.L.R. 759.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee. 74 A.L.R.4th 1120.
Liability of owner or operator of place of public resort for injury to patron by dog. 17 A.L.R.2d 459.
Presence of owner as affecting liability for killing trespassing dog. 42 A.L.R. 437.
Public service corporation’s employee entering premises, liability for injury to, by dog. 2 A.L.R. 1389.
Rabid dog, liability for injuries inflicted by. 13 A.L.R. 492.
Show, liability for injury inflicted by dog exhibited at. 80 A.L.R.3d 507.
Statute eliminating scienter as condition of liability. 1 A.L.R. 1114; 142 A.L.R. 436.
Trespassing dog, owner or keeper of, as liable for damages. 107 A.L.R. 1323.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
1. Purpose and Effect of Statute.
2. Construction with Other Sections.
3. Basis of Liability.
4. –Landlord.
5. Character of Dog.
6. Scienter or Knowledge.
7. Enclosures.
8. Injuries for Which Recovery Allowed.
9. Form of Action.
10. Federal Immunity.

1. PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF STATUTE.
One purpose of enacting this section was to relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving knowledge of the previous acts and character of the dog but this was not the only purpose and the words “or otherwise injure any person” were broad enough to sustain an action for indirect injuries. Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R.I. 225, 86 A. 146 (1913).

2. CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER SECTIONS.
This section should be construed as harmoniously as possible with § 4-13-18. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

3. BASIS OF LIABILITY.
Liability of a defendant for damages done by dog outside his premises is not conditioned upon his negligence or fault in permitting or enabling the dog to leave the premises. Palmer v. Saccocia, 33 R.I. 476, 82 A. 265 (1912).
The clause “while traveling on the highway or out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of such dog” modifies the word “person” and not the word “dog.” Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).

4. –LANDLORD.
An out-of-possession landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by person bitten outside leased premises by dog owned by tenant where landlord did not have knowledge of dog’s presence on premises. Lindsay v. Crohan, 508 A.2d 674 (1986).

5. CHARACTER OF DOG.
Evidence of prior peaceable habits of the dog was not admissible either as a defense or in mitigation of damages. Kelly v. Alderson, 19 R.I. 544, 37 A. 12 (1896).
In an action for injuries resulting from a dog bite, the peaceable character of the dog was not material, because the statute has enlarged the common law liability of the dog’s owner or keeper. Whittet v. Bertsch, 39 R.I. 31, 97 A. 18 (1916).

6. SCIENTER OR KNOWLEDGE.
For a person to recover for injuries for dog bite under this section without proof of defendant’s scienter, he must have been out of the enclosure of the owner or keeper of the dog. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
Person bitten by dog while in enclosure set apart from adjoining property by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate approximate limits where dog might be kept is not under provisions of this section, even though there are intervals in the line, and the plaintiff is required by common law to allege and prove scienter of the keeper. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
This section provides for an owner’s or keeper’s liability absent proof of negligence or fault. Brotko v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 78 (D.R.I. 1989).

7. ENCLOSURES.
The premises of the keeper of a dog not surrounded by a fence, ditch, or hedge was not an enclosure within the meaning of this section. Whittet v. Bertsch, 39 R.I. 31, 97 A. 18 (1916). See also Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
The meaning of the word “enclosure” is the same in this section and § 4-13-18. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
The word “enclosure” denotes occupied premises set apart from adjoining premises by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate the approximate limits of occupation. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
The important thing in determining whether a dog is within an enclosure is that there be something to give a man reasonable notice that he is entering upon occupied premises where there may be a dog. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
Plaintiff bitten by dog while on the keeper’s premises which were entirely enclosed by stone walls and other visible and tangible obstructions, except for driveway entrance, was in defendant’s enclosure as defined by this section and was required to allege and prove scienter of defendant, as required by common law, to avoid directed verdict. Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936).
The purpose of the enclosure is to give the entrant reasonable notice that he is entering upon occupied premises where there may be a dog and the requisite notice is afforded if the premises are set apart from adjoining property by boundaries sufficiently apparent to indicate the approximate limits of occupation. Bernhart v. Nine, 120 R.I. 692, 391 A.2d 75 (1978).
Where there were no signs, fences, gates or other barriers and nothing to warn the general public that there was a dog running loose on the land, there was no enclosure under this section and it was not error to award damages for a dog bite. Lamoureux v. Davis, 504 A.2d 449 (1986).
The term “enclosure” includes not only a fence or physical obstruction but also any condition that will give reasonable notice that the land is private property. Butti v. Rossi, 617 A.2d 881 (R.I. 1992).
The trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the issue of whether the defendant had enclosed his property was improper since the question of whether an adequate enclosure existed was dependent on the credibility of witnesses. Butti v. Rossi, 617 A.2d 881 (R.I. 1992).

8. INJURIES FOR WHICH RECOVERY ALLOWED.
A plaintiff whose horse ran away as the result of being bitten by a dog and who was injured when the attached wagon collided with a curbstone could recover for the injuries in action on the case by virtue of the language “or shall assault or bite or otherwise injure any person.” Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R.I. 225, 86 A. 146 (1913).
The statute is broad enough to allow recovery for both direct and indirect damages. Pritsker v. Greenwood, 47 R.I. 384, 133 A. 656 (1926).
Plaintiff was entitled to recover medical expenses resulting from attack by defendant’s dog on plaintiff’s child while traveling on highway. Pritsker v. Greenwood, 47 R.I. 384, 133 A. 656 (1926).

9. FORM OF ACTION.
Action for injuries resulting from being bitten by a dog while traveling on the highway could be brought either in trespass or on the case. Barlow v. Tierney, 26 R.I. 557, 59 A. 930 (1905) (Decision prior to adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure providing for one form of action).
There was no variance between writ and declaration in suit for damages due to dog bite for failure of declaration to allege that dog bite was vi et armis, et contra pacem, since form of action was trespass in both writ and declaration. Barlow v. Tierney, 26 R.I. 557, 59 A. 930 (1905) (Decision prior to adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure providing for one form of action).

10. FEDERAL IMMUNITY.
The federal government may not be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as a “harborer or keeper” of a dog which bites a child living in a military housing area, because Rhode Island dog bite law provides for strict liability, i.e., liability absent proof of scienter, negligence, or fault, and the FTCA precludes strict liability actions against the United States government. Brotko v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 78 (D.R.I. 1989).

South Carolina Dog Law

Liability Statute

Whenever a person is bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a public place or is lawfully in a private place, including the dog owner’s property or the property of a person having the dog in his care or keeping, the owner or keeper is liable for damages suffered by the person bitten or otherwise attacked.

Common Law Liability

In addition to recovering under the liability statute, dog bite victims can also file suit under the common law. To recover damages under the common law, a plaintiff must prove that the dog’s owner or keeper had control and possession of the dog at the time of the injury. Once control and possession are established, the owner or keeper owes a duty of care against foreseeable harm.

Dangerous Animal Statute

The meaning of a “dangerous animal.” Under South Carolina law, a “dangerous animal” includes:

• a dog that the owner knows, or reasonably should know, has a propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, cause injury, or otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals
• a dog that makes an unprovoked attack that causes bodily injury to a human being and the attack occurs off the owner’s premises. “Bodily injury” means broken bones, lacerations, punctures of the skin, or any physical injury resulting in death.
• a dog that commits unprovoked acts off the owner’s premises that cause a person to reasonably believe that the animal will attack and cause bodily injury to a human being
• a dog that is owned or kept for fighting, or one which is trained for fighting
• a “dangerous animal” does not include an animal that attacks a person who is trespassing or who appears to be trespassing

Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Dangerous Animals

Dangerous animal must be confined securely indoors or confined in a securely enclosed fence or securely enclosed and locked pen or run area on the owner’s premises. The pen or run area must be clearly marked as containing a dangerous animal and must be designed to prevent the entry of the general public, including children, and to prevent the escape or release of the animal.

A dangerous animal is not permitted to go beyond its owner’s premises, unless the animal is safely restrained.

Owners must register dangerous animals with local law enforcement.

Owners must maintain liability of insurance of at least $50,000 to insure the owner for personal injuries inflicted by the animal.

Liability of Owners of Dangerous Animals

In addition to being subject to civil liability, the owner of a dangerous animal that attacks and injures a person faces will face criminal liability. For the first offense, the owner is subject to a fine of $5,000 and a term of imprisonment of up to three years. For second and subsequent offenses, the owner is subject to a fine of up to $10,000 and a term of imprisonment of up to five years.

TITLE 47. ANIMALS, LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY
CHAPTER 3. DOGS AND OTHER DOMESTIC PETS
v ARTICLE 2. LIABILITY TO PERSON BITTEN OR OTHERWISE ATTACKED BY DOG
S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-110 (2002)

§ 47-3-110. Liability of owner or person having dog in his care or keeping.

Whenever any person is bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a public place or is lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping is liable for the damages suffered by the person bitten or otherwise attacked. For the purposes of this section, a person bitten or otherwise attacked is lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this State, by the ordinances of any political subdivision of this State, by the laws of the United States of America, including, but not limited to, postal regulations, or when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner of the property or of any lawful tenant or resident of the property. If a person provokes a dog into attacking him then the owner of the dog is not liable.

HISTORY: 1986 Act No. 343.
NOTES:
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE REFERENCES–
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals § § 85 et seq.
3A C.J.S., Animals § § 170 et seq.
2 S.C. Juris. Animals § 6.
1 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Animals, Forms 91 et seq. (liability for injuries by animals).
33 Am Jur Trials 195, Pit Bulldog Attack Litigation.
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Torts. 38 SC L Rev 236 (Autumn 1986).

ANNOTATIONS–
Liability of owner or operator of place of public resort for injury to patron by dog harbored by him. 17 ALR2d 459.
Relative rights and liabilities as between landlord and tenant with respect to keeping of dogs, birds, or other pets. 18 ALR2d 880.
Injury by dog or other animal as wilful and malicious injury so as to preclude it or judgment procured on it from operation of bankruptcy discharge. 26 ALR2d 1368.
Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by dog. 66 ALR2d 916.
Liability to social guest injured by dog. 79 ALR2d 459.
Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser. 64 ALR3d 1039.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant. 81 ALR3d 638.
Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner’s or personal liability policy. 96 ALR3d 891.
Liability of owner of dog for dog’s biting veterinarian or veterinarian’s employee. 4 ALR4th 349.
Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 7 ALR4th 607.
Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog. 30 ALR4th 986.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat. 67 ALR4th 976.
Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty. 74 ALR4th 1099.

CASE NOTES
1. In General
Even if owner of property on which dog owners lived did not have landlord/tenant relationship with dog owners, he was not liable to minor who was bitten by dog, as he was not the dog’s owner or keeper; owner of property merely allowed dog to be kept on property on which he did not live, owner visited property but did not provide any care or support for dog, and dog owners were in almost complete control of animal. Bruce v. Durney (S.C.App. 2000) 341 S.C. 563, 534 S.E.2d 720, rehearing denied.
One who controls the use of property has a duty of care not to harm others by its use; conversely, one who has no control owes no duty. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.
Whether individual would not have fallen and injured herself had owner’s dog not jumped on her was question for jury in individual’s action against dog owner for injuries sustained when dog allegedly jumped on her and caused her to fall off ramp. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

2. Strict liability
Proof of evil motive is not required to impose liability on dog owner, under statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog who bites or otherwise attacks another, for injuries caused by dog’s jumping or pouncing upon victim. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

3. “Otherwise attacks”
Dog did not “otherwise attack” animal control officer whose shoulder was injured as she attempted to lift dog into her truck by its neck from end of pole, and thus, statute imposing strict liability on owners of dogs that bite or otherwise attack person without provocation was inapplicable in officer’s action against dog’s owners; officer conceded that dog never bit or touched her. Padgett v. Mercado (S.C.App. 2000) 341 S.C. 229, 533 S.E.2d 339.
Dog did not “otherwise attack” animal control officer whose shoulder was injured as she attempted to lift dog into her truck by its neck from end of pole, and thus, statute imposing strict liability on owners of dogs that bite or otherwise attack person without provocation was inapplicable in officer’s action against dog’s owners; officer conceded that dog never bit or touched her. Padgett v. Mercado (S.C.App. 2000) 341 S.C. 229, 533 S.E.2d 339.
Term “otherwise attacks”, as used in statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog who “bites or otherwise attacks” another, includes situations where dog jumps on or pounces upon someone. Elmore v. Ramos (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 507, 489 S.E.2d 663.

4. Other animals
To recover damages for personal injuries, veterinarian kicked by horse was required to prove that horse owners knew or should have known that their horse had dangerous or vicious nature; rule holding dog owners liable for dog bites regardless of knowledge of dangerous propensities did not apply to horses. Henry v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1997) 327 S.C. 336, 489 S.E.2d 639, rehearing denied, certiorari denied.

5. Possession and control
Whether owners and inhabitants of residence at which minor child was attacked by dogs had sufficient possession and control of dogs and premises so as to impose liability upon them for injuries sustained by child in attack was question for jury. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.
Partial owner of residence at which minor child was attacked by dogs, who inherited her interest in residence from her father, had not lived at residence for over five years, and did not take care of dogs, did not owe a duty to child injured in attack to control dogs and, thus, could not be liable for injuries sustained by child in attack. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

6. Licensee
Finding that minor child was a “licensee” and, thus, was lawfully on dog owners’ property at time she was attacked by dogs, for purposes of statute imposing strict liability on dog owners for damages sustained by victim lawfully on property as result of dog bite or attack, was supported by testimony of child’s father that he told one owner that his child would probably be on the property with him when he cut their lawn, and that other owner let father and child into the backyard and assured them that the dogs never bothered anyone. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.
A “licensee” is a social guest or a person who is privileged to enter upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.
To be considered a “licensee,” an individual’s presence on the property must be for the primary benefit of the individual, not the owner. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

7. Damages
Punitive damages award to father, as guardian of minor child injured in attack by dogs, was not was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, where dogs were enclosed in fenced-in yard at time of accident, there was no evidence that dogs were ever allowed to roam freely, there was no evidence that any of dogs had ever attempted to attack anyone prior to attacking child, there were at least two offers by dog owners to put the dogs in the house if father was concerned about child being in yard with dogs, which father declined, and one of the owners had trusted her own grandchildren to play with dogs. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.
A tort is characterized as reckless, willful, or wanton if it was committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff’s rights, for purposes of determining whether punitive damages should be awarded. Nesbitt v. Lewis (S.C.App. 1999) 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11.

South Dakota Dog Law

Liability Statute

South Dakota does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

To establish liability, the injured person must prove that the dog owner knew or had reason to know that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner was negligent in failing to prevent the injury.

Vicious Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A “vicious dog” is:

• any dog which, when unprovoked, in a vicious or terrorizing manner approaches in an apparent attitude of attack, or bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a person in public;
• any dog which, on private property, when unprovoked, in a vicious or terrifying manner approaches in an apparent attitude of attack, or bites, or inflicts injury, or otherwise attacks a mailman, meter reader, serviceman, journeyman, delivery man, or other employed person who is on the owner’s property with permission.
• Under this statute, a dog cannot be declared vicious if an injury is sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort on the owner’s premises, or if the injured person was teasing, tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog, or committing or attempting to commit a crime at the time of the injury.

Liability of Owners of Vicious Dogs

Under this statute, owning a vicious dog is a public nuisance. A person directly affected by the dog or a government official can file a civil action or an action to have the owner abate, or stop, the nuisance.

Tennessee Dog Law

Liability Statute

Tennessee does not have a Dog Bite Statute. However, any dog that causes death or serious injury to a human may be destroyed upon order of a judge.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover for a dog-bite, the plaintiff must prove that the dog owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Tennessee does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Texas Dog Law

Liability Statute

Texas does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

Generally, a dog owner will not be found liable for damages the dog causes, unless the dog is vicious and the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the viciousness. If the animal is vicious or has aggressive tendencies and the owner has knowledge of that propensity, the owner is subject to liability under the law of strict liability. If an animal is non-vicious, the owner may still be subject to liability for his or her negligence in handling the dog.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that makes an unprovoked attack on a person that causes bodily injury and the attack occurs outside of the dog’s enclosure; or
• a dog that commits unprovoked attacks outside of its enclosure that cause a person to reasonably believe the dog will attack and cause bodily injury.

Legal Responsibilities of Dog Owners

Dangerous dogs must be kept in a secure enclosure. The secure enclosure must be a fenced area or a structure that is locked, capable of preventing the entry of the general public, including children, capable of preventing the dog from escaping, and clearly marked as containing a dangerous dog. When the dog is not in the enclosure, it must be restrained at all times on a leash or in the immediate control of a person.

A dangerous dog owner must register the dog with the local animal control authority.

A dangerous dog owner must maintain liability insurance coverage of at least $100,000 to cover damages for bodily injuries caused by the dog.

Liability of Dog Owners

A dangerous dog owner commits a criminal offense if the dog, when unprovoked, attacks a person outside the dog’s enclosure and causes bodily injury.

In all cases where a dog causes death or serious bodily injury, the owner will be criminally liable. A serious bodily injury is one characterized by severe bite wounds or severe ripping and tearing of muscle that would cause a reasonable person to seek medical attention, even though the injured person may not have actually sought medical attention. In cases of serious bodily injury or death, provocation and location of the attack is irrelevant. Additionally, a judge may order the dangerous dog destroyed and impose a $10,000 civil penalty on the owner.

Texas Dog Bite Law

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
TITLE 10. HEALTH AND SAFETY OF ANIMALS
CHAPTER 822. REGULATION OF ANIMALS
SUBCHAPTER D. DANGEROUS DOGS
Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.041 (2002)

§ 822.041. Definitions

In this subchapter:

(1) “Animal control authority” means a municipal or county animal control office with authority over the area where the dog is kept or a county sheriff in an area with no animal control office.

(2) “Dangerous dog” means a dog that:

(A) makes an unprovoked attack on a person that causes bodily injury and occurs in a place other than an enclosure in which the dog was being kept and that was reasonably certain to prevent the dog from leaving the enclosure on its own; or
(B) commits unprovoked acts in a place other than an enclosure in which the dog was being kept and that was reasonably certain to prevent the dog from leaving the enclosure on its own and those acts cause a person to reasonably believe that the dog will attack and cause bodily injury to that person.

(3) “Dog” means a domesticated animal that is a member of the canine family.

(4) “Secure enclosure” means a fenced area or structure that is:
(A) locked;
(B) capable of preventing the entry of the general public, including children;
(C) capable of preventing the escape or release of a dog;
(D) clearly marked as containing a dangerous dog; and
(E) in conformance with the requirements for enclosures established by the local animal control authority.

(5) “Owner” means a person who owns or has custody or control of the dog.

LexisNexis (TM) Notes:
TREATISES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS

1. 3 Tex Jur ANIMALS § 29, Texas Jurisprudence, 3rd Edition, Animals, § 29 Dangerous dogs, Copyright 2002 West Group

2. 19-310 Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide § 310.201, Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide, Unit VII Pleadings in Personal Injury Litigation, § 310.201 Texas Statutes and Rules, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

3. 1-1 Texas Torts and Remedies § 1.02, Texas Torts and Remedies, Division I PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY, § 1.02 ‘”Negligence” as Measure of Fault, Copyright 2002, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
TITLE 10. HEALTH AND SAFETY OF ANIMALS
CHAPTER 822. REGULATION OF ANIMALS
SUBCHAPTER E. DANGEROUS WILD ANIMALS
Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.110 (2002)
§ 822.110. Attack by Animal; Escape of Animal; Liability

(a) An owner of a dangerous wild animal shall notify the animal registration agency of any attack of a human by the animal within 48 hours of the attack.

(b) An owner of a dangerous wild animal shall immediately notify the animal registration agency and the local law enforcement agency of any escape of the animal.

(c) An owner of a dangerous wild animal that escapes is liable for all costs incurred in apprehending and confining the animal. (d) An animal registration agency, a law enforcement agency, or an employee of an animal registration agency or law enforcement agency is not liable to an owner of a dangerous wild animal for damages arising in connection with the escape of a dangerous wild animal, including liability for damage, injury, or death caused by the animal during or after the animal’s escape, or for injury to or death of the animal as a result of apprehension or confinement of the animal after escape.

Utah Dog Law

Liability Statute

Every person that owns or keeps a dog is liable for damages caused by the dog. The plaintiff is not required to prove that the dog was vicious or mischievous or that the owner or keeper knew of its propensities. The amount of liability is determined by comparative fault. Therefore, any fault on the part of the injured person may reduce the amount of damages awarded.

Dangerous Dog Statute

TITLE 18. DOGS
CHAPTER 1. INJURIES BY DOGS
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (2003)

§ 18-1-1. Liability of owners — Scienter — Dogs used in law enforcement

Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought therefor to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or mischievous; but neither the state nor any county, city, or town in the state nor any peace officer employed by any of them shall be liable in damages for injury committed by a dog when: (1) The dog has been trained to assist in law enforcement, and (2) the injury occurs while the dog is reasonably and carefully being used in the apprehension, arrest, or location of a suspected offender or in maintaining or controlling the public order.

HISTORY: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 70; C.L. 1917, § 112; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 24-0-1; L. 1971, ch. 29, § 1.
NOTES:

CROSS-REFERENCES. –Dog field meets and training, Wildlife Resources Code, § § 23-17-8 and 23-17-9.
Pound, power of city to establish, § 10-8-64.
Rabies, control and prevention, § § 26-6-11 to 26-6-15.
Taxing and regulation of dogs by cities, § 10-8-65.
Taxing and regulation of dogs by counties, § 17-5-224.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Apportionment of fault.
Damages.
Injuries by horses.
“Keeper” defined.

APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT.
For a jury to apportion relative fault between two parties, the jury must have sufficient evidence of culpability of each party to make that apportionment; consequently, in an action for damages arising out of dog bite injuries, the trial court committed harmful error in excluding evidence of the dog’s disposition, prior biting history, and the owner’s knowledge thereof, making it impossible for the jury to make an accurate apportionment. S.H. ex rel. Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996).

DAMAGES.
Although dog owners are strictly liable for damages arising out of injuries inflicted by their dogs, the percentage of those damages that the owner must pay is determined by the comparative fault provisions of § § 78-27-37 to 78-27-43, the Liability Reform Act. S.H. ex rel. Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996).

INJURIES BY HORSES.
None of the reasons the legislature had for holding owners and keepers of dogs strictly liable would support extending strict liability to owners and keepers of horses, even when they are kept in a residential neighborhood for recreational purposes. Pullan v. Steinmetz, 2000 UT 103, 16 P.3d 1245.

“KEEPER” DEFINED.
The term “keeper,” as it is used in this section, implies the exercise of a substantial number of the incidents of ownership by one who, though not the owner, assumes to act in his stead. One becomes the keeper of a dog only when he, either with or without the owner’s permission, undertakes to manage, control, or care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to do. Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. –4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 96 et seq.
C.J.S. –3A C.J.S. Animals § § 186 to 203.
A.L.R. –Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance, 11 A.L.R.3d 1399.
Dog owner’s liability for damages from motor vehicle accident involving attempt to avoid collision with dog on highway, 41 A.L.R.3d 888.
Liability of motorist for collision as affected by attempts to avoid dog or other small animal in road, 41 A.L.R.3d 1124.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 A.L.R.4th 446.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute, 64 A.L.R.4th 963.
Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat, 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 A.L.R.4th 823.
Liability for injuries inflicted by dog on public officer or employee, 74 A.L.R.4th 1120.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 A.L.R.4th 1004.
Landlord’s liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 A.L.R.4th 374.
Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to action for injury by dog, 11 A.L.R.5th 127.
Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 68 A.L.R.5th 599.

Vermont Dog Law

Liability Statute

Vermont does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In Vermont, dog owners can be held liable for damages inflicted by their dogs, so long as the plaintiff proves that the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Vermont does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Vermont Dog Bite Law

TITLE TWENTY. INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY
PART 8. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 193. DOMESTIC PET OR WOLF-HYBRID CONTROL
SUBCHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
20 V.S.A. § 3546 (2003)

§ 3546. Investigation of vicious domestic pets or wolf-hybrids; order

(a) When a domestic pet or wolf-hybrid has bitten a person while the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is off the premises of the owner or keeper, and the person bitten requires medical attention for the attack, such person may file a written complaint with the legislative body of the municipality. The complaint shall contain the time, date and place where the attack occurred, the name and address of the victim or victims, and any other facts that may assist the legislative body in conducting its investigation required by subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The legislative body, within seven days from receipt of the complaint, shall investigate the charges and hold a hearing on the matter. If the owner of the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid which is the subject of the complaint can be ascertained with due diligence, said owner shall be provided with a written notice of the time, date and place of hearing and the facts of the complaint.

(c) If the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is found to have bitten the victim without provocation, the municipal officials shall make such order for the protection of persons as the facts and circumstances of the case may require, including, without limitation, that the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is disposed of in a humane way, muzzled, chained, or confined. The order shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. A person who, after receiving notice, fails to comply with the terms of the order shall be subject to the penalties provided in section 3550 of this chapter.

(d) The procedures provided in this section shall only apply if the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is not a rabies suspect. If a member of the legislative body or a municipal official designated by the legislative body determines that the animal is a rabies suspect, the provisions of subchapter 5 of this chapter and the rules of the department of health shall apply.

HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 215 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 12, 1978; 1993, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. June 15, 1994.

NOTES:
HISTORY
SOURCE. V.S. 1947, § 7629. P.L. § 8292. G.L. § 6742. 1910, No. 223. P.S. § 5651. 1902, No. 121, § § 1, 3.

AMENDMENTS–1993 (ADJ. SESS.). Substituted “domestic pets or wolf-hybrids” for “dogs” in the section catchline.

Subsection (a): Amended generally.

Subsection (b): Substituted “domestic pet or wolf-hybrid” for “dog” preceding “which” in the second sentence.

Subsection (c): Substituted “domestic pet or wolf-hybrid” for “dog” preceding “is found” and preceding “is disposed” and “shall” for “may” preceding “make such” in the first sentence and “subject to the penalties provided in section 3551 of this chapter” for “fined not more than $250.00″ following “order shall be” in the third sentence.

Subsection (d): Added.

–1977 (ADJ. SESS.). Amended section generally.
CROSS REFERENCES
Search warrants, see § 3551 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

1. CONSTRUCTION.
Town’s right to control dogs that bite, pursuant to this section, did not give rise to a generalized duty to control vicious dogs for purposes of common law negligence liability. Rubin v. Town of Poultney (1998) 168 Vt. 624, 721 A.2d 504 (mem.).

2. DESTRUCTION OF DOGS.
Police officers are authorized to destroy vicious dogs under authority of this section when they have been given appropriate orders to do so. 1952-54 Op. Atty. Gen. 299.

The authority granted state police officers by § 1914 of this title is broad enough to clothe them with power to act when required to destroy dogs under this section. 1952-54 Op. Atty. Gen. 299.
CITED. Cited in Morgan v. Kroupa (1997) 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this heading: division, article, chapter, part or title.
Vermont Dog Bite Law

Virginia Dog Law

Liability Statute

Virginia does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

An injured person can recover damages for injuries caused by a dog against its owner if the plaintiff proves the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

In Virginia, the governing body of any county, city, or town is free to enact a local dangerous and vicious dog ordinances. If a county chooses to enact such laws, the state requires, at a minimum, the following:

The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is a dog that has bitten, attacked, or inflicted injury on a person or a companion animal (other than a dog) or one that has killed a companion animal. When a dog bites or attacks another dog, the attacking dog will not be deemed dangerous if no serious physical injury, as determined by a veterinarian, has occurred; if both dogs are owned by the same person; or if the attack occurred while the dogs were hunting or participating in an organized lawful dog handling event.

The Meaning of a “Vicious Dog”

A “vicious dog” means a dog that has killed a person, has inflicted serious injury on a person, including multiple bites, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of a bodily function; or has continued to exhibit the behavior which resulted in a previous finding by a court that it is a dangerous dog.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

Owners must obtain a dangerous dog registration certificate from the local animal control officer for a minimum fee of $50.00.

A dangerous dog must wear a “dangerous dog” identification tag. In addition, the dog must be identified with a tattoo on its inside thigh or by the insertion of an electronic implant.

Owners must post their property with clearly-visible signs warning both minors and adults of the presence of a dangerous dog. While on its owner’s property, the dog must be confined indoors or confined outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked structure to prevent its escape and direct contact with or entry by minors, adults, or other animals. When off its owner’s property, the dangerous dog must be kept on a leash and muzzled to prevent it from biting a person or another animal.

Dangerous dog owners must maintain liability insurance coverage of at least $100,000 that covers animal bites.

Dog Owner’s Liability

Owners who violate a Dangerous Dog Ordinance face up to one year in prison and/or a maximum fine of $2,500. If the owner of a dangerous dog is a minor, the child’s parent or legal guardian is responsible for complying with all laws.

TITLE TWENTY. INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY
PART 8. ANIMALS
CHAPTER 193. DOMESTIC PET OR WOLF-HYBRID CONTROL
SUBCHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
20 V.S.A. § 3546 (2003)

§ 3546. Investigation of vicious domestic pets or wolf-hybrids; order

(a) When a domestic pet or wolf-hybrid has bitten a person while the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is off the premises of the owner or keeper, and the person bitten requires medical attention for the attack, such person may file a written complaint with the legislative body of the municipality. The complaint shall contain the time, date and place where the attack occurred, the name and address of the victim or victims, and any other facts that may assist the legislative body in conducting its investigation required by subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The legislative body, within seven days from receipt of the complaint, shall investigate the charges and hold a hearing on the matter. If the owner of the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid which is the subject of the complaint can be ascertained with due diligence, said owner shall be provided with a written notice of the time, date and place of hearing and the facts of the complaint.

(c) If the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is found to have bitten the victim without provocation, the municipal officials shall make such order for the protection of persons as the facts and circumstances of the case may require, including, without limitation, that the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is disposed of in a humane way, muzzled, chained, or confined. The order shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. A person who, after receiving notice, fails to comply with the terms of the order shall be subject to the penalties provided in section 3550 of this chapter.

(d) The procedures provided in this section shall only apply if the domestic pet or wolf-hybrid is not a rabies suspect. If a member of the legislative body or a municipal official designated by the legislative body determines that the animal is a rabies suspect, the provisions of subchapter 5 of this chapter and the rules of the department of health shall apply.

HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 215 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 12, 1978; 1993, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. June 15, 1994.

NOTES:
HISTORY
SOURCE. V.S. 1947, § 7629. P.L. § 8292. G.L. § 6742. 1910, No. 223. P.S. § 5651. 1902, No. 121, § § 1, 3.

AMENDMENTS–1993 (ADJ. SESS.). Substituted “domestic pets or wolf-hybrids” for “dogs” in the section catchline.

Subsection (a): Amended generally.

Subsection (b): Substituted “domestic pet or wolf-hybrid” for “dog” preceding “which” in the second sentence.

Subsection (c): Substituted “domestic pet or wolf-hybrid” for “dog” preceding “is found” and preceding “is disposed” and “shall” for
“may” preceding “make such” in the first sentence and “subject to the penalties provided in section 3551 of this chapter” for “fined not more than $250.00″ following “order shall be” in the third sentence.

Subsection (d): Added.

–1977 (ADJ. SESS.). Amended section generally.
CROSS REFERENCES
Search warrants, see § 3551 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

1. CONSTRUCTION.
Town’s right to control dogs that bite, pursuant to this section, did not give rise to a generalized duty to control vicious dogs for purposes of common law negligence liability. Rubin v. Town of Poultney (1998) 168 Vt. 624, 721 A.2d 504 (mem.).

2. DESTRUCTION OF DOGS.
Police officers are authorized to destroy vicious dogs under authority of this section when they have been given appropriate orders to do so. 1952-54 Op. Atty. Gen. 299. The authority granted state police officers by § 1914 of this title is broad enough to clothe them with power to act when required to destroy dogs under this section. 1952-54 Op. Atty. Gen. 299.

CITED. Cited in Morgan v. Kroupa (1997) 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this heading: division, article, chapter, part or title.

Washington Dog Law

Liability Statute

The owner of any dog that bites a person, when unprovoked, while the person is in a public place or lawfully on a private place, including the owner’s property, is liable for damages the dog causes, regardless of its former viciousness and regardless of the owner’s knowledge of viciousness.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a “Potentially Dangerous Dog”

A “potentially dangerous” dog is a dog that when unprovoked:

• bites a human or a domestic animal;
• chases or approaches a person in any public place in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack; or
• any dog with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to cause injury or otherwise to threaten the safety of humans or domestic animals.

The Meaning of a “Dangerous Dog”

A “dangerous dog” is any dog that:

• inflicts severe injury on a human being without provocation. Severe injury is one that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery.
• kills a domestic animal without provocation while the dog is off the owner’s property; or
• # has been previously found to be potentially dangerous because of injury inflicted on a human and thereafter aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans.

Legal Responsibilities of Potentially Dangerous Dog Owners are regulated by each individual county. Legal Responsibilities of Owners of Dangerous Dogs

An owner must register the dog as dangerous.

The owner must confine the dog indoors or outdoors in a securely enclosed and locked pen or structure that prevents the entry of young children, as well as escape by the animal. The pen or structure must have secure sides and a secure top. It is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure, unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under the physical restraint of a responsible person.

The owner must post the property with a clear, visible sign that warns people that a dangerous dog is on the property. The owner must also conspicuously display a sign with a warning symbol that informs children of the presence of a dangerous dog.
The owner must maintain an insurance policy of at least $250,000, insuring the owner for any personal injuries inflicted by the dangerous dog.

Owner’s Liability for Aggressive Attacks by Any Dog, including Potentially Dangerous or Dangerous Dogs

The owner of any dog that, without provocation, aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death to any human that is not a trespasser, is guilty of a felony that is punishable by up to five years in prison, a fine of up to $10,000, or both.

TITLE 16. ANIMALS AND LIVESTOCK
(FORMERLY: ANIMALS, ESTRAYS, BRANDS, AND FENCES)
CHAPTER 16.08. DOGS
(FORMERLY: DANGEROUS DOGS)
Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 16.08.040 (2003)

§ 16.08.040. Dog bites — Liability
The owner of any dog which shall bite any person while such person is in or on a public place or lawfully in or on a private place including the property of the owner of such dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.

HISTORY: 1941 c 77 § 1; Rem. Supp. 1941 § 3109-1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Construction
Lawfully on private property
Owner
Public place

CONSTRUCTION.
This section is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Beeler v. Hickman, 50 Wn. App. 746, 750 P.2d 1282 (1988).

LAWFULLY ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.
Imposition of liability for dog bites extends to bites which occur when the victim is “lawfully” on private property owned by third persons; the term “lawfully” describes property upon which the victim is allowed or permitted by law. Hansen v. Sipe, 34 Wn. App. 888, 664 P.2d 1295 (1983).
Social guest is not “lawfully” on private property for the purposes of this section, since he is not there in the performance of a duty imposed by law. Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wn.2d 25, 548 P.2d 541 (1976).

OWNER.
This section makes the owner strictly liable without regard to knowledge. Frobig v. Gordon, 124 Wn.2d 732, 881 P.2d 226 (1994).
Although granddaughter purchased dog, the fact that grandmother resided with, cared for, and had exclusive possession of the dog for three years raised a genuine issue of material fact as to who was the owner of the dog within the meaning of this section. Beeler v. Hickman, 50 Wn. App. 746, 750 P.2d 1282 (1988).
This section does not apply to property owners who are not owners of the dog in question. Shafer v. Beyers, 26 Wn. App. 442, 613 P.2d 554, review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1018 (1980).

PUBLIC PLACE.
Dog owners were liable for damages sustained by plaintiff when their dog bit plaintiff as she walked along a railroad right-of-way abutting the owners’ unfenced property. Hansen v. Sipe, 34 Wn. App. 888, 664 P.2d 1295 (1983).

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Who “harbors” or “keeps” dog under animal liability statute. 64 ALR4th 963.
Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dog bite. 51 ALR4th 446.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this heading, part, article, chapter or title.

Washington, D.C. Dog Law

Liability Statute

Under this statute, if a dog injures a person while it is running at large, the owner’s lack of knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities, standing alone, cannot absolve the owner from a finding of negligence.

Dangerous Dog Statute
The Meaning of a Dangerous Dog

Under D.C. law, a “dangerous dog” is:

• a dog that has bitten or attacked a person or domestic animal without provocation
• a dog that, in a menacing manner, approaches, without provocation, any person or domestic animal as if to attack; or
• a dog that has demonstrated a propensity to attack without provocation or otherwise to endanger the safety of humans or domestic animals.

Legal Responsibilities of Dangerous Dog Owners

An owner must either confine a dangerous dog indoors or confine it outdoors in a locked pen or structure measuring at least 5 feet wide by 10 feet long and 6 feet high. The structure must prevent entry of young children, as well as escape by the animal. When the dog is not confined, it must be controlled by a responsible person and muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash that is no longer than 4 feet.

Owners of dangerous dogs must register their dogs with local authorities as dangerous.

Dangerous dog owners must maintain liability insurance coverage of at least $50,000 for personal injuries inflicted by the dog.

Owners must post their property with a written warning that a dangerous dog is on the property. The warning must have a conspicuous warning symbol that informs children of the dangerous dog’s presence.

Liability of Owners with Dangerous Dogs

In addition to civil liability, if a dangerous dog kills or seriously injures a human or domestic animal, without provocation, the owner is subject to a fine of up to $10,000.

Washington D.C. Dog Bite Law

TITLE 8. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION
SUBTITLE E. ANIMAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION
CHAPTER 18. ANIMAL CONTROL
D.C. Code § 8-1808 (2003)

§ 8-1808. Prohibited conduct [Formerly § 6-1008]

(a) No owner of an animal shall allow the animal to go at large.

(b) No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.

(c) No person shall remove the license of a dog without the permission of its owner.

(d) No person shall change the natural color of a baby chicken, duckling, other fowl or rabbit.

(e) No dog shall be permitted on any school ground when school is in session or on any public recreation area unless the dog is leashed.

(f) No person shall sell or offer for sale a baby chicken, duckling, other fowl, or rabbit that has had its natural color changed.

(g) No person shall sell or offer for sale a rabbit under the age of 16 weeks or a chick or duck under the age of 8 weeks except for agricultural or scientific purposes.

(h) (1) Except as provided in this subsection, no person shall import into the District, possess, display, offer for sale, trade, barter, exchange, or adoption, or give as a household pet any living member of the animal kingdom including those born or raised in captivity, except the following: domestic dogs (excluding hybrids with wolves, coyotes, or jackals), domestic cats (excluding hybrids with ocelots or margays), domesticated rodents and rabbits, captive-bred species of common cage birds, nonpoisonous snakes, fish, and turtles, traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes, and racing pigeons (when kept in compliance with permit requirements).
(2) A person may offer the species enumerated in paragraph (1) of this subsection to a public zoo, park, museum, or educational institution for educational, medical, scientific, or exhibition purposes.
(3) This section does not apply to federally licensed animal exhibitors; however, the Mayor retains the authority to restrict the movement of any prohibited animal into the District and the conditions under which those movements are made.
(4) The Mayor may allow a licensed wildlife rehabilitator, a licensed veterinarian, or a licensed animal shelter to maintain an animal prohibited in this subsection for treatment or pending appropriate disposition.
(5) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to persons who own or possess domestic dog hybrids of wolves, coyotes, or jackals prior to March 17, 1993.

(i) No person may sponsor, promote, train an animal to participate in, contribute to the involvement of an animal in, or attend as a spectator any activity or event in which any animal engages in unnatural behavior, is wrestled or fought, mentally or physically harassed, or displayed in such a way that the animal is struck, abused, or mentally or physically stressed or traumatized, or is induced, goaded or encouraged to perform or react through the use of chemical, mechanical, electrical, or manual devices in a manner that will cause, or is likely to cause, physical or other injury or suffering. This prohibition applies to any event or activity at a public or private facility or property and is applicable regardless of the purpose of the event or activity and regardless of whether a fee is charged to spectators.

(j) No person who has control or custody of a dog shall, direct, encourage, cause, allow or otherwise aid or assist that dog to threaten, charge, bite, or attack a person or other animal, except that a person may keep a properly trained dog on private property to defend it and its occupants from intruders, and may order a dog to defend a person under attack. This section does not apply to dogs who work for the Metropolitan Police Department or any other law enforcement agency.

HISTORY: 1973 Ed., § 6-2408; Oct. 18, 1979, D.C. Law 3-30, § 9, 26 DCR 765; Sept. 16, 1980, D.C. Law 3-97, § 2(d), (e), (g), 27 DCR 3523; 1981 Ed., § 6-1008; Mar. 10, 1983, D.C. Law 4-199, § 4(b), 30 DCR 119; Mar. 17, 1993, D.C. Law 9-236, § 2(d), 40 DCR 614; June 8, 2001, D.C. Law 13-303, § 4, 47 DCR 7307.

NOTES:
SECTION REFERENCES. –This section is referenced in § 8-1802.
EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS. –D.C. Law 13-303 added (j).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 3-30. –See note to § 8-1801.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 3-97. –See note to § 8-1802.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 4-199. –See note to § 8-1803.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 9-236. –See note to § 8-1804.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 13-303. –Law 13-303, the “Freedom From Cruelty to Animals Protection Amendment Act of 2000,” was introduced in Council and assigned Bill No. 13-473. The Bill was adopted on first and second readings on June 6, 2000, and July 11, 2000, respectively. Signed by the Mayor on August 4, 2000, it as assigned Act No. 13-418 and transmitted to both Houses of Congress for its review. D.C. Law 13-303 became effective on June 8, 2001.

ANALYSIS
Negligence.
NEGLIGENCE.
Former D.C. Code § 6-1008(a) (now D.C. Code § 8-1808(a) was too general for a negligence per se instruction; it set a general standard of care for animal owners, but it did not contain the kind of specific guidelines that would allow one to determine whether it had been violated without resorting to a common law reasonable care analysis. Chadbourne v. Kappaz, App. D.C., 779 A.2d 293 (2001).
D.C. LAW 13-303
AN ACT
D.C. ACT 13-418
IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1999 D.C. ALS 303; 1999 D.C. Stat 303; 1999 D.C. Law 303; 1999 D.C. Act 13 L-418

SYNOPSIS: To amend Chapter 106 of the Acts of the Legislative Assembly to add the action of cruelly chaining any animal to the definition of cruelty to animals and to otherwise modernize the animal cruelty law; to add enhanced penalties if the offenses are committed with the intent to commit serious bodily injury or death and to add certain technical amendments to the law; to amend An Act to prevent cruelty to children or animals in the District of Columbia to clarify and increase penalties for engaging in animal fighting; to amend the Animal Control Act of 1979 to add to prohibited conduct the restriction of a person from allowing a dog to conduct any illegal activity; and to add enhanced penalties.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this act may be cited as the “Freedom From Cruelty to Animals Protection Amendment Act of 2000″.
[*2]be
Sec. 2. Chapter 106 of the Acts of the Legislative Assembly is amended as follows:

(a) Section 1 is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Definitions and penalties.

“(a) Whoever knowingly overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly chains, cruelly beats or mutilates, any animal, or knowingly causes or procures any animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, cruelly chained, cruelly beaten, or mutilated, and whoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, knowingly inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the same, or unnecessarily fails to provide the same with proper food, drink, air, light, space, veterinary care, shelter, or protection from the weather, shall for every such offense be punished by imprisonment in jail not exceeding 180 days, or by fine not exceeding $ 250, or by both.

“(b) For the purposes of this section, “cruelly chains” means attaching an animal to a stationary object or a pulley by means of a chain, rope, tether, leash, cable, or similar restraint under circumstances that may endanger its health, safety, or well-being. Cruelly chains includes, but is not limited to, the use of a chain, rope, tether, leash, cable or similar restraint that:
“(1) Exceeds 1/8 the body weight of the animal;
“(2) Causes the animal to choke;
“(3) Is too short for the animal to move around or for the animal to urinate or defecate in a separate area from the area where it must eat, drink, or lie down;
“(4) Is situated where it can become entangled;
“(5) Does not permit the animal access to food, water, shade, dry ground, or shelter; or
“(6) Does not permit the animal to escape harm.

“(c) For the purposes of this section, “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, mutilation, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. Serious bodily injury includes, but is not limited to, broken bones, burns, internal injuries, severe malnutrition, severe lacerations or abrasions, and injuries resulting from untreated medical conditions.

“(d) Except where the animal is an undomesticated and dangerous animal such as rats, bats, and snakes, and there is a reasonable apprehension of an imminent attack by such animal on that person or another, whoever commits any of the acts or omissions set forth in subsection (a) of this section with the intent to commit serious bodily injury or death to an animal, or whoever, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to animal life, commits any of the acts or omissions set forth in subsection (a) of this section which results in serious bodily injury or death to the animal, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, or by a fine not exceeding $ 25,000, or both.”.

(b) Section 4 is amended as follows:
(1) The existing text is designated as subsection (a).
(2) The newly designated subsection (a) is amended by striking the phrase “And the person making such arrest” and inserting the phrase “The person making the arrest or the humane officer taking possession of an animal” in its place.
(3) A new subsection (b) is added to read as follows:

“(b)(1) A humane officer of the Washington Humane Society may take possession of any animal to protect it from neglect or cruelty. The person taking possession of the animal or animals, shall use reasonable diligence to give notice thereof to the owner of animals found in the charge or custody of the person arrested, and shall properly care and provide for the animals until the owner shall take charge of the animals; provided that, the owner shall take charge of the animals within 20 days from the date of the notice.

“(2) If the owner or custodian of the animal or animals fails to respond after 20 days, the animal or animals shall become the property of the Washington Humane Society and the Washington Humane Society shall have the authority to:
(A) Place the animal or animals up for adoption in a suitable home;
(B) Retain the animal or animals, or
(C) Humanely destroy the animal or animals.”.
(c) Section 5 is amended by striking the word “member” and inserting the phrase “humane office” in its place, both times it appears.
(d) Section 6 is amended by striking the word “member” and inserting the phrase “humane officer” in its place, both times it appears.

[*3]
Sec. 3. An act to prevent cruelty to children or animals in the District of Columbia is amended as follows:
(a) Section 6 is repealed.
(b) A new section 6a is added to read as follows:
“Sec. 6a. Penalty for engaging in animal fighting.
“(a) Any person who: (1) organizes, sponsors, conducts, stages, promotes, is employed at, collects an admission fee for, or bets or wagers any money or other valuable consideration on the outcome of an exhibition between two or more animals of fighting, baiting, or causing injury to each other; (2) any person who owns, trains, buys, sells, offers to buy or sell, steals, transports, or possesses any animal with the intent that it engage in any such exhibition; (3) any person who knowingly allows any animal used for such fighting or baiting to be kept, boarded, housed, or trained on, or transported in, any property owned or controlled by him; (4) any person who owns, manages, or operates any facility and knowingly allows that facility to be kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting any animal; or (5) any person who knowingly or recklessly permits any act described in this subsection, to be done on any premises under his or her ownership or control, or who aids or abets that act, is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $ 25,000 or by imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or both.
“(b) Any person who is knowingly present at any place or building where preparations are being made for an exhibition described in subsection (a) of this section, or who is knowingly present as a spectator at any such exhibition, or who knowingly or recklessly aids or abets another in such exhibition, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $ 1,000 or by imprisonment not to exceed 180 days, or both.
“(c) For the purposes of this section, the term:
(1) “Animal” means a vertebrate other than a human, including, but not limited to, dogs and cocks.
(2) “Baiting” means to attack with violence, to provoke, or to harass an animal with one or more animals for the purpose of training an animal for, or to cause an animal to engage in, fights with or among other animals.
(3) “Fighting” means an organized event wherein there is a display of combat between 2 or more animals in which the fighting, killing, maiming, or injuring of an animal is a significant feature, or main purpose, of the event.”.

[*4]
Sec. 4. The Animal Control Act of 1979 is amended as follows:
(a) Section 9 is amended by adding a new subsection (j) to read as follows:
“(j) No person who has control or custody of a dog shall, direct, encourage, cause, allow or otherwise aid or assist that dog to threaten, charge, bite, or attack a person or other animal, except that a person may keep a properly trained dog on private property to defend it and its occupants from intruders, and may order a dog to defend a person under attack. This section does not apply to dogs who work for the Metropolitan Police Department or any other law enforcement agency.”.

[*5]
Sec. 5. Fiscal impact statement.
The Council adopts the fiscal impact statement in the committee report as the fiscal impact statement required by section 602(c)(3) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, approved December 24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Code § 1-233(c)(3)).

[*6]
Sec. 6. Effective date.
This act shall take effect following approval by the Mayor (or in the event of veto by the Mayor, action by the Council to override the veto), approval by the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority as provided in section 203(a) of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, approved April 17, 1995 (109 Stat. 116; D.C. Code § 47-392.3(a)), a 60-day period of Congressional review as provided in section 602(c)(2) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, approved December 24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Code § 1-233(c)(2)), and publication in the District of Columbia Register.
LINDA W. CROPP
Chairman
Council of the District of Columbia
HISTORY:
Approved by the Mayor: August 4, 2000, effective June 8, 2001

West Virginia Dog Law

Liability Statute

Any owner or keeper of a dog who permits it to run at large is liable for any damages it inflicts. If the dog is running at large at the time of the injury, the owner’s negligence need not be proven.

Common Law Liability

When a dog injures a person when it is not running at large, the owner is subject to liability for damages if the injured person proves the owner’s negligence caused the injury. In cases where the plaintiff can show that the owner had knowledge that the dog had a dangerous or vicious propensity, the owner will be strictly liable.

Vicious Dog Statute

A person is not permitted to keep a dog if he or she knows it is vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other people, regardless of whether the dog wears a tag or muzzle. Once a dog is proven to be vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking people, a judge may authorize it to be destroyed.

Dogs Generally Considered to be Vicious

Any person who keeps a dog that is generally considered to be vicious, for the purpose of protection, must acquire a special license from the county assessor.

Legal Responsibilities of Dog Owners

The owner must secure the dog in a way that prevents it from injuring people who lawfully enter the owner’s property.

Liability of Dog Owners

The owner of a dog generally considered to be vicious is strictly liable for any injuries it causes. This vicious dog law, however, does not abolish defenses to personal injury actions.

Wisconsin Dog Law

Liability Statute

A dog owner is liable for damages caused by his or her dog. In addition to civil liability, the owner is subject to a fine of up to $500. When a dog makes a second or subsequent attack, the owner faces liability for twice the full amount of damages caused by the dog, as well as a fine of up to $1,000. When determining damages, any fault on the part of the injured person is taken into account. In cases where the owner was notified or knew that the dog previously injured a person, domestic animal, or property, the owner is liable for two times the amount of damages.

Common Law Liability

In order to recover damages for a dog bite under the common law, the injured person must prove that the owner’s negligence caused the injury.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Wisconsin does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute.

Wyoming Dog Law

Liability Statute

Wyoming does not have a Dog Bite Statute.

Common Law Liability

In Wyoming, an injured person can recover damages caused by a dog if he or she proves that the owner’s negligence caused the injury. A victim can also recover under a theory of strict liability in cases where the dog owner knew, or should have known, that the dog had vicious propensities. In Wyoming, knowledge of vicious propensities can be proven by showing the general class that the dog belongs to.

Dangerous Dog Statute

Wyoming does not have a Dangerous Dog Statute. Individual counties are, however, permitted to enact dangerous and vicious dog ordinances.

Wyoming Leash Law

Wyoming does not have a state-wide leash law.

STATE LEASH LAWS

Alabama Leash Law

Alabama does not have a state-wide leash law.

Alaska Leash Law

Alaska does not have a state-wide leash law.

Arizona Leash Law

In Arizona, dogs must be leashed when they are at public parks and on public school property.

Arkansas Leash Law

Arkansas does not have a state-wide leash law.

California Leash Law

California does not have a state-wide leash law.

Colorado Leash Law

Colorado does not have a state-wide leash law.

Connecticut Leash Law

Under Connecticut law, it is unlawful to permit a dog to run at large. The only exception is for hunting dogs. Under this statute, if an owner or keeper permits a dog to run at large when the owner or keeper knows, or should have known, of the dog’s vicious propensities, and the dog bites someone, the owner or keeper is not only subject to civil liability, but can also be fined up to $1,000 and be imprisoned for six months. The only defense is when the victim teased, tormented, or abused the dog.

Delaware Leash Law Dogs are not permitted to run at large in Delaware, unless they are accompanied and under the reasonable control of an owner or custodian. The only exception is for farm dogs.
From sunset to sunrise, dogs must be: (1) confined in an enclosure that prevents escape; or (2) firmly secured with a collar or chain or other device, so they can’t stray from the premises; or (3) under the reasonable control of some person. If a dog is running at large and bites someone, the owner or custodian of the dog is subject to civil liability, as well as a fine of $100 to $500 for the first offense, and $750 to $1,500 for second and subsequent offenses.

District of Columbia Leash Law

In D.C., dogs are not permitted to run at large. They are also not permitted on school grounds when school is in session or on any public recreation area without a leash.

Florida Leash Law

Florida does not have a state-wide leash law.

Georgia Leash Law

Georgia does not have a state-wide leash law.

Hawaii Leash Law

Hawaii does not have a state-wide leash law.

Idaho Leash Law

Idaho does not have a state-wide leash law.

Illinois Leash Law

Dogs are prohibited from running at large in Illinois.

Indiana Leash Law

Indiana has a “restraint statute.” Under this statute, dogs must be restrained at all times. If a dog injures someone when it is not restrained, the owner is subject to various criminal penalties, as well as civil liability.

Iowa Leash Law Iowa does not have a state-wide leash law.

Kansas Leash Law

Kansas does not have a state-wide leash law.

Kentucky Leash Law

In Kentucky, dogs are not permitted to run at large between sunset and sunrise, unless they are accompanied by and under the control of their owner.

Louisiana Leash Law

In Louisiana, dogs are not permitted to run at large.

Maine Leash Law

It is unlawful for any dog, except a hunting dog, to run at large in Maine.

Maryland Leash Law

Maryland does not have a state-wide leash law.

Massachusetts Leash Law

Massachusetts does not have a state-wide leash law.

Michigan Leash Law

Michigan does not have a state-wide leash law.

Minnesota Leash Law

Minnesota does not have a state-wide leash law.

Mississippi Leash Law

Mississippi does not have a state-wide leash law.

Missouri Leash Law

Missouri has a “State Lands Leash Law.” Under this law, dogs must be on leashes no longer than 10 feet when they are in state parks or on state historic sites.
Additionally, Missouri law prohibits dogs that have rabies, or dogs that have been exposed, to rabies to run at large.

Montana Leash Law

Montana does not have a state-wide leash law.

Nebraska Leash Law

In counties where the population is 80,000 or more, Nebraska law prohibits dogs from running at large.

Nevada Leash Law

Nevada does not have a state-wide leash law.

New Hampshire Leash Law

It is unlawful for any dog to run at large in New Hampshire, except (1) when the dog is accompanied by its owner or a custodian; or (2) where the dog is being used for, or being trained for, hunting, herding, or supervised competition and exhibition.

New Jersey Leash Law

New Jersey does not have a state-wide leash law.

New Mexico Leash Law

New Mexico does not have a state-wide leash law.

New York Leash Law

New York law requires dogs to be confined or restrained at all times.

North Carolina Leash Law

In North Carolina, dogs are not permitted to run at large at nighttime, unless they are accompanied by a member of the owner’s family or some other person who has the owner’s permission.

North Dakota Leash Law

North Dakota does not have a state-wide leash law.

Ohio Leash Law

In Ohio, dogs must be physically confined or restrained or properly leashed and controlled by a person, except in cases where the dog is hunting with its owner or keeper.

Oklahoma Leash Law

Oklahoma does not have a state-wide leash law.

Oregon Leash Law

Oregon does not have a state-wide leash law.

Pennsylvania Leash Law

In Pennsylvania, dogs must be confined within their owner’s property; firmly secured on the premises so they cannot stray; or reasonably controlled by a person.

Rhode Island Leash Law

Rhode Island does not have a state-wide leash law.

South Carolina Leash Law

South Carolina does not have a state-wide leash law.

South Dakota Leash Law

South Dakota does not have a state-wide leash law.

Tennessee Leash Law

In Tennessee, it is unlawful to permit a dog to run at large, unless the dog is engaged in legal hunting or herdi

Texas Leash Law

Texas does not have a state-wide leash law.

Utah Leash Law

Utah does not have a state-wide leash law.

Vermont Leash Law

Vermont does not have a state-wide leash law.

Virginia Leash Law

Virginia does not have a state-wide leash law.

Washington Leash Law

Washington does not have a state-wide leash law.

West Virginia Leash Law

West Virginia does not have a law that requires dogs to be leashed. It does, however, have a law that holds dog owners and keepers liable for all damages caused by dogs that are permitted to run at large.

Wisconsin Leash Law

Wisconsin does not have a law that requires dogs to be leashed. It does, however, have a law that holds dog owners and keepers liable for all damages caused by dogs that are permitted to run at large.

Wyoming Leash Law

Wyoming does not have a state-wide leash law.

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State Legal Resources

ALABAMA

Alabama State Bar Association
www.alabar.org
Alabama State Trial Lawyers Association
www.atla.net/al/

ALASKA

Alaska State Bar Association
www.alaskabar.org
Alaska Trial Lawyer Association
www.AlaskaTrialLawyers.org/ak/

ARIZONA

Arizona State Bar Association
www.azbar.org
Arizona Trial Lawyers Association
www.aztla.org/az/

ARKANSAS

Arkansas State Bar Association
www.arkbar.org
Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association
www.arktla.org/ar/

CALIFORNIA

California State Bar Association
www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_home.jsp
Consumer Attorneys of California
www.caoc.com

COLORADO

Colorado State Bar Association
www.cobar.org
Colorado Trial Lawyers Association
www.ctlanet.org/co/

CONNECTICUT

Connecticut State Bar Association
www.ctbar.orgv
Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association
www.cttriallawyers.org/index.cfm

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

District of Columbia Bar Association
www.dcbar.org

DELAWARE

Delaware State Bar Association
www.dsba.org
Delaware Trial Lawyers Association
www.dtla.org/de/

FLORIDA

Florida State Bar Association
www.flabar.org
The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers
www.aftl.org

GEORGIA

Georgia State Bar Association
www.gabar.org
Georgia Trial Lawyers Association
www.gtla.org

HAWAII

Hawaii State Bar Association
www.hsba.org
Consumer Lawyers of Hawaii
www.clh.org

IDAHO

Idaho State Bar Association
www2.state.id.us/isb/
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association
www.itla.org/id/

ILLINOIS

Illinois State Bar Association
www.illinoisbar.org
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association
www.iltla.com/

INDIANA

Indiana State Bar Association
www.inbar.org
Indiana Trial Lawyers Association
www.i-t-l-a.org/

IOWA

Iowa State Bar Association
www.iowabar.org/main.nsf
Iowa Trial Lawyers Association
www.iowatla.org

KANSAS

Kansas State Bar Association
www.ksbar.org
Kansas Trial Lawyers Association
www.ktla.org/ks/

KENTUCKY

Kentucky State Bar Association
www.kybar.org
Kentucky Academy of Trial Lawyers
www.kata.org/ky/

LOUISIANA

Louisiana State Bar Association
www.lsba.org
Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association
www.ltla.org/la/

MAINE

Maine State Bar Association
www.mainebar.org
Maine Trial Lawyers Association
www.mtla.org

MARYLAND

Maryland State Bar Association
www.msba.org
Maryland Trial Lawyers Association
www.mdtriallawyers.com

MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts State Bar Association
www.massbar.org
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys
www.massacademy.com/ma/

MICHIGAN

Michigan State Bar Association
www.michbar.org
Michigan Trial Lawyers Association
www.mtla.net

MINNESOTA

Minnesota State Bar Association
www.minncle.org
Minnesota Trial Lawyer Association
www.mntla.com

MISSISSIPPI

Mississippi State Bar Association
www.msbar.org
Mississippi Lawyers
www.mslawyer.com

MISSOURI

Missouri State Bar Association
www.mobar.org
Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys
www.matanet.org/mo/

MONTANA

Montana State Bar Association
www.montanabar.org
Montana Trial Lawyers Association
www.monttla.com

NEBRASKA

Nebraska State Bar Association
www.nebar.com
Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys
www.nebraskatrial.com

NEVADA

Nevada State Bar Association
www.nvbar.org
Nevada Trial Lawyers Association
www.ntla.org

NEW HAMPSHIRE

New Hampshire State Bar Association
www.nhbar.org
New Hampshire Trial Lawyers Association
www.nhtla.org/nh/

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey State Bar Association
www.njsba.com
New Jersey Association of Trial Lawyers
www.atlanj.org

NEW MEXICO

New Mexico State Bar Association
www.nmbar.org
New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association
www.nmtla.org

NEW YORK

New York State Bar Association
www.nysba.org
New York State Trial Lawyers Association
www.nystla.org

NORTH CAROLINA

North Carolina State Bar Association
www.ncbar.com/index.asp
North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers
www.ncatl.com

NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota State Bar Association
www.sband.org
North Dakota Trial Lawyers Association
www.ndtla.com/pages/1/index.htm

OHIO

Ohio State Bar Association

www.ohiobar.org

Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
www.oatlaw.org

OKLAHOMA

Oklahoma State Bar Association
www.okbar.org
Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association
www.otla.org

OREGON

Oregon State Bar Association
www.osbar.org
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association
www.oregontriallawyers.org

PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania State Bar Association
www.pabar.org
Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association
www.patla.org

RHODE ISLAND

Rhode Island State Bar Association
www.ribar.com
Rhode Island Trial Lawyers Associations
www.ritla.org/ri/

SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina State Bar Association
www.scbar.org
South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association
www.sctla.org

SOUTH DAKOTA

South Dakota State Bar Association
www.sdbar.org

TENNESSEE

Tennessee State Bar Association
www.tba.org
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association
www.ttla.org/tn/

TEXAS

Texas State Bar Association
www.texasbar.com
Texas Trial Lawyer Association
www.ttla.com/tx/

UTAH

Utah State Bar Association
www.utahbar.org
Utah Trial Lawyer Association
www.utla.org/ut/

VERMONT

Vermont State Bar Association
www.vtbar.org
Vermont Trial Lawyers Association
www.vtla.org/vt/

VIRGINIA

Virginia State Bar Association
www.vsb.org
Virginia Trial Lawyers Association
www.vtla.com

WASHINGTON

Washington State Bar Association
www.wsba.org
Washington State Trial Lawyers Association
www.wstla.org

WEST VIRGINIA

West Virginia State Bar Association
www.wvbar.org
West Virginia Trial Lawyers Association
www.wvtla.org/wv/

WISCONSIN

Wisconsin State Bar Association
www.wisbar.org
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers
www.watl.org

WYOMING

Wyoming State Bar Association
www.wyomingbar.org
Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association
www.wytla.org/wy/

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